


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
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
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# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER  
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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### PART 8

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JANUARY 29, FEBRUARY 6, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 1952

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Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary





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UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1952

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# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, JANUARY 29, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 2:55 p. m., pursuant to notice, Senator Homer Ferguson presiding.

Present: Senators Ferguson and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research. Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order.

Mr. ROSINGER, do you solemnly swear that, in the matter now pending before this subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate of the United States, you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. ROSINGER. I do.

## TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER, NEW YORK CITY, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, LEONARD B. BOUDIN, NEW YORK CITY

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, three witnesses before this committee—namely, Prof. William Canning, Prof. Karl Wittfogel, and Professor Budenz—have testified that you are a member of the Communist Party. We have asked you here today to ask you the question: Were you ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that on the ground that your answering the question would tend to incriminate you?

Mr. ROSINGER. I must stand on the answer I have just given.

Senator FERGUSON. Does your word "decline" mean that you refuse to answer?

Mr. ROSINGER. It means refuse on the grounds given.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You refuse on the grounds given?

Mr. ROSINGER. As I understand it, the witness does not have to employ any particular terminology in explaining.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted the record to make sure that you were refusing to answer, and then you assign the reason, as under the Constitution?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Another witness before this committee, Governor Stassen, has specified that you and Mr. Owen Lattimore were the leaders of a group of experts in the State Department conference in October 1949, which group dominated the atmosphere of the conference at that time.

Mr. Rosinger, are you prepared today to discuss what took place at that conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes. I wouldn't like to give in advance a commitment on any conceivable question, but I am certainly prepared to discuss the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. With respect to your answer that you refuse to answer the question as to whether or not you were a Communist, and the fact that you were called by the Secretary of State as an adviser, in 1949, what position does that put the Secretary of State in?

Mr. ROSINGER. I am afraid that I can't answer that question. I would like to say though, on the use of the word "adviser", while the word is open to many interpretations, it should be clear that I was one of 25 people invited for a 2½-day period in the process of a long discussion of American Far East policy, including China policy.

I therefore wouldn't want the word "adviser" to suggest that I had any great importance.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were an adviser; and is it not true that, as such, you submitted a written document to the Secretary of State on questions of the Far East?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes. The document was submitted to Mr. Jessup.

Senator FERGUSON. As one of the officers of the Secretary of State?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that they were not seeking advice?

The way I would put it is this—and this is the way they put it to us, both in connection with the memoranda and in connection with the conference: By "us," I mean the people who submitted memoranda, assuming they received the same communication as I did; and, by "us" at the conference, I mean the participants.

They said they were interested in hearing a range of opinion. There is no way of telling what importance they would attach to any segment of the range.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not they were seeking the range of an opinion of a Communist? Do you think it included that?

Mr. ROSINGER. I do not know what range of opinion they were seeking.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you a copy of the document that you submitted?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a copy?

Mr. ROSINGER. I must have had it at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have a copy. It was submitted to us today.

Senator FERGUSON. That is why I asked him if he did have a copy. Did you give the copy to the committee?

Mr. ROSINGER. What I did was this: The committee asked me whether I had a copy. I said I was not certain; I would look for it when I got back to New York. I did that and could not find a copy. I then wrote to Mr. James E. Webb of the State Department saying that the committee had requested a copy; I could not find one in my files; I was therefore telling him that I would have no objection to the release of the memorandum to the committee. As I understand from what Mr. Morris has said, the memorandum has been released to the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Rosinger, do you think that as an American citizen, which you are, you should act as an adviser to the State Department on a foreign-policy problem and then refuse to answer as to whether you are or are not a Communist?

Mr. ROSINGER. I can only stand on the position that I have taken.

Senator FERGUSON. And you refuse to answer that question on the ground that it may tend to incriminate you?

Mr. ROSINGER. As you know, I have not used that terminology. I simply stand on the answer I have already given.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, that it would be in violation of the fifth amendment of the Constitution?

Mr. ROSINGER. Essentially, that I have no further comment to make on these particular questions of the considerations on the part of the Secretary of State, or anyone else, in inviting me to a conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Who invited you to the conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. I read into the record at the executive session, the telegram received in the name of Dean Acheson. If you would like me to, I will read it into the record again.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I wish you would.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that we ought to put into the record the whole transcript of the executive session.

Mr. MORRIS. Some of these things I think we can cover individually, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you read the telegram?

Mr. ROSINGER. It is addressed to me at the American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York City, and reads as follows:

I am inviting a few persons interested in American foreign policy toward China to attend a confidential consultative meeting in the Department on October 6, 7, and 8. Purpose is to provide exchange of views valuable to the Department in developing American foreign policy in this area. Your participation would make a real contribution. The Department will pay travel and per diem. Please write or telegraph, attention Francis Russell, possibility of your attending.

DEAN ACHESON, *Secretary of State.*

Senator FERGUSON. So it would indicate that the Secretary of State was personally requesting your appearance?

Mr. ROSINGER. Actually, I have no means of knowing what discussions went on. Many telegrams are signed in his name. It does not necessarily indicate he had given deep personal thought to the membership of the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who did invite you?

Mr. ROSINGER. No. This is my first knowledge of the existence of the plans for such a conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it the only knowledge?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only knowledge? You attended on that?

Mr. ROSINGER. After this, there was some further communication relating to routine details, about methods of transportation, and that kind of thing.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you paid for attending?

Mr. ROSINGER. I was paid transportation between New York and Washington, and a per diem.

Senator FERGUSON. How much per diem?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't know, except that I think the present rate is \$9, and very likely it was \$9 a day at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. So you then were, in effect, an employe, because you were receiving compensation as well as transportation?

Mr. ROSINGER. In actual fact, when a person goes to a conference in another city he has taxi expenses to the railway station, food expenses and so on, which are rarely covered by the per diem. That is, if his transportation between cities were the only thing covered, he would be taking money out of his own pocket in order to attend.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were paid per diem as well as transportation?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. To and from Washington?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. To Washington, and from Washington back to New York?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

May I say one thing more? I wouldn't accept the statement that I was an employee of the Government because this seems to me to be a very tenuous connection on my part with the Government, and I would say in my own thinking that an employee is presumably somebody who receives some kind of honorarium or salary.

Senator FERGUSON. I see the press here. Have you any objection to your picture being taken if the committee recesses?

Mr. ROSINGER. No. Let us go ahead. I have no objection.

Senator FERGUSON. I will recess the committee so you gentlemen can perform your functions as to photographs, and then you can leave.

(A short recess was taken.)

Senator FERGUSON. I noticed when I asked you the question, including the word "incriminate" as to whether or not you refused to answer on the ground it would tend to incriminate, you left that out of your answer previously. I am asking you now: What provision of the fifth amendment is it that you refuse to answer under?

Mr. ROSINGER. As I understand it, there is a clause in the fifth amendment giving a person the right not to testify against himself in certain situations.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that it?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. Are you a naturalized citizen of the United States?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; a native-born citizen.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, were you a teacher in the New York City school system?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. For what period of time?

Mr. ROSINGER. During the school year 1937-38 and during the school year 1940-41.

Mr. MORRIS. And then you left the school system, Mr. Rosinger; is that right?

Mr. ROSINGER. Actually, I should modify the last part. It was the school year 1937-38 but from September 1940 to September 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Rosinger, what employment did you take after you left the New York City school system?

Senator FERGUSON. Just one moment. In the fifth amendment, will you point out the particular part that you are claiming privilege under?

Mr. ROSINGER. May I consult counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; consult your counsel. Will you tell us what part of it you are claiming privilege on?

Mr. ROSINGER. It is the part which begins:

No one shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

Senator FERGUSON. This is not a criminal case.

Mr. ROSINGER. Well, Senator, if you want me to use the word "incrimination"—

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking you to use any word. I want to know whether it is on the ground it will tend or may tend to incriminate you.

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So you are not claiming this provision of being a witness against yourself?

Mr. BOUDIN. May I make a comment? That part that has just been read, the privilege not to be a witness against himself, is the privilege of self-incrimination. The words "self-incrimination" are not used in the Constitution, and the witness need not use those words, but, in order that there be no ambiguity he is using it so there will be no question in the committee's mind that he is pleading the constitutional privilege.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I want to make sure, that it is not on the ground he is testifying in a criminal case, but it is on the ground that it may tend to incriminate him.

Mr. BOUDIN. That term "in the criminal case" is the language which the courts will apply to congressional investigations, as to any proceeding in which they may be a tendency to self-incrimination.

Senator FERGUSON. But the record clearly shows he has avoided and intentionally avoided the question of self-incrimination, because when the chairman asked that question, he avoided it in his answer.

Mr. BOUDIN. Perhaps I ought to say that I had advised the witness what I understand to be the law, that one need not use a particular phraseology and terminology, and that so long as it is made clear to the committee that it is a constitutional privilege set forth in the fifth amendment, the privilege not to be a witness against one's self, the witness is sufficiently protected.

However, since you did then raise the issue, the witness decided to answer you in the terms used by you.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. What appointment did you take after you left the New York City school system, Mr. Rosinger?



Mr. ROSINGER. I took employment prior to leaving the New York City school system, that is, the school year 1940-41 ended in June 1941, the summer vacation then began. During the summer vacation—I believe on August 1, 1941—I joined the staff of the India Government Trade Commissioner in New York. The Trade Commissioner was then Mr. H. S. Mallik, who is now the Indian Ambassador to France.

When September, 1941, came, I resigned from the school system and continued in the employment that I had begun during the summer.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you do both at the same time?

Mr. ROSINGER. There is no contradiction. The school term had come around; I couldn't be holding two jobs at once.

Mr. MORRIS. I wanted to be sure you had not.

Now, when did you first work for the Foreign Policy Association?

Mr. ROSINGER. I think I began there on July 1, 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you stay with the Foreign Policy Association?

Mr. ROSINGER. Until sometime in June 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what were your duties with the Foreign Policy Association at that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. Essentially to do research and writing, with some lecturing.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you receive any grants during the period 1937 to 1948 from various foundations?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you enumerate those grants to the committee, please, if you will, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. I am wondering in what sense you are using the word "foundations"?

Mr. MORRIS. Used in the broadest possible sense.

Senator FERGUSON. From any source.

Mr. ROSINGER. In the summer of 1937 I had a tuition scholarship at a Chinese-language summer school at the University of Michigan from the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

From the American Council of Learned Societies, I had a study grant for the study of the Chinese language and Chinese history for 1938 and 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us with whom you negotiated in accomplishing each of those two grants, that is, the one with the Institute of Pacific Relations and the one with the American Council of Learned Societies?

Mr. ROSINGER. With the Institute of Pacific Relations, I believe, because I am not absolutely certain, that it was a Miss Ruth Earnshaw.

With the American Council of Learned Societies—

Mr. MORRIS. Was it with Mortimer Graves?

Mr. ROSINGER. Was he the top officer in the council at that time?

Mr. MORRIS. I don't know. The question is with whom you negotiated.

Mr. ROSINGER. I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Mr. Graves?

Mr. ROSINGER. I have met him on one or two occasions, but I had not met him at that point. I wrote to whoever was the top person in the American Council of Learned Societies.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not have any recollection of any negotiation with any particular individual at that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the next grant that you received, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. It was a training fellowship in the Rockefeller Foundation for work on the staff of the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. In what amount?

Mr. ROSINGER. I would say roughly \$2,000 for the year 1939-40, that is, from September 1939 through August 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. With whom did you negotiate that grant, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. I made an application. I don't recall the exact procedure.

Then I was called to the Rockefeller Foundation offices for an interview which I had with Mr. Stacey May.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your next grant, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. The next grant was not a grant to me personally; it was a grant to the American Institute of Pacific Relations for work on a book which was published as *The State of Asia*.

My work on this grant began in September 1948 and ended about October 1950, with one qualification; that the grant did not cover my entire salary. It was simply a contribution toward my working on the staff.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the amount, in that case?

Mr. ROSINGER. You mean the amount of the grant?

Mr. MORRIS. The amount of the grant.

Mr. ROSINGER. It was a grant for \$7,000.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that \$7,000 expended on you alone, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. No, not entirely, because part of it was used for honoraria for chapters in the book, that is, honoraria for authors other than myself.

Mr. MORRIS. In addition to that amount of money, that fraction of \$7,000 did you receive any other compensation from the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes, I had a salary, and the institute made up the difference between the allocation of the grant and the total salary.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that salary?

Mr. ROSINGER. It was \$6,000 annually.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your principal function during the time you were so engaged in the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. To write and do research work.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your principal project at that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. This was the principal project.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "this" was the principal project, what do you mean?

Mr. ROSINGER. I mean *The State of Asia*. The original idea was that I would do the entire book. Then it became apparent that it was impossible for one person to do it. We therefore decided on a book which would be essentially a symposium.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rosinger is now giving testimony in connection with the publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations, published by Alfred A. Knopf in 1951, called *The State of Asia*, a contemporary survey by Lawrence K. Rosinger and Asso-

ciates, issued under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. Are all the associates mentioned in the book?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Now, reading from the table of contents, there is:

Foreword by William L. Holland.

The State of Asia by Lawrence K. Rosinger.

China by Lawrence K. Rosinger.

Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet by Owen and Eleanor Lattimore.

Korea by Shannon McCune.

The Korean Crisis and the United Nations by Miriam S. Farley.

Japan by John M. Maki.

Indochina by Ellen Hammer.

Thailand (Siam) by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff.

Burma by S. B. Thomas.

Malaya by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff.

The Philippines by Shirley Jenkins.

Indonesia by Paul M. Kattenburg.

India by Lawrence K. Rosinger.

Pakistan by Holder Furber—

that is all, and then the bibliography, the contributors, and the index.

Mr. Rosinger, when was this project, *The State of Asia*, first contemplated by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. Roughly, in May or June of 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it decided at a meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't know, because if there was any meeting, I was not present.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first hear about it, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. The Institute of Pacific Relations asked me whether I would be interested in such a project.

Mr. MORRIS. Who at the institute?

Mr. ROSINGER. Mr. Holland.

Mr. MORRIS. That was in 1948?

Mr. ROSINGER. 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Had they told you at that time that a grant had been obtained for the project?

Mr. ROSINGER. No. The grant was obtained from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Mr. MORRIS. When was the grant actually obtained?

Mr. ROSINGER. I think in June 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of the negotiations that took place between the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Rockefeller Foundation which brought about that grant?

Mr. ROSINGER. Not in any detail.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you know about it?

Mr. ROSINGER. I simply knew that negotiations were going on.

Mr. MORRIS. Between what individuals?

Mr. ROSINGER. I suppose between Mr. Holland and whatever people at the foundation he was approaching.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you do not know who the people in the foundation were whom he was approaching?

Mr. ROSINGER. I would like to put it this way: I don't know exactly what procedure he followed. Of course, I know the names of some of the people at the foundation who may have been connected—

Mr. MORRIS. We do not want you to say "who may have been," just those you do know.

Mr. ROSINGER. I cannot tell you on the basis of present recollection, that Mr. Holland went to a certain person and presented the project to him.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know William Mandel? William M. Mandel?

Mr. ROSINGER. I most respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment of the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Harold R. Isaacs?

Mr. ROSINGER. I must respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Daniel Thorner?

Mr. ROSINGER. I most respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privileges in the fifth amendment of the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. I read from the book, *The State of Asia*, about which we have been speaking, for which you received a grant, under "Editor's acknowledgment."

The other contributors and I also owe much to the sixty-odd specialists, to each of whom one or more of the chapters was submitted for critical comment, in an effort to achieve accuracy and balance. These readers included (in addition to a number of persons in official United States or United Nations agencies) the following persons—

among the persons named are Harold R. Isaacs, William M. Mandel, and Daniel Thorner.

On the next page, which is marked with "x" at the top, it is signed by Lawrence K. Rosinger.

I will ask you whether or not you knew what was in the book?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that was in the book?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not any of the three names were in any way connected with the Communist Party, either of the United States or of Soviet Russia?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment of the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the most information, then, you can give to this committee and to the people, who are, in effect, asked to read this book; is that true?

Mr. ROSINGER. I stand on the answer I have given. I must say though that I think if anybody should judge the book, he ought to read the book.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, are you willing to tell the committee the steps that you have taken in compiling this volume?

Mr. ROSINGER. Again I can't commit myself on every question, but I would certainly have no objection to giving you the general procedure that was followed.

Mr. MORRIS. I want to know, Mr. Rosinger, whether or not you are willing to tell this subcommittee of the United States Senate, what steps you took in compiling this volume which was put out at the expense of a great foundation and which was put out under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which we are investigat-

ing here, and ask you if you will be willing to make full disclosure before this committee of what steps you took in compiling that volume?

Mr. ROSINGER. I can't commit myself on such a blanket question.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Rosinger, so that the record may be clear and it may help you in answering these questions, one of the reasons for this committee making this investigation and having you before it, as other witnesses, is that they are trying to ascertain whether or not it is a fact that this organization, the American Institute of Pacific Relations, or the Institute of Pacific Relations, was penetrated by Communists, or those who believed or sponsored Communist philosophy. That is one of the reasons that we are conducting this examination.

Now, if the writer of one of their books, who gets a grant from them, comes in and refuses to answer as to whether or not he is a Communist and as to whether or not those that are connected with the writing of the book or the reading of and contributing to the book, reading, and therefore in the way it is used here, contributing, to the book, as to whether or not certain people are or are not Communists, how are we going to ascertain whether or not there was a penetration of Communists into this organization?

I state that, and ask you whether or not, keeping that in mind, and you being a citizen of the United States, your answers are the same, that you refuse to answer the questions?

Mr. ROSINGER. I think the problem might be solved if Mr. Morris would simply question me. We might find at the end that we had gone through all the questions.

Mr. MORRIS. The question is: Will you make full disclosure? Or, will you make limited disclosures?

Mr. BOUDIN. May I ask if there is a question?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you still refuse to answer the questions that were asked you, that you did refuse to answer?

Mr. BOUDIN. Those are the ones on which privilege was previously pleaded.

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes; I stand on those answers. May I say, that would permit a great deal of discussion of the book?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to say, Mr. Rosinger, that you are willing to discuss this book, except with regard to actions on your part which involve Communists, or pro-Communists?

Mr. ROSINGER. I can't specify.

Mr. BOUDIN. Essentially the answer is that given to the chairman. The witness will stand on the privilege, as previously asserted.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question that counsel has asked appears to go to whether the witness is claiming privilege with regard to a series of questions about the publication of this volume.

Mr. BOUDIN. Yes; and the witness said he could not answer a general inquiry like that. "Will you answer questions on a certain general subject?" If questions were put, he would attempt to answer them, except where he felt the privilege should be asserted.

Mr. MORRIS. One reason I have in asking this question is that one of the facts, I suppose, that this committee will have to decide, is whether the employees of the Institution of Pacific Relations, when they came before this committee, volunteered to make full disclosure about their experience in the past.

So I think the fact is an absolute fact, and it calls for an absolute answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Can you answer the question?

Mr. ROSINGER. You are asking me to agree to a whole series of questions you do not now know?

Mr. SOURWINE. Are there areas of your experience or activity in connection with the publication of this book with regard to which you would have to claim privilege?

Mr. ROSINGER. I won't know until I hear the questions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, will you tell us to what extent you consulted with Mr. Daniel Thorner in the preparation of this volume?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the extent to which you conferred with William Mandel in the preparation of this volume?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell the committee to what extent you conferred with Harold Isaacs in the preparation of this volume?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were the people or officials of the United States that you conferred with, that are not mentioned here?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall who they were.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were the officials of the United Nations agencies that you conferred with, or the readers included that are not named here?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall any of them?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, how frequently have you been in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. Quite infrequently.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you estimate the number of times you have been there for the committee, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. BOUDIN. You mean during his whole life?

Mr. MORRIS. During his whole life, yes.

Mr. ROSINGER. We might first delimit the period. Excluding the conference, which I do not suppose could be regarded as occurring in their office, I don't think I have been there since 1946, possibly 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom were you visiting when you were last there, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall. My first visit probably occurred in 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you estimate the number of visits you made to that particular office between 1943 and 1947, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. Probably on the average of about once a year.

Mr. MORRIS. So you would estimate that at about five or six visits that you made to the Far Eastern Section?

Mr. ROSINGER. That would be a fair assumption.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom did you visit while you were there, Mr. Rosinger?



Mr. ROSINGER. I do not recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could be sure that Mr. Rosinger is not being unresponsive to this particular question.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot recall anyone that you ever visited in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I don't recall at the moment.

Mr. MORRIS. During that period, do you know who was in charge of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department? You are a far-eastern expert, are you not, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right. For a time, Mr. John Carter Vincent was in charge.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever visit with him while you were in Washington, in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. I am not sure. I may have visited him once.

Senator FERGUSON. Could there be a reason other than you just do not remember, that you do not want to name people that you visited in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever visit Alger Hiss in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment of the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever visit with Julian Wadleigh in the State Department?

Mr. BOUDIN. May I confer?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you may confer with your client.

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment of the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever visit John S. Service in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever visit John P. Davies in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever visit Robert W. Barnett in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment of the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like again your answer to the question: Did you ever visit John Carter Vincent in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. Will you have my answer read back?

Mr. MORRIS. Couldn't you answer the question without its being read back? Give us your true recollection at this time.

Mr. ROSINGER. I think I may have visited him once, but I am not sure.

Mr. MORRIS. So it is your testimony that you cannot be sure whether or not you ever visited John Carter Vincent in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent have you ever conferred with or consulted with or visited with John Carter Vincent?

Mr. ROSINGER. The only contact with him that I am certain of is that, as I recall, he was a delegate to the Hot Springs Conference of the American Institute of Pacific Relations early in 1945.

I was there as a recorder and I met him at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. But your further testimony is that you cannot recall whether or not you did meet him in the State Department; is that right?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Therefore you are not sure that you have met him only once in your life?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; it may have been twice.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever visit Lt. Andrew Roth in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. I must respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. You know whom I am talking about, a former lieutenant in the United States Navy? You understand about whom I was speaking?

Mr. ROSINGER. I stand on my answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know an assistant of John Carter Vincent in the State Department named Julian Friedman?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read into the record, particularly apropos of this particular point, an excerpt of a personal statement of John S. Service as appeared before the Loyalty Board? Will you identify the source, Mr. Mandel, as you read it into the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from a transcript of proceedings before the Loyalty Security Board in the case of John Stewart Service in the State Department:

Mr. MORRIS. Could you give the document number on that?

Mr. BOUDIN. Could we have the page number?

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from page 2234 of the hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, part II, appendix:

#### STATEMENT OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

During my period of consultation after my return to the Department on April 12, 1945, I saw a number of newspapermen and writers on China. This was in the normal course of events, and a part of the usual function of officers on consultations, who have newly returned from the field and are in a position to give background information.

One of the people I remember seeing was Lawrence Rosinger of the Foreign Policy Association. I recall that he was having an interview with one of the officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs, and as their discussion apparently concerned recent events in China, I was called in to answer some questions.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you stop there?

Does that refresh your recollection, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. I wonder whether Mr. Mandel could read the whole excerpt?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Another contact, I remember, was Raymond Swing, who was referred to me by my superior, Mr. Vincent, for background information in regard to some news reports of the day.

Mr. ROSINGER. Have you read everything that applies to me?

Mr. MANDEL. There is more coming.

Mr. MORRIS. Anything about that particular episode.

Mr. MANDEL (reading) :

After discussing the particular point, Mr. Swing asked me for comment on General Hurley and an opinion as to whether his negotiations were proceeding successfully. This I declined to discuss, and referred him back to Mr. Vincent.

Another press contact was with two members of the editorial staff of Fortune magazine, which was preparing an exhaustive article on China. These researchers had approached General Olmstead, who was G-5 on General Wedemeyer's staff and was then in Washington. General Olmstead had referred them to me for political background.

I mention these instances, and I know there were many others, as indication that it was current policy to permit responsible officers to give background information to the press. At this time, of course, I had just returned from Yenan, and was in possession of a great deal of recent information of great interest.

Shortly after my arrival I received an invitation to meet on an off-the-record basis, with the research staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations in New York. This invitation was in a brief letter addressed to me by Edward C. Carter.

I discussed it with Mr. E. F. Stanton, Deputy, and then Acting Director of FE, who approved my accepting.

This meeting with IPR took place on April 25. I believe there were 10 or 12 people present. Practically all of them were writers, including T. A. Bissen, Lawrence Rosinger, and a New Zealander named Belshaw.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all that relates to you, Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. ROSINGER. May I see that a minute, please?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the reading of that document brings out a conflict between Mr. Rosinger's testimony, where he said he had never met Mr. Service.

Mr. BOUDIN. Mr. Rosinger did not say he had never met Mr. Service.

Mr. MORRIS. In the offices of the State Department.

Mr. BOUDIN. In the offices of the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Will the reporter read the question?

(The following question was read by the reporter :

Did you ever visit John S. Service in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. That represents a change of question. Actually, what Mr. Mandel read indicated Service had testified that I was in the State Department, that he happened in, which would be a different situation.

I must still say I don't recall the incident in the State Department, but it could have happened.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the visitor mentioned in the testimony of Mr. Service that you were visiting at that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't have the faintest recollection at the moment. What is the date of that? Does he give the date of that?

Mr. MANDEL. On or about April 12, 1945.

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Service says :

One of the people I remember seeing is Lawrence Rosinger, of the Foreign Policy Association. I recall he was having an interview with one of the officers in the Office of Chinese Affairs.

Do you remember that incident?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't, but it is possible.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know any officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs? You were then an expert on China, Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. ROSINGER. There wouldn't be any point in speculating.

Mr. MORRIS. The question is, Did you know any officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall.

Mr. BOUDIN. Is this word "officers"?

Mr. MORRIS. I am using the language of the testimony here, "e-r-s."

Mr. CHAIRMAN. I submit that the witness may not be responding to the questions in this case, inasmuch as at this time he was a far-eastern expert, and we have testimony here—at least Mr. Service's statement, to the effect that Mr. Rosinger visited with one of the officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs.

I have asked Mr. Rosinger if he knew at that time any officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs. He says he cannot remember.

Mr. ROSINGER. Do you have a list of the officers? I would be glad to look at such a list. The State Department went through a number of reorganizations. It is hard to recollect exactly what a position a person may have been in at a particular time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Julian Friedman?

Mr. ROSINGER. I have already invoked the privilege on that.

Mr. MORRIS. I am not trying to enumerate officers, while they are getting a complete list of those who were in the Office or Division of Chinese Affairs.

Do you know Mr. Ringwalt?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't have any recollection of ever meeting him.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. John P. Davies?

Mr. ROSINGER. I have already said, I believe, I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know John K. Emerson?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't believe I have ever met him.

May I make one point? You mentioned that my own work has been that of a specialist in the far eastern field. I thing it should be apparent from the small number of visits as I testified before, that this work wasn't primarily a question of personal contact, and that it really was a question of research and study in printed material, some conversations, and that kind of thing.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write or telegraph or telephone to officers in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. I can't say that I never did, but it would not have been a common occurrence. It would not have been the kind of thing I did every week or even every month.

Senator FERGUSON. Did State Department officials come to you outside of the State Department to confer with you?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't believe anybody ever did. They wouldn't have been coming to me and saying "What shall we do about this?" or "What shall we do about that?" There was no such relationship.

Mr. MORRIS. I give you the organization of the Department of State, April 1, 1945, and I call your attention to page 11, under the heading: "Division of Chinese Affairs."

You will see there the names of eight officers. Will you tell us which of those officers you knew personally?

Mr. ROSINGER. I have already testified that I had met John Carter Vincent at the IPR conference earlier in that year. I have invoked the privilege on one other person.

Mr. MORRIS. That is Mr. Friedman?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

I have no recollection of ever having met any of the other people listed here.

Mr. MORRIS. According to your testimony, then, if you were visiting an officer in the Division of Chinese Affairs at that time it would only be Mr. Friedman or John Carter Vincent; is that not right, Mr. Rosinger?

He is testifying he has not met any of the officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs, and there is testimony to the effect that he was visiting an officer in the Division of Chinese Affairs. It must have been one of those two officers.

Mr. BOUDIN. He did not testify he was visiting officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs. You are incorporating Service's testimony.

The witness stated that he had no recollection. He is not disputing it, because Mr. Service was evidently not making it up.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the witness to be answering the questions, no counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You answer the question.

Mr. ROSINGER. With respect to one of these people, I have invoked the privilege.

My feeling is that you would have to know the exact organization of that Division at that time. This is in a book. Nobody can tell what shifts were made. Nobody can tell whether somebody who is not technically in this Division, but was concerned with China work, might have been the person I was visiting, so that if one could be sure that this was the precise set-up and that there was no confusion in Mr. Service's mind, then I suppose the conclusion would follow.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you have no other recollection about visiting officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs?

Mr. ROSINGER. I didn't testify to that effect. I don't believe you asked me that question. You asked me only in relation to this particular time.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. That is what I am asking about, in connection with this particular incident mentioned by Mr. Service.

Mr. ROSINGER. In relation to this particular incident, I have no recollection of the person I visited.

Mr. MORRIS. How often have you met John S. Service?

Mr. ROSINGER. If we assume that Mr. Service's statement is correct—as I have said, I don't have any recollection, but I don't want to challenge it—if we assume that is correct, my conclusion would be twice, because he mentioned another occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. So, you recall no other episodes in meeting Mr. Service, other than the two he has testified to?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. How well do you know Mr. Jessup, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. Very slightly.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you amplify on that, please?

Mr. ROSINGER. I met him in connection with my IPR work. That is, when I was on the IPR staff he was at certain times also connected with the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently did you meet him on those occasions?

Mr. ROSINGER. I think we can put it this way: I was at the IPR in 1939-40. I believe he was probably at the Hot Springs conference of the IPR that November and December, at which I was a recorder. So, I must have seen him on that occasion.

Outside of that, the chances are I have seen him twice, three times, during the year, and then, casually. He would have dropped into the office.

You must remember, I was a very junior person at that time, both in age and in position, in the IPR, and the fact of his dropping in and passing me, saying a word or two, wouldn't in itself mean anything.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you did not know him very well, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What I am trying to do is reconcile your testimony about your acquaintance with Mr. Jessup with the fact that when you wrote him a memorandum you addressed him "Dear Phil". That would seem to be in contradiction to what you are giving us now.

Mr. ROSINGER. That is standard IPR practice. After you are in the organization 1 week you are calling everybody by their first name.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Frederick Vanderbilt Field in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever address any communications to Field as "Dear Fred"?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that I addressed a question to Mr. Rosinger in connection with a designation that he used in correspondence. I don't think he answered the question. He suggested that there was a general practice within the Institute of Pacific Relations that after a week everybody called everybody else by his first name.

Mr. ROSINGER. That was not an inflexible rule, but it might have been 2 weeks.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they also address letters the same way, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes. It was not just personal conversation, letters, memoranda, anything of that sort.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is at variance with the understanding that I am sure Mr. Mendel and I have with respect to the letters in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how many times you wrote Jessup?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it more than once?

Mr. ROSINGER. I assume so.

Senator FERGUSON. He was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations when you were there?

Mr. ROSINGER. I can't say that he was, at all times. He was, in 1939-40.

Senator FERGUSON. You were there at that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right. He was there at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. How often would he be in the offices?

Mr. ROSINGER. I can't really answer, because the IPR at that time was located in the building that was like a maze. It was so intricate in



its construction. As I say, I was a very junior person. He could have made many visits without my knowing it.

Senator FERGUSON. How many times would you say you were in his office?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't think he had an office at that time. My recollection is that he was on the faculty at Columbia; so, he would simply have been dropping in.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you writing at that time for the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulting Jessup?

Mr. ROSINGER. You mean as to the contents?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ROSINGER. This was 12 years ago. I can't remember, but I think it can be put this way: His opinion might have been asked about a broad subject I was to write on, or that was under discussion.

I doubt very much whether I would have asked him "Is this particular point accurate?" or "How shall I handle this problem?" I certainly wouldn't have known him well enough for that.

Senator FERGUSON. As a minor official, whom did you consult as to the accuracy of statements?

Mr. ROSINGER. My recollection is that during that actual year I didn't finish many pieces of work. I think I did a few articles. My main work was on "China's Wartime Politics" which wasn't completed until several years later, and completed in a form that was different from the one conceived at that time. So, there wouldn't have been much of a finished character to discuss with anybody.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever write for the Institute of Pacific Relations and any writing under any other name than your own?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write for any other person and turn it over to someone?

Mr. ROSINGER. You mean for an IPR publication?

Senator FERGUSON. Or any other publication.

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever write under a pseudonym in writing an article?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. You do answer that you never wrote under any other name for the Institute of Pacific Relations or do you decline to answer on that?

Mr. ROSINGER. As far as I know, I have never written anything that the IPR published under a name other than my own.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you have never used a pseudonym in writing an IPR publication?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is my recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you answer the question: Have you ever used a pseudonym for any other publication?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, will you tell us your association with Mr. T. A. Bisson?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully refuse to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Bisson a fellow employee of yours in the Foreign Policy Association?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a fellow employee of yours at the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. How do you define an employee? As a person on the staff at the time?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first join the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. As a staff member, in September 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. You were not, then, an ordinary member?

Mr. ROSINGER. I may have been. An ordinary member simply receives the publications. It is quite possible that I subscribed to their publications before that time.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not recall whether or not you were an ordinary member of the Institute of Pacific Relations at that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. No, I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Who asked you to become a staff member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. You will recall that I became a staff member through the Rockefeller Foundation fellowship; so, it was not a question of asking. I had heard that the fellowship existed; that it was to be granted, and I applied for it.

Mr. MORRIS. You applied to whom, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. As I mentioned before, I don't recall the exact procedure, but I was given an interview at one point by Stacey May, of the Rockefeller Foundation.

Mr. MORRIS. From there you were assigned to the Institute of Pacific Relations, to carry out the function of the grant?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right. The grant was to train a person on their staff.

Senator FERGUSON. How many grants did you work under that received any moneys from the Rockefeller Foundation?

Mr. ROSINGER. Three.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you named them all on the record?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I think one has been omitted.

When I visited India at the end of 1949 and the early part of 1950, that was under a Rockefeller Foundation grant.

Senator FERGUSON. When you made application for these grants, or to work under these grants, were you ever asked the question as to how you felt about communism?

Mr. ROSINGER. Not as far as I can recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Did anyone ever ask you whether or not you were a Communist, in connection with these grants, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. Not as far as I can recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, will you tell us the circumstances leading up to your grant in connection with your trip to India?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

The American IPR had a conference scheduled in New Delhi on Indian-American Relations, in conjunction with an Indian organization, the Indian Council of World Affairs.

The executive secretary of the American IPR, Mr. Clayton Lane at that time, felt that it would be a good idea if I were able to attend the conference and, of course, have the opportunity for some travel before and after that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it his idea that you should go to that conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. It was an idea that was common to both of us. I wanted to go, and it was also his idea that it would be a good thing to do.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that act on his part subject to ratification by the executive board or the board of trustees?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you proceed and explain the circumstances of the grant?

Mr. ROSINGER. Mr. Clayton Lane applied to the Rockefeller Foundation; I believe sent them a letter, describing the conference. I don't recall the letter. I don't have a copy of it. He stated that he would like me to be able to go, and putting the question to them.

I believe that in previous testimony Mr. Holland made some reference to some other situation involved, in which there was a discussion among people, but that wasn't anything that I would have personal knowledge of.

Mr. MORRIS. How much time did you spend in India on that conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. The conference lasted 10 days or 2 weeks, I have forgotten exactly. I was in India for a longer period.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you told us what the conference was?

Mr. ROSINGER. It was on the subject of Indian-American relations.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the State Department interested in it?

Mr. ROSINGER. I have no knowledge of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Were any of their representatives there?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think that they were there?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't think so. I was not involved in the running of the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was running it?

Mr. ROSINGER. The host organization was the Indian Council of World Affairs. The American Institute was represented only to the extent that there was a delegation there. But the Indian Council of World Affairs was responsible for the arrangements.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know who was in the Indian Council of World Affairs?

Mr. ROSINGER. Some of the people.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether that was a Communist-front organization?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what a Communist-front organization is?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would allow to go into the record at this time an excerpt from articles by Mr. Rosinger, taken from his book *The State of Asia*? These are being offered into evidence simply as samples of the writings of the witness, who has

been named by three people before this committee as a Communist, and who himself refuses and invokes the constitutional privilege when asked about that particular testimony.

Mr. BOUDIN. May I suggest that perhaps the better way to do it, and I do this with the utmost deference, is simply to incorporate the entire chapter in the appendix of the hearings here, rather than a small paragraph?

I would have no objection to your doing it after the hearing is over, to save time.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the problem, Mr. Chairman. I don't want to run up the printing bill.

Senator FERGUSON. If the witness wants any other paragraph to explain the paragraph that is put in, I will ask him to submit to the committee, and the committee will pass on whether or not it will be printed in the appendix.

Mr. BOUDIN. The witness will just have to consider whether that is practical, under that proposal.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I also suggest that since this seems to be a narrative and history of a certain period, I am just taking a certain segment of that history and that lends itself to reduction much more readily than would an expression of views.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ROSINGER. Anybody who is engaged in writing knows that it is the totality of the article, not individual sentences or paragraphs that contain the essence of the article.

Mr. MORRIS. We are mindful of that.

Senator FERGUSON. I ask you whether or not you believe this article as a whole is pro-Communist?

Mr. ROSINGER. What article are you referring to?

Senator FERGUSON. In the book.

Mr. MORRIS. This is your article on China.

Mr. ROSINGER. The way I would answer that question is that I believe that the chapter is true, that is, it seems to me at least as of the time I wrote it, it was, because there are new developments since, but it seems to be a correct statement of events, given the fact that you can never tell the whole history of China in 60 pages or whatever it was there.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you consider it pro-Communist?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I would not.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it anti-Communist?

Mr. ROSINGER. I would like to stand on my previous answers that I do not consider it pro-Communist, and that I consider it true.

Senator FERGUSON. But you cannot answer my question as to whether or not it is anti-Communist?

Mr. ROSINGER. I must say that the words themselves are not words about which there is any universal agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever heard it described as being anti-Communist?

Mr. ROSINGER. Perhaps not in those words, but I have seen it praised very highly by an anti-Communist publication.

Mr. MORRIS. What publication is that?

Mr. ROSINGER. It was the Catholic Weekly, the Commonweal, in its issue of July 13, 1951.

May I read something from it?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't have the whole review here. This is just a part, but the whole thing can be checked [reading]:

In spite of the tremendous importance of the Far East in the world of today, the average American knows far too little about it. The arguments which he hears as to what American policy in the Far East should be are generally based on opinion rather than facts, emotion rather than reason, and in the absence of adequate and readily available books on the area, he has been left to flounder in darkness.

Mr. Rosinger's book should do much to dispel that darkness. It is the best general work on the postwar Far East yet published. Unlike some of his less competent colleagues—

I want to say I don't take any responsibility for that remark—

Mr. Rosinger apparently realizes that neither he, nor anyone else is qualified to survey recent events in the whole of the vast region stretching from India to Japan. He himself has contributed three chapters to the book, a good introduction survey, an excellent chapter on China, and a somewhat less satisfying one India—

there is some material that isn't particularly relevant. Then he says:

The chapters are factual rather than interpretative, and their general quality is good.

Senator FERGUSON. Has it been praised by any pro-Communist publication?

Mr. ROSINGER. Not to my recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any pro-Communist publications?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. May I call attention to the fact that the passages I was introducing into the record are not introduced to show whether or not Mr. Rosinger is or is not a Communist. I have suggested that they be introduced purely on the basis that these are sample writings of a man who, as I describe it, three times was identified before the committee as a Communist, and who himself invoked the constitutional privilege when asked.

Senator FERGUSON. And they will speak for themselves at the present time.

I will receive them on that ground.

Mr. ROSINGER. Are these passages from all my writings?

Mr. MORRIS. I will tell you what they are. I am taking the segment from history here, page 34 of your volume on China, beginning: "Events in the fall of 1945 \* \* \*

Mr. ROSINGER. To where?

Mr. MORRIS. Now, go to the first marker there.

Mr. BOUDIN. What you are really going to do now is direct the reporter to incorporate it?

Mr. MORRIS. I am telling it to him. He is going to be making notes at the same time.

Page 34, starting with "Events in the fall of 1945," up to the word "positions," which is in the middle of page 44. There is a notation "end" there.

And then on page 86, the first paragraph, which is marked "Begin": "In the fall of 1949" up to the end of that article.

(The excerpts referred to were incorporated in the record and appear at the conclusion of Mr. Rosinger's testimony on p. 2541.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, do you know Mr. Solomon Trone?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that Mr. Solomon Trone at this particular conference, the Indian conference we have discussed here on which testimony has been taken, appears as one of the members of the American delegation to this Indian-American relation conference.

Senator FERGUSON. As shown by what book?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will identify this volume.

Mr. MANDEL. As shown by the volume *India-American Relations Proceedings of the Indian-American Conference held in New Delhi in December 1949*, listing Lawrence K. Rosinger as rapporteur.

Senator FERGUSON. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 352" and filed for reference in the committee file.)

Mr. ROSINGER. Rapporteur of one of the three round tables.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently did you consult with Mr. Owen Lattimore at this conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall any particular consultation. All of the delegates talked with each other. I would say there was striking little discussion about the content of the conference outside of the conference room itself.

Mr. MORRIS. How about the subjects covered by the conference? Did you discuss them with other delegates?

Mr. ROSINGER. There were remarks but no concerted discussion that I can recall.

Mr. MORRIS. With whom did you travel to India?

Mr. ROSINGER. I traveled alone.

Mr. MORRIS. You went by yourself?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you precede or follow Mr. Lattimore in going to this conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first meet Mr. Lattimore in India?

Mr. ROSINGER. I imagine on the opening day of the conference. My own recollection is that I arrived in New Delhi the evening before the conference about 1 o'clock in the morning and then the following day the conference began.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you confer with Lattimore at any time other than during the conference hours, during that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. I have no recollection of conferring with him.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether there was a Communist caucus preceding the conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first meet Mr. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. ROSINGER. You mean at any time?

Mr. MORRIS. At any time, the first time you ever knew him?

Mr. ROSINGER. I suppose about 1938, 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. Who introduced you?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't really know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you attend any caucus prior to the conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I couldn't have. I got there at 1 a. m.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know whether any caucus was called prior to the conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. What kind of caucus?

Senator FERGUSON. Any caucus of the members or the delegates.

Mr. ROSINGER. I think the delegates may have met to discuss details of conference procedure or something of that sort. The word "caucus" is a word that has many interpretations.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether any Communists met?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to proceed to another one of the volumes of Mr. Rosinger's, if you have covered all the questions on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write China's Crisis?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record again as a sample of the writings of Mr. Rosinger as he appears before this committee today two entire chapters of Mr. Rosinger's book entitled "China's Crisis."

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want them in the appendix or do you want to leave them here in the text?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like them to appear in the appendix.

Senator FERGUSON. They may so appear.

(The excerpts referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 353" and appear at the conclusion of Mr. Rosinger's testimony, p. 2541.)

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any part on which you want to ask questions?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I think on one of these you might care to ask a few questions.

Senator FERGUSON. You may read that part.

Mr. MORRIS. The chapter is called Are They Communists? It begins [reading]:

Ever since the early days of the Chinese Soviets foreign observers have tended to regard the Communists as agrarian socialists or peasant radicals rather than as Communists. According to this view, the present guerrilla movement is essentially the latest in a series of radical peasant movements that have burst forth throughout Chinese history at moments of crisis. For example, in the middle of the last century the Taiping Rebellion, which almost unseated the Manchus 50 years before they actually lost the throne, was basically a peasant revolt.

Then you go on and give views of many observers as to whether or not the Chinese Communists were actually Communists.

I submit, Mr. Chairman, you may have some questions.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. What is your view as to whether or not they were Communists?

Mr. ROSINGER. My view is that they were.

Senator FERGUSON. That they were Communists?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. They were tied directly to the Kremlin, the Communists of the Kremlin?

Mr. ROSINGER. I will have to stand on what I have just given.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you mean then by saying that you agreed they were Communists and not agrarian reformers? Is that what you want to answer?

Mr. ROSINGER. Is that what?

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what you want to answer, that they were Communists and not agrarian reformers?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I point out that Mr. Rosinger has stated in his article here he just presented the views of certain people rather than used his own views.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I want to find out what his own views were.

Mr. ROSINGER. The thing that troubles me is that these are extremely complex problems which can't be discussed simply and in an off-hand way. Whenever I had written any article or book, it has always been the product, not only of research, but of very careful drafting and redrafting and when I am asked today to say for a permanent record, to express for the permanent record, some opinions on very complex subjects, it does not seem to me that it is feasible.

Mr. MORRIS. You have testified that you believe the Communists are actually members of the Communist International?

Mr. ROSINGER. When was that?

Mr. MORRIS. You said they were actually Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. I asked the question.

Mr. ROSINGER. The question was, do I believe, as I recall, that they are or were Communists, and my answer was "Yes."

Mr. MORRIS. Do you believe they are members of the Communist International?

Mr. ROSINGER. I would have to look up the record as of that time to see what the situation was.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe it now that they are part of the Communist International?

Mr. ROSINGER. What do you mean by the Communist International?

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you the question. What is the Communist International?

Mr. ROSINGER. If by Communist International you mean a specific organization, I don't know whether there is such an organization at the present time.

Mr. MORRIS. By the use of Communist International I mean an alliance of Communist parties throughout the world.

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the reason that you cannot answer as to whether or not the Communists of China are part of the Communist International?

Mr. MORRIS. This International Alliance we have just discussed.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. BOUDIN. He is relying on the privilege in connection with that last question.

Senator FERGUSON. You are relying on the privilege?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you indicate in the statement to the State Department that China as of that time, October 1949, was part of the Communist International?



Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall because I haven't had a copy of the memorandum.

Mr. MORRIS. May we go into that State Department conference now?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you may.

I will read to you:

The Chinese Communists will find economic recovery and reconstruction an enormously difficult job. They will therefore be interested in trade with the west. But there is no reason to believe that for the sake of such trade they would abandon their alinement with the U. S. S. R. or sacrifice basic principles of their internal policy.

Did you state that in your memorandum that you gave to the State Department on September 22, 1949?

Mr. ROSINGER. May I see the memorandum?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I will mark that item.

The letter attached is dated September 22, 1949, to Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, United States Mission to the United Nations, 2 Park Avenue, New York City, "Dear Phil," signed, "Larry Rosinger."

Mr. MORRIS. May this go in the record at this time now?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will receive the whole document in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 354" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 354

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,  
Washington, January 29, 1952.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,

*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.*

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Enclosed herewith is a memorandum submitted to the Department by Mr. Lawrence K. Rosinger on September 22, 1949. I believe that this is the memorandum you requested in your letter of January 28 to the Secretary.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.

Enclosure: As stated.

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,  
New York, N. Y., September 22, 1949.

AMBASSADOR PHILIP C. JESSUP,

*United States Mission to the United Nations,  
New York City.*

DEAR PHIL: Here at last is a statement of my personal views on various aspects of China policy. It should not, of course, be regarded as reflecting in any way an official IPR viewpoint.

With best regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER.

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD CHINA

(By Lawrence K. Rosinger)

The United States should seek to encourage an American-Chinese relationship consistent with America's stake in world peace and prosperity, as well as with the international development of democratic institutions. More specifically, policy should attempt to promote among the Chinese people an attitude of friendliness toward the United States; to preserve and develop the trade, investment, cultural and other contacts built up over the past century; and to achieve a state of mutual accommodation which will tend to reduce the explosive problems confronting this country in other parts of Asia, notably southeast Asia. If these objectives are attained to a sufficient degree, the effect will be to lessen international tensions in the Far East, enhance the

security and well-being of the United States, promote the revival of east Asian economy, and work toward a situation in which China will not be aligned exclusively with a single power, the U. S. S. R.

The emphasis in the above paragraph is on long-term development. The reason is simple: As a result of recent events, the United States has lost many of its traditional links with China. The main immediate problem is to avoid adhering to lines of policy that have already failed, and to set in motion long-term processes which will tend to convince the Chinese people that American policy is in their interest, as well as in the interest of the United States. Under the difficult circumstances in which far eastern policy is now being reconsidered, there may be a tendency to think that China can be "written off." But the fact is that in population, location, economic, and military potential, traditional cultural influence, political significance, links with southeast Asia, and other ways China is a crucial portion of the east. The United States should unquestionably work for a further satisfactory development of its relations with India, Japan, and other eastern countries. But this cannot be a substitute for satisfactory relations with China and the integration of these relations in an over-all far eastern policy. Indeed, it must be recognized that an unsound American-Chinese relationship could have very serious effects on our relations with many other areas of eastern and southern Asia.

To develop a successful policy, it is necessary, in Secretary Acheson's words, to avoid basing policy on "illusions or wishful thinking," and to "face the situation as it exists in fact." What, then, are some of the principal realities confronting the United States in China today?

1. The Chinese Communists have won the civil war. Although fighting will go on for a time, a military decision has been reached. There is no reason to suppose that this decision could be reversed by outside efforts to revive the forces of the Kuomintang or to support provincial warlords. The white paper is conclusive on this point.

2. In the Communist-controlled areas the bulk of the people (including the modern middle class, with which the United States has had its closest contacts) appear either to welcome or to accept the new state of affairs. Many intellectuals who have had American training or associations are cooperating actively with the new regime. There is no sign of any significant feeling that the new government is under outside domination.

3. Nationalism has never been as strong in China as it is today, and the Chinese Communists have succeeded in making themselves the leaders of Chinese nationalism.

4. The prestige of the United States in China is currently at low ebb. This is reflected not only in the attitude of the Chinese Communists toward the United States, but also in the widespread antagonism which many non-Communist Chinese have developed toward American policy during the past years of civil war. The fact to be faced is that many Chinese feel strongly that America followed a policy which was not in China's interest. In general, it seems clear that any political tendency or movement which is suspected of receiving American support, or even sympathy, is likely to be discredited in Chinese eyes as a result of that fact.

5. The Chinese Communists will find economic recovery and reconstruction an enormously difficult job. They will therefore be interested in trade with the west. But there is no reason to believe that for the sake of such trade they would abandon their alignment with the U. S. S. R. or sacrifice basic principles of their internal policy. They are, however, likely to show considerable flexibility in discussing the economic details of trade relations. (Opinions vary as to the importance of large-scale trade with the United States for China's economic development. Some Americans believe that Chinese reconstruction is impossible without such aid. The author considers this view incorrect and feels that the absence of large-scale trade with the United States would render more difficult, but not prevent, reconstruction. Consequently, if the United States were to follow a policy of blockade or limited trade, this country nevertheless would possibly be confronted in the end by a reconstructed China, modernized and powerful. In view of the obstacles the United States would have placed in the way of Chinese economic development, such a China would inevitably be far more hostile toward the United States than is the case today.)

6. The friendship of the Chinese people has not been permanently lost to the United States. It is essential to note, first of all, that the anti-American sentiment prevailing in China today is not, by and large, a reflection of pro-Russian sentiment. In addition, anti-American sentiment appears in the main

not to be based on theory, but on pragmatic reactions to specific American policies of the past few years. Finally, preponderant evidence indicates that anti-American sentiment is primarily sentiment against policy—not against individual Americans, not against the American people, not against the United States as a country. All these considerations suggest that if we act wisely and with a full consciousness of Chinese realities, it should not be too late to develop a successful policy beneficial to America's interests in China. It seems unlikely that in a country basically as pragmatic as China a recovery of American prestige could fail to be reflected in Chinese policy. One note of caution is necessary here. China is now living through a highly fluid, transitional period. It is therefore important to approach developments with calmness and perspective, and not to react to random occurrences as if they were definitive, or to feel that moral judgment must be passed on each day's events.

If these are some of the realities of the Chinese situation, the most sensible course would seem to be to recognize them in policy as soon as possible. What shape can such recognition assume?

(1) No further aid to Chiang Kai-shek or other segments of the Kuomintang. No aid to war lords or local regimes.

A. This includes avoidance of economic or military intervention in Formosa. Such intervention would almost certainly arouse Chinese nationalism and anti-American sentiment to white heat; saddle the United States with a continuing financial and military obligation in a relatively minor area; and involve this country in actions damaging to our international prestige, no matter how they might be explained. Formosa is properly part of China; we have so indicated by our pledged word at Cairo and by the swift turn-over of the island to the Chinese Government after VJ-day.

(2) We should offer no impediments to normal trade with China beyond the exclusion of outright materials of war—military equipment and ammunition. We should, on the contrary, seek to encourage normal trade. This would involve, among other things:

(a) Avoidance of any action which would tend to prolong the Nationalist blockade.

(b) Development of trade between Japan and China. Japan needs the trade and in the long run is almost certain to engage in it. To the extent that the United States might prevent trade, this country would have to pay the bill economically (in subsidies for Japan) and politically (in Japanese nationalist resentment).

(c) Recognition of the need of Britain, especially in view of its present economic difficulties, for normal trade with China.

(d) Normal trade between the United States and China.

(3) United States de jure recognition of the new Chinese Government after it is formed. The new Government will be the Government of China; there will be no other, even though fragments of military opposition will exist for a time in certain areas. There is also no prospect that at any time in the foreseeable future this new Government will be displaced by another regime. It is therefore essential to face the facts and maintain the fullest direct contact with the Chinese scene.

(4) Active encouragement to American citizens to maintain, as far as possible, their educational, religious, and other cultural connections with China. This is one of the most important and delicate aspects of American-Chinese relations. American citizens working in this field can be effective in winning Chinese friendship only if they abstain from all intervention in Chinese internal affairs. In this respect the activities of the American Friends Service Committee in China may be worthy of study. Successful execution of the above, and other, policies in China depends, of course, on China as well as on the United States. The author realizes, too, that within the United States many factors shape policy—for example, the views of Congress as well as those of the executive departments. It is, however, essential that the United States decide fairly quickly what it wishes to do. A policy of inaction and drift could only result in the further deterioration of American influence in China. It should also be noted that timing is quite important: early recognition can win us good will in China, but if our recognition merely follows that of many other countries, Chinese opinion will conclude that we grudgingly yielded to realities which we could no longer deny.

It is proper to ask what advantages might accrue to the United States from the course of action suggested above, since no policy can be justified unless it is clearly in the interest of the United States. Some of the advantages have already been brought out or suggested in previous pages. But it may be useful to state explicitly the benefits the United States might expect to obtain:

(1) Saving of the money, and avoidance of the policy difficulties, involved in prosecuting an unsuccessful course of action.

(2) Preservation and possible extension of the China trade of the United States and associated countries. Given the economic problems of Britain and Japan, and the shrinking foreign markets of the United States, this trade cannot be considered negligible—all the more so since a China in the process of reconstruction could become a far greater market than in the past.

(3) The rewinning, in significant measure, of the good will long enjoyed by the United States in China, with possible beneficial consequences to the United States in the international sphere and in China's internal evolution. Any policy—such as that outlined in this statement—which tends to produce a less, rather than a more rigid, development of Chinese life should have effects beneficial to peace and to the international survival and spread of the best values of our own tradition.

(4) Promotion of some of the conditions essential to orderly change in other parts of Asia. The Chinese revolution will inevitably have effects beyond the borders of China, especially since the surrounding countries are themselves pregnant with change. One way to help regularize the outside effects of Chinese developments would seem to be to work for normal relations with the new Chinese Government. This is not to say that in the event of normal trade, etc., with China, the latter will lose interest in, for example, southeast Asia. Far from it. Nor can the most satisfactory relationship with China in itself provide an answer to the explosive policy issues in the area of Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, etc. The question is simply this: Is it likely to be easier for the west to deal with the need for change in southeast Asia, if American-Chinese relations are marked by sharp hostility, or if China already has been given a stake—an economic stake—in good relations with the United States and Britain?

The assumption in the preceding remarks is that it is deeply in the interest of the United States to normalize its relations with China; that the United States does not have the power to control the Chinese situation; that the exertion of various forms of economic and other pressure on China would constitute no more than delaying actions; and that the power of China, in alliance with other factors in Asia, to harass the Western Powers is not less, and perhaps greater, than the power of the west to harass the new Chinese Government. Apart from these considerations, the writer assumes that the years immediately ahead will be years of general peace—no matter how disturbed particular areas may be—and that some of the most crucial issues in Asia—like the Chinese civil war itself—will be settled within a peaceful international framework.

There is no intention in the above statement to suggest that even the most satisfactory American relationship with China could in itself provide answers to the problems confronting the United States elsewhere in Asia. Trade between Japan and China, for example, will help Japan to face its economic problems, but cannot take the place of a satisfactory Japanese economic policy. Again, nothing that happens in China can be expected to save France from a debacle in Indochina—a debacle which is the product, first of all of French policy. A few general observations are therefore in order: (1) The United States should make known by its actions that it is not afraid of political, social, and economic change in Asia. Asia is overripe for change, and no policy committing this country to support of the status quo can be successful. (2) The United States should particularly concentrate on economic improvement in Asia. The more we help the peoples of Asia to establish governments contributing to the well-being of the average man—who, in four cases out of five, is a peasant—the more secure will our own democracy be. (3) It is futile to think that we could control the future of Asia. We have the power to influence, but the power of decision lies increasingly with the people of the region.

Mr. MORRIS. This is introduced in the record to show again the recommendations of a particular witness who has testified as he has today before this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. He has refused to answer certain questions and it is clear that he has because they have been repeated at times.

We will receive now in evidence this document as to the recommendations he made to the United States Department of State after a request that he furnish information and advice to them.

What is your answer to the question?

Mr. ROSINGER. Will you repeat the question?

(The reporter read back the following question:)

I will read to you: "The Chinese Communists will find economic recovery and reconstruction an enormously difficult job. They will therefore be interested in trade with the west. But there is no reason to believe that for the sake of such trade they would abandon their alinement with the U. S. S. R. or sacrifice basic principles of their internal policy." Did you state that in your memorandum that you gave to the State Department on September 22, 1949?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe that today?

Mr. ROSINGER. I think that is another question on which I would have to study the situation and draft an answer very carefully.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you do that and furnish it for the committee?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I submit that inasmuch as opinions are being introduced as samples of Mr. Rosinger's views, that unless he wishes to amplify on this in any way that we let them stand.

Senator FERGUSON. This is to stand. This is not an explanation. I am talking about today.

You cited on page 1 of the American policy toward China, by you, and you have it before you, the white paper as authority for the first item. What is your authority for No. 2?

Mr. ROSINGER. If authority means specific references, obviously I couldn't recall them at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ROSINGER. Specific reference would have to be something that was written at the time and there would be no means of recalling now what those references were.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that true as to No. 3?

Mr. MORRIS. What is No. 3, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER (reading):

Nationalism has never been as strong in China as it is today, and the Chinese Communists have succeeded in making themselves the leaders of Chinese nationalism.

This was September 1949.

A person can obtain reference for a fact, when was a certain cabinet established? In the process of research it isn't so easy to obtain source proofs for a broad conclusion that represents a kind of summation of a lot of reading and work.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but you were giving the State Department advice. I want to know the source of your advice.

Mr. ROSINGER. If you want it in general terms, the source was a great deal of reading and thinking about the China situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever been in China?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How long?

Mr. ROSINGER. In 1946.

Senator FERGUSON. How long?

Mr. ROSINGER. I left this country, if I recall, in April and was back, I think in September.

Senator FERGUSON. Under whose auspices did you go to China?

Mr. ROSINGER. The Foreign Policy Association.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it under a grant?

Mr. ROSINGER. The association itself, as I recall, provided the money.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they get it from a grant?

Mr. ROSINGER. You mean from a foundation or organization?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your mission there?

Mr. ROSINGER. It was to travel about, study the situation, learn as much as I could about conditions in China.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you meet Mao Tse-tung?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you reconcile No. 3 about the nationalism with the language you used under 5 on page 3 of the original, of their alinement with the U. S. S. R., that they would not abandon their alinement with the U. S. S. R.? Do you consider that that was still nationalism?

Mr. ROSINGER. Again this is a very complex question which would have to be explored at length.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the authority for No. 4, "The prestige of the United States in China is currently at low ebb"?

Mr. ROSINGER. Again I don't recall the exact references but I think that a simple check of leading magazines, Time, Life, and so on, at that time would indicate agreement with this estimate of the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know anything about the directive that General Marshall had when he went to China in 1946?

Mr. ROSINGER. You mean public directives?

Senator FERGUSON. No, a directive from the State Department as to what his mission was.

Mr. ROSINGER. I recall a statement by the President at that time. There was some documentation in the white paper.

Senator FERGUSON. About his mission?

Mr. ROSINGER. About his mission.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything about his directive other than what appeared in the document you testified about?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. So everything you learned about this particular directive you learned from the source about which you testified?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, certain portions of this have been underlined. Is that underlining yours?

Mr. ROSINGER. I think so. It was just designed to make initial sentences stand out.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Rosinger, have you put in the record when you were born?

Mr. ROSINGER. 1915.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you write your first article, what age?

Mr. ROSINGER. Probably about 22.

Senator FERGUSON. You had not written anything before that?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; not for publication.

Senator FERGUSON. At what age did you graduate from college?

Mr. ROSINGER. Twenty.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you written anything that was published before you graduated from college?

Mr. ROSINGER. Well, some theses in school publications.

Senator FERGUSON. But nothing under a grant?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your age when you received the first grant?

Mr. ROSINGER. It depends upon which one you mean. At the time of the Chinese Language Summer School in the summer of 1937, I was 22, or a little less than that. At the time of the grant of 1939-40 I was 24 or a little bit less, when that grant began.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record—it already has been introduced as exhibit 129, but I would like to have it read in the record in connection with the appearance of Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter in the record, identifying it first?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Mr. W. L. Holland, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York, N. Y., from J. K. Fairbank, care of Mr. Lauchin Currie, the White House, Washington, D. C., February 28, 1944:

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: I have read over the latter part—  
and in pencil is inserted "Of Rosinger's ms on China"—

and it seems like a very good job indeed. Can't something be done to send Rosinger to China some time? The Government will not be happy about this but it is so well done that they can hardly call it—

and then the word "near" is crossed out—

propaganda.

How can we expedite bringing our friend to California?

Sincerely—

signed "John" and then below that "J. K. Fairbank."

Mr. MORRIS. We put the penciled note on that, Mr. Chairman, even though when it was originally introduced in the record we did not put it in the record, but let the record show that now.

Mr. MANDEL. Penciled note marked:

ECC.

John thinks you should wire Sproul to find out what is happening about the invitation to Han-seng. He is quite worried about the delay—

signed "WLH."

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever discuss with John K. Fairbank the possibility of your being sent to China?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall completely, but there could have been such a discussion.

Mr. MORRIS. How well did you know John K. Fairbank?

Mr. ROSINGER. Slightly, over a period of time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. ROSINGER. I met Lauchlin Currie I think at the IPR conference at Hot Springs in 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the Government had anything to do with your going to China in 1946?

Mr. ROSINGER. Not to my knowledge, unless you include the passport in that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Other than the passport.

Mr. ROSINGER. No; not as far as I know.

Senator FERGUSON. In 1946, did you not have to have clearance by the Army?

Mr. ROSINGER. I believe I went just after that rule was dropped. That is my recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record a letter dated December 30, 1943, from Mr. Rosinger to Mr. William L. Holland.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that, please?

Mr. MANDEL. May I mention that the previous letter has already been introduced as exhibit No. 129? This letter has been introduced previously as exhibit No. 131. It is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and is on the letterhead of the Foreign Policy Association, dated December 30, 1943, addressed to Mr. William L. Holland from Larry Rosinger.

DEAR BILL: Thanks for the comments from Stewart. I disagreed with one or two of them, but I believe they will be very useful. I am looking forward to the suggestions from Fairbank and Hiss. I have taken care of your order for the two foreign policy reports, which I understand will be sent to you at a 20-percent discount. I think you will be interested to know that we will publish on February 1 another report of mine, tentatively titled "The Western Stake in Colonial Asia." I doubt that this will be available in print much before publication, but if your conference is taking place before the end of the month, it may be possible to secure some copies. In any event, if you want me to, I will send you the proofs, in about 2 weeks.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall writing that letter, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privileges in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you answer that way as to that whole letter?

Mr. ROSINGER. There is no way of breaking the letter in parts.

Senator FERGUSON. You said you did not know or that you did know Fairbanks? Which is it?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't think you asked me at this session.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Fairbank?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How long have you known him?

Mr. ROSINGER. I am sorry. Of course, I have already answered. I said I had known him slightly, over a period of time.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his position?

Mr. ROSINGER. At what time?

Senator FERGUSON. On December 30, 1943.

Mr. ROSINGER. I can't be sure. He had some Washington position.

Senator FERGUSON. In the Government?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes; that is my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. What suggestions were you looking forward to from a man by the name of Fairbank in the Government?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever get any suggestions from Fairbank, who was in the Government, back in 1943?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever get suggestions from a man named Hiss?



Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever get comments from a man named Stewart?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the Stewart who appears on this letter Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. BOUDIN. Which letter?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the Fairbank mentioned here the John K. Fairbank?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the Hiss mentioned here Alger Hiss?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Donald Hiss?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Apparently, Mr. Chairman, we are not going to get any additional evidence from this witness on this particular letter, so I think we had better let it stand.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce in the record a letter from Mr. W. L. Holland, addressed to Mrs. Wilma Fairbank, Department of State, Washington, D. C., October 27, 1944.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter?

Mr. MANDEL. That is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and reads as follows:

DEAR WILMA: Here is a letter to Chien Tuan-sheng and a covering note to Dr. White which you may want to read and then give to him. In case you have to get the money to him quickly I am enclosing my check for \$300. As soon as I hear that you have cashed it I will ask the IPR to reimburse me.

Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of Larry Rosinger's book, China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44 in the hope that you can send it by pouch to someone in Kunming who can deliver it to Chien. Possibly Dr. White himself might take it if he wants to read the book on the way.

Senator FERGUSON. The copy that you gave out here, dated October 27, does not have a part of that in it. You have inserted something after 1937-44, in the one you handed me to put in evidence, "in the hope that you can send it to Chien."

Mr. MANDEL. There is an error in copying by the clerical staff. The copy I have here reads "send it by pouch."

Mr. MORRIS. Give Mr. Rosinger an opportunity by using this particular sheet to insert what has been left out in the transcription.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of Larry Rosinger's book China's Wartime Politics, 1937-1944, in the hope that you can send it by pouch to someone in Kunming who can deliver it to Chien. Possibly Dr. White

himself might take it, if he wants to read the book on the way. I shall also try to have a copy sent to the OWI office in Kunming. I am most grateful for your help. Best wishes,  
Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Senator FERGUSON. Read what it says in the lower left-hand corner.  
Mr. MANDEL (reading) :

Mrs. Wilma Fairbank, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

(The document referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 355.")

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, did you make any arrangements to have your volume, China's Wartime Politics, 1937-1944, delivered by pouch to Government officials abroad?

Mr. ROSINGER. Not as far as I can recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any such arrangement that was made?

Mr. ROSINGER. Well, specifically, it would apply to this letter. I have no recollection of ever having seen this letter or heard of its contents.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know a Dr. White?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know a Wilma Fairbank?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know W. L. Holland?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was Holland?

Mr. ROSINGER. At the present time he is the—I have forgotten the exact title of it—I think International Secretariat of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record a letter from W. L. Holland to John K. Fairbank, care of Mrs. Wilma Fairbank, Division of Cultural Relations, State Department, Washington, D. C., dated February 21, 1944.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that as a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and read its contents?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 21, 1944, to Dr. John Fairbank, from W. L. Holland:

DEAR JOHN: I enclose a manuscript by Larry Rosinger on China's wartime politics, in the hope that you can find a few minutes in which to read it and give me your criticisms. This was supposed to have been sent to you some weeks ago, but I have been waiting for some comments from people in the State Department. The comments, when they arrived, were not very enlightening, but you know how those things are. If you don't feel like reading the whole thing through, I wish you would concentrate on the last part, from page 47 onward. The manuscript is unsatisfactory in several ways mainly because Rosinger had originally intended to write about twice as much but had to change his plans because of his illness and lack of time.

I shall be down in Washington next Friday and would like to see you then for a few minutes.

P. S.—I have sent the books from Lowdermilk to Wilma.

(For the document referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandel see exhibit No. 128, open hearings before this committee, pt. 2, p. 479.)

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have a copy of that?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who Wilma is there?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know a person by the name of Lowdermilk?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, to what extent was the manuscript of your volume China's Wartime Politics submitted to officials of the State Department for criticism before publication?

Mr. ROSINGER. I can't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you do not know?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right. I don't know to whom it was submitted.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you give us any testimony in connection with this procedure that Mr. Holland is writing about to Mr. John Fairbank?

Mr. ROSINGER. What procedure do you mean?

Mr. MORRIS. Respecting the comments on your manuscript by the State Department.

Mr. ROSINGER. With the proviso that the explanation of a letter by somebody else should really come from the writer, but not from me—

Mr. MORRIS. We are asking you if you have any additional testimony.

Mr. ROSINGER. I just mean that in the last analysis its meaning must be given by the person who wrote it. The general procedure at the Institute of Pacific Relations, as far as I am familiar with it, was to submit manuscripts for criticism to a variety of people in a fixed field. That included unofficial people and it at times included official people.

Senator FERGUSON. You would say that all your writings under these grants were submitted to people in the Secretary of State's office for criticism.

Mr. ROSINGER. That I cannot say, because it wasn't an invariable rule that it had to go to an official. The invariable rule that it had to be read by a group of people outside the office.

Senator FERGUSON. On what occasions do you have knowledge that your works were submitted to the Department of State officials?

Mr. ROSINGER. Well, I am willing to accept the statement in this letter concerning China's Wartime Politics.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any corrections that the State Department ever made on any of your manuscripts or any additions?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I can't recall any precisely, but, as a general proposition, I would like to say that the kind of corrections they made were usually things that could be called sheer facts, dates, something of that sort, rather than any effort to discuss interpretation.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ever change any conclusions that you had drawn?

Mr. ROSINGER. Not to my knowledge. Of course, they didn't have the power to change any conclusions. All they could do was to suggest, but I don't recall their making any suggestions.

Senator FERGUSON. What were you asking for?

Mr. ROSINGER. I wasn't asking.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the institute asking for when they wrote a letter like the one of February 21, 1944?

Mr. ROSINGER. Essentially they wanted any suggestions for improvement that they could get.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that not include conclusions, policy?

Mr. ROSINGER. Just as an assumption, I assume the institute would have no objection, but my recollection, or my impression is that that kind of suggestion was not forthcoming. Usually the comments were confined to pretty factual points.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know any changes that the State Department suggested in any of your writings?

Mr. ROSINGER. I cannot recall any.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they made, if they were suggested by them?

Mr. ROSINGER. Well, if anybody ever pointed out to me a factual error in something I had written in a manuscript I would take it without the slightest hesitation.

Senator FERGUSON. Are we then to take for granted that the works you have written here, outside of factual data, like dates, and so forth, have been approved by our State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. Absolutely not.

Senator FERGUSON. Have they been submitted?

Mr. ROSINGER. In this case, but if I recall, the kind of statement they always made was that "This does not constitute approval."

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever ask John Fairbank for a criticism of any of your works, prior to publication?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall personally asking him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever ask Wilma Fairbank?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall personally asking her.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record a letter from Frederick V. Field, dated January 23, 1940, to the members of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter and read the last paragraph?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the letterhead of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated January 23, 1940, from Frederick V. Field. The last paragraph reads as follows:

You may be interested to note that two other newly published American council pamphlets are now off the press. Deadlock in China, by Lawrence K. Rosinger, provides a vivid and up-to-date picture of the Sino-Japanese War in its international setting, and America Holds the Balance in the Far East, by Robert W. Barnett, analyzes the present issues in American policy against the background of far eastern history and of America's relations to Europe.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 357" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 357

Officers: Philip C. Jessup, Chairman; Wallace M. Alexander, Vice Chairman; Miss Ada L. Comstock, Vice Chairman; Benjamin H. Kizer, Vice Chairman; Philo W. Parker, Vice Chairman; Robert Gordon Sproul, Vice Chairman; Ray Lyman Wilbur, Vice Chairman; Frederick V. Fields, Secretary; Francis S. Harmon, Treasurer; Miss Hilda Austern, Assistant Treasurer

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,  
New York, N. Y., January 23, 1940.

To the MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL:

The expiration of the Japanese-American trade treaty on January 26, 1940, 6 months after its denunciation by the United States Government, serves to focus the spotlight on the next move in American Far Eastern policy.

To aid in clarifying this important political issue and placing it in its proper perspective, the American council has just published *Our Far Eastern Record: A Reference Digest on American Policy*, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. It contains a brief selection of important diplomatic documents, trade statistics, data on public opinion and a digest of proposed legislation. It is hoped that this will be of use to council members who wish certain documentary information in compact form, but who are too busy to go to official sources.

You may be interested to note that two other newly published American council pamphlets are now off the press. *Deadlock in China*, by Lawrence K. Rosinger, provides a vivid and up-to-date picture of the Sino-Japanese war in its international setting, and *America Holds the Balance in the Far East*, by Robert W. Barnett, analyzes the present issues in American policy against the background of Far East history and of America's relations to Europe.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have asked questions of the witness before, concerning Frederick V. Field and Robert W. Barnett. In each case the witness has invoked his privilege. I assume that the questions I have prepared for the witness in connection with Mr. Barnett and Mr. Field will meet with the same response.

Is that right, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. So, I have no other questions, in view of that fact.

Senator FERGUSON. So, this may remain in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. I had intended to ask the witness about his relations with Mr. Field and Mr. Barnett, but, in view of his previous invoking of the privilege, I am dispensing with it.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record a letter dated May 31, 1940, from Mr. Owen Lattimore to Mr. E. C. Carter.

I will ask Mr. Mandel if he will identify this and read paragraph 1.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew Mr. Lattimore; did you not, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How long have you known Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. ROSINGER. Slightly over a period of perhaps 13 years.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever been to his home?

Mr. ROSINGER. Once.

Senator FERGUSON. Has he ever been to your home?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. On what occasion were you at his home?

Mr. ROSINGER. Simply invited down there.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. I can't recall. Perhaps 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever submit any of your works to Owen Lattimore for criticism before their publication?

Mr. ROSINGER. I may have submitted to him the manuscript of *China's Wartime Politics*.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know any alterations or changes he made in it, or additions?

Mr. ROSINGER. My recollection is that he did not make any suggestions for change.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How long have you known Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. ROSINGER. I probably didn't meet her until some years after meeting him. I know her extremely slightly.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you visit the Lattimores, and at their house, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. Perhaps 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it approximately that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. It could have been 1948; I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you work with Mr. Lattimore on the institute?

Mr. ROSINGER. My recollection is that he was an editor of Pacific Affairs when I was there, in 1939-40; but my work did not involve working with him, as part of my regular employment.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see him often at that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; because I think he was mostly not in New York.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever visit the State Department with him?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You answered, I believe——

Mr. ROSINGER. Except, of course, with respect to that China conference. We were all there at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you agree generally with Lattimore at that conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. I would have to examine his remarks at the conference, and study the degree of disagreement or agreement, with my own.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you disagree with Harold Stassen at the conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. I think that has two aspects. I don't recall that I expressed disagreement with the specific point that he made, in relation to his having made it.

Senator FERGUSON. You advocated recognition of Red China there.

Mr. ROSINGER. There were a couple of points on which our statements did not coincide.

Senator FERGUSON. You did advocate the recognition of Red China?

Mr. ROSINGER. Instead of saying "Yes" or "No," could I read the one paragraph statement I made at the conference, which I think gives more of the shadings of my position than a "Yes" or "No" answer would?

Senator FERGUSON. I will put it this way: Do you now advocate the recognition of Red China by the United States?

Mr. ROSINGER. You mean at this particular moment?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. We have the other statement in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Not yet, Mr. Chairman. We have not introduced that in the record. We have introduced in the record here recommendations in connection with what should be done, but we have not introduced in the record as yet his actual statements at the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. I think he was talking about his recommendations in writing.

Mr. ROSINGER. I was talking about my oral remarks.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you advocate at that time that we give no aid in keeping Chiang Kai-shek and his government in Formosa?

Mr. ROSINGER. My recollection is that I said nothing on the subject of Formosa at the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. But in your statement of—

Mr. ROSINGER. You mean this statement? Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I have not read it through. The statement itself will show that.

You have this on page 4:

No further aid to Chiang Kai-shek or other segments of the Kuomintang. No aid to war lords or local regimes.

A. This includes avoidance of economic or military intervention in Formosa.

Mr. BOUDIN. We are looking at a different copy. We cannot find the material.

Senator FERGUSON. It is (1) on page 4.

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes; I said that in the memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether Harold Stassen advocated the same thing?

Mr. ROSINGER. He never submitted a memorandum. My recollection is that he did not advocate that at the conference, but neither did I say anything on the subject of Formosa at the conference. In fact, I would like to add that Mr. Stassen mentioned 10 points I was supposed to have advocated.

A careful search of the transcript of the conference indicates he might have been right on 2½ or 3, but on 7 or 6 of the other 10 points you won't find confirmation in the conference transcripts.

Mr. MORRIS. It was his testimony, Mr. Rosinger, that the group of which you and Mr. Lattimore were leaders, had advocated that.

Mr. ROSINGER. I am not granting the description of the conference. I must say, from what I have read of the testimony, he shifted ground in so many cases, it is hard to tell whether he was charging me with 10 points or not, but the newspaper coverage, which was naturally a brief clip coverage, definitely gave the impression that he said I supported 10 points.

I think, if a person has supported 3 or 4 out of 10 points, he can't conceivably be called an advocate of those 10 points at the conference.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, in view of the fact that Mr. Rosinger impliedly indicates he has not read these 10 points—

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I have read the 10 points.

Senator FERGUSON. Who furnished you a copy of the transcripts?

Mr. ROSINGER. Of that conference?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ROSINGER. The State Department sent it to all the participants when it made a public release.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to that, did you have a conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you agree with Owen Lattimore at the conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. I have already said I would have to see exactly what he said.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do remember the part about Stassen?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes; because, when a man attacks you, you naturally pay a certain amount of attention to what he says about you.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate, then, that Lattimore agreed with you.

Mr. ROSINGER. No; not everybody who disagrees with me, fortunately, has engaged in attacking me.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you known Governor Stassen before?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever met him before that conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you meet him at the conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

I would like to say also that you had another witness who attacked me, Professor Colgrove, and his testimony is not in agreement with that of Governor Stassen on some points.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Professor Colegrove?

Mr. ROSINGER. I met him only at the conference.

I would like to point out in connection with his reliability or unreliability as a witness that he testified that George Kennan spoke at the conference and he, Colgrove, thought that Kennan's remarks were old stuff and of no particular interest or help.

But, if you will look at the record of the conference, you will see that he praised Kennan's remarks effusively at the time.

In other words, you have a witness who says on one occasion before this subcommittee that Kennan's remarks were of no value whatever, and then at the conference asserts that they are of the greatest value.

Mr. MORRIS. That is your comment with respect——

Mr. ROSINGER. It is in the record. A comparison by your research staff will show that fact.

Mr. MORRIS. You used the words "attack you", Mr. Rosinger; is that correct?

Mr. ROSINGER. Of whom?

Mr. MORRIS. Both of Mr. Stassen and Mr. Colegrove.

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes; I would say it was an attack.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, was Lattimore's article or manuscript ever submitted to you for comment prior to its publication?

Mr. ROSINGER. I was the editor of *The State of Asia*, and a chapter of the book is by him and his wife. So, I would say, as far as I recall, that is the only manuscript of his that I have commented on.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Field ever submit a Lattimore manuscript to you for criticism?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have just asked the witness a question in connection with Lattimore's article being submitted to him for criticism before publication. "He can recall one incident."

I then asked him if he recalls Frederick Field submitting an article by Lattimore to him for criticism. He declines to answer.

I think the witness is in a very contradictory position there.

Mr. BOUDIN. I do not think there is anything contradictory when you yourself agree for the record that any reference to Field can bring an assertion of the privilege.

Senator FERGUSON. Does he claim his privilege on this last question?

Mr. BOUDIN. Yes, the witness claims the privilege.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that right?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.



Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record a memorandum to FVF, which are the initials used by Mr. Field, from LKR, which are the initials of Mr. Rosinger, dated February 5, 1940.

This commences:

I think Lattimore's article is excellent; clearly thought out and very well put. I have a few suggestions of a minor character that may improve it further.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received, with that understanding as to the source.

(The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 359 and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 359

FEBRUARY 5, 1940.

F. V. F. from L. K. R.:

I think Lattimore's article is excellent; clearly thought out and very well put. I have a few suggestions of a minor character that may improve it further:

Page 1, paragraph 3, line 3. Shouldn't "therefore" be "however," since the implication of the two previous sentences is that we are taking a strong position toward Japan?

Page 3, line 10. Since the implication here is that we should develop a correct policy before the events, instead of sadly understanding events after they have occurred, how about saying "the problem today is one of correctly understanding and shaping history in the making."

Page 4, line 11. Wouldn't it be better to say: "it will be partly because of American stupidity"? After all, if it is foolish to say that Russian influence by itself can bring bolshevism to China, then it is at least equally false to attribute that power to the United States.

Pages 4-5. The argument here is that social explosions result when internal forces meet outside pressures. I don't know what can be done about it, but this argument—despite a certain cogency—struck me as a little bit foolish, since it is almost equivalent to say that (e. g.) if tsarism had been tsarism, then there would never have been a Bolshevik revolution. And yet the point has its validity. Perhaps it would be helpful to indicate here (as well as later) that the pressures upon China do not now constitute a fixed mathematical quantity, but that their weight can be changed radically by the counterpressure of the United States.

Page 5, last line. Considering the highly dubious origin of the new life movement (i. e., it was essentially a political move in the civil war period), I wonder whether it should be cited as an example of the drive toward "modern," "efficient" political ideas. I don't know much about what has happened to the movement since the outbreak of the far eastern war, but my feeling is that new life is pretty much in the background—perhaps almost the discard.

Page 6, line 10. Perhaps it would be desirable to qualify "every" by "almost," since I suppose that there are certain elements, particularly compradore elements in the captured cities, that—whatever their abstract desires—would be willing to deal with the Japanese, permanently. Or is Lattimore's statement "wants to grow stronger" sufficient to make "almost" unnecessary?

Page 12, paragraph 3, line 5. "led by the Communists." Since Lattimore has not stated precisely what the nature of the split in the united front might be, one would be entitled to assume that important Kuomintang elements might go along with the Communists. In this case, one could only say that the Communists would have more weight than they do now, but whether they would actually be the leaders is at least open to discussion. (This, I think, is particularly valid, since Lattimore has already said that "most" of the Chinese, in the circumstances mentioned, would go along with Russia and that only "some" of them would be of the Wang Ching-wei type.)

At this point perhaps it would buttress the argument to mention the well-known fact that Sun Yat-sen turned to Russia back in 1923-24 only after he was convinced that he could expect nothing—except possibly opposition—from other powers.

I think it might be wise in the paragraph next to the last line in the article to indicate that there might be ways, other than the embargo, of helping China—just so that the suggestions made will have as catholic a character as possible.

Mr. MORRIS. There is a contradiction, Mr. Chairman. This is obviously evidence of the fact that a Lattimore article was submitted to Mr. Rosinger for criticism and he has said he can recall of only one instance in 1948.

Senator FERGUSON. But he refuses to answer the other question as to whether or not any were submitted by Field.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter dated May 31, 1940, from Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Carter. May that be introduced?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want that in the appendix?

Mr. MORRIS. In the volume.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

Mr. MORRIS. Any objection, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. BOUDIN. We are not going to object to any documents you put in. I do not think it is our privilege to object to documents that you want to put in. I would suggest you just mark each one and put it in the record.

(The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 360, and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 360

[Pacific Affairs, published quarterly by the Institute of Pacific Relations, Amsterdam, London, Manila, Moscow, New York, Paris, Shanghai, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto]

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,  
Baltimore, Md., May 31, 1940.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,  
*Institute of Pacific Relations, New York City.*

DEAR CARTER: Your letter of May 30 about the seriousness with which we must regard our responsibility during a period in which so many international journals have disappeared from view, is very welcome. I have been holding everything, wondering if perhaps the best thing we could do would be to call on resources within the staff to get out a special issue of Pacific Affairs for next September.

However, what has come in thus far, or is already promised, seems to be fairly well aimed at the bulls-eye of the target you specify.

(1) We have the promise of an article by Rosinger on Soviet policy in the Far East since the outbreak of the European war. Considering the standard of his previous articles, this ought to be very good.

(2) We have the promise from Taylor on the theory and mechanics of puppet government. This will be rather speculative in nature. While based on study of Japanese methods in North China, it will have wider applications which, considering the recent submergence of a number of countries, ought to be sufficiently obvious.

(3) We have a long article, on the condensation of which I am now working, by a man named Shore, on the relation of Lenin's writing to Sun Yat-sen. This will be valuable as a background study for both Russian and Chinese policies and trends.

(4) I am also working on the condensation of an article that promises to be really magnificent on the relation of prospects for capital investment, the "450 million" market of China, the nature of the opposition between Japan's "new order" policy and America's open door policy, and so forth. This is by a man named Brandt (if I remember correctly, which I am not sure). This article was passed on to me by Field, but the manuscript does not have the author's name on it.

(5) I am thinking of writing an article myself to be called "Empire lies in the East," to deal with the fact that while the acute focus of struggle between England, France, Germany, and Italy lies in Western Europe, the spoils of victory lie in Africa and above all in Asia.

(6) If the review of the Canadian Royal Commission Report which you have requested from W. Y. Elliott arrives in time, it may also rank with our main articles in importance.

(7) Also financial article by Kurt Bloch.

Any suggestions for improvement or better balance that may occur to you will be very welcome.

I am very glad that both you and Holland will be keeping an eye on Herbert Norman. Like everybody else, I have been impressed by the quality of his work. We certainly ought to have something from him in Pacific Affairs.

Is *The Geology of China*, which you mentioned in your note of May 28, and which an accompanying bookseller's letter describes as "imported from Holland," the same as Li Ssu-kuang, *The Geology of China*. This author's name is given on our catalog card also as "J. S. Lee." We have the book in our geology collection, and it is given as published in 1939, in London, by T. Murby. Based on lectures given at various British universities.

If this is in fact the same book, I shall be glad to look at it and make a recommendation as to purchase.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a memorandum from FVF to LKR dated February 5, 1940.

Senator FERGUSON. These are all papers, Mr. Mandel, coming out of the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, are they?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. It will be received in evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a memorandum to FVF from ECC, dated April 2, 1940, previously introduced in the record as exhibit No. 217 at the open hearings of August 23, 1951.

Senator FERGUSON. You want it received again? It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 361, and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 361

APRIL 2, 1940.

FVF from ECC:

I have just had word from Cripps that he will accept my invitation for dinner on the evening of Thursday the 11th. This takes the place of the dinner to which I had invited you for this week. I hope you can come.

Before I send out all of the invitations that I would like to, I wish you would glance through the list below and let me know what four of five people had better be eliminated and what four or five people are important to add from the American Council point of view.

The private room at the Gladstone only holds 20 at the outside and I had rather thought that a meeting of more than 20 might inhibit complete candor on Cripps' part.

Yes. Frederick V. Field (in pencil)	Yes. Rossinger
Yes. P. E. Corbett	No. <del>T. A. Bisson</del>
Yes. W. W. Lockwood	Yes. Harry Price
W. B. Osgood Field, Jr.	No. <del>Luther Tucker</del>
No. Philip G. Jessup	No. <del>Sam Harper</del>
No. <del>Joe Barnes</del>	John Hazard
Yes. Harriet Moore	W. D. C.
No. <del>Mrs. Eliot Pratt</del>	Yes. Faymonville
Yes. Vilhjalmur Stefansson	(?) Geoffrey Wilson
Rose Rubin	No. <del>McCann</del>
Rose Somerville	Yes. Muhle
Robert S. Lynd	
Wm. W. Lancaster	
Yes. Ruth Carter	
Yes. Jack Shepherd	
Yes. Kathleen Barnes	
Yes. Robert W. Barnett	
Yes. Ch'ao-ting Chi	
Andrew Grajdanzev	
Yes. Edward C. Carter	
Yes. Sir Stafford Crips	

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter from Arthur H. Dean, dated April 18, 1949, to Clayton Lane, executive secretary of the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 362" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 362

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL,  
New York, April 18, 1949.

Mr. CLAYTON LANE,  
*Executive Secretary,*  
*American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.*  
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. LANE: Thank you for your letter of April 15, 1949, together with its enclosures. I think you are greatly to be congratulated on your success with General Marshall. I think we must be very careful, however, that we do not indicate to him either (a) that he is coming into an institution of financial difficulties and that we are going to use him to bolster up our appeal to the foundations, who I am inclined to think might misunderstand it, or (b) that we are going to use his name to obtain additional funds.

I realize that you have come into an exceptionally difficult situation, but I think we might go back to the publications of the institute and with the help of Larry Rosinger point out the difficulties our State Department is now facing in attempting to get up a constructive policy for China. I think we might make a very real contribution to the subject if we could state very objectively, but explicitly, problems which we now face in China. I am sure Owen Lattimore would be a great help in this.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR H. DEAN.

I hope you won't get discouraged. It is tough but I think worth while. You have my complete support but (1) I would not mention the Communist attack in relation to IPR publications, (2) for income tax as well as policy reasons I would not indicate we are engaged in pro- or anti-Communist attacks, (3) I would not indicate you have been brought in, to relieve a bad situation. This has antagonized some of Ned's friends.) Some way we must solve the Russian problem. It's up to us to find out what makes them tick; why they are what they are; it's not up to us to fight communism. If we try that we have no function; we must expose how it works, what it is, what it does, when it fails.

A. H. D.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter from Lawrence K. Rosinger to Mr. Frederick V. Field, dated May 8, 1940.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 363" and is as follows:

EXHIBIT No. 363

MAY 8, 1940.

To FVF from LKR:

I would like to add some ideas supplementary to those you have presented.

I agree that the time for an embargo has probably passed, in view of the long period Japan has had to prepare economically against such action, and in the light of the rapidly changing international situation.

It was originally hoped that the embargo would help bring about the national liberation of China and also aid in preserving the peace of the United States. These objectives must still be sought, but it is a question whether a program developed before the outbreak of war in Europe can still serve such ends. It may at least be inadequate and, at worst, dangerous.

If we consider the possibilities before American far eastern policy today, there are three courses that might appear feasible to the administration: (1) Compromise with Japan on the basis of America's yielding; (2) pressure on Japan to produce a compromise on American terms; (3) pressure on Japan with an eye toward war. The first of these policies is not impossible (the current Japanese-American conversations may be interpreted as supporting this), but does not appear likely to me, in view of America's sharpened consciousness of world power since the European war began, the possibility that Japan may

try to take advantage of British and French difficulties in Europe to press on farther in the Far East (i. e. against western interests—concessions in China, or against the East Indies), and the possibility that American appeasement of Japan might simply bring the Soviet Union into the far eastern situation more actively than before. Such a policy would be likely only if Washington decided to subordinate American far eastern interests to the needs of Britain and France in Europe. It is far more likely that the State Department intends to try to work out a synthesis in which opposition to Japan becomes a means of supporting Britain and France. \* \* \* The second policy is, I think, still being tried, but I feel that in view of Japanese preparations to meet the embargo and the Allied difficulties in Europe, American action short of war would not deter Japan and might simply lead her to move precipitately. \* \* \* This would leave the possibility of war with Japan, and there is no doubt that if the State Department had this in mind, it could use an embargo as a step toward military action.

It should be remembered that the embargo idea was initiated at a time when it was hoped that strong American action against Japan would simply form one part of international action, involving Britain, France and the U. S. S. R. It was hoped that this front (whether of all four nations, or three, or two) would impede Japan without offering her any hope of finding a way out through war. Of course, it was always considered possible that war might result, but this was thought to be quite unlikely. Today, however, an embargo policy must be thought of as an isolated American action. Britain and France are desperately anxious for agreement with Japan and are quite likely to carry this through despite American wishes. On the other hand, a Soviet-American front (though almost certainly a guarantee against war with Japan) is not in the realm of practical politics. The United States would then have a choice: (1) It could take unilateral action against Japan, at a time (such as the present) when the European and Far Eastern wars are still separate; or (2) it could, if the European and Far Eastern wars were already joined, take action against Japan and thereby make this country an ally of Britain and France. I am inclined to think that the former course, no less than the latter, would involve us in the European war.

Along these lines, an important point should be made. It is commonly assumed, in discussing the embargo question, that the only danger lies in the possibility that Japan might take such action as the occasion for war with the United States. It is worth while to consider whether the United States might not use the embargo as a first step toward war with Japan. It is conceivable that the State Department may reach the conclusion that a peaceful agreement with Japan on American terms is impossible, that Japan is bent on continuing a war which only has the effect of ruining China more and more completely and making it profitless for all nations, and that there is real danger of Japan's joining up at an appropriate moment with Germany—and Italy. In such a situation, the United States might decide that Japan should be stopped by war. I am inclined to think that such a policy appears more credible than it would have some months ago, in view of the definite steps taken for the extension of American economic and political influence abroad—e. g.: Western "hemispheric cooperation," stronger attitude toward Mexico (on oil) interest in Greenland and Iceland. The official statements on the Dutch East Indies, though now probably simply part of a diplomatic maneuver, could also point in this direction. Leaving aside the possible ways of American involvement in war suggested on the last page, it is also worth while to think about the situation that would arise if further Anglo-French defeats in Europe should bring a weakening of the imperial control of the two countries. It is possible, in such a situation, to think of a race among Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States to "fill the vacuum" created by a gradual or rapid French and British decline. This may not occur, of course, but support of the embargo might simply mean support of a general American expansionist movement in connection with which China would be a relatively minor issue.

The question then arises: What concrete far-eastern policy can be suggested for the United States. It is important to remember that it is not always necessary to suggest a policy that may be feasible from a governmental point of view at a particular moment. There are times when all "practical" policies may be undesirable, and when all desirable policies may be officially "impractical." I think that, in connection with the Far East, the tendency should be to watch American policy closely, to ask constantly whether American far-eastern policy envisages a truly independent China or whether the objective is to establish an American economic (indirectly political) control which will keep China in a semicolonial status, even though the heel of Japan has been removed. It is also important to consider all the time the possibility of American involvement in war by way of the Pacific. I think the emphasis should be on: (1) No involvement in war; (2) No agreement with Japan; (3) Continued sympathy with China, as indicated by already existing measures (silver purchases, loans).

As far as the embargo is concerned, despite what I have said, I would not be in favor of publicly abandoning the idea. This would, I think, be very bad from the point of view of the pro-China movement in this country, since some people might get the idea that what Japan does and what happens to China is of no interest to us at all. Furthermore, I think continued discussion of America's complicity in Japanese aggression can be worth while in indicating the dangers inherent in American far-eastern policy. In short, I think the embargo question should be given a subordinate function of an educational character in the movement for sympathy with China and that one should no longer stress the hope that the State Department can be induced to change its present far-eastern policy without replacing it by something equally bad in other respects.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter dated October 5, 1946, to Mr. E. C. Carter, ECC from RJG, dated October 5, 1946.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 364," and is as follows:)

OCTOBER 5, 1946.

ECC from RJG:

Am in New York for the weekend and just couldn't stay away from the office! No, actually I came in in the hopes of finding you for a few minutes conversation, or, lacking that, to leave you this memo so that you will have it the first thing Monday morning.

Point number one is that the first Washington advisory committee meeting is now scheduled for Thursday evening, October 17. Could you possibly come down for it? In talking with Mortimer Graves I said that probably you or Peggy or both would be down for this first meeting. He asked to be remembered to you and expressed the hope that you could make this first meeting for he felt it would serve as a tremendous shot in the arm for the whole committee if you were there. I know Peggy hoped to come down for it and both of you would be even better. Please do let me know if we may expect one or both of you as soon as you can make plans, won't you? I'd like to tell the other committee members so as to be doubly sure they'll be present.

Incidentally, the people who served on the committee before and who are still in Washington are:

Catherine Porter (probably will have left by then)

Isabel Ward

Eleanor Lattimore

Abbot Low Moffat (and Mrs. Moffat)

Mortimer Graves (and Mrs. Graves)

Pat and Bob Barnett

Margaret and William Carter

Shirley Jenkins

Karl Pelzer (and Mrs. Pelzer)

Lillian Coville

The additions who have been approved to date by the above people and whom I hope to have at the first meeting are:

John Barrow (replaces Dr. Arndt at the U. S. Office of Education)

Ethel Summy of Wilson Teachers College

Mr. and Mrs. Seldon Menefee

Mary Jane Keeney (now in charge of programs at the Metropolitan Broadcasting Company)

Eric Beecroft (now in Hawaii and won't be back by then)

If you think of someone else you think we should have at that meeting please do tell me won't you? Dr. Johnstone's assistant I haven't met yet, but I plan to this week and everyone thinks he should be asked if he is interested.

\* \* \* \* \*

Point number two—in carrying out the two office meetings and one larger meeting each month plan, we have about concluded that the large November meeting should really be a large one. We would like it to be enough of a drawing card so that a large number of people who are potential members can be sent invitations as well as the total Washington membership. This means a name and fairly popular. We all think John Hersey would be the perfect person. I know you were thinking of him in terms of a New York lunch, but do you think he

might do both? Or, if not, don't you think perhaps a large dinner or just an evening meeting in Washington in November using him might take precedence over a New York meeting just this once? We do so need something large and impressive at this juncture. If you agree, I wonder if you would ask Hersey since he did write such a nice letter with his contribution telling you how much he was indebted to the IPR. He probably comes up to Washington anyway from time to time from North Carolina. He could set his own date and we'd work around it. Please let me know your reactions on this won't you?

Incidentally, will you please let me know right away whether I should ask Sumner Welles to the Advisory Committee meeting in Washington or whether you'd like to write to him or whether we shouldn't ask him at all.

Our office meeting for the 10th is Roy James talking about Guam. We will probably have Hendershot on Burma for the second office meeting later in the month. We are still trying to get Larry Rosinger for a luncheon the end of this month—working it through an invitation the Lattimores are extending to the Rosingers to spend a weekend with them and incidentally talk to the IPR on a Friday or a Monday (he's teaching in New York Tuesdays and Thursdays).

The enclosed are the announcements we have sent to all members and various organizations in and around Washington. Do you think of anyone or any place we should have particularly sent it to? We also included all the regional offices, incidentally.

That is about all the vital questions and information. I will be anxious for your reply before going ahead any further on any of this.

RENEE.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter to Gen. Frank McCoy, Foreign Policy Association, from Raymond Dennett, dated November 28, 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 365" and is as follows:)

NOVEMBER 28, 1944.

General FRANK R. MCCOY,  
*Foreign Policy Association,*  
22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

DEAR GENERAL MCCOY. Do you think it would be possible for the Foreign Policy Association to dispense with Lawrence Rosinger's services for the period of the Ninth International Conference of the IPR from January 5 to 17, 1945? As you know, the Institute has published a number of Rosinger's special studies and the American Council is quite anxious to have him attend the Conference as a recorder. In this position we may secure the benefit of his expert knowledge and the Foreign Policy Association may profit from the opportunity he will get to talk over Far Eastern matters with some of the delegates from the other countries.

Mr. Rosinger would be taking notes at some of the sessions which would be available for his own use in the FPA as well as furnishing material for published proceedings which will be issued later by the Institute. The total cost of the trip, including transportation, will probably be in the vicinity of \$180. The American Council will be glad, if it is necessary, to take care of some portion of this expense, but we would be very glad indeed if the Foreign Policy Association would be able to consider the time Mr. Rosinger spends in Hot Springs as part of official business and might, therefore, be able to take care of a major share of this expense.

I sincerely hope that you will consider this request favorably and will be kind enough to make Mr. Rosinger's services available.

With cordial best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

Mr. MORRIS. This is a memorandum dated December 4, 1944, listing members present at the 1945 conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 366" and is as follows:)

DECEMBER 4, 1944.

## AMERICAN COUNCIL SECRETARIAT FOR 1945 CONFERENCE

## Executive Secretaries:

Raymond Dennett  
 William C. Johnstone  
 Charles F. Loomis  
 Ernest B. Price

Harriet Mills  
 Lawrence Rosinger  
 Marguerite A. Stewart  
 Virginia Thompson (?)

## Recorders:

Dorothy Borg  
 Miriam S. Farley  
 Shirley Jenkins  
 Carolyn Kizer  
 Bruno Lasker  
 Eleanor Lattimore

## General Workers:

Frances Sharpe  
 Nancy Wilder  
 Stenographer: Margaret Fischl  
 Secretary to American Delegation:  
 Harriet H. Parker

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter from Roger F. Evans to W. L. Holland, dated January 18, 1951.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The documents referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 367" and is as follows:)

## The Social Sciences:

Joseph H. Willits, Director  
 Norman S. Buchanan, Associate Director  
 Leland D. De Vinney, Associate Director  
 Roger F. Evans, Assistant Director  
 Philip E. Mosely, Assistant Director

## THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION

49 West 49th Street, New York 20

JANUARY 18, 1951.

Cable Address: Rockfound, New York

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,

*Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street,  
 New York, 22, N. Y.*

DEAR BILL: Acknowledgment of the relevance, timeliness, and quality of Rosinger's volume is good news and I am glad for the lift it has given you. I certainly shall look forward to reading it.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Roger Evans  
 ROGER F. EVANS.

RFE: jms

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter to Mr. Edward C. Carter from Mr. Chen Han-Seng, dated March 12, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 368," and is as follows:)

## CHINA INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

KOWLOON, HONGKONG

P. O. Box 1688

(Pencilled) Received March 12, 1941.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,

*129 East 52nd Street, New York City.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: With this mail will arrive also Mr. Currie on his way back to America. He was twenty days in Chungking but as a trained observer and not like a trained bureaucrat he has certainly learned and understood many things. I am sure he has already appreciated the fact that Chungking is not China because of the exclusive depressive deteriorating atmosphere over there. He certainly made a splendid speech of half an hour before the highest and selective audience in Chungking sponsored by the Sino-American cultural Society on February 23rd. All the way through his speech he emphasised the importance



of democracy for the sake of both national resistance and the upbuilding of a modern state.

. I saw him both on his way to Chungking and upon his return despite the attempts to encircle him. While in Chungking he asked Hollington Tong to arrange an interview with Professor Ma Yin-tsu. Holly replied after a day of so that Ma was not to be found. Currie enquired if Ma is now confined somewhere, but Holly said that cannot be true. Factually, of course, Ma is now confined somewhere near Chungking because of his criticism of the government finance. He advocated a tax levy on those who became rich during the war.

By ordinary mail I sent you a few days ago a copy of February 15th Newsletter of the China Defence League. The article on the United Front in that issue is worth reading and if I may say so it may be regarded as a brief supplement to my unprinted MS on that same topic. Kindly pass this on to Rosinger if you see fit.

The American Council is to be congratulated for the improved style and new policy of the FAR EASTERN SURVEY. I for one have always been opposed to the narrow and dry statistical articles that the Survey used to carry. I am enclosing a clipping herewith for the Survey's reference. I wish somebody would find it feasible to use Dr. Lim's speech and write a short piece for the Survey.

Dr. Lim pointed out three problems in his work: nutrition, training and transport. His work is really connected with everybody's work because these problems are both national and urgent. I wish I could find time to write a short article to explain how the economic policy has now affected the Central troops very seriously, because these troops are in the rear where prices are high and no fighting is being carried out. The guerrillas and other troops are mostly on the fronts, where prices are much cheaper, being unaffected by the government policy. Their morale is much higher. If there is really a wide-scale civil war, I estimate that only one-tenth of the Central troops are fit to fight. Have you received the 28th issue of the FAR EAST BULLETIN, dated February 15th?

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

[s] Chen Han-seng  
CHEN HAN-SENG

Mr. MORRIS. Finally this is a letter from MP on the letterhead of China Aid Council, of which Mildred Price was then executive secretary, to Mr. T. A. Bisson, Mr. William Holland, and Mr. L. K. Rosinger, and Mr. E. Snow.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 369," and is as follows:)

#### CHINA AID COUNCIL

COMBINED WITH THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR CHINESE WAR ORPHANS  
1790 Broadway, Room 713, New York 10, N. Y.

MARCH 29, 1944.

#### MEMORANDUM

From Mildred Price, Executive Secretary.

To: Mr. T. A. Bisson  
Mr. Wm. Holland  
Mr. L. K. Rosinger  
Mr. E. Snow

I found this clipping and thought you might be interested in a copy of it.

[s] M. P.  
M. P.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you testify, Mr. Mandel, that all those documents handed to you are taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. Those are the ones that the committee has now received in evidence?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. May the oral remarks of Mr. Rosinger made at the conference, and included in the transcript, be introduced in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 370" and is as follows:)

ORAL REMARKS OF LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER DURING STATE DEPARTMENT  
CONFERENCE HELD OCTOBER 6, 7, AND 8, 1949

[Oct. 6, 1949, morning session]

Mr. ROSINGER. I have been wondering about the order of the questions. That is, it seems to me that perhaps logically the first thing to do is to turn to something like 22 and 23, which are rather basic questions on the nature of the Far Eastern situation as it confronts us before getting into some of the more specific aspects of China policy and policy in Southeast Asia, and so on.

CHAIRMAN. It is entirely up to the members, it is entirely agreeable to the Department. Twenty-two and 23 are rather general questions, as you will see.

Mr. ROSINGER. I suppose I asked for it. I didn't have anything very extensive to say. It just seemed to me that by a certain logic that they apply to the general situation, and that they might be considered first. On question 22, "To what extent is the upheaval in China and elsewhere in the Far East a predominantly political movement, and to what extent is it the expression of deep-rooted forces arising out of social and economic conditions?" I think it is rather clear that while the political aspect is important as the international situation in the Soviet Union and United States, while the functioning of particular parties—in the case of China the Communists and Kuomintang—are extremely important, the situation would not be the same if those parties did not exist in their present form, that nevertheless we are facing pretty deep-rooted social and economic conditions in the region, that even given a change in the existing political set-up, the existing political movements which are available for expressions of opinion and action in those countries, you would have the gravest kind of discontent, the gravest kind of political upset, because of the general poverty of the area, because of the unresolved social and economic conditions which have the character of a long-term revolutionary process which started a long time back and will not be completed in our time.

[Oct. 6, 1949, 2:00 p. m. to 5:15 p. m.]

Mr. ROSINGER. I would like to express my approval of a great deal of what has been just said and to add a few remarks of my own. There have been a number of suggestions this afternoon concerning the possibility of blocking China off or, to put it differently, writing China off. The assumption seems to have been that, for one thing, the Chinese Communists and the Communist-dominated regime could be allowed to stew in its own juices, get into increasing dilemmas, and finally after the passage of years finally be overthrown or come to the United States and ask for the assistance it must have under those conditions in order to continue. The second assumption seems to have been that in the meantime we could, undisturbed, except perhaps by certain local phenomena, build up our position and the position of friendly groups in the countries of southeast Asia and interest India and Pakistan; therefore, that we would have great freedom of action, that the Chinese Communists would have an increasing lack of freedom of action. A number of the questions involved in these two assumptions, I think, will be discussed in the course of these three days. I don't want to go into them in any thorough way, but I would like to throw out the possibility that the Chinese Communists, while facing extremely serious problems—and I think they are rather obvious to us—may solve those problems in fair degree; that is, that the view that they will be unable to solve these problems is of the present moment an assumption.

There are several evidences which would tend to support that assumption; there are others which would tend to oppose that assumption, and the assumption itself needs to be analyzed very seriously. With regard to the second point about our own ability to act relatively unimpeded in southeast Asia, I think there is an assumption there that the new regime in China will simply accept this situation of blockade and do nothing to counter it. My reading of the present

situation in southeast Asia is that the Western powers with interests there are extremely vulnerable; that the British and Dutch are having problems and the French are having problems in various areas; that the ability of the United States to influence the situation in those places decisively cannot be taken for granted at this moment. I think if we look at the existence of Chinese populations in a number of the countries of southeast Asia, if we look at a certain community of economic condition, a certain community of political outlook—I don't mean on the Communist ideological level but on the ideological level of nationalism and unsolved economic problems which give rise to certain political attitudes—that there is a significant community between China as today constituted and various countries of western Asia. I would go further and say that if the relations between the United States and this new China are utterly hostile that we would have to expect that every possible instrument would be used against us in these areas of southeast Asia and against nations closely associated and allied with us. Therefore, I think it is dangerous to look at this as a one-sided proposition in which the other side stands still, is confounded, faces dilemma, while we act.

It is an interacting situation and we ought to weigh very carefully the question of whether our power to harass, simply to put it on that plain and blunt level, is equivalent to the power of others to harass us. I am not at all sure that the answer is that our power is greater in this respect. This brings me to a further point. I don't think we can write China off, and we need to have a constructive policy towards southeast Asia and India. By all means, we must promote the economic recovery of those areas, we must promote their alignment with us, no question about it. I don't think that can be pursued most constructively if China is imagined as utterly outside this plain as an area with which we are completely hostile. I would like to suggest, then that the normalization of our relations with China—it isn't going to happen next month or perhaps six months from now, but that the normalization of China, the establishment of some kind of situation in which feelings run cordial, at least relations are correct—is an important prerequisite to effective action on our part in other sections of Asia. To put it in a slightly different way: That our ability to be constructive, let's say, in India is not something which can be considered independent of our relationship with China. My own view is that the normalization of relations with China is essential in fair degree to the development of constructive relations with India. Or, to put it still another way: That the development of relations satisfactory to ourselves with a non-Communist India, which we wish to see continue non-Communist, depends upon some kind of correct relations with the China which is presently Communist and which presumably will continue to have such a political make-up for a long time to come or at least as long as we can now foresee.

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. ROSINGER. The statement that I thought we should ask the Chinese Communists about their Indian policy before proceeding on it represents a misunderstanding of what I said. My point was that I felt that the normalization of relations with China was an important element in our carrying on an effective policy with other parts of Asia, not that we need ask permission.

\* \* \* \* \*

[Oct. 7, 1949, 9:15 a. m. to 12:15 p. m.]

Mr. ROSINGER. I was thinking particularly about the present military situation. The question was raised as to what effect arms from across the border would have, which you answered in part by saying that arms have been smuggled through for some time, but let's say, to what extent increased arms from across the border would have when the Chinese Communists reach that frontier—how would it effect the Indo-Chinese military situation?

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. ROSINGER. It does, but the particular question I had in mind was this: My impression, which I offer very tentatively, is that the military situation in Indo-China, granting a number of differences, might be compared roughly with the position of the Generalissimo's forces in China itself, let us say in 1947 or possibly early '48. In other words, I am wondering whether the French prospect there is of the same general character as Jung's (spl. ?) prospect was a year or a year and a half ago.

CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rosinger.

MR. ROSINGER. I would like to speak briefly on a question of ideology. We have had some discussion this morning of the importance of having more Americans familiar or become familiar with Asia and there is certainly no question of that. We have had some discussion of the importance of how the United States speaks to Asia, and I think that subject is also significant, but I would like to suggest that our ideology in Asia is basically the sum total of our actions in Asia, and the generalization is that the people of the various Asian countries form about us, our way of operating, our way of thinking and doing things, on the basis of these actions; that is, that any emphasis on words alone is misleading and deceiving to ourselves unless, let us say, in Indonesia, Indonesian nationalists feel that American policy is really promoting Indonesian independence, if that happens to be the kind of appeal we wish to make. In other words, that we have to think primarily on the action level, primarily on the level of what policy actually does. I don't believe for a moment, for example, that it would be possible to sell to the bulk of the Chinese people, or the bulk of Chinese intellectuals, or the Chinese middle class hostility towards the United States just on the basis of words. There must have been something in their own experiences they saw which made them receptive to that kind of approach, and, therefore, it is to the actions and not to the question of words, even though words can be persuasive for a time, that we must primarily address ourselves.

I would like to mention one concrete question which I had hoped to bring up before in connection with Miss DuBois' presentation. There has been an item in the press in the past few days to the effect that gold from Japan is going to be transferred to France in the name of Indochina in connection, I believe, with reparations arrangements. I don't know whether that gold is to be used in Indochina by the French or whether it is to be used in France. That would be a significant question. From the news reports, which were brief, it is to be assigned to the Bank of Indochina in some form. I would suggest that nothing we can say to the gretnemas (?) is one-hundredth as important as the concrete question of whether a certain number of millions of dollars of gold is going to be used in Indochina for French purposes, and then without considering the further question of the particular use that is made of that gold.

In other words, I don't think, to sum up, that we can consider this simply on a verbal level. I defer to Mr. Reischauer on the question of Japan, and I would certainly agree that Japan is certainly more ideologically conscious than China or the areas of South Asia. But taking China, taking the areas of South Asia, and taking even Japan in the sense, I believe, that the Japanese people are considered highly practical as well as theoretical I think actions come first. If the actions appeal then you have a marvelous talking point. They can be played up in extremely persuasive ways. But they are basic.

[Oct. 7, 1949, 2:07 p. m. to 4:45 p. m.]

MR. ROSINGER. I don't think we can find out whether Chinese Communist terms are acceptable until trade is actually launched as a real possibility because my impression is that in all trade with the United States, between the U. S. and other countries, and so on, you first have to have an actual proposition come forward and then you reach your decision. I think it would be very unfortunate if on the basis of a possibility that Chinese Communist's terms might be unacceptable we didn't find out what those terms actually were. I think another consideration is that my impression is that in most trade that goes on you will find some terms acceptable and some not so that would seem a day-to-day process of bargaining on the part of the people, private and official, who are actually negotiating the trade.

\* \* \* \* \*

[Oct. 8, 1949, 9:00 a. m.]

CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Rosinger.

MR. ROSINGER. I'd like to associate myself with the view frequently expressed around this table that we should extend recognition. My own personal feeling is that the recognition should come as early as possible. At the same time, I recognize that within this country there are certain practical problems to be faced politically in this connection. The question of timing has been referred to frequently; I think that is extremely important. I think there is a period, it is hard to define in advance, but a period of perhaps three, six, maybe nine months, in which recognition by the United States will have a certain value in

terms of Chinese opinion and will not simply be a reluctant, grudging following after the facts and after the actions of other countries which will have recognized before us. I would not agree with the statement that with recognition of the new Chinese Government by Russia all the advantages of recognition are lost to other countries. I think that is not so, and the reason why I state this opinion is that I think we have to look at the state of Chinese public opinion. As I see it, the bulk of politically conscious Chinese opinion is not to the extent that it is hostile to the United States, hostile because it is pro-Russian; its anti-Americanism is not pro-Sovietism, by and large, regardless of what the situation may be in connection with particular individuals or leaders.

As I see it, Chinese public opinion, politically conscious public opinion, is not by and large hostile to individual Americans, regardless of particular incidents, it is not by and large hostile to the United States as a country, but rather hostile on rather pragmatic grounds to particular phases of American policy as experienced and perceived in China over the past few years. If that is so, then there is a stake to be won in considering this state of Chinese public opinion. If it is not now, by and large, pro-Russian in its anti-Americanism, then there is a much more favorable basis for returning it to some kind of friendly attitude toward the United States than if, let's say, its anti-Americanism were identical with a pro-Soviet approach.

I might add as a footnote that I think that in a country of 450 million people such as China, in which only a small percentage of the population, even the politically conscious, have a clear-cut, fixed ideology, that this question of how people feel on grounds of personal reaction to the policy of a foreign power, in this case the United States, is very important. I, personally, as I have suggested, would be in favor of recognizing at the earliest feasible moment. I think, though, that in terms of preparing American public opinion for recognition, there is a process of disentanglement from the Chinese Nationalists which can be carried out in the weeks ahead, and I think to the extent that we disentangle ourselves from the Chinese Nationalists, we lay the basis for recognition. As a matter of fact, if we were to recognize today, assuming that were possible, we would be in a highly contradictory situation of recognizing at the time that we were delivering through ECA supplies to Formosa, and so on.

We have not yet cleared ourselves from the entanglement with the Nationalists. I'd like to suggest, although I am not informed on the technical questions, problems of carrying out some of these action, that we end our ECA assistance as soon as possible to the remnants of the Chinese Nationalists. I'd like to suggest that one important question would be the position we take at the United Nations in connection with the resolutions or the proposals of the Chinese Nationalists. I think to the extent that we associate ourselves at the United Nations with their position, we make it very difficult to move toward recognition. I would be in favor of keeping ourselves as clear as possible from association with the Chinese Nationalist position at the United Nations. I think the question of the blockade is extremely important. I was particularly interested in the phrase from the letter of Mr. Hopkins, just read by Mr. Robertson, to the effect that we should actively break the blockade. Regardless of the phrase that is used, I think it is rather obvious that the blockade could not continue if the United States and Britain took an active position against it. The blockade, let's say, arose independently of our will, but its continuance is dependent on the assumption of a certain position of acquiescence on our part.

In this connection, I have been struck by the whole issue of the Isbrandtsen ships, in the stopping and seizure of two of them by the Chinese Nationalists. It seems to me that one of the questions that are most easily understood by the American public and not just recently but all the way back, is the question of the right of American ships to trade freely in various parts of the world. Had action been taken—again I won't try to define it, I don't know the technical details—but had action been taken to defend the right of these American ships to trade through a blockade, which is not a blockade but technically a port closure, a port closure which we have already asserted we don't recognize as a blockade, had action been taken to defend the right of these ships to go through, I think it would have been very difficult for any opponents of the process of moving toward recognition to say "this shall not be done," because this kind of action is highly intelligible to the broadest kind of American public opinion.

Therefore, I'd like to suggest, as a generalization, that the process of disentanglement be carried forward as rapidly as we can carry it forward, as a basis for preparing public opinion as a basis for early recognition.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mildred Price?

Mr. ROSINGER. I decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you accept in the record a book review on Mr. Rosinger's "India and the United States," by Peter Meyer, which appeared in the New Leader of December 18, 1950, on page 21?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Peter Meyer?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received in evidence.

(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 371" and is as follows:)

#### SHALL INDIA SHARE CHINA'S FATE?

"INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

(By Lawrence K. Rosinger. Macmillan. 149 pp. \$2.75)

"Reviewed by Peter Meyer, author, *The Soviet Union: A New Class Society*, and *Tito's Threat to Stalin's Empire*

"Since it achieved independence, India has refused to align itself either with the Western or the Eastern power bloc. In the United Nations, it has often abstained from voting on controversial issues. After the fall of China, it refused to organize an independent Asiatic alliance against Communism. It opposed French and Dutch imperialism in the Indies and induced the Western powers to press Holland to give Indonesia independence. It recognized Communist China and did everything it could to maintain friendly relations with the Peking regime. Only when all possibilities of conciliation or evasion were exhausted did India reluctantly join the Western powers on such issues as defense against the aggression in Korea. And confronted with Chinese aggression in Korea, Indochina and Tibet, it follows a policy of outright appeasement.

"Under these circumstances, a study of the motivations, achievements, and failures of the Indian foreign policy and of American relations with India, could be of great value, and the reader opens Mr. Rosinger's book with great expectations. Mr. Rosinger is a staff member of the American Institute of Pacific Relations; he traveled extensively in China and India and is introduced to the readers as a great expert on Asiatic affairs.

"As far as factual material is concerned, there is not much more than could be gathered from diligent reading of the daily press. Still, the book is intriguing in one respect. For while it purports to present the facts objectively, it still contains a very definite interpretation and conveys a message. What is this message? Let us look at a few examples.

"America and Indian independence. It is generally acknowledged that America traditionally supported Indian striving for independence. American pressure on Britain during the war is well known from various documents and wartime memoirs. What is Mr. Rosinger's interpretation of these policies? Let us quote:

"A study of the quoted passages suggests the concern of the United States government that the transition from British to Indian rule be as smooth and unexplosive as possible. The references to the effects Indian actions might have on "world peace and prosperity for generations to come" and to the possibility that "civil strife" in India might "become the source of new international tensions" seem more than perfunctory. Conflict in India clearly would have further reduced the strength of war-weakened Britain. \* \* \* Besides, in 1946-47, China and parts of Southeast Asia were already in flames, and it was at this very time that the alliance of the Big Three disintegrated into the "cold war."

"With regard to India itself, independence was certain to come before many years. One fundamental question was whether this changeover would be by peaceful negotiation or by force. It was, of course, plain that the more peaceful the transition, the more moderate the future leadership of India is likely to be. London finally decided that it had no realistic course but to seek a negotiated withdrawal, hoping that the new Dominions of India and Pakistan would elect to remain within the Commonwealth when they came to make a choice. In this broad effort the British government apparently had the support of the United States."

"This description disregards several things. For instance, American diplomacy was supporting Indian striving for independence when it was by no means sure that Churchill's government would agree to it. And, of course, this was long before the alliance with Russia disintegrated—in fact, in the heyday of this alliance. Considerations about the 'cold war' could not play any decisive role.

"This quotation seems to argue that the imperialist, American as well as British, agreed to give India independence because they could not avoid it. There is some truth in this, but not the whole truth. Some imperialist powers do maintain their rule against the will of the great majority of the colonial population and against the will of world public opinion. And one wonders how far Gandhi would have gotten if India had belonged to the Soviet instead of the British Empire. Britain decided, with American advice, for the independence of India, Burma, and Ceylon without doubt under pressure; but other decisions were possible, even if they had been extremely unwise. Why the wise decisions were made certainly needs more explanation. One reason probably is that in democratic states labor, liberals, and humanitarians can and do fight against imperialism and put pressure on their own governments. This is not true of totalitarian states like the U. S. S. R., but an analysis of Soviet imperialism is conspicuously absent from Mr. Rosinger's book.

"Kashmir. Mr. Rosinger introduces this subject with several questions, about which, he says, 'only speculation is possible on the basis of present information.' For example: What is the precise strategic view of India held by the Pentagon? \* \* \* What is the extent of current Anglo-American consultation on India? \* \* \* What is the degree to which Indian policy on Korea and American policy on Kashmir have influenced each other?

"The author then proceeds to say that on certain issues important to India, among them Kashmir, 'the U. S. S. R. has shown more of a tendency to vote with India, or not to vote against it, than has the United States. On the Kashmir question the U. S. S. R. has abstained, while the United States has sometimes leaned toward the pro-Indian view, sometimes away from it.' One wonders why complete abstention is more favorable to India than an honest endeavor to settle the issue, partly but not totally in Indian favor.

"But, Mr. Rosinger explains, America was primarily interested in averting war between India and Pakistan because such a war would endanger united resistance to Communism in Asia, or, in Mr. Rosinger's words, 'Kashmir could be the graveyard of the remaining Anglo-American position on the continent of Asia.'

"This approach, he says, embittered the Indians and the Pakistanis, for whom Kashmir is a deeply felt matter of national rights, prestige and interest. Few things irritate the Indians more than to see the question of Kashmir approached as a factor in the American-Soviet balance of power. \* \* \* And the appearance of the names of General Walter Bedell Smith and Admiral Chester Nimitz as prospective mediators of the Kashmir conflict 'strongly suggests' that American interest in Kashmir has a strategic aspect, says Mr. Rosinger.

"Well, it cannot be denied that the Western powers have a vested interest in peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute. Strangely enough, Mr. Rosinger does not mention that, correspondingly, Stalin has a strong vested interest in fomenting the conflict and abstaining from any endeavors for its solution.

"Still, it would seem, the vested American interest in peaceful solution does coincide with the true interest of the Indian and Pakistani people. And the vested Soviet interest in fomenting strife happens to threaten their vital interests.

"Is Nehru's policy pure hypocrisy? Describing Indian foreign policy, Mr. Rosinger notes that 'the stated purpose of Indian policy has been to follow an independent course in foreign affairs, somewhere in between the positions of the two great powers.' But, 'as tension has mounted between the great powers and between opposing elements inside India, the Indian government has gradually moved in the direction of Britain and the United States, although not abandoning its verbal formula of an independent foreign policy.'

"Why? Because Soviet imperialism constituted a greater threat to Asiatic nations than the traditionally known Western imperialism? By no means. Mr. Rosinger's formulations about the stated purpose and verbal formulas and numerous innuendoes on almost every page of the book show that he did not trust Indian assurances about independent policies from the very beginning. His explanation is: Indian leaders could not 'leap into the Anglo-American ranks at the very moment of severing the long-hated British tie.' They feared a war because it

'would make the survival of their government completely uncertain.' They hoped that their 'more or less' independent position 'clearly might increase their bargaining power' in seeking economic aid from the United States. A 'small but influential minority,' identified with commercial interests, favors a more or less clear-cut Western alignment, but the majority is afraid of war, fears the influence of foreign capital, is against Western imperialism. Another small, this time 'significant,' minority supports the Soviet view, and even non-Communists and some anti-Communists are attracted by Soviet industrialization, by 'Soviet policy and practice in connection with nationalities and national minorities.' If the Indian government should 'overcommit' the country on international issues, it 'might run into difficulties.' The politically conscious Indians are a very small minority who will not be able to speak indefinitely for the entire country. When the currently inarticulate mass of Indians is aroused to political activity, it will introduce new factors into Indian foreign policy. The most decisive element is likely to be the changing outlook of the Indian people.

"Here, Mr. Rosinger wisely stops. He does not tell us what this changing outlook is supposed to be and who will, in his opinion, arouse the masses and for what. But sapienti sat. A Communist, reading this story, would have no difficulty translating it into his own language: Nehru is a lackey of Western imperialism. He must be careful because Indian masses are opposed to war and imperialism. But his independent foreign policy is a sham; it is conceived to deceive the masses. Behind the screen of stated purposes and verbal declarations, he moves into the imperialist camp, here and there bargaining for a better position, for more economic help. The 'influential' minority of Indian bourgeois pushes him to do it faster. The 'significant' minority of Communists is fighting against this betrayal; Soviet industrialization achievements and nationality policies are winning new followers (who fortunately don't know anything about slave labor and the deportation of whole nationalities). And when the broad masses awake, Nehru's play will be finished; the government, whose survival is already uncertain in any serious crisis, will go the way of Chiang Kai-shek

"This has all been said before in the resolution of the Indian Communist party. But did Mr. Rosinger say it? No, he did not—not in these words. He only, to use his favorite expression, 'strongly suggested' it.

"Nehru and the Commonwealth. If more examples are necessary, read the chapter about India's relations with the British Commonwealth. When Britain gave India independence, the chapter starts, the hope existed that a conservative Indian government, facing internal problems and opponents, might look to some kind of British connection to strengthen its position. (Another Communist thesis: the colonial bourgeoisie, fearing the masses, must betray the struggle for independence and look for protection in the arms of the imperialists \* \* \*)

"And, really, India remained dependent on Britain in significant ways: Britain leads in Indian foreign trade, it owes money to India, it still has investments in the country; India relies on Britain for naval defense. The official Indian approach to the Commonwealth 'has gone through an extended evolution designed to avoid arousing Indian majority opinion.'

Again, Nehru is deceiving the masses by his clever policies. But is he? The question is whether the facts adduced prove a one-sided dependence on England, or an interdependence of the member nations of the British Commonwealth. One has only to think of the way in which Nehru's appeasement of Red China influenced British policies.

"But in Mr. Rosinger's interpretation, the repeated declarations that India will conduct independent policies even within the Commonwealth again seem only verbal assurances which rather conceal than reveal the true state of things. In addition, Indian affiliation with the Commonwealth provides further links with America. The imperial framework so long maintained by the British retains some of its effectiveness, and London possesses methods and contacts which are not available to the United States.' Yes, after all, the British labor government is, as is well known, only a servant of American imperialist warmongers.

"This is enough to illustrate Mr. Rosinger's methods; more examples can easily be provided. Everyone has the right to criticize the policies of the Indian, American and all other governments. But this method of underhand suggestion, vaguely formulated suspicion, cleverly dispersed innuendo—all under the mask of irreproachable objectivity—is trial by slander if there ever was one.

"And why is all this done? We find out in the last chapter, where the author presents some 'more personal observations.' He reports that India is industrially weak, that economic conditions are difficult, that there is unrest among



the masses, and that the government is shaky. If it cannot 'deliver the fruits of independence' in five years or a little more, another political leadership—right or left—will replace it.

"Is the situation the same as with Chiang Kai-shek? Mr. Rosinger has to admit differences, although mainly in degree, 'in the details of day-to-day development.' Prices are high, but there is no inflation comparable to that of post-war China. Indian bureaucracy has weaknesses but is not so corrupt as Chiang Kai-shek's administration. Communist movements are 'significant' though not as strong as the Chinese Communists were in the years preceding their victory. But, Mr. Rosinger reminds us, the Indian situation is comparable to that of China in the twenties. At that time, the Kuomintang government was still rather stable; its leaders still talked about reforms and even enacted some. And see what happened. The same can—and probably will—happen in India. Mr. Rosinger does not say whether we should hope for it or fear it.

"In any case, we should do nothing to avoid it. 'The concept of an Asian bloc under Indian leadership appears to have no basis in realities.' 'India is not a bastion against China or Russia.' American relations with India cannot be a substitute for satisfactory relations with Red China. It is not within the power of the United States to assure India's future progress and stability. Hands off, let's go home. \* \* \*

"This recommendation constitutes the political core of the book. That's why it was written. That is the advice of our Asiatic expert.

"He is not the first one. From many experts of the Institute of Pacific Relations, we have heard for years the same refrain: China must be left alone. Korea is not worth defending. Japan is more of a liability than an asset. Indochina must be written off. India cannot be saved.

"And another chorus answers about Europe: The Balkans were lost anyway. Czechoslovakia has got what it asked for. Turkey and Greece are hopelessly corrupt. The Germans are all Nazis and no worthy allies. France and Italy are degenerate and will soon collapse. Scandinavia is indefensible.

"Today, these recommendations are not formulated as openly and directly as they used to be in the times when everybody accepted the advice of Mr. Lattimore without criticism. Now, they are proffered by lesser experts, in more cautious language, in a more camouflaged way. But they are the same voices and, confronted by so much camouflage and insincerity, we cannot refrain from asking ourselves the old questions: Cui prodest?"

(THE NEW LEADER, Dec. 18, 1950, pp. 21-23.)

Mr. MORRIS. Now, we have compiled a list of works of Mr. Rosinger in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations. In executive session, that list was submitted to him. We gave Mr. Rosinger the opportunity to correct any mistakes that may have been made in that listing, and he today has submitted a memorandum in which he points out certain minor discrepancies.

I wish that they be introduced in the record, so that Mr. Rosinger's full comments will be available.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received and the works listed and referred to but not included in the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 372" and is as follows:)

2775 MORRIS AVENUE,  
New York 68, N. Y., January 24, 1952.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,  
Internal Security Subcommittee, Judiciary Committee,  
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR Mr. MORRIS: In accordance with your requests at yesterday's subcommittee session, I am writing to give you the following information:

(1) The hotel at which I stayed during the State Department conference of October 6-8, 1949, was the Hamilton Hotel.

(2) On October 6, 1951, I issued a press release of which I am enclosing a copy. There were one or two others of which I do not have copies.

(3) I have no record of the name of the person at the University of California who offered me the teaching position I had there in the summer of 1948.

(4) I have no copy of the written memorandum which I submitted to the Jessup committee in September 1949. In this connection I have carefully checked my files, as I promised I would. I have therefore written to Mr. James E. Webb at the Department of State, declaring that I have no objection to the release of my memorandum to the subcommittee.

(5) I have checked on "Exhibit No. 118, Lawrence K. Rosinger" (pp. 468-469 of the subcommittee's printed record) and find that the following corrections should be made for purposes of accuracy:

(a) Line 1: The date is "1937-1944" in the title of China's Wartime Politics.

(b) Line 3: Should be "Far Eastern."

(c) Line 4: "staff" not "staffs."

(d) Line 5: "1937-1944."

(e) Line 5: China's Crisis (not "China Crisis") and Restless India should be omitted, since these were not IPR books. (You will note at the top of p. 468 the statement that the material is being introduced in the record as evidence of my "activities within the Institute of Pacific Relations." Neither of these books had any connection with the IPR's work, and they were written and published at a time when I was not employed by the IPR.

(f) Line 7: Should be "American Institute of Pacific Relations."

(g) Line 11: Should be November 18-December 2, 1939.

(h) Line 18: "India-America."

(i) Line 19: "Research Associate."

(j) Line 25: "Relations" not "Relation."

(k) Line 25: Omit semicolon.

(l) Line 27: "Relations."

(m) Line 36: "Book Review, 1938, pages 421-432" should read: "Germany's Far Eastern Policy Under Hitler, 1938, pp. 421-432."

(n) Line 37: "Book Review, 1939, pages 186-188" should read: "Letter, 1939, pages 186-188."

(o) Line 44: "Book Review, 1942, pages 117-118" should be "Book Review, 1942, pages 116-118."

(p) Line 46: This item should be omitted, since a review of one of my books by another person cannot properly be regarded as part of my record at the IPR.

(q) Line 47: This item should be omitted for the same reason as that given in (p).

As I indicated in appearing before the subcommittee, it has not been feasible for me to check every point. But, with the above corrections, the material in the list may be regarded as substantially correct in form and fact.

I assume that this letter will be introduced into the record as part of my testimony.

Sincerely yours,

[S] Lawrence K. Rosinger.  
LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER.

Mr. MORRIS. One of these items will be a compliance on the part of Mr. Rosinger with the request that a certain telegram sent by the State Department to him be made a part of the record, and Mr. Rosinger's message appears on that and is made part of the record.

Senator FERGUSON. That will be received. That is the telegram asking you to come down in 1949 to the conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. May I see that?

(Telegram handed to the witness.)

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes; that is right. It is embodied in a press release.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean you included it in a press release?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 373" and is as follows:)

OCTOBER 6, 1951.

*For immediate release.*

In reply to a telegram of October 5 from Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb, requesting an expression of views on the possible public release of the

transcript of the confidential State Department conference of October 6, 7, 8, 1949 on Far Eastern problems, Mr. Lawrence K. Rosinger has sent Mr. Webb the message given below. Mr. Rosinger, a private writer and lecturer and the author of a number of books on the Far East, attended the conference together with twenty-four other persons prominent in business, university teaching, missionary activity, and other fields. The purpose of the conference was to obtain a statement of various points of view on Far Eastern problems by persons competent in that field. Mr. Rosinger's message follows: "I would welcome release of the full transcript of the round table discussions on the Far East. In fairness to all participants, I most strongly urge that the record include not only the remarks of outside persons like myself, but also all briefings and other statements by government officials present at the conference. In my judgment, the conference embodied a calm, reasoned discussion of differences of opinion of a type that we desperately need today instead of emotion and hysteria."

Mr. ROSINGER. Since you have included this review by Peter Meyer of India and the United States, a review which I happen not to have seen, but which, I suppose, is not favorable, it seems to me I should be allowed to submit for the record some favorable reviews.

Mr. BOUDIN. We will send them in after the hearing.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means. We certainly will include some of them. The only difficulty might be the bulk and the printing cost.

Mr. BOUDIN. We will bear that in mind.

Mr. ROSINGER. The only point I want to make is: to judge a man's works by reviews is less than a satisfactory procedure. Everything I have written has been praised by somebody and damned by somebody else. I don't see that any conclusion can be reached.

I may say on the basis of my own recollection that, broadly speaking, the vast majority of the reviews have been favorable, and not unfavorable, but even in strict logic, that does not prove anything.

I think the method of judgment by review is not a satisfactory method, but if it is to be followed, then I would like to have it noted that the reviews have been largely favorable.

Mr. MORRIS. You will note, Mr. Rosinger, that all these things introduced, all your writings introduced in the record, are not to show whether or not you had a disposition one way or the other, but a sampling of your writings, of you, as a particular witness before this committee.

Mr. Chairman, there are two other pieces of business here.

General Wedemeyer, who testified before this committee, has written two letters to the chairman of this committee, asking that they be made a part of the record in connection with the testimony he has previously given.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received.

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibit 374-A" and "Exhibit 374-B" and are as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 374-A

ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER,  
*Vice President and Director*

AVCO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION

420 LEXINGTON AVENUE

New York 17, N. Y.

NOVEMBER 11, 1951.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,  
*United States Senate,*  
*Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR SENATOR: The recent correspondence between Representative Daniel J. Flood (Democrat, Pennsylvania) and Carlisle H. Humelsine, of the Department of State and the pertinent exhibits provided by Mr. Humelsine, have been

widely noted and commented upon in the press and radio. There has been a tendency to raise the issue of possible inconsistencies in my testimony of September 19, 1951, before your Subcommittee on Internal Security. A few editorial comments that have come to my attention, possibly, could be interpreted as a reflection upon my good faith and sincerity of purpose. I therefore venture to address you in the premises not for that reason alone, but also because I deem it very important that every American interested in the security of our country be provided with available factual information. Maliciously or unwittingly current issues are sometimes confused and misinterpreted in certain quarters. I wish therefore to clarify to the best of my ability testimony pertaining to the four political advisers, John Paton Davies, John Stewart Service, John K. Emmerson, and Raymond P. Ludden, assigned to the China theater staff in 1944-45.

Mr. John K. Emmerson did not submit reports pertaining to developments in the China theater. His responsibilities were confined to political reporting, intelligence, and psychological warfare with respect to Japan. Therefore, remarks that I have made or testimony submitted pertaining to report on China from political advisers on my staff do not apply to him.

The crux of the implications raised by the State Department's release of pertinent official correspondence is that, although I voluntarily commended the four political advisers in the spring of 1945 for outstanding performance of duties, I recently indicated to your committee that their advice and suggestions in the military field were not sound and, if implemented, would have accelerated Communist control of China. I must assume that the purpose of establishing what seems to be a paradox is to involve me in an inconsistency. The fact is that there is neither a paradox nor an inconsistency. The facts are these:

When I assumed command of the China Theater in the Fall of 1944 the military situation was deteriorating rapidly and experienced observers predicted that the Japanese would force China out of the war within a few weeks. Therefore, initially I concentrated my attention and efforts upon salvaging the military situation. My directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington explicitly required me to support the Chinese Nationalist Government and to maintain the Chinese armies in effective opposition to the approximate one million two hundred thousand Japanese soldiers in the area. If this were accomplished, obviously the enemy armies would be pinned down in China and the Japanese High Command would therefore be prevented from disengaging large numbers for employment against the advancing American forces of General MacArthur in the Philippines and Ryukus.

With the earnest cooperation of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese forces supported valiantly by American Air Forces under the command of Major General Claire Chennault, the China Theater Forces did experience a measure of success, and in fact the Allied military posture vis-à-vis the Japanese gradually improved, so that, by early Summer, 1945, Allied forces were beginning to wrest the initiative from the Japanese.

During the crucial period of military operations (Fall and Winter 1944-45) as Theater Commander I necessarily subordinated the attention I normally would have given political developments in the area. The four political advisors on my staff—John Paton Davies, John Stewart Service, John K. Emmerson and Raymond P. Ludden—submitted oral and written reports. Frequently these reports provided information pertaining to the character and ability of certain Chinese civil and military leaders. Some reports contained suggestions pertaining to the economic and psycho-social situations. Occasionally the reports included recommendations concerning the potentialities of and developments within the Chinese Communist Army.

Much of the information thus provided was helpful and constructive particularly that pertaining to the character and ability of Chinese individuals with whom I as Theater Commander was almost constantly in official contact.

On the other hand, the information embodied in the reports pertaining to the military situation uniformly was critical of the Chinese Nationalist Forces and invariably was complimentary to the Chinese Communist Forces. Some of the reports included definite recommendations to the effect that I should provide U. S. equipment to and support the Chinese Communist Forces on the grounds that they were fighting the Japanese realistically and would contribute more than the Chinese Nationalists to the over-all war effort. These latter recommendations I did not accept for three reasons:

(a) My directive required me to support the Chinese Nationalist Forces.

(b) From the logistical viewpoint it would have been most difficult to transport arms and equipment to the Chinese Communist Army which was located in the remote Province of Sensi.

(c) Reports from competent American military observers indicated that the Chinese Communist sporadic operations against the Japanese were inconsequential; were designed primarily to capture arms and equipment from isolated Japanese strong points, and finally were not contributing materially to the overall Allied effort in China.

When the above-named political advisors were relieved from my staff in the Spring of 1945 and were assigned to the American Embassy, I voluntarily issued them letters of appreciation because at that time I felt definitely that their services fully merited commendation even though I did not accept or implement their specific recommendations pertaining to support of the Chinese Communist military forces.

Later as I came to grips with political, economic and social problems in the China Theater, it was obvious that if I had implemented the recommendations of my political advisors to support the Chinese Communist Forces, I not only would have violated my directive, but also such action would definitely have contributed to the success of the Soviet-inspired Chinese Communists against the Chinese Nationalists in their internecine struggle after the war and would thereby have accelerated the communization of the entire area.

Some press and radio reports associated their names with Communist activities and although I was interested, I was in no position to follow up such reports to ascertain their authenticity.

I had never questioned nor do I now question their loyalty to me or to our country. I have testified exactly to this effect before Congressional Committees. Also I have consistently so informed governmental officials investigating the loyalty of those four men.

May I respectfully request that the foregoing be included in the record of your Committee's inquiry not only for the purpose of clarifying the issues involved, but also to reaffirm the premises established therein. I do not object to anyone disagreeing with my views, opinions or judgments. I do object strongly to any reflection upon my sincerity of purpose or upon my integrity.

I wish to thank you and the members of the Committee for your kind consideration in the premises.

Faithfully,

[s] A. C. Wedemeyer

A. C. WEDEMEYER,

Lieutenant General, USA, Retired.

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EXHIBIT No. 374-B

ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER  
Vice President and Director

AVCO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION

420 LEXINGTON AVENUE

New York 17, N. Y.

9 OCTOBER 1951.

The Honorable PAT McCARRAN,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Internal Security,  
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,  
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: I respectfully invite your attention, and that of the members of your Subcommittee on Internal Security to the attached telegraphic correspondence between myself and the Honorable James E. Webb, Acting Secretary of State, relating to a statement of mine to the Department of State on 26 September 1949.

May I suggest that this matter, which bears upon a subject now under inquiry by your subcommittee, be made a part of the record pertaining to my recent testimony.

With every good wish, I am,  
Faithfully,

[s] A. C. Wedemeyer  
A. C. WEDEMEYER.

Incls—

1951 OCT.—6 P. M. 4:52.

No. 310 Long Govt. DL PD—TDN Staten Island, N. Y., 6: 434P—General ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER,

*AVC Manufacturing Corp., 420 Lexington Avenue:*

The Round Table discussions on problems of U. S. policy toward China, held in the Department of State on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, to which you submitted statement, were stated at the time to be on an informal and confidential basis, with the transcript of the discussion to be made available only to officers in the Department concerned with that policy. The Department has made every effort up to the present time to maintain the integrity of that understanding. As you have undoubtedly noticed, there has been extensive reference in the press and before Committees of Congress to these meetings and numerous assertions concerning the nature of the statements by the various participants, from Members of Congress and from the press to make public the transcript of the discussions. Will you please wire immediately collect your views on a possible public release of the transcript of the discussion at the meetings which included your wired statement.

JAMES E. WEBB,

*Acting Secretary of State, Dept. of State, Wash., D. C. 061944Z.*

[Western Union]

AVCO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,

*420 Lexington Avenue, New York 17, N. Y., 9 October 1951.*

JAMES E. WEBB,

*Acting Secretary of State, Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.:*

In reply to your telegram of 6 November requesting permission to make a public release of my statement of 26 September 1949, to the State Department Round Table on Far Eastern affairs of 6, 7, and 8 October 1949, May I state:

I cordially assent to your request with on unequivocal stipulation, namely, that my statement be released only in its entirety and without accompanying remarks or interpretations by the Department of State which might emphasize one recommendation more than another.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that the controversy evoking your request center about testimony given to the McCarran Committee, I am sending that committee this exchange of telegrams, including the text of my statement of 26 September 1949, so that the committee may, if it wishes, include it in its record.

A. C. WEDEMEYER.

[Confidential—Priority]

26 SEPTEMBER 1949.

(Dispatched from Headquarters Fifth Army; Chicago, Illinois)

From: Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer enroute to Sixth Army, Presidio San Francisco, California

Action to: Under Secretary James Webb, State Department: Attention: Francis Russell, Washington, D. C.

Information to: General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

Reference your kind invitation to attend meetings of 20 leading Americans for exchange of views on problems United States policy in China October 6, 7, and 8, respectfully request that I be excused. Mrs. Wedemeyer and I are

motoring across the country in my private car in accordance with a prearranged schedule which enables me to obtain a long deferred vacation and then to arrive at my destination in time to participate in Joint Army-Navy Exercises. Acceptance of invitation to attend meetings in Washington would leave Mrs. Wedemeyer stranded in Colorado for several days and might interfere with my timely arrival in Sixth Army. Further, I have stated my views pertaining to China to State Department and National Military Establishment officials and representatives both orally and in writing. Only recently I conferred with special group of analysts, Ambassador Jessup, Doctor Fosdick and Doctor Case. It would seem reasonable to assume that my personal views are sufficiently well-known by responsible individuals within the Government as to render my attendance at the meeting unnecessary.

Herewith résumé of views substantially as expressed in the manner and to the individuals referred to above.

The United States should not surrender the initiative in any field of international endeavor, in any area of the world. The timing, the scope, and the character of our efforts in one area (for example the Far East) should be carefully coordinated and integrated with our efforts in other areas of the world (for example, Western Europe, Central Europe, Middle East, et cetera). To insure economy of means and to make our efforts more purposeful to all nations our efforts should be integrated and coordinated with those nations and peoples having objectives compatible with our own.

Specifically with reference to policies and objectives in China the following ideas appear pertinent:

1. The pronounced and progressive deterioration of China's political and economic structures, also the impotence of Government military forces, render it impractical at this time to provide large-scale material aid repeat material aid. The remaining Chinese non-Communist forces or elements, with or without National Government's cognizance, are not organized or equipped to assimilate or to use effectively large-scale material aid.

2. The Chinese people, individually and collectively, would receive a tremendous uplift in morale and would derive strength and hope for the future if the United States (also Great Britain, France, and other friendly countries) publicly affirmed the determination to support anti-Communists or non-Communist elements in China and throughout the Far East. Such a public pronouncement by the President or the Secretary of State would provide the moral support so urgently needed by bewildered millions not only in the Far East but in other important areas of the world.

3. Material aid repeat material aid to Chinese leaders, communities, provinces, or specific areas, actively resisting or tangibly striving to generate realistic opposition to Communism, should be given by the United States on an evaluated scale—carefully supervised by United States representatives—progressively increased in scope if developments warrant. In this connection military equipment, propaganda media, medical equipment, food and clothing might be distributed at times in areas, and in quantities determined by careful evaluation of the existing and developing situation. Our initial objectives should be to restrict and harass the military and economic activities of the Communists and concomitantly to confute and refute the ideas, the ideals, and the ideologies of the Communist political and cultural forces.

4. Continued observation and evaluation of the results attained by the above unequivocal moral support accompanied by evaluated material aid repeat material aid might justify later greatly increased material aid repeat material aid in certain localities or, for example, in support of indigent movements that give tangible evidence of momentum and substance in their struggle against Communist domination.

If clarification or expansion of above ideas is desired I would be glad to comply. My exact location is known at all times to the Chief of Staff, United States Army.

(Signed) H. E. HASTWOOD,  
*Brigadier General, GSC, Chief of Staff.*

Symbol ALFCS 261730Z Sep. 49.

Mr. MORRIS. Also, we have an exchange of correspondence in connection with Julian Friedman, with the State Department, in connection with his records, that have a direct bearing on the hearings which are now in process.

I would like those to be incorporated in the record at the same time.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 375" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 375

SEPTEMBER 19, 1951.

Honorable DEAN ACHESON,

*Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: During the course of the testimony of Alice Widener before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on September 18, 1951, testimony concerning a report filed by Julian Friedman entered the record.

Julian Friedman was an employee of the State Department (App. Div. Asst. in the Dept. of State Sept. 2, 1943; Asst. to Chief Div. of Labor Relations Sept. 1, 1944; Divisional Asst. Nov. 20, 1944; Asst. Sec. of Comm., United Nations Conf. on Int. Org., San Francisco, 1945; Research & Analysis Asst. May 17, 1945.—Biographic Register, Dept. of State, Oct. 1, 1945, page 106) and was dismissed without prejudice.

Would you make available to this Committee whatever reports Julian Friedman submitted on the Chinese Communist Labor Movement?

It would also be appreciated if you would inform this committee the significance of Mr. Friedman's "dismissal without prejudice." With such a dismissal could Mr. Friedman be returned to employment by the State Department if an opening should occur?

Were any facts available in this case to the State Department that could be made available to this Committee in following up this matter?

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

SEPTEMBER 24, 1951.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,

*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,*

*United States Senate.*

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I have your letter of September 19, 1951, addressed to the Secretary, requesting certain information in regard to Julian Friedman, a former employee of the Department of State, referred to during the course of the testimony of Alice Widener before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on September 18, 1951.

This matter will receive prompt attention, and I will communicate with you further in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.

Rec'd Oct. 19, 1951.

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,

*Washington, October 9, 1951.*

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Further reference is made to your letter of September 19, 1951 requesting certain information concerning Julian Friedman, a former employee of the Department of State.

With respect to your request for "whatever reports Julian Friedman submitted on the Chinese Communist Labor Movement" a search of the Department's files has disclosed only one such report. This report is in the form of a despatch from Shanghai, dated 1945, which contains SECRET information gained from a controlled American source.

It is the view of the Department that preserving the integrity of the reporting by Departmental officers is a matter of principle of the highest importance. In the present context, the release of Mr. Friedman's report, even though he is no longer an employee of the Department, would undoubtedly have the effect of inhibiting the free and frank expression of views by other officers in their reports to the Department. This is true not only because an officer must have absolute confidence that his sources will be protected to the fullest while he is still gathering information but also because the sources must have assurance that they will not be exposed or embarrassed sometime in the future. For these reasons the request for Mr. Friedman's report must be respectfully declined.



With regard to Mr. Friedman's termination from the Foreign Service on November 12, 1946, there is little that can be added to Mr. Elbridge Durbrow's letter to you of April 23, 1951, on this matter. Mr. Friedman was one of approximately 80 Auxiliary officers whose services were terminated on November 12, 1946 as a result of the liquidation of the Foreign Service Auxiliary. There is nothing in the Department's records on Mr. Friedman which indicates that there was any significance behind his termination. Should Mr. Friedman apply for reemployment in the Department today, he would be considered as any other applicant and as such would be subject to a full investigation, and a complete review of his case would be made under the Department's present employment and security standards.

In reply to the question contained in paragraph five of your letter, a thorough examination of the Department's files has disclosed that there were no facts available to the Department either prior to or at the time of Mr. Friedman's separation.

Sincerely yours,

[s] W. K. Scott

WALTER K. SCOTT,  
*Acting Deputy Under Secretary.*

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all we have, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want to say on the record that I think the testimony today demonstrates the bill that is on the calendar, which would permit committees to grant immunity and require the answers to questions, should receive the very careful attention of the Senate of the United States and the House at the present. It is apparent that if this committee is going to really serve the people of the United States, on occasions, it will be necessary that we be entitled to compel witnesses to testify.

If the people are going to be enabled to act as advisers to our State Department, and then refuse to answer certain questions on the ground that it would tend to incriminate them, as to whether or not they are Communists or non-Communists, and whether or not they know certain people, I think that the people, in order that they may obtain the facts, are going to have to do something about the granting of immunity, and the compelling of witnesses to answer questions.

Mr. MORRIS. There is one other point I notice I did not cover in the press of events.

Were you ever a lecturer at the Jefferson School of Social Science?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you actively assist in the circulation of the Stockholm peace petition?

Mr. ROSINGER. To the best of my knowledge I had nothing to do with it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see it or a copy of it or a facsimile of it?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall, except that it was reported widely in the press. I certainly saw it there.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have anything to do with its circulation, directly or indirectly?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't know the full meaning of the word "indirectly" but I didn't have reservations when I said I had no recollection of having anything to do with circulating it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know it was a Communist-inspired document?

Mr. ROSINGER. I decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that there was a Jefferson School of Social Science?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that a witness testified here that you were a student at that school, or went to its meetings?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that that was a pro-Communist school?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

(Whereupon, at 5:20 p. m. the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Wednesday, January 30, 1952.)

#### EXHIBIT No. 353

#### CHINA CRISIS

(By Lawrence K. Rosinger)

(Pages 90-96)

#### CHAPTER XI—PART I—"ARE THEY COMMUNISTS"

Ever since the early days of the Chinese Soviets foreign observers have tended to regard the Chinese Communists as agrarian socialists or peasant radicals, rather than as Communists. According to this view, the present guerrilla movements is essentially the latest in a series of radical peasant movements that have burst forth throughout Chinese history at moments of crisis. For example, in the middle of the last century the Taiping Rebellion, which almost unseated the Manchus fifty years before they actually lost the throne, was basically a peasant revolt. The Manchus previously had suppressed other revolts, and each dynasty before them had also been faced by its quota of rural uprisings. By analogy, then, the activities of the guerrilla armies and governments today could be considered a current variation on an old Chinese theme.

A far more important consideration in judging the Communists has been the moderate nature of their program. Even in the days of civil war, when they expropriated large land-owners, the guerrillas never tried to introduce anything resembling collectivization of agriculture. Their immediate goal was always the launching of long-needed rural reforms and the establishment of a landowning peasantry. Later, when existing policies were remoulded for the sake of unity with the Kuomintang, the Communists became more moderate in method as well as in program. Most striking was their pledge in September 1937 to support Sun Yet-Sen's Three Principles of the People: to abandon the policy of overthrowing the Kuomintang by force, establishing Soviets, and forcibly confiscating land; to abolish the Soviet Government and enforce democracy based on the people's rights; and to place their armies under the control of the National Government.<sup>1</sup>

Most foreign observers would agree that, while the last point has been realized only nominally because of friction with Chungking, the other pledges have been observed, even though Chungking on its side has done little to promote unity. The Eighteenth Group (originally the Eighth Route) and New Fourth Armies' policy of improving the lot of the people, encouraging them to participate in government, and mobilizing them for war against Japan are in agreement with Sun's principles of national independence, democracy, and popular welfare. Moreover, the Communists actually have abandoned the policy of land confiscation, have ended the Soviet political system, and, while defending themselves, have not sought to overthrow the Kuomintang by force.

It is an interesting fact that the twenty-fifth item in the Kuomintang's Program of Resistance and Reconstruction, adopted in 1938, urges the kind of mass organization activity the Communists have been carrying on. This clause reads as follows:<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> The Chinese Year Book, 1938-39 (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1939), p. 338.

"The people throughout the country shall be organized into occupational groups such as farmers, laborers, merchants, and students. The principle shall be: From each according to his ability. The rich shall contribute in money, and the able-bodied shall sweat. All classes of people shall be mobilized for war."

It is also worth noting that the whole emphasis of the Communists has been on change without violence, and in the areas under their control they have constantly sought to minimize the differences among classes. For example, while effecting reductions in rents and interest rates, they have invariably sought to dissuade the peasants from pressing for more radical reforms that would cause sharp class friction.

This is why, in a broadcast of August 11, 1943, Raymond Gram Swing declared quite correctly that "the Communists have become versed in the democratic art of compromise."<sup>2</sup> This is also why a liberal editorial writer remarks with good reason that they "could more appropriately call themselves the Chinese democrats."<sup>3</sup> At the same time it is necessary to point out that they regard themselves as Communists both in their political theory and outlook. It is true that the mass of people in the Communist areas are simply peasants looking for decent government and a better way of life. But many of the leaders, as well as ordinary citizens, are actually Communists.

The Communists hold that at the present time China is only ready for what they call "New Democracy," i. e. a progressive economic, political, and social program within the framework of a modified capitalism. The realization of their ultimate desire for a socialist China will be possible, they believe, only in the remote future. This attitude is expressed clearly in the following report of an interview by a foreign correspondent:

"Why do you call yourselves 'Communists' if you are practicing democracy?" a foreign visitor here asked a prominent party man.

"We are Communists," he was told, "and shall always remain Communists. But you must realize what a correct application of the Communist theory means in a backward semifeudal country like China.

"It must mean promotion of the smooth development of productive methods, with the help of capitalistic enterprise, as well as the enterprise of co-operatives.

"For only from that distant stage of fully developed modern economy can the next step toward socialism be made and only much later can the final step to Communism be taken \* \* \* Communism in China for decades to come can only mean 'new democracy.' There is no opposition to this policy in our party and the nonparty people everywhere in our areas know we mean what we say and support us because of this policy."

This spokesman also declared that "party members are predominantly peasants, keen on reforms and progress but definitely averse to any premature experiments like collective farming and socialist revolution on (the) basis of present low production and low culture."

While the Communists have reiterated on many occasions their desire for the strongest kind of unity with the Kuomintang and other political groups, they may be expected to show considerable toughness in adhering to the reform program they have laid down and in maintaining the independent existence of their party. On both points they are influenced not only by current considerations, but by their interpretation of the break-up of the first united front in 1927. At that time, they say, the Communists and left-wing movement in general placed too much confidence in the intentions of conservative nationalists and therefore were unprepared for the period of suppression. One may be sure that throughout the present war of resistance, whenever friction has increased, the minds of Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh and other leaders have turned back to the events of 1927.

This, in part, explains the Communists' constant emphasis on preserving their unity and independent existence on the same basis as the Kuomintang. In 1938 the latter proposed that the Communists dissolve and join the Kuomintang as individuals. The Communists refused, arguing that they had a distinct program and that Chinese conditions required more than one party. They proposed instead, that, as in 1924-27, they maintain their own party, but also be permitted to join the Kuomintang (with their names known to the Kuomintang). A second suggestion was for the creation of a national alliance of all parties, led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The various groups would be equally represented on a Central Executive Committee and local Executive Committees, which

<sup>2</sup> Amerasia (New York), September 1943, p. 282.

<sup>3</sup> The New Republic (New York), March 13, 1944, p. 335.

<sup>4</sup> Guenther Stein, Christian Science Monitor, August 30, 1944.

would be responsible for carrying out the united front. Neither of these arrangements was acceptable to the Kuomintang.

One of the questions most frequently asked about the guerrilla leaders is how closely they are tied to the Soviet Union. Intellectually, there is no doubt that they are highly sympathetic toward the Russians in outlook and purposes. In the early days of the Chinese Communist movement, considerable advice and aid were received from the U. S. S. R.—although it should be noted that this was also true of the Kuomintang, which, during 1924-7, relied heavily on Soviet support. Later on the Communists were located largely in the southern province of Kiangsi, ringed about by territory under Central control. When they reached the Northwest in 1935, they were closer to the U. S. S. R., but still were separated by some hundreds of miles of territory in which transport was ordinarily carried on by nothing better than a few caravan routes. Under the circumstances it appears unlikely that they received any significant aid from the Soviet Union after the late twenties.

For more than a decade and a half they have been essentially on their own, and have managed to survive and strengthen themselves despite civil conflict and Japanese aggression. In the course of the present war of resistance they have received virtually no outside aid. Except for some materials delivered by the Central Government during 1937-9, small quantities of medicines from abroad, and a trickle of goods imported from Free China despite the blockade, everything they have they appear either to have made for themselves or to have seized from the enemy. In effect, they have been considerably less dependent on foreign assistance than has Chungking itself, for all outside supplies delivered to China, whether from the Soviet Union, the United States, or other countries, have gone to the Central Government. It is significant in this connection that at no time during the present war has the Central Government, or any Central spokesman, stated or even suggested that the guerrilla armies were receiving any foreign military aid.\*

These facts point to a conclusion of supreme importance: that the Communists are deeply rooted in Chinese political life and that their political stability and power arise from inside China. They must be considered a native political force stemming from Chinese conditions—a force which will have to be dealt with by the Central Government regardless of the position taken by the Soviet Union on questions relating to China. Moreover, however great the sympathy Moscow may feel for the Chinese Communists, the Soviet Union is not alone in its current attitude toward them. The United States in the past year or two has exerted considerable pressure on Chungking to settle its differences with the Communists and achieve a united war effort. At the same time it must be recognized that, if the U. S. S. R. joins in the war against Japan and as a result establishes direct contacts with China's guerrilla armies, the latter will be greatly strengthened beyond their present considerable power.

The moderate, democratic domestic program that the Chinese Communists adopted in 1935-7 is a program to which they have adhered without important changes through all the succeeding vicissitudes of internal and international affairs, and despite all changes in the foreign relations of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the situation in China today presents this crucial issue: Will a coalition government be formed, with the Communists operating simply as a parliamentary left wing?

On such a basis China could look toward internal peace after the war, and the two or more political jurisdictions that exist in the country could be moulded into one, especially if unity at the center is combined with recognition of variety in the provinces. The fundamental problem, however, is one of democracy for the more democratic the National Government becomes the less occasion will there be for Kuomintang-Communist conflict. That is why Michael Lindsay has suggested:

"The risk of future civil strife depends very largely on the form of the post-war Chinese government. It might almost be said that the Central Government need only fear the existing (guerrilla) organization in North China if it intends to govern badly. A Central Government which tried to abolish democratic institutions and restore the former exploitation of the peasants by powerful landlords and money lenders working with corrupt officials would certainly meet with the universal opposition of the North China population and might well cause a civil war. On the other hand, a democratic government which confirmed and extended

\* See, for example, T. V. Soong's statement about guerrillas, quoted on p. 139.

† Michael Lindsay, "The North China Front, Part II," *Amerasia* (New York), April 14, 1944, p. 125.

the present reforms would find no reason for conflict. It would find no reason for conflict. It would find, in fact, that North China had changed from one of the most backward to one of the most progressive areas of China."

What is said here about North China applies with equal force to the entire question of unifying the nation, and what is said about the need for post-war democratic government also holds for government in war time. The unity of the future—or lack of it—is being shaped today and will not wait for decisions to be reached after the defeat of Japan.

## CHINA CRISIS

(By Lawrence K. Rosinger)

[Pages 139-147]

### CHAPTER IV—PART II—IN THE REAR OF THE ENEMY

The Communist-Led Eighteenth Group (formerly Eighth Route) and New Fourth Armies have played an essential part in preventing a Japanese victory during these past seven and a half years of war. Utilizing guerrilla tactics, they have kept Chinese authority alive in thousands of villages in the rear of the enemy. For, even though Japan long ago seized the key cities and main communications lines, large sections of the countryside remain in Chinese hands. Millions of citizens of the Chinese Republic have learned how to resist effectively, although completely surrounded by enemy forces.

It should not be thought that the Central Government has utterly failed to organize guerrilla warfare, but the Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Armies have accounted for the bulk of effective guerrilla fighting. The area of these armies stretches from unoccupied territory in the Northwest (the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region) to Shantung province in the East, and from the mountains north of Peiping to the Yangtze River in Central China. The dividing line between the two forces is the Lunghai railway, cutting across North China from the coast south of Shantung. Above the railway lies the field of operations of the Eighteenth Group Army; below it, that of the New Fourth. Neither army holds any of the large cities, but their troops are found only a few miles from places like Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking, Tsinan, and Kalgan, all of which were lost years back in the first phase of the war.

Opinions have varied concerning the exact size of the Communist armies, but the number of troops undoubtedly has risen sharply during the war. Early in 1941 Sun Fo, a high Central Government official, spoke of 500,000 Communist troops but T. V. Soong, then Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank of China, thought the total not over 250,000. In the spring of 1944 Theodore H. White of *Life* magazine declared that, according to the best information, there were between 200,000 and 300,000 in the Communist armies. In 1944 the Communists themselves estimated their regular forces at 470,000.

A force of from 200,000 to 470,000 Communist troops—taking White's minimum estimate and the Communist figure—would equal roughly from 7 to 16 percent of the Central armies, if these are set at 3,000,000 men. Superficially, this might suggest that the Communists are unimportant, were it not for several other factors. First of all, the number of persons below the level of the regular army, but assisting its operations in one way or another, probably runs into the millions. The Communists in 1944 claimed to have 2,200,000 guerrillas. Secondly, the Communist regulars are highly trained in the type of warfare they conduct and therefore are to be compared only with the best troops of the Chungking Government. Finally, the Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Armies appear to be holding down a disproportionately high percentage of the Japanese troops in China.

There are no Central figures on the last point, but in September 1943 Mme. Sun Yat-sen, widow of the famous Chinese nationalist leader, wrote that "the guerrilla areas \* \* \* are engaging and have engaged almost half of the Japanese forces in china."<sup>1</sup>

According to Theodore H. White, the Communists account for "perhaps 200,000 or more Japanese troops."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In *Guerrilla China* (Report of China Defense League, Chungking, published by China Aid Council of United China Relief, New York, 1944), p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Theodore H. White, "Life Looks at China," *Life* (New York), May 1, 1944, p. 109.

Since there are said to be approximately 600,000 Japanese soldiers in China, this would be at least one-third of the total. Moreover, both Chinese and foreign estimates of the regional distribution of the Japanese forces have generally assigned the largest number of divisions to the North China areas where the Eighteenth Group Army operates. Undoubtedly, the guerrilla achievement is an impressive one.

To these forces, it is important to recognize, war has been a natural condition not for seven and a half years, but more than twice as long. The first units of the Chinese Red Army, which ultimately evolved into the Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Armies, were organized as far back as 1927. The regular and guerrilla forces have been fighting ever since—first against the troops of the old Nanking Government in Civil War, and since 1937 against the Japanese. Their only period of rest was in the year preceding war with Japan, when a state of undeclared peace generally existed with the Central forces.

In August 1937, after a period of negotiation, the Communist forces were re-organized into the Eighth Route Army under the authority of the National Military Council in Nanking. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, as Chairman of the Council, confirmed the appointment of the existing commander, General Chu Teh, and vice commander, General Peng Teh-huai, to the same posts in the new army. Subsequently, the two Communist leaders announced that, with the support of the National Government, the Eighth Route Army had marched eastward to engage the enemy. In October, Nanking authorized the formation of a second force, to be known as the New Fourth Army, from Communist guerrillas who had operated in various parts of Central China during the civil war, and were still located there. On April 15, 1938, the New Fourth Army was ordered to begin moving to the rear of the enemy for battle. Its first small victory was won with the destruction of four Japanese trucks south of Chinkiang, on June 16, 1938.

In the early years of the war the Eighth Route Army received from the Central Government enough money to pay three Central divisions of 15,000 men each. The New Fourth Army received much less. Both sums, although quite inadequate for the troops involved (since the size of the armies was underestimated and they expanded rapidly), were stretched unusually far. This was possible because the pay of the ordinary soldier in the guerrilla forces was one Chinese dollar a month, and the highest commander, Chu Teh, received five dollars a month—less than the pay of a Central private. Even in the initial period of resistance, aid from the Central Government was on a small scale, but in 1939-40 all pay and supplies of ammunition were cut off. At the same time, Chungking instituted a strict economic blockade described in a later chapter.<sup>3</sup>

The guerrillas have secured most of their war materials by seizing supplies from the Japanese. According to an official Eighteenth Group Army statement, from September 1937 to July 1942 the following arms, munitions, and equipment were captured from the enemy: 73 pieces of field artillery, 29 infantry guns, 2 pieces of anti-aircraft artillery, 225 trench mortars, 257 heavy machine guns, 1,735 light machine guns, 95,782 rifles, 4,027 pistols, 352 signal guns, 861 bomb throwers, 9,923,347 rounds of small arms ammunition, 31,865 rounds of artillery ammunition, 108,222 hand grenades, 669 gas bombs, 3 airplanes, 73 automobiles and motorcycles, 8,379 trucks, 142 wireless transmitters, 939 telephone sets, 8,682 bicycles, 130 receiving sets, 12,925 steel helmets, 7,201 gas masks, 27,362 overcoats, and 55,121 army blankets. Not all of these supplies could be used by the guerrillas—for example, airplanes—but the bulk consisted of items they could handle.

Captured materials are supplemented by the output of primitive arsenals, often located in the mountains and turning out, in the main, hand grenades and land mines. In a few of the best-equipped factories cartridges are made by re-filling old cases. One observer saw a small field arsenal at the front that was producing a rifle a day from steel rails removed by the guerrillas from Japanese-controlled railways. But despite the seizure or production of equipment, the arms situation is serious—far more so than in the Chungking areas. A publication circulated by Eighteenth Group Army sources laments that "worn-out rifles cannot shoot accurately \* \* \* bullets fall midway \* \* \* soldiers have only a few rounds to shoot."<sup>4</sup>

The heart of guerrilla warfare in any country is mobilization of the people behind a political and economic program that advances their interests. This has

<sup>3</sup> See Part Three, Chapter 7, "Guerrillas Under Blockade," pp. 262-5 below.

<sup>4</sup> North China Unconquered (no place, no publisher, June 1943), p. 11.

been true in the underground military movements against the Nazis, and it is also true in China. The political features of the Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Army program have already been noted, and the economic aspects will be discussed later on.<sup>5</sup> Here it will be in order, however, to describe some of the military characteristics of popular mobilization by the guerrillas.

First of all, enlistment is entirely voluntary, since guerrilla warfare cannot be based on compulsion, especially in a country like China, where the army has often had a bad reputation among the people. For lack of equipment, there is a waiting list of recruits in the Eighteenth Group Army area, and until they are called they receive part-time training. Through organizations of peasants; workers, merchants, women, and others, every effort is made to heighten the conviction among the people that they should participate personally in resistance and not view the war as spectators. School instruction, newspapers, mass meetings, songs, and plays are all employed to this end.

The following quotation from a guerrilla play, involving three peasants, suggests clearly the nature of the appeal:<sup>6</sup>

"Third farmer: Look at the People's Army! They don't take the harvest from us, and they even want to reduce the land tax and give us a better chance to live, so that we farmers will see better days.

"First farmer: That's a fact. That's true. They're the kind of people who really help us.

"Second farmer: When people do something to help us, it's up to us to do something too."

The play soon follows up the last point and explains how the peasants can help:<sup>7</sup>

"First farmer: How are we going to fight? We've only our bare fists. What are we going to fight with?

"Sergeant of the People's Army: You've all got something, right in your hand! Your hoes and rakes are not worse than our guns. (He lifts up his old gun to show it.) We'll surround the Japanese devils and fight them; you get behind and dig ditches and trenches so their lorries cannot retreat.

"All: Yes! Yes! Let's go home and get our shovels.

"Sergeant: Take what you've got right now! Use your saws to cut down their telephone posts. Use your axes to dig up railway tracks. Use your hoes to pull down telephone wires. And you? (Points to an empty-handed farmer.) You know the roads, so you can be our guide . . .

"All: (All raise their weapons high in the air.) Good! Army and People! Forward together and fight it out with Japan! Take what you've got in your hand, and fight! Forward and fight the Japanese! They march off, with big strides.)"

No policy of winning popular cooperation could work, if the Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Armies did not respect the rights and property of the people. This is one reason for the enforcement of three major and eight minor rules, most of which deal with the treatment of the civilian population:<sup>8</sup>

#### MAJOR RULES

- "(1) Executive the anti-Japanese patriotic principles.
- "(2) Execute the instructions of higher leaders.
- "(3) Do not take the smallest thing from the people."

#### MINOR RULES

"(1) Ask permission before entering a house. Before leaving thank the occupants for their courtesy, and ask them if they are satisfied with the condition of the house.

"(2) Keep the house clean.

"(3) Speak kindly to the people.

"(4) Pay for everything that you use, at the market price.

"(5) Return all borrowed articles.

"(6) Pay for all articles which the army has broken or destroyed.

"(7) Do not commit a nuisance (dig latrines).

"(8) Do not kill or rob the captives."

<sup>5</sup> For the economic program, see pp. 206-215.

<sup>6</sup> J. Clayton Miller, "The Drama in China's Anti-Japanese Propaganda," *Pacific Affairs* (New York), December 1938, p. 467.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 469.

<sup>8</sup> Evans F. Carlson, *The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, pp. 36-7).

The existence of these rules reflects the impression left by China's former war-lord armies, which often looted the villages they passed through and proved a plague to the people. Today any Chinese army that hopes for strong popular support must be careful to avoid actions reminiscent of the militarists.

The pattern of military organization contains four elements: the regular army, guerrillas, local militia, and village self-defense units. The large forces that constitute the core of the Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Armies are known correctly as "regular" rather than "guerrilla" troops (although it has been found convenient to use the latter as an over-all term in this book). The regulars have a well-developed formal organization and are equipped with light and heavy machine guns and trench mortars. Below the regular army there are guerrilla detachments in the various districts. These are full time soldiers, less well equipped than the regulars. Below the guerrilla detachments, in turn, are the local militia—farmers with a few hand grenades, who harass the Japanese when they raid. And on the lowest level of all are the village self-defense units which aid the army as porters and guides and engage in intelligence work, furnishing the Chinese forces with the latest information on Japanese troop movements.

Relations between officers and men are reported to be close and friendly, and it is the opinion of many observers that the leaders of the Eighteenth Group Army are outstanding for their personal qualities, which show in their leadership. According to Colonel Carlson, who spent considerable time with the guerrilla forces in the early years of the war, "the high ranking leaders of the Eighth Route Army are distinguished by their honesty, frankness, humility, and intelligence." (9 *Ibid.*, p. 39.) Later, Colonel Carlson sought to develop the same type of leadership among his own Marine Raiders, who engaged in guerrilla warfare behind the Japanese lines on Guadalcanal when American forces were fighting for that island.

The attitude of the guerrilla commanders is reflected in the active political training given their troops. Each company has a political leader, who is in charge of the education of the forces and seeks to develop their morale and understanding of the war. Before every action a meeting of the troops is held, at which the commander explains the purpose of the engagement and other related matters. Afterwards mistakes are discussed at another meeting. Emphasis is constantly placed on the soldiers' thoroughly grasping the meaning of what is being done as well as their own function in the war. It could hardly be otherwise, for guerrilla activity places a premium on the intelligence and initiative of the individual fighting man.

The guerrillas, generally outnumbering the enemy, have sought to hit at his flanks and rear, to cut his communications, and to engage in night rather than day attacks. The practice in retreat has been to destroy everything that might be of value to advancing Japanese troops. However, it would be an error to think of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies as restricting themselves to "hit-and-run" operations by small guerrilla bands. The regular army units frequently carry out coordinated actions, involving thousands of men for several weeks at a time, and even engage in positional warfare of short duration.

All these methods, applied with striking ingenuity, have enabled the guerrillas to meet the enemy successfully. The effect is to harass the invaders, prevent consolidation of their positions, and keep China actively in the struggle. Guerrilla leaders have never had the illusion that their tactics could be decisive in bringing about Japan's defeat, but have always regarded such operations simply as one important phase of a strategy of protracted war. In urging such a strategy—and they were among the first to do so—they made it clear from the outset that, if victory was to be won, the guerrilla stage would have to lead to a final stage in which China would be strong enough and have enough foreign aid to launch a continuing counter-offensive, and engage in considerable positional fighting.

For their resistance to the Japanese the guerrillas, like the Central troops, have paid a heavy price, and the enemy has struck at them time after time in bitter offensives. In spite of this, the Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Armies have carried on effectively. Undoubtedly the guerrillas would be still more active if the Chungking blockade were removed and they did not have to bear in mind the possibility of a Central attack. In any event, it is impossible to study the record of these armies and not conclude that, without their resistance, China's struggle probably would have ended in defeat many years ago. For, despite strained internal relations, the guerrillas have provided an indispensable complement to the Central forces in China's fight for survival, and have served to stiffen their country's spirit of resistance.



[See page 2496 for discussion regarding the following]

## EXCERPTS FROM THE STATE OF ASIA

(By Lawrence K. Rosinger and Associates)

[Pages 34 through 44]

Events in the fall of 1945 suggested that Chiang Kai-shek was not in a position to defeat the Communists in civil war. It is true that during the opening phase of the renewed conflict the Central Government added to its wartime territory the area of southeast China, the lower Yangtze-Valley, most of the large cities, and footholds in north China. But the Communists sent forces into Manchuria, considerably expanded their control of rural north China, including most of Shantung Province, and took over some important cities. In this process the Central armies suffered several defeats, although they retained a marked over-all superiority to the Communist troops in number and equipment.

While aiding the Kuomintang, the United States remained interested in the possibility of achieving a Kuomintang-Communist peace agreement. Late in August 1945 Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley was instrumental in bringing about a trip by Mao Tse-tung from Yenai to Chungking for talks with Chiang Kai-shek, but a subsequent agreement on principles in October did not stop the civil war. This was a period of growing concern over China within the United States Government. While some officials wished to give Chiang much stronger support, the dominant reaction was one of caution. There was a feeling that, in view of the many serious economic and other problems he faced, the Generalissimo was overanxious for a military solution and careless about the danger of overextending his forces.

Toward the end of November 1945 Ambassador Hurley, a proponent of large-scale aid to Chungking, resigned, and the President named General George C. Marshall as a special envoy to China. On December 15, in a statement that was part of the new envoy's instructions, the President called for a cessation of hostilities in China, an early unification conference of China's "major political elements," the broadening of the National Government through "fair and effective representation" of other groups, and the integration of autonomous armies into the Chinese National Army. "United States support," he said, "will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife," and he suggested that American military and economic aid would be conditioned on China's moving "toward peace and unity."<sup>1</sup>

In late December 1945 the United States, the U. S. S. R., and Britain agreed at Moscow on "the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government, and for a cessation of civil strife."<sup>2</sup>

The available evidence indicates that both this statement and the earlier declaration by President Truman were in keeping with majority sentiment among politically conscious Chinese who, like the rest of their countrymen, earnestly desired a peaceful solution of internal differences.

On January 10, 1946, with General Marshall as a mediator, the Nationalists and Communists reached a cease-fire agreement, to take effect on January 13. A Political Consultative Conference of the Kuomintang, Chinese Communist party, Democratic League, and other elements, meeting in Chungking during January 10-31, adopted a unity accord providing for a coalition regime as a transition to constitutional government. China's armies were to be reorganized and nationalized, civil liberties protected, and reforms introduced in agriculture, industry, and education. The Kuomintang was assigned a preponderant position in the government and army, but the Communists seemed to have an assurance that their local administrations would not be destroyed. On February 25 the Kuomintang and the Communist party agreed that a sixty-division national army (composed of fifty Kuomintang and ten Communist divisions) would be created over a period of eighteen months.

The hopes raised in China by the Marshall mission were not realized, although many Chinese and Americans worked strenuously to achieve peace. The bitterness and suspicion between the two main Chinese parties were great, and neither

<sup>1</sup> Text in *United States Relations with China* (Washington, D. C., Department of State, 1949), pp. 607-9.

<sup>2</sup> Text in Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner (eds.): *Documents on American Foreign Relations* (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1948), Vol. VIII, pp. 829-30.

trusted the other. Military violations of the truce later occurred on both sides, but the weeks immediately following the conclusion of the agreements were the decisive period for their success or failure. It was at this time that the rightists took the initiative against the peace accords by carrying out what General Marshall subsequently called "quite evidently inspired mob actions"<sup>3</sup> and by seeking important changes in the agreed terms.

The Chinese Communists, according to the American envoy, did not at that time appear irreconcilable.<sup>4</sup> On the whole, they were extremely careful to avoid being held responsible by Chinese opinion if the agreements broke down. They seemed acutely conscious of the long-term value of this approach in influencing the middle group, which in general regarded peace as its only hope of real survival. Some Kuomintang leaders—for example, Shao Li-tze and Chang Chih-chung, two of the government's peace negotiators—favored maximum efforts to make the agreements work. But the dominant Kuomintang elements apparently misjudged both the difficulties of winning a civil war and the extent of the commitment the United States would undertake in China. Although Washington's threat to deny aid had served to insure conclusion of the unity agreements, the rightists, including powerful military and political figures, did not believe that the United States would set sharp limits to its aid if the Central government was hard pressed during a military conflict. They also tended to believe that American-Soviet tension would grow and perhaps lead to an early third world war in which Kuomintang China would be an ally of the United States. Such considerations far outweighed all private words of caution from American representatives, especially since American aid continued, and in some ways expanded, during the crucial first half of 1946, in which the Political Consultative Conference pacts broke down irreparably.

Manchuria was a key area of conflict, and an especially complicated one because of the presence of Soviet forces, which had engaged Japan's Manchurian army for a brief period after the Soviet declaration of war on Japan in August 1945. In the winter of 1945-6 several Chinese-Soviet disputes developed, as differences emerged over the status of the Dairen-Port Arthur area and it became known that the U. S. S. R. had removed an important segment of Japanese machinery from Manchuria as "war booty." In addition, Soviet forces occupied various nontreaty areas in Manchuria for some weeks beyond the final withdrawal date of February 1, 1946. (The Russians were originally to leave by December 1, 1945, but at the request of Chungking, which was not in a position to take over, the date was twice extended—first to January 1 and then to February 1.)

The Chinese Communists undoubtedly benefitted from the presence of the Russians in Manchuria, for the Kuomintang was hampered by the timing of Soviet withdrawals and by Moscow's refusal, under its interpretation of the 1945 treaty, to allow Nationalist troops to enter the region by way of Dairen. The Russians apparently also played a part, directly or indirectly, in the acquisition of surrendered Japanese military equipment by the Communists.

It should be noted, however, that in many places outside the larger cities the Chinese Communist forces themselves effected the surrender of Japanese troops. Despite the Soviet actions, the Chinese Communists were considered by most expert observers to be fundamentally dependent on themselves for their material resources.

General Marshall, for example, privately warned high Central officials in September 1946 that, if the civil war deepened, the Communists might "be driven to seek and be dependent upon outside support, such as Russian aid"—a statement that would have been pointless if Yen-an had been thought to be relying on Soviet help.<sup>5</sup>

In January 1947 he stated publicly that he knew of no evidence that the Chinese Communists were being supported by Russia.<sup>6</sup>

Again, in October 1947, Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart reported that there was "little if any evidence of material assistance from Moscow."<sup>7</sup>

These impressions were reinforced, as the civil war mounted in intensity, by the increasing Communist use of American equipment taken from Nationalist troops.

Meanwhile, a basic feature of the postwar period was making itself felt: the reaction of the Chinese people in the Kuomintang and Communist areas to the

<sup>3</sup> Statement of January 7, 1947, in *United States Relations with China*, p. 687.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 688.

<sup>5</sup> Quoted from the official United States paraphrase of Marshall's remarks, *ibid.*, p. 187.

<sup>6</sup> *New York Times*, January 12, 1947.

<sup>7</sup> *United States Relations with China*, p. 832.

kind of government they were living under. The Kuomintang was at first welcomed in the cities it took over from the Japanese. The problems of postwar reconstruction were considerable, but despite shipping shortages, railway damage, inflation, the need to restore domestic trade, and other problems, the situation had favorable aspects. The government's gold and foreign exchange reserves totaled more than nine hundred million U. S. dollars at the end of 1945; much of the wartime damage to economic facilities could be repaired in a fairly short period; and extensive industrial properties were inherited from Japan. What the economy needed to make these assets effective was peace, accompanied by increased revenues and a cut in military expenses.

Popular disillusionment set in as officials proved corrupt and prices soared. Private industry suffered from the unstable economy, as well as from the privileged position of government enterprises. The Central budget, devoted mostly to military items, was increasingly unbalanced. There was no land reform, the peasant bore a continuing burden of conscription, and the armies consumed food needed by the cities. The cutting of railways by the Communists and the separation of the northern Nationalist-held cities from the food and raw materials of the Communist-held countryside were also extremely important in adding to the problems of the Kuomintang.

Because the Kuomintang was generally believed to have taken the initiative in resuming civil conflict, and because conditions in its territory were so unsatisfactory, the politically conscious section of the urban middle class, especially the intellectuals of Shanghai and Peiping, became ever sharper in their criticism. The Kuomintang's principal answer was repression and use of the secret police. A new constitution was adopted late in 1946 and other reforms were announced at intervals, but the grim realities of Chinese life remained unchanged.

At the same time the Chinese Communists were carrying forward under post-war conditions the policies they had developed during the war. As before, life was not easy in their areas: much fighting took place in Communist-controlled territory in 1946-7; the armies had to be fed; the countryside was isolated from the cities; and excesses were sometimes committed. But the local and regional governments tried to minimize these problems by keeping expenses low (the entire officialdom, including Mao, lived on an austere economic level), by distributing the tax burden approximately according to wealth, and by engaging in extensive political indoctrination to maintain morale.

The theme of the Communists' land program changed from rent reduction to large redistribution: the landlords were reduced to a peasant status, and their expropriated land was parcelled out among millions of landless and land-poor peasants. The surplus land of many "rich peasants" (a category of peasant just below the landlord level) was also taken. In this explosive process much violence was used against landlords, and policy was sometimes applied so indiscriminately as to affect ordinary peasants. Alarmed at reports of the alienation of many "middle peasants" (who were neither to receive expropriated land nor to lose any of their existing land), the Communist leadership in late 1947 and early 1948 warned the party's rural personnel to curb the tendency toward excesses. The main long-term effect of the program was to create a landed peasantry under Communist auspices in large areas of Manchuria and north China, as well as in parts of central China. The existence of this new peasantry, with an economic stake in its government, strengthened the position of the Communists in the civil war.

The Communist formula for attaining and expanding power had long included three elements: the party, the army, and a "united front" with various "revolutionary classes" (especially the workers and peasants). The party machine, operating from village and town cells up to the level of the National Congress and Central Committee (with the Political Bureau as its nucleus), was an efficient, disciplined, highly indoctrinated organization. Its leaders and many of its ordinary members displayed an iron sense of dedication to a cause.

The army—originally named the Chinese Red Army, then the Eighth Route (or Eighteenth Group) and New Fourth armies during the war with Japan, and later the People's Liberation Army—was also efficient, disciplined, and indoctrinated. One American observer wrote of it early in 1949: \*

The Communist Liberation Army is a unique fighting organization which owes its successes more to its leadership, its morale, and its contact with the people than to its material strength. The Nationalists have often shown in their better days that they could fight as bravely as the Communists, but they

\* A. T. Steele, *New York Herald Tribune*, May 18, 1949.

have never been able to match the adaptability of the Reds to the peculiar conditions of warfare in China.

The "united front" policy involved an appeal not only to the peasants, but also to labor, the intelligentsia, and even sections of the Chinese business community. The Communists devoted careful efforts to winning the support of, or at least neutralizing as many members of, these groups as possible. Over the years, thousands of intellectuals were trained as organizers of the peasantry—a combination of tiller and scholar which was new in Chinese politics. The Taiping Rebellion, while arousing the peasants, had been opposed by the scholars; Sun Yat-sen had aroused the intellectuals, while making little impression on the countryside. The combination of both elements constituted a powerful force.

It would be hard to overemphasize the political importance of the Kuomintang's loss of the intelligentsia, which had traditionally wielded great influence in China. Frustrated in their hopes for national reconstruction, and harassed politically and economically, many liberal scholars, writers, and artists came to feel that they had nothing to look forward to under the Nationalists, but would, or might, have a future under the Communists. They realized that the Communist areas followed a monolithic doctrine and restricted civil liberties. But the liberals also observed that the Communists, unlike the Kuomintang, actively encouraged certain forms of criticism of the workings of government, and knew how to combine their own predominant leadership with an ability to work in coalition with others. To many members of the middle group the alternatives seemed increasingly to be a sterile Chinese anti-Communism and a Chinese Communism that perhaps offered a way out. Ideally they would have preferred a constructive non-Communism, but this hardly existed in practical Chinese politics.

American opinion tended increasingly to see China largely as a factor in the "cold war." But most politically conscious Chinese shrank from this approach, fearing that their country would become a battleground in a new world conflict. American and Soviet preferences carried little weight with them; and even to the intellectuals, ideology was usually not the crucial factor in choosing between Chiang and Mao. It is also worth remembering that—particularly as a result of the Kuomintang-Soviet-Chinese Communist alliance of 1924-7—the Sun Yat-sen type of philosophy characteristic of the middle group contained Marxist features as well as liberal Western and other elements.

In its traditional stronghold—its leadership of Chinese nationalism—the Kuomintang also lost prestige. Its heavy reliance on aid, or the hope of aid, from an outside power, the United States, was an aspect of this development. Moreover, nationalism meant to the Chinese not only the existence of a national government, but its effective operation for purposes of national construction. No government that failed in this domestic work could long satisfy the nationalistic spirit.

During the civil war of 1946-9, Chinese leftists and Communists unceasingly denounced the Central government as subservient to the United States. These attacks fell on fertile soil in intellectual and other middle class circles. On March 18, 1948, the American Embassy in Nanking (which had again become the national capital after the war) reported that "the slow increase of anti-American sentiment in the country is noteworthy" and referred to "a common conviction \* \* \* that the Generalissimo is, in fact, leading the country to ruin and chaos, and that he could not do so if it were not for the support which the American Government has given him."<sup>9</sup>

The trends just described were a crystallization of many day-to-day developments in the civil war and China's international relations. During the months after it launched its military campaign in the summer of 1946 the Kuomintang won victories, adding to its territory most of the Communist-held cities, as well as sections of the Communists' rural areas. In March 1947 Yen'an fell. But the Communists did not, as in 1927 and 1934-5, suffer a basic defeat and the Central government failed to reach what must have been its minimum goal: effective control of the north China railway network.

The strategy of the Communists was not to concentrate on holding territory, but to try to inflict to the Kuomintang much greater losses in men and equipment than they themselves suffered. For its territorial success of 1946-7 the Central government paid a high price. In the spring of 1947 the Communists took the offensive, and in the summer their troops struck across the Yellow River into central China. The Kuomintang never regained the initiative, but resorted to

<sup>9</sup> Message to the Department of State in United States Relations with China, p. 906.

the defense of fortified strong points, which the Communists bottled up and later took one by one.

American policy toward China also passed through various phases. In January 1947 General Marshall left China to become secretary of state, after issuing a public statement on the **failure of his mediation efforts.**<sup>10</sup>

He described as the chief obstacle to peace "the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other." In the Kuomintang he found "a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government." They had, he said, "evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their actions."

General Marshall criticized sharply the Communists' attacks on American policy, their refusal to join the constitutional assembly held late in 1946, and the "radicals" among them, whom he viewed as seeking the Central government's collapse, "without any regard to the immediate suffering of the people." But in addition to the "radicals," he felt there was "a definite liberal group \* \* \* especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments." His conclusion was that "the liberals in the Government and in the minority parties" should assume leadership under Chiang in an effort to attain "unity through good government."

During 1947 war weariness became widespread in Kuomintang China. In February one of a series of economic crises occurred. Late that month and in March a non-Communist revolt erupted on Formosa, mainly as a result of local resentment at maladministration by officials sent from the mainland. The uprising was broken by the indiscriminate shooting down of thousands of Formosan Chinese. In April, largely in response to American pressure, cabinet changes took place in the Central government. Ambassador Stuart, who wished to help rejuvenate the government by encouraging the relatively liberal elements in the Kuomintang, noted that the extreme right wing was still dominant in the party. In May a new economic crisis was accompanied by rice riots, strikes, and student demonstrations. In October 1947 the government banned the Democratic League.

Since the war American military and economic aid to the Central government had taken such forms as postwar lend-lease, the transfer of surplus property and naval vessels, Export-Import Bank credits, and a preponderant American share in the funds of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Out of a total UNRRA expenditure of \$658,400,000 in China during 1945-47, the American share constituted \$474,000,000. In July 1947, when the Central government was clearly in serious difficulties, President Truman sent to China (and Korea) an investigating mission headed by Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who had once served in China as General Stilwell's successor. Wedemeyer issued a scathing public statement about the need for reform and, in a secret, official report<sup>11</sup> that was later published, proposed far-reaching military and economic aid to the Nationalists, extensive reforms, and the appointment of American advisers to supervise use of the aid.

The Wedemeyer mission stimulated the continuing American debate on China policy. Two principal and closely connected issues were these: Whether or how to give the Nationalists further aid, and how much importance to attach to reform in judging the China situation. These questions were examined within an international framework of growing American-Soviet tension, and increasingly the main theme of China policy was Russia rather than China.

The Wedemeyer report asked, in essence, that the United States assume direction of the Kuomintang's civil-war effort.<sup>12</sup> In view of Chinese Communist strength, this meant undertaking a commitment of indefinable duration, scope, and cost. China would at once become a major area of American cold-war strategy, and the preponderant American emphasis on Europe would inevitably be affected. The prevailing view in Washington was that the United States would be overcommitting its strength if it tried to act on the same scale in Asia as in Europe; that Asia's temper and stage of development made it desirable to avoid any deep American involvement in unstable situations there; and that

<sup>10</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 686-9.

<sup>11</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 764-814.

<sup>12</sup> See Walter Lippmann: "The White Paper: Wedemeyer and Marshall," *New York Herald Tribune*, September 8, 1949.

Europe came first because its industry was the decisive element of modern economic power outside the United States and the Soviet Union. In Asia, moreover, Washington regarded Japan as its major military position and thought largely in terms of island bases for air and naval power rather than of continental positions.

EXCERPTS FROM THE STATE OF ASIA

(By Lawrence K. Rosinger and Associates)

[Pages 86-95]

In the fall of 1949 the various states in the Soviet bloc recognized Peking. In December 1949, Burma became the first non-Communist government to extend recognition, followed shortly by India and, early in January 1950, by Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Ceylon. By the end of September 1950, formal relations existed with seventeen governments, including Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, East Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland, Vietnam (the government of Ho Chi Minh), and the U. S. S. R. Nine other countries—Afghanistan, Ceylon, Finland, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia—had expressed the desire to exchange representatives. Of these, four—Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom—were then conducting negotiations with Peking on the subject.

During the Chinese civil war Britain had avoided committing itself to the Kuomintang and had tried to keep the door open to dealing with a successor regime. Consequently, despite certain incidents, British contacts with the Chinese People's Republic lacked the background of intense suspicion and conflict existing between Washington and Peking. According to Chou En-lai, however, the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Britain had been delayed because of Britain's refusal to vote against the Kuomintang's holding China's seat in the United Nations. Britain's position was that it would vote to admit Peking, if the resolution were assured of a majority. At the same time it took a stand favorable to Peking on certain United Nations issues other than recognition. These actions presumably reflected an effort to reconcile a policy of recognition with a desire to avoid voting against the United States on the question of seating Peking in the United Nations.

Britain was desperately anxious to expand its trade all over the world, including China, in which it had a great investment stake, especially at Shanghai. It also possessed the Crown Colony of Hong Kong, consisting of an island off the south China coast near Canton and a small portion of the adjacent mainland. One of the leading ports of the world, Hong Kong contained huge amounts of British capital. Its population of 1,800,000 was overwhelmingly Chinese, and it was regarded by Chinese nationalists of all shades as rightfully part of China, from which the land had been wrested in the nineteenth century. Strained relations with the Peking government might endanger Britain's investments in China, the British position at Hong Kong, or—at a greater distance—Britain's "dollar arsenal" in Malaya, which contained a large overseas Chinese population and a dissident, predominately Chinese guerrilla movement.

British opinion about China was much more unified than American opinion. The British tended to believe that they could do business with Chinese Communism, which they considered an almost inevitable result of Kuomintang misrule and an internal improvement on Chiang's regime. They felt strongly that the West had nothing to gain from voluntary enmity toward the Chinese People's Republic, since this would merely serve to cement the Chinese-Soviet alliance. They also placed China in a different category from Eastern Europe on the ground that China had a distinctive social structure, economic development, and national tradition, and that the Chinese Communists had come to power essentially through their own efforts. China, in their view, was a country that could—unlike Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia—aspire to the status of a great power. The effect, according to many English observers, was to promote an equal rather than a subservient Chinese Communist approach to Russia. The British did not know what the future might bring, but they considered it wise to encourage such a Chinese attitude.

After the application of blockade measures by the Kuomintang, Britain rather early used warships to escort its commercial vessels in Chinese waters. While

not formally recognizing the blockade, the United States, by contrast, accepted it in practice. In December 1949, for example, Washington warned American ship captains that they might lose their masters' licenses if they took American vessels into Shanghai waters. Again, the British wished a largely unrestricted trade with China, but the United States increasingly imposed a wide range of restrictions on strategic commodities. In this respect Britain's China trade policy gradually followed that of the United States, especially after the outbreak of the Korean war.

Early in 1949 American businessmen in China, like the British, were reported interested in trying to operate under the Communists. This attitude continued for many months, although it was somewhat affected by the beginnings of the blockade, labor disputes in Shanghai in the summer of 1949, and other questions. With the tightening of the blockade, the worsening of American-Chinese relations, and the introduction of heavy business taxes by Peking, a decidedly pessimistic attitude developed among American businessmen. Peking desired and needed trade, but its approach to foreign firms was one of marked independence. With no great investment stake in China and various economic alternatives at home, many American companies were in a position to withdraw.

In August 1949, following the fall of the Kuomintang Washington published an official defense of its China policy, especially, in the 1944-9 period. Entitled *United States Relations with China*, and known informally as the China "White Paper," this volume, based on State Department files, aroused extensive comment and controversy. Its main thesis was that the United States gave the Nationalists extensive advice that was ignored and aid that was wasted, and that nothing the United States "did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed" the outcome in China. Total American aid to the Kuomintang since VJ-day was estimated at slightly more than two billion dollars in military and economic grants, plus civilian and military surplus property costing more than one billion and sold at \$232,000,000.

The main State Department tendency during 1949 was to "wait for the dust to settle" in China. According to this view, recognition might ultimately come, but the timing would depend on American politics and Chinese policies. Meanwhile, as the magnitude of China's internal problems became clear, Peking would perhaps soften its attitude toward the United States, in the hope of obtaining aid. If at the same time the United States avoided major new commitments to the Kuomintang, Chinese anti-American sentiment might lessen, Chinese attention might shift to elements of friction in relations with the U. S. S. R. (e. g., over Manchuria, Mongolia, or Sinkiang), and the result might be a form of Chinese Titoism.

According to a powerful contrary view, held by sections of the Administration, of Congress (especially in Republican ranks), and the press, the Chinese People's Republic was simply a Moscow satellite, the hope of Titoism was illusion, Peking should be denied recognition or admission to the United Nations, trade with it should be kept to a minimum, and the United States should undertake to keep Formosa in non-Communist hands. Supporters of this general approach, including General MacArthur, also tended to desire a much greater or even a primary emphasis on the Far East in American Foreign policy, as contrasted with the existing preponderant emphasis on Europe.

While the two approaches can be isolated for purposes of analysis, actual policy combined them in a complex fashion reflecting domestic and international pressures. The State Department was more willing than its opposition to think of finally recognizing Peking, but at the same time American official influence worked against early recognition by other countries. Again, the President and secretary of state early in 1950 declared firmly that the United States would not intervene in Formosa, but American aid continued to go to the Kuomintang on Formosa.

In the spring and summer of 1949 the Communists showed signs of desiring relations with the United States, and on October 1, 1949, the Chinese People's Republic asked the United States, along with other governments, to extend recognition. But relations hardened, perhaps particularly after the Kuomintang blockade and bombings, which Peking charged were American-inspired. Several incidents in China also had a marked effect in the United States. In October, for example, the American Consul in Mukden was arrested and imprisoned on the charge of beating a Chinese employee. After trial and conviction he was deported. Early in 1950 Peking's seizure of a section of American consular prop-

erty in the capital was followed by the withdrawal of all American consular personnel from the Chinese mainland.<sup>1</sup>

Formosa became a major issue between the United States and Peking. At the Cairo conference in 1943 and at Potsdam in 1945 it had been agreed that this island, which had been Chinese territory under the Manchu dynasty, but had been lost to Japan at the end of the nineteenth century, should be returned to China after the war. This was done following the Japanese surrender.

The Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang were as one in declaring Formosa Chinese territory. The Kuomintang hoped to maintain itself on the island and from it eventually to invade the mainland with American support. The Communists saw Formosa as the last Nationalist refuge, whose incorporation (together with Tibet) would end the civil war, the blockade, and the threat of Nationalist bombings, as well as the Kuomintang itself. They also declared that victory on Formosa would permit the launching of a full peacetime economy in China.

Chiang withdrew to Formosa in December 1949 and on March 1, 1950, formally resumed the presidency of Nationalist China. On Formosa he had an army of about half a million men, as well as a considerable refugee population of former mainland officials and Kuomintang supporters. The normal population of Formosa consisted of approximately seven million persons, mostly Chinese long settled there. Japan had carried out a degree of modern development for its own imperial purposes, but industry and mining had deteriorated markedly since 1945. The population was reported hostile to the Kuomintang because of misrule and the bloody suppression of the 1947 Formosa uprising. But in 1950 the Kuomintang was trying to rehabilitate itself with the local population; for example, through land reforms.<sup>2</sup>

Located on important communications routes, Formosa also possessed two good harbors and space for good airfields. Its political instability and severe potential economic problems, however, affected its military value in Kuomintang hands. Observers doubted that Chiang could hold it if Peking acquired the air power to protect troop ships sent from the mainland. It was evident that, with Soviet aid, Peking was developing an air force, and by the summer of 1950 rumors of an early campaign for Formosa were widespread.

On January 5, 1950, in an effort to settle sharp official differences on the subject, President Truman declared that the United States had accepted Chinese authority over Formosa, had no designs on the island, and would not follow a course leading to involvement in the Chinese civil war, or give military aid or advice to the Nationalists on Formosa.<sup>3</sup>

On the same day Secretary Acheson commented on the view that Formosa was legally Japanese territory until the conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty.<sup>4</sup>

The Chinese have administered Formosa for 4 years. Neither the United States nor any other ally ever questioned that authority. \* \* \* We did not wait for a treaty on the islands over which we have trusteeship.

The policy enunciated by the President went counter to the views of General MacArthur and to statements made a few days before by ex-President Hoover and Senator Taft, advocating use of the American Navy, if necessary, to keep the Chinese Communists from taking Formosa.

The utterances by Truman and Acheson did not end the official debate and Formosa. Early in June 1950, with the visit of several high American officials to General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, a strong trend toward a shift in policy was indicated, although the decision apparently remained to be made. The Korean war crystallized the situation, and on June 27 the President announced that Chinese Communist occupation of Formosa "would be a direct

<sup>1</sup> The property taken over had been assigned to the United States following the Boxer Rebellion and had once been used as a military barracks, but later converted to office use. Peking also took over similar French, Dutch, and British property, but the respective governments did not follow the United States in its action. The former Russian military cantonment was returned to China in 1950 under a clause of the Chinese-Soviet treaty of February 14, 1950 (see p. 85, above).

<sup>2</sup> The Chinese-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, set up under the 1948 congressional appropriation for China, was important in this connection.

<sup>3</sup> He stated that economic aid would continue. During 1950 Economic Cooperation Administration aid to Formosa exceeded the total taxes collected by the Chinese Nationalist government on the island.

<sup>4</sup> Department of State Bulletin, January 16, 1950, p. 80.



threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces" in that region.<sup>5</sup> He added:

"Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."

This represented a significant, although not complete, incorporation into policy of the views of General MacArthur about Formosa. Soon afterward, as north Korean forces advanced rapidly in south Korea, Washington became concerned at the possibility of involvement in hostilities with China either in Korea or Formosa. Moreover, much Indian and other Asian opinion was opposed to the Formosan policy of the United States, and London indicated that it intended to stay out of any conflict if Peking launched operations to take the island.

The President declared to Congress on July 19 that "military neutralization" of Formosa was "without prejudice to political questions affecting that island."<sup>6</sup>

At the end of the month MacArthur arrived in Formosa for conferences with Chiang and other Kuomintang leaders. Late in August, in a message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, he declared Formosa strategically essential to the United States. Referring to various islands under American or friendly control, he said: "From this island chain we can dominate with air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific."<sup>7</sup>

On an order from the President, MacArthur asked the Veterans of Foreign Wars to withdraw the statement, but it had already been distributed. A White House spokesman said that the purpose of the order had been to avoid confusion about policy in Formosa, and that in foreign policy there could be only one voice, that of the President.

The United States viewed Peking's policies with increasing suspicion. At the same time Peking's reaction to American policy, both in Formosa and Korea, was vehement. On June 29 Premier and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai denounced the Formosan action as "armed aggression against the territory of China" and declared his government's determination to "liberate Taiwan (Formosa)."<sup>8</sup>

Again, on July 6, he sent a sharp protest to United Nations Secretary-General Trygve Lie. Later in the month an "Anti-American Aggression Week" was held in China, and Peking subsequently asked the Security Council to order the withdrawal of American forces from Formosa.

The issue of China's representation in the United Nations has been under international discussion for many months. Late in 1949 Peking had asked for the expulsion of the Kuomintang delegates and its own admission to the organization. In January 1950, following the defeat of a Soviet proposal for the ouster of the Nationalist representative in the Security Council, the Soviet delegate had launched a boycott of the Council, which continued until the August session. The declared American position was one of opposition to seating Peking, but willingness to accept a majority vote of the Council as not subject to a veto. American opposition, however, clearly deterred a number of United Nations members from voting for admission, although they regarded continued Kuomintang representation as at least unrealistic. Five of the eleven members of the Security Council—half the membership apart from Nationalist China—had already recognized Peking.<sup>9</sup>

In March 1950 Secretary-General Lie began to press for a settlement of the question as essential to the functioning and progress of the United Nations organization. Later, in July 1950, the Indian government, through Prime Minister Nehru, sought unsuccessfully to bring about Peking's admission as a prelude to discussion of a Korean settlement.

Some divisions of the north Korean armies were reported to consist of Korean troops that had once been part of the Chinese Communist armies in the civil

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., July 3, 1950, p. 5.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., July 31, 1950, p. 166.

<sup>7</sup> U. S. News and World Report (Washington, D. C.), September 1, 1950, p. 32.

<sup>8</sup> People's China, July 16, 1950, p. 4.

<sup>9</sup> The recognizing Security Council members were: India, Norway, Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom, and the U. S. S. R. The other Council members were: Australia, (Nationalist) China, Canada, Ecuador, Egypt, and the United States.

For details of United Nations aspects of the situation, see the chapter: The Korean Crisis and the United Nations.

war and had later returned to Korea. But during the summer of 1950 there seemed to be no evidence of Chinese involvement in Korea with men or materials. There was much speculation in the United States as to whether Moscow might persuade Peking to act in Korea. The issue, however, was not simply one of ideology or general Communist strategy, since Manchuria bordered on Korea and depended for some of its electric power on facilities located on the Korean side of the frontier. Korea had also been used by Japan as an invasion route to China. In this connection a thoughtful American commentator, Walter Lippmann, noted "the critical importance of Korea in the foreign policy of any Chinese government, no matter what its ideology," and added that "in its geography Korea is to China what Florida is to the United States."<sup>10</sup>

When the Korean war began, the new Chinese government was less than nine months old, and its problems were enormous. It was only on the assumption of peace that the various plans for the country's economic development over a period of years could have made sense when they were drafted. Liu Shao-chi, for example, had declared on May 1, 1950, with reference to the projected incorporation of Tibet, Formosa, and some coastal islands then held by the Kuomintang:<sup>11</sup>

After the end of the war and the unification of the whole country, we shall urgently need a peaceful environment to carry out our economic construction.

The Chinese did not enter the Korean war in July and August 1950, when their presence might have resulted in a north Korean victory, or make an effort to save the north Korean forces south of the 38th parallel after the landings at Inchon in the north Korean rear in September. Official Indian sources voiced the view, based on reports from the Indian ambassador in Peking, that a crossing of the parallel by United Nations forces might be followed by Chinese action in Korea. The decision, however, was to launch operations in north Korea, apparently on the assumption that China would not intervene. In a speech on September 30, 1950, shortly before south Korean troops marched north of the parallel, Chou En-lai declared that the Chinese would not "supinely tolerate seeing their neighbours being savagely invaded."<sup>12</sup> In mid-October, as soldiers under General MacArthur's command moved close to the Manchurian-Korean frontier, Chinese forces appeared in the Korean war. Within a few weeks it was evident that they were present in significant numbers.

With the sharpening of the international crisis, China's foreign relations moved into a new phase. Peking wielded a power not previously known to the Kuomintang. Action in Korea was one aspect of the situation; the entrance of Chinese troops into Tibet was another; rumors of Chinese assistance to the Vietnamese forces of Ho Chi Minh in Indochina possibly indicated a third. Peking was undoubtedly operating in close association with Moscow under the Chinese-Soviet alliance. But in its own right China plainly had become a greater force in Far Eastern affairs than at any time in the previous century.

<sup>10</sup> Walter Lippmann: China's Interest in Korea, New York Herald Tribune, August 29, 1950.

<sup>11</sup> People's China, May 16, 1950, Supplement, p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., October 16, 1950, p. 7.



# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you swear the witness?

Senator FERGUSON. You do solemnly swear in the matter now pending before this committee, being a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. GELFAN. I do.

## TESTIMONY OF HARRIET MOORE GELFAN, NEW HAVEN, CONN., ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID REIN, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, witnesses before this committee, notably Hede Massing, Elizabeth Bentley, and Louis Budenz, have testified you were a member of the Communist Party. Were you as a matter of fact a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. GELFAN. I decline to answer on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Senator FERGUSON. You are a citizen of the United States?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And as such you realize the importance of this committee's work in trying to ascertain facts on the question of subversion in government and subversion in the United States?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. While I do not want to try and unduly persuade you to answer these questions, but as an American citizen appreciating the importance of this, is there any way that you can help us, that you feel that you can help us and not have to claim this privilege?

Mrs. GELFAN. I shall answer all those questions I feel I can answer, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel that under the circumstances, notwithstanding the importance to the country, that you cannot answer that question because of the constitution?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And your answer may tend to incriminate you.

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, was your maiden name Harriet Moore?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. As Harriet Moore, were you ever secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. I was acting secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. At what time?

Mrs. GELFAN. It was in the second half of 1943, until the spring of 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom did you succeed in the position of secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. I succeeded Mr. Lockwood.

Mr. MORRIS. You were in turn succeeded by whom?

Mrs. GELFAN. Mr. Dennett.

Mr. MORRIS. So you in the interim were acting between Mr. Lockwood and Mr. Dennett?

Mr. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you chairman of the nominating committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations under the name of Harriet Moore?

Mrs. GELFAN. I believe I was, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. For the years 1941 and 1942?

Mrs. GELFAN. As I recall it, those are the years, but I believe you have the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record at this time the national officers in 1941 of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I find that has already been introduced as exhibit 60.

Senator FERGUSON. Can we not refer to it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. This shows that Harriet Moore was a member of the board of trustees, was a member of the executive committee, and was chairman of the nominating committee in the year 1941. As I say, that has been introduced as exhibit 60. (See pt. 1, p. 264.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at that time a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. GELFAN. I cannot answer that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the same claim of privilege?

Mr. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Again, you appreciate that there were many people who believed this organization to be a patriotic organization interested in getting the real honest facts in the Far East and that if it was penetrated by Communist influences that it would be important that the people know it so they might guard themselves in the future from belonging to organizations and in taking for granted that all organizations, even though they appear on the surface to be proper organizations, may be the spokesmen of communism. You appreciate how important this is, that we ascertain whether or not people who had a direct, official, let us say a directing effect upon the organization, whether or not they are Communists. I want to assure you these questions are asked for that purpose. If we can discover what did

take place in this organization, having that in mind, can you answer the last question? I mean as to whether at the time you were or were not a Communist when you were secretary?

Mrs. GELFAN. I feel I cannot answer that question on the same grounds.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you chairman of the nominating committee in 1942?

Mrs. GELFAN. Sir, my memory is not exact as to which year; one year, whether it was 1941 or 1942. I believe you have the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your recollection you did not serve as chairman both years?

Mrs. GELFAN. No. I may have been nominated to that position, but I recall serving only 1 year.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, are you currently a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last serve as a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. I am afraid I don't recall. I do recall that the last time I was elected I resigned immediately because I was not in position to attend the meetings; but I don't remember which year that was.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that in 1946?

Mrs. GELFAN. It might have been. I don't recall which year it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, did you work for the Institute of Pacific Relations in Moscow?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us how long you worked in Moscow for the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. I went to Moscow in the winter of 1934-35 as a research associate—I don't remember the exact title—for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I returned again in the spring of 1936 as a member of the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first join the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mrs. Gelfan?

Mrs. GELFAN. In 1932.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you graduate from college?

Mrs. GELFAN. 1932.

Mr. MORRIS. Immediately upon graduation you joined the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that right?

Mrs. GELFAN. After the summer vacation.

Senator FERGUSON. What college did you graduate from? We had better keep our voices up so that everybody can hear.

Mrs. GELFAN. Bryn Mawr.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you specialize in any particular field?

Mrs. GELFAN. When I was in college we had two majors. Mine was economics and politics.

Senator FERGUSON. They taught politics in those days, too.

Was there any Communist activity on the campus?

Mrs. GELFAN. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a Communist at the time you graduated from college, Mrs. Gelfan?

Mrs. GELFAN. I cannot answer that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the same claim of privilege?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, we have some letters that have been extracted from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. We would like to ask you certain questions about these letters. We will try to make it just as quick as we can.

Are you acquainted with a letter introduced into the record from Mr. Carter to Mr. Lockwood wherein he discusses various assignments of the Institute of Pacific Relations? This is dated May 8, 1940, and it was introduced into the record as exhibit 41 (see pt. 1, p 237) in the hearing of August 2, 1951. One paragraph here says:

Send Harriet Moore to the U. S. S. R. to go through all Government and party writings on postwar problems and supplement this by interviewing party and Politburo chiefs.

Are you acquainted with that exhibit?

Mrs. GELFAN. I read it in the printed booklet.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Carter as a matter of fact send you to the U. S. S. R. to go through all government and party writings on postwar problems and supplement this by interviewing party and Politburo chiefs?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir; he did not.

Mr. MORRIS. As I said, Mr. Chairman, that has already been introduced into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have instructions as to what to do in Moscow?

Mrs. GELFAN. When, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. When you went over as an agent for the Institute of Pacific Relations. This in effect says that you were sent over there to go through all Government and party writings.

Mrs. GELFAN. But I didn't go, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never went over there?

Mrs. GELFAN. Not on this assignment; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When you did go, did you have an assignment? You said that you had been in Moscow for the organization.

Mrs. GELFAN. I wasn't clear as to your question.

The first time I went I went to do research on the subject of Boriad, Mongolia. The second time I went, I went as a member of Mr. Carter's staff.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Mr. Carter's mission on that occasion when you went as a member of his staff?

Mrs. GELFAN. Mr. Carter at that time was touring various countries which had organizations related to the Institute of Pacific Relations and seeing the local organization of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It was in that connection that he was going to Moscow in 1938.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you really want to find out on your first mission? They must have assigned a mission to you.

Mrs. GELFAN. I was to study materials on certain minority people in the Soviet Union, the Boriad Mongols and do research on them.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you want to find out about the minority people?

Mrs. GELFAN. I simply wanted to study their background and their development.

Senator FERGUSON. How was that to be used by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. The Institute of Pacific Relations was interested in the peoples of the east.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, they were interested in Russia. Russia was considered by the institute as part of the east?

Mrs. GELFAN. Part of Russia borders on the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore you were interested in that?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you develop something in relation to the minorities?

Mrs. GELFAN. I did not complete my study, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why not?

Mrs. GELFAN. Because I could not get permission to travel to Boriat, Mongolia.

Senator FERGUSON. You tried to get permission in Moscow?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were turned down?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they assign a reason?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you did not really do anything on your mission?

Mrs. GELFAN. I studied the published material that could be found in libraries.

Senator FERGUSON. In Moscow?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that same material be here in our Library of Congress? Do you know?

Mrs. GELFAN. Some of it might.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you read Russian?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you say you were born?

Mrs. GELFAN. In Evanston, Ill.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you study Russian?

Mrs. GELFAN. I studied it in London and again in Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Mrs. GELFAN. Just before going there. It was in 1934.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did it take you to be able to read Russian?

Mrs. GELFAN. It took me quite a while, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. About how long?

Mrs. GELFAN. That is a difficult question to answer because I wasn't taking a single course that I could date.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you bring back any report?

Mrs. GELFAN. Just notes, sir. I did not publish a book or a study on it.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was paying your way on that trip?

Mrs. GELFAN. The Institute of Pacific Relations had given me, I believe, a research grant.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did they get the money for the research grant?

Mrs. GELFAN. Sir, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that it was a research grant?

Mrs. GELFAN. I believe that was the status in their books, but I wouldn't be sure. You would have to check their records.



Senator FERGUSON. When they granted these grants to people to do research, do you know what investigation they made of the people that were to do that?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir; I don't know what investigation was made.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they make an investigation of you?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recollect any inquiry of you as to whether or not you could do the job?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall any particular—

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall any investigation.

You may take the witness, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, do you know that from time to time charges were leveled in and about the Institute of Pacific Relations that you were a Communist or pro-Communist in your writings?

Mrs. GELFAN. I have read the testimony that has been given here.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to the fact that we held hearings here, Mrs. Gelfan?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir. I don't know what you are referring to.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall anything that was printed or said around the institute or anywhere else saying that you were a Communist or had leanings or sympathies for the Communist movement?

Mrs. GELFAN. There may have been some statements in the press before. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall any of them? Had it ever been called to your attention that it was claimed that you had pro-Soviet leanings?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall, sir. There may have been. I just don't recall.

Mrs. MORRIS. We had a letter from Mr. Dubinsky appearing in our record in regard to the controversy that he had with Russian War Relief. The principal issue in that controversy was whether or not you were pro-Communist.

Mrs. GELFAN. I misunderstood the question. I thought it was in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. In my question I did have it in regard to the institute, but was there anything in connection with any work?

Mrs. GELFAN. Naturally, I recall the episode of Russian War Relief.

Mr. MORRIS. You were then a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. I was a member, I believe, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mrs. GELFAN. In 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. You were at that time a member of the executive committee, a member of the board of trustees, and chairman of the nominating committee, were you not?

Mrs. GELFAN. In 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. So you were at that time an active member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The fact that these charges had been leveled, had been raised at the Institute of Pacific Relations—they had, had they not?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't quite understand the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the fact that you had pro-Communist leanings ever raised at the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. I still don't understand the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mrs. Gelfan. You have said you knew Mr. Dubinsky had made certain charges?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were those charges ever discussed at the Institute of Pacific Relations by you with your superiors or by your superiors with you, by your associates there with you?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall that being discussed at the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you now a photostat of a letter from Mr. Edward C. Carter to Mr. Goodwin Watson dated August 24, 1942.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you identify that document as having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and then read that letter for us, please?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, might I interrupt for just a moment? We have another period, to wit, the period during which the witness was connected with Russian War Relief.

At that time you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. GELFAN. I feel I cannot answer that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the same claim of privilege?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated August 24, 1942, addressed to Dr. Goodwin Watson, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, from Edward C. Carter. It reads:

This is in answer to your inquiry regarding Miss Harriet Moore.

I have no hesitation in testifying to her unimpeachable loyalty and high character. She is an American of the Americans. As to her objectivity, I can quite understand how some people, especially in former years, would criticize her as pro-Soviet. I think that this derives from the fact that for several years she has been assigned the task of studying the Soviet Union and writing about the Soviet Union. Prior to June 22 last year almost anyone who wrote descriptively and objectively regarding Soviet developments, whether in the field of science, education, industry, or communications, was accused of being pro-Soviet.

I have personally known Miss Moore frequently to criticize manuscripts because of their being pro-Soviet and thus not objective.

It is not true to say that Miss Moore has invariably followed the party line. She was, for example, interventionist long before June 22, 1941. I know that she was extremely critical of movements like the American Peace Mobilization.

As you doubtless know, criticism of Miss Moore in certain quarters derived from a case of mistaken identity. She was confused with another Miss Harriet Moore, who is said to have been one of the founders of the Communist Party in the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know another Harriet Moore?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you heard of one?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

There is no family connection between these two women, and the other Harriet Moore was several inches shorter and several years older than the Harriet Moore of whom you write.

In discussions of Soviet policy I have heard Miss Moore criticize the approach and behavior of Soviet officials and the Soviet system again and again.

If I can give you any further information, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced in full into the record in connection with the question put to the witness.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 403" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any further comment on that letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. I have no comment on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I ask one question?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you while you were in the Institute of Pacific Relations criticize manuscripts because they were pro-Soviet and, therefore, nonobjective?

Mrs. GELFAN. I might well have; I don't recall. It is a long time since I did that work. I couldn't name any specific—

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, I have here a letter dated June 24, 1943. It is addressed to you from Mr. Carter. It discusses a program to be undertaken by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I ask you if you can recall that letter? Do you recall having received that letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. I probably received that letter. I don't recall it exactly, but I recall the subject matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, could you ask Mr. Mandel to identify that letter as a photostat?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify that as a photostat of a letter taken from the files of the institute?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 24, 1943, headed H. M. from E. C. C. and marked W. W. L. in the corner.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the document just shown to the witness?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could that be put in the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 404" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 404

JUNE 24, 1943.

HM from ECC:

In connection with the bright outlook for the development of the Washington office because of Katrine Parsons' acceptance of the job, I wish to follow up my suggestion yesterday with reference to working out a plan for the progressive increase of Amco membership in Washington. Such a move can have many substantial results:

1. Washington shares with New York the premier position as a news center. A high percentage of newspapermen now in Washington have had journalistic experience in the Far East. They should all gradually be rounded up for membership.

2. There are substantial and heretofore completely untapped financial possibilities in developing the Washington Amco membership. Some of our best friends from different cities are now in Washington, including, Lt. John D. Rockefeller, 3rd, Harold K. Hochschild, Charles Dollard, Mrs. Frances Bolton, Maj. H. S. Little, Raymond Gram Swing, Ambassador Grew, etc. Of these almost the only one that we have systematically cultivated since starting our Washington office is Mrs. Bolton.

3. The current information and research possibilities are almost unlimited. Experts and research workers in Government bureaus, in spite of their intellectual objectivity are peculiarly susceptible to the influence of social and political prestige. As Holland said yesterday, we can get a great deal more cooperation from cautious but able Government experts if the IPR from time to time makes a modest splash in high social and political circles. These oc-

casional affairs will also have the desired psychological effect on the men in the press bureaus whom we will want to handle regular releases on the Far Eastern Survey, Amco pamphlets, Pacific Affairs, and IPR books.

4. When, after the war, people now in Washington return to their homes right across the country they can advance the IPR in Seattle, San Francisco, Chicago, and way stations if they have become enthusiastic participants in the Washington program of the American Council.

In order to start a number of the best present Amco members in Washington thinking on our common problems so that the autumn program will be theirs rather than ours, I am wondering what you would think of having Parsons and Jayson arrange for a planning party at some fancy Washington home about the third week of July. Cocktails at 5:30 and discussion from 6 to 7 might start a lot of people thinking of our common problems and aid us in (a) launching the autumn program; (b) finding suitable quarters; (c) immediately expanding the membership; (d) enlisting a few volunteers; (e) increasing press contacts.

Possible places for such a party would be at the home of Mrs. Robert L. Bacon, Mrs. Frances P. Bolton, Robert Bliss, Mrs. Gifford Pinchot, Mrs. J. Borden Harriman, Joseph E. Davies. Do you know what sort of establishment John Rockefeller maintains?

A preliminary step to all of the foregoing would be the immediate preparation of a complete list for circulation to several of us of the present Washington Amco members.

I do not think that the development of such a membership program would interfere with the research and information objectives which have prompted your desire to develop the Washington office. As indicated above, I think they would multiply those contacts and make it far easier for Miss Parsons to establish immediate prestige. It would automatically in an impressive social setting put her into pleasant personal contact with a lot of people whose offices she will want to visit in connection with our information program.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there not some way that we can put these in the record and not have them read and printed twice?

I notice in the record you find it read once and then the instrument inserted. I think if the witness will follow it, and if there is any change, then she can say so and we will not have to print it twice.

Mr. MORRIS. It is merely a stenographic device. If the thing appears in its entirety, there should be no need of its again appearing.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice that. It will be reprinted then. If it is something which has been read in part, then you have to show the whole thing so that it can be seen whether or not it is out of context.

Where you read the whole document, that should only be printed once.

Mr. SOURWINE. I had asked that it be placed in the record at this point and identified. Then it can be discussed. It is now in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. I am going to the next letter. I have here a letter signed by Mortimer Graves, administrative secretary of the American Council of Learned Societies, addressed to Mr. Carter.

In this letter, Mrs. Gelfan, there is a paragraph which begins:

Miss Moore says "the ARI is not an academic institution."

Will you identify that?

Mrs. GELFAN. The American-Russian Institute.

Mr. MORRIS. This reads:

As I understand it, this is exactly the reason why it was not represented at the conference. In an effort to have a small conference, Dr. Stevens decided to confine it to an academic group. It would be possible to argue that some other kind of conference is needed, but the fact is that this is the kind of conference

that this particular conference was. It concerned itself with what is to be done about Slavic studies at the academic level, and possibly peripherally and inadequately with what the academicians might do to help Slavic studies at other levels. This seems to me a quite sound limitation, and my experience has been that conferences ought to adopt limitations and ought to limit themselves to matters they are competent to discuss.

Do you recall that particular conference mentioned in that letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. What is the date?

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a copy before you?

Mrs. GELFAN. No.

Mr. MORRIS. That is July 10, 1943.

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir; I believe I do recall this letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, can we have this letter identified by Mr. Mandel and placed in the record at this point?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here an original of a letter dated July 10, 1943, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the letterhead of the American Council of Learned Societies addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, and it is signed by Mortimer Graves, administrative secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the letter which was just shown to the witness and which she and Mr. Morris were discussing?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. May it be offered for the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 405" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 405

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

Member of the International Union of Academies

Executive Offices

1219 Sixteenth Street NW.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

JULY 10, 1943.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,

*Institute of Pacific Relations,*

*129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR NED: Thank you very much for sending me Harriet Moore's comments on the Rockefeller Foundation Conference on Slavic Studies. I am sorry to say that it seems to me as though pique plays a more prominent part in it than criticism. Whether the pique is justifiable or not is another question. I realize very well that Miss Moore has worked exceedingly hard to build up ARI to the point it has reached, and that she has every reason to be proud of it. However, this was frankly a gathering of academicians at the university level. The matter "Slavic studies at school level, and even popular public education on the Slav countries" was not really discussed; it came up quite by accident on the basis of remarks made by Bernadotte Schmitt, and received only such consideration as politeness to Schmitt required. Heaven knows, nobody realizes better than we do that there is no "problem" about getting Russia and the Far East into school curricula; the problem is in seeing that they get into curricula under the best conditions.

I find it difficult to share Miss Moore's amazement that "no attention was given to ARI" in the discussion of library problems. So far as I remember, no library—except possibly the Library of Congress—was seriously mentioned, though there may have been incidental remarks about some of the libraries with which the people there were connected. At any rate, no attempt was made to list libraries or to evaluate them, and it seems to me, therefore, idle to worry

about whether any particular library was mentioned or not. There was suggested a serious study of American library facilities in this field, and if such a study should be made without taking the ARI into cognizance there would be ample reason to complain, but the study, so far as I know, has not yet even been started.

I confess that I do not know how the "Russian Economic Institute" memorandum got into the picture. It was one of the documents that was kicked around but nothing was done about it; I do not even remember that it was mentioned in the discussion, and I doubt very much if there is the slightest chance that any money will be given to this organization.

Mr. Stevens has certainly heard of ARI. My understanding is that he now has an application for its support in front of him.

Miss Moore says "The ARI is not an academic institution." As I understand it, this is exactly the reason why it was not represented at the conference. In an effort to have a small conference Dr. Stevens decided to confine it to an academic group. It would be possible to argue that some other kind of conference is needed, but the fact is that this is the kind of conference that this particular conference was. It concerned itself with what is to be done about Slavic studies at the academic level, and possibly peripherally and inadequately with what the academicians might do to help Slavic studies at other levels. This seems to me a quite sound limitation, and my experience has been that conferences ought to adopt limitations and ought to limit themselves to matters they are competent to discuss.

There, of course, is some general justice in Miss Moore's feeling that people and organizations who were "prematurely and excessively" anti-Fascist or realistic about the Soviet Union are in some quarters considered to be under a cloud. I really do not know, but I doubt very much whether this consideration would weigh very heavily with Dr. Stevens, though the Foundation would have to take account of any public feeling in the matter. I do not think that it would be wise to show Miss Moore's comment in its present form to Dr. Stevens, because I think that its intemperance would militate against the ARI. So far as I know there is no danger that the ARI will not be thought of in any suggestion which involves a center of information on the Soviet Union.

Most sincerely,

[s] Mortimer Graves,  
MORTIMER GRAVES,  
*Administrative Secretary.*

MG: B.  
Enclosure.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the next paragraph, please?

Mrs. GELFAN. Which one?

Mr. MORRIS. The one after the one I read.

Mrs. GELFAN (reading):

There is, of course, some general justice in Miss Moore's feeling that people and organizations who were "prematurely and excessively" anti-Fascist or realistic about the Soviet Union are in some quarters considered to be under a cloud. I really do not know, but I doubt very much whether this consideration would weigh very heavily with Dr. Stevens, though the Foundation would have to take account of any public feeling in the matter. I do not think that it would be wise to show Miss Moore's comment in its present form to Dr. Stevens, because I think that its intemperance would militate against the ARI. So far as I know there is no danger that the ARI will not be thought of in any suggestion which involves a center of information on the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall that particular episode?

Mrs. GELFAN. My protest?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mrs. GELFAN. I do, in general, recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know where your document may be that you wrote? This reads:

I do not think that it would be wise to show Miss Moore's comment in its present form.

Do you know where that document is?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know its contents?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you just think about it a while? If you do not know where it is, you might recall what was in it.

Mrs. GELFAN. I am afraid I do not recall what happened that long ago in any precise detail.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, will you read the last long sentence in the first paragraph?

Mrs. GELFAN (reading):

Heaven knows, nobody realizes better than we do that there is no "problem" about getting Russia and the Far East into school curricula; the problem is in seeing that they get into curricula under the best conditions.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you engage in any activity in connection with getting Russia and the Far East into school curricula?

Mrs. GELFAN. Personally, I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say personally, you mean what?

Mrs. GELFAN. I mean in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations in the program of preparing booklets for schools.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us what that program was, and who was head of it, and something about it; in fact, all you know about it?

Mrs. GELFAN. I believe the institute had always had that as part of its program to provide factual materials on all levels, the high-school level, the college level, and other levels, on the Far East.

In this connection they published some pamphlets, booklets, that were aimed specifically for the school-reading public.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the American-Russian Institute have any program with regard to placing material in school curricula?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall any such program, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you—

Senator FERGUSON. It would indicate here that Russia went into these programs willingly and wanting to get in.

"There is no problem about getting Russia and the Far East into school curricula."

He said the problem was to get them in under the best condition.

What would you say that meant?

Mrs. GELFAN. I am afraid you will have to ask him. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. As a student of what the Institute of Pacific Relations was doing and what their program was.

Mrs. GELFAN. I really can't guess at that, sir. I don't know what he meant.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it be logical to say it meant to get them in so as to not let it appear on the surface that they were in?

Mrs. GELFAN. Sir, I don't know what he meant.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you say in reading that? What does it mean to you?

Mrs. GELFAN. If I saw the rest of the correspondence, sir, perhaps I would know what he meant there, but I don't know from this what he meant.

Senator FERGUSON. You do know what the last paragraph means about your memorandum. Is that clear?

Mrs. GELFAN. What is clear, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. That what was in your memorandum would not be well to be shown to Dr. Stevens because it was intemperate!

Mrs. GELFAN. That is what he says.

Senator FERGUSON. And it would militate against the ARI. Do you know how it was intemperate?

Mrs. GELFAN. I imagine I was rather angry at the time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At what?

Mrs. GELFAN. That the ARI was not invited to that conference, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were trying to get the ARI into the conference?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir. I did not know about the conference until after it happened.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you were angry that it had not been taken in?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why?

Mrs. GELFAN. Because I felt that the ARI had one of the best libraries on Russia that it was logical to invite it to a conference discussing libraries and other forms of study and Russia.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had worked very hard to build up the ARI and you did not like to see it passed over?

Mrs. GELFAN. All right; put it that way. I felt logically it belonged at the conference since it had been one of the best libraries.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you say that Russian literature of today is generally propaganda for the Communist Party?

Mrs. GELFAN. You mean literature published in the Soviet Union?

Senator FERGUSON. By the Soviet Union.

Mrs. GELFAN. Sir, I have not been following their publications in the last few years.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were studying them and looking into them, were they or were they not generally Communist propaganda?

Mrs. GELFAN. That is a difficult question to answer, sir. You have to define the terms in the first place, and you have to recognize the limitations to reading all of the literature that is published by a country.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever found any Russian literature that was Communist propaganda.

Mrs. GELFAN. Oh, certainly, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever found any that was not Communist propaganda?

Mrs. GELFAN. I would question whether some literature was specifically Communist propaganda.

Senator FERGUSON. You think there is a free thought in Russia?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't know precisely what you mean by that.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know what I mean by that? Is there the right to free thought in Russia?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't really know.

Senator FERGUSON. You were one of the people who were interested in framing the policies of the Institute of Pacific Relations and trying to get the Russian literature into our schools, and so forth?

Mrs. GELFAN. I didn't say that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the Institute of Pacific Relations was interested in it.

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't know about that.

Senator FERGUSON. You were a secretary.

Mrs. GELFAN. As far as I know, the Institute of Pacific Relations was never interested in getting literature into the schools.



Mr. SOURWINE. Mrs. Gelfan, didn't you at one time have charge or supervision of a program of preparation of material for use in schools under the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, I was not in charge of such a program.

Mr. SOURWINE. As secretary you had no supervision over that program?

Mrs. GELFAN. As secretary I had general supervision over whatever programs were going on there at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew about a program for preparing material for use in the public schools?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us anything about the nature of that material?

Mrs. GELFAN. It was small illustrated books.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it trying to put into the schools? What was its aim?

Mrs. GELFAN. Trying to put information about the countries around the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it trying to put the information in about Russia?

Mrs. GELFAN. There was a pamphlet on Russia; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What pamphlet was that, Land of the Soviets? Do you remember that pamphlet?

Mrs. GELFAN. I could identify the pamphlet if I saw it, but I don't remember the title.

Mr. MORRIS. By Maxwell and Marguerite Stewart, Land of the Soviets?

Mrs. GELFAN. Have you got a copy?

Mr. MORRIS. Not here.

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't remember the exact title.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever read it?

Mrs. GELFAN. I suppose I did read it.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did that information come from?

Mrs. GELFAN. You will have to ask the people that wrote it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it was biased, pro-Communist?

Mrs. GELFAN. It is a long time since I read that pamphlet.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any pro-Communist literature going out under the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. Not that I knew about, sir; not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say you were well versed in what communism stood for?

Mrs. GELFAN. Would you repeat the question, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that you were well versed in what communism stood for?

Mrs. GELFAN. I wouldn't say I was terribly well versed in that; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say you were moderately versed?

Mrs. GELFAN. These are awfully vague terms.

Senator FERGUSON. How much did you know about communism?

Mrs. GELFAN. The theory of communism? Not very much, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you studied communism, or the theory of communism, or Marxism, or Marxist-Leninist-Stalinism in any Communist meetings or group meetings?

Mrs. GELFAN. Sir, I feel I must decline to answer that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the same grounds?

Mrs. GELFAN. That it might tend to incriminate me.

Senator FERGUSON. Madam, if you were asking to put these books into the schools, that is, your organization, the Institute of Pacific Relations, do you not think that it was one of the requirements that a person be versed in this question of communism to see whether or not they were actually true in fact, before we exposed our children of America to them?

Mrs. GELFAN. Could you make the question more concise, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. I do not know how I can make it any clearer.

I say do you not think that as one of the people that were directing the Institute of Pacific Relations, that it was a requirement that you be well versed in the principles of communism in order that you may ascertain whether or not this literature that was to go out and go into our public schools was screened by experts to see whether or not it was presenting the picture as it really was and what communism stood for before we exposed our children in the public schools to this literature?

Mrs. GELFAN. Sir, that question never came up there.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think an institution that is having people write books for the public schools about the Soviet Union ought to know something and really be an expert as to what communism was before we would put them in the schools and expose our children to them?

Mrs. GELFAN. Sir, the procedure with regard to publications at the Institute of Pacific Relations, as I understood it, was to submit the manuscript to a number of people who were recognized as experts in that field to get their criticism.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there not danger if you do not have a person who is skilled in communism, knows what it is to recognize it and still steeped in the principles of Americanism, that you are apt to give it to an expert who might be a Communist? Is that not dangerous?

Mrs. GELFAN. That could happen.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any searching in the Institute of Pacific Relations to ascertain whether any of its writers were really Communist or pro-Communist?

Mrs. GELFAN. I had no knowledge of any investigation of that sort.

Senator FERGUSON. You understand the position that the Institute of Pacific Relations is being placed in by your testimony this morning where you refuse to state as to whether or not you were or were not a Communist? You appreciate that?

Mrs. GELFAN. I did refuse to answer the question, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think, then, it would be a fair inference by the public there may have been Communists on this board, or on the direct force of the Institute of Pacific Relations where witnesses come in here who had something to do with it and do not testify?

Mrs. GELFAN. Maybe.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot help us any more than you have this morning because of the Constitution? You claim you have that privilege?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have a letter here from Frederick V. Field, a photostat, dated August 22, 1939, addressed to Miss Harriet Moore, American-Russian Institute, New York City.

Mr. Mandel, I ask you if you will identify that as a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated August 22, 1939, to Miss Harriet Moore, American-Russian Institute, from Frederick V. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that a clear copy?

Mrs. GELFAN. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Use this one.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that Frederick V. Field asked you to write for him in the magazine *Amerasia*?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall the particular incident.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write an article along the line suggested by Mr. Field in the letter of August 22, 1939?

Mrs. GELFAN. I can't remember. If I did, it is in *Amerasia*.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony you have no recollection about this particular letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. May it be introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 406" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 406

AUGUST 22, 1939.

Miss HARRIET MOORE,

*American Russian Institute,*

*56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York City.*

DEAR HARRIET: I wonder if you would be interested in writing a little piece for *Amerasia* based on the enclosed propaganda blurb from Kinney of the S.M.R. Incidentally, would you return the blurb for our propaganda files?

What I have in mind is something roughly comparable, although I hope better done and a little more elaborate than the piece I wrote on Japanese propaganda in the *Topics in Brief* for our October 1938 issue.

This present item on the Manchukuo-Mongolian border fighting of the summer seems to me particularly vicious because they use the names of at least two pretty decent American correspondents to support their allegations. I doubt very much, for instance, whether Steele of the *Chicago Daily News* ever filed a dispatch to the effect that "the Japanese aerial force was far superior to that of the Soviet and that the bravery and morale of the Japanese-Manchukuo troops far exceeded those of the Soviet-Mongolian forces." This, of course, may be true but I am sure that neither Morris nor Steele said so, not to speak of the eight other correspondents mentioned. It would be interesting to compare what Kinney says these men said with what they actually sent their newspapers. Furthermore, it would be interesting to compare his account of the border fighting with what appears to have taken place. Incidentally, what did take place? That too would be pretty good news.

I really wish you would try your hand at this either in a *Topics in Brief* of three to five hundred words or in an article of a thousand or more. In answering this note as to whether or not you will agree to write the article you might also attempt a brief paragraph telling me the inner and outer significance of the Soviet-German trade treaty and accompanying Russian editorials.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Mr. Field?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was one of the moving spirits in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. At one period; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he, when you were in it?

Mrs. GELFAN. For part of the time; yes, sir. He was on the staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say as a member of the board of directors, or the moving spirit of the Institute of Pacific Relations that he would be a proper person, or would have been a proper person, to have submitted Soviet literature that was to go into our public schools?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't get the precise question.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew Mr. Field?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And he was one of the directors I believe, or trustees, as they call them, of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. As a director of the Institute of Pacific Relations, would you say that he would have been a proper person to submit literature that was being written about the Soviets which went into our public schools? Would he have been a proper person to submit it to ascertain whether it was proper to go to our students in our public schools?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir. He had no special knowledge of Russia. His field was China.

Senator FERGUSON. Whom did you have in the Institute of Pacific Relations as a proper person to submit these to?

Mrs. GELFAN. It was submitted to outside experts.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were those experts?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't know, sir. I wasn't in charge of that.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Andrew Grajdanzev?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he considered one of the experts of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the question of Russia?

Mrs. GELFAN. He did some research for them on the question of Russia.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I go back?

Were there any booklets or papers submitted about China to the public schools?

Mrs. GELFAN. You have the list of the school pamphlets.

Senator FERGUSON. Would he have been a proper person to have submitted it to concerning China? You say he was an expert on China.

Mrs. GELFAN. That was his field.

Senator FERGUSON. Would he have been a proper person?

Mrs. GELFAN. When?

Senator FERGUSON. When they were submitting them to the schools?

Mrs. GELFAN. I have never thought about that. I never had anything to do with that. I don't know whether I would have thought so, or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Field have pro-Communist leanings, or not?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't know?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that he had?

Mrs. GELFAN. I read the newspapers, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what Amerasia was?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it pro-Soviet?

Mrs. GELFAN. I wouldn't know about that, sir, unless I looked through it again. It is a long time. It didn't deal very much with Russia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Frederick V. Field any relation to Olga Field of the Institute of Pacific Relations staff?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall whether or not Amerasia was not pro-Soviet?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir, I don't. It is many years since I have looked at those articles. As I say, it didn't deal very much with Russia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your field was specifically Russia?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had been there on extended visits, had you?

Mrs. GELFAN. I had been there on not too extended, but visits.

Mr. SOURWINE. On two occasions?

Mrs. GELFAN. On three occasions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you outlined those three for us? I only remember two.

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir; I have not mentioned the third one, which was the first time I was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that?

Mrs. GELFAN. That was in 1934, the spring, I believe.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long were you there on that occasion?

Mrs. GELFAN. Six or eight weeks at the most.

Mr. SOURWINE. The second time you have mentioned, how long were you there then?

Mrs. GELFAN. Four or five months.

Mr. SOURWINE. The third time?

Mrs. GELFAN. Again, 6 or 8 weeks.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was the extent of your visits to Russia?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see why you say they are not extended.

Did you during that time make any studies of Russian state documents, political documents of any nature?

Mrs. GELFAN. I studied only books available in libraries.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you during that period and thereafter maintain a regular correspondence with persons in Russia?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not?

Mrs. GELFAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the witness if she recognizes that book.

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is that book?

Mrs. GELFAN. That book is a book I wrote, summarizing—

Mr. SOURWINE. The name of that book is Soviet Far Eastern Policy 1931-45; is that right?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which you wrote?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The jacket says, "Sponsored by the International Secretariat Institute of Pacific Relations." Is that right?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you look on the inside of the jacket and will you read the underlined language there? Would you read aloud just so we will know what and that we are talking about the same thing?

Mrs. GELFAN (reading):

Knowledge of Russian, extended trips to the Soviet Union and continuous correspondence with Russians have enabled her to observe and evaluate Russian attitudes. She is at present research director of the American-Russian Institute. The book is sponsored by the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. That paragraph refers to you as the "she"?

Mrs. GELFAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of that blurb?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir; that is a publisher's blurb. It is exaggerated, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not think it was propaganda?

Mrs. GELFAN. The blurb?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mrs. GELFAN. Publisher's propaganda; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you study at any special schools in Russia?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir. I attended no school in Russia, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the publisher?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall who the publisher was?

Mrs. GELFAN. The Princeton University Press.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not you ever denied that statement? Do you remember seeing it before?

Mrs. GELFAN. I must have seen it, I suppose. I don't know that I saw it in advance of its being put on the book. That I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. After it was on the book?

Mrs. GELFAN. No doubt I saw it.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not deny that it was an accurate statement of facts? An accurate fact?

Mrs. GELFAN. No. It is an exaggeration, but it is usual, I believe, for publishers to exaggerate.

Senator FERGUSON. It is what is known as puffing?

Mrs. GELFAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. This book covers the period 1931-45?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that include the period of the Hitler-Stalin pact?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us where in the book you referred to that?

Mrs. GELFAN. I am not sure I can.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not find it in the index.

Mrs. GELFAN. Maybe I didn't refer to it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that or was that not an important incident?

Mrs. GELFAN. In the Far East?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mrs. GELFAN. It had a bearing. If I may be permitted to read from my introduction, I can perhaps explain this.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean why it was not included?

Mrs. GELFAN. May I?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mrs. GELFAND (reading) :

The reader of this short study will not find the full story of the Soviet Union as a far-eastern power. That story will not be written until archives are opened, not only in Moscow, but in China, Japan, and the western capitals. What is attempted in this book is to bring to the American reader an account of what the Soviet Union said and did in the Far East from 1931 until 1945. It gives approximately the picture which the Soviet people themselves have of this part of the world scene, for the study is compiled almost exclusively from Soviet sources.

In addition, the appendices include translations of Soviet editorial comments on the most important developments. As far as possible, the account of actual events has been checked against known Soviet sources, but the author has not been able to make use of materials in Chinese or Japanese.

Although it has not been possible to give adequate space to European events whose impact on Soviet far-eastern policy has been so great it will be obvious to the reader that Soviet relations at one end of its vast domain cannot but be of vital importance to its relations at the other.

Senator FERGUSON. Who furnished you the material, or helped you with this book?

Mrs. GELFAN. I did the research myself, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You said it was all from Russian source.

Mrs. GELFAN. I read Russian.

Senator FERGUSON. A Soviet source; is that correct?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss the Yalta problem, the agreements at Yalta?

Mrs. GELFAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do all the translating yourself from the Russian into English?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know about Yalta at the time the book was written?

Mrs. GELFAN. I didn't know about Yalta until I read about it in the papers, and I don't know when it was in the papers.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't discuss that in the book?

Mrs. GELFAN. I shouldn't think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that not be a very vital and important part?

Mrs. GELFAN. If I didn't know about it, I couldn't write it.

Senator FERGUSON. If it were published before your book was out?

Mrs. GELFAN. I would have referred to it had it happened.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel now that it was not published at the time your book came out?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't think it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when the book was actually published?

Mrs. GELFAN. It was published at the end of 1945, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. About February of 1945 Yalta was announced.

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't believe what happened at Yalta was made known until sometime later.

Senator FERGUSON. Any of it?

Mrs. GELFAN. Except maybe there was a conference. When was Yalta—

Senator FERGUSON. We will find out.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have read into the record at this time an extract of a report apparently submitted by Mrs. Gelfan in connection with the points we have covered in our examination.

Mrs. Gelfan, I would like to offer you a document which Mr. Mandel will testify has been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Apparently it was signed by you, was it not, Mrs. Gelfan?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That is your report to the Institute as acting secretary?

Mrs. GELFAN. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. That bears the date January 1944, does it not?

Mrs. GELFAN. I guess so. You have it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read from page 3 on that? It is in connection with schools in the Far East and the pamphlet is put out by the Institute of Pacific Relations. This is your report.

Mrs. GELFAN (reading):

The American Council's school program is meeting an evermore enthusiastic response both from school teachers and from educational organizations concerned with the lack of attention given to the Far East in American schools. As reported in IPR in wartime the American Council has felt its central job to be the preparation of teaching materials and has concentrated on that.

Two more pamphlets, the sixth and seventh of the Webster series of unit tests for high school classroom use, are now appearing. Twentieth Century India by Kate Mitchell, and Kumar Gashal is just off the press and Behind the Open Door by Foster Rhea Dulles, a history of America's relations with the East, will be published in February. The gross income from sales of the first five titles amounted to \$45,000 in 1943.

A second series designed for the elementary school is now in preparation. This will consist of three readers—one dealing with the peoples of Asia; one with geography, and one with history—to appear during 1944. A short illustrated reference manual on the countries of the Pacific is to be added to the Webster publications as an aid to teachers.

Incidentally, to this basic program, the American Council has also prepared, at the request of United China Relief, a geography worksheet on China and a primer on Chinese calligraphy.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you acknowledge that is evidence that the Institute of Pacific Relations did engage in getting pamphlets—

Mr. SOURWINE. If I may interrupt, would it not be better to ask the witness if she had included that in her report? She does not pretend to be a lawyer and cannot answer a question as to what is evidence.

Mrs. GELFAN. I wrote that report.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was true and factual? It referred to things that had happened and were happening?

Mrs. GELFAN. The report?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not misrepresent in your report?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you accept this?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred was marked "Exhibit No. 407" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 407

#### ADDENDA TO THE REPORT, IPR IN WARTIME

The following informal report is intended to round out the story of the American Council's work in 1943 and project its program in 1944. The 1941-43 report, issued in August under the title "IPR in Wartime" covered in greater detail the various aspects of the current program.



## STAFF CHANGES

In recent months, additions to the American Council's staff have been made which enable it to carry forward a more effective program in three of its principal offices. Bruno Lasker has returned to the staff of the New York office with the assignment of supervising a large part of the research publication and of improving the library and information services. In San Francisco, Dr. Ernest B. Price has been appointed Director of the Bay Region group. The plans he has outlined to expand the IPR programs there are summarized below. The Washington office has been established as a strong branch office under Rose Yardumian as Washington representative and Dean William C. Johnstone, of Washington University, as Director of the Washington study program. As will be described below, these appointments have, for the first time since Robert Barnett left for the Army, made possible a continuing IPR program in Washington.

## FAR EASTERN SURVEY

In the second half of 1943, the Far Eastern Survey has had an enviable record of publishing articles of great public interest. Following its wartime policy of presenting important views on current war and postwar problems, it has received favorable comment and quotation from leading American writers and commentators. As material becomes available, it will carry an increasing amount of discussion on postwar plans—both in those put forward by various American organizations and those originating in Pacific countries. Arrangements have also been made for a correspondent in India in addition to Gunther Stein whose reports from China have been appearing in the Far Eastern Survey.

The circulation of the Far Eastern Survey has been growing slowly and now stands at 2,000. While it will undoubtedly remain primarily a publication for students and experts, systematic promotion is expected to increase its circulation substantially.

## IPR PAMPHLETS ON THE FAR EAST

Henceforth the American Council intends to issue six pamphlets a year, under the series title "IPR Pamphlets." These are designed to present, in popular form, basic information about far-eastern countries, and to furnish the average citizen with a background for discussion of important current issues with particular emphasis on postwar problems. IPR Pamphlets are approximately 64 pages in length, illustrated, retailing at 25 cents (subscription for series of six, \$1).

First of the 1943-44 series is *Speaking of India*, by Miriam S. Farley, giving in question-and-answer form the kind of elementary information that Americans seek about India. Other pamphlets now in preparation are as follows (titles tentative):

China, by Maxwell S. Stewart.

The United States and the British Commonwealth, by F. R. Scott.

The Philippines, by Catherine Porter.

America's Economic Interests in the Far East, by John H. Oakie.

Civil Aviation in the Pacific, by Leonard Engel.

Korea, by Andrew Grajdanzev.

Japan, by Marguerite A. Stewart.

America's Role in the Pacific (author to be announced).

To meet continued demand, two of our earlier pamphlets *Know Your Enemy: Japan and Asia's Captive Colonies* have recently been reissued in revised editions. Our *Far Eastern Record* (two volumes in one) is also being reprinted.

Returns from recent promotion indicate that these pamphlets are satisfying a wide public demand in the United States to learn more about the countries and peoples of the Pacific.

In addition to the regular pamphlet series, the American Council from time to time plans to publish annotated bibliographies with brief introductory articles. The first of these deals with Korea.

## THE FAR EAST IN THE SCHOOLS

The American Council's school program is meeting an ever more enthusiastic response both from school teachers and from educational organizations concerned with the lack of attention given to the Far East in American schools. As reported in IPR in Wartime, the American Council has felt its central job to be the preparation of teaching materials and has concentrated on that.

Two more pamphlets, the sixth and seventh of the Webster Series of unit texts for high-school classroom use, are now appearing. Twentieth Century India by Kate Mitchell and Kumar Goshal is just off the press and Behind the Open Door by Foster Rhea Dulles, a history of America's relations with the East, will be published in February. The gross income from sales of the first five titles amounted to \$45,000 in 1943.

A second series designed for the elementary school is now in preparation. This will consist of three readers—one dealing with the peoples of Asia, one with geography, and one with history—to appear during 1944. A short illustrated reference manual on the countries of the Pacific is to be added to the Webster publications as an aid to teachers.

Incidentally to this basic program, the American Council has also prepared, at the request of United China Relief, a geography work sheet on China and a primer on Chinese Calligraphy.

In an attempt to focus the attention of the individual school teacher on this area of study, the American Council in cooperation with the American Observer, a school magazine reaching 450,000 children, conducted a test on the Far East. Through this medium, teachers were enabled to find out impartially just how much their pupils had learned about the Far East.

Some 44,000 children in 729 schools in 43 States took the test, which was given with no special advance preparation. The median achieved was 28 correct answers out of a possible 51. The teachers welcomed this test as a tool for evaluating their pupils' background information, as well as a device for interesting them in the Far East. We received a large number of letters from these teachers, expressing their gratitude, but indicating surprise that their pupils seemed to know so little about the Pacific area. Many stated that they planned to take immediate steps to give additional emphasis to the Far East. In response to their requests, a second test will be prepared by the IPR this spring to provide these teachers with a means of measuring their pupils' progress, after classroom attention has been given to the subject.

It is interesting to note that the results of this test while not to be taken as more than indicative of a general situation, showed improvement as compared to results obtained in a high-school test conducted in 1939 by Dr. Alfred Church under the auspices of Harvard University. In that test the median was 25 correct answers out of a possible 100.

#### RESEARCH

The two major research undertakings of the American Council have been fully described in The IPR in Wartime. Suffice it to add that the first volume resulting from the Study of the History of Chinese Society under the direction of Karl August Wittfogel is now ready for publication. It is hoped that it will be possible to start it through the press in the immediate future.

Jan Broek's Economic Geography of Southeast Asia is well under way. Maps have already been prepared on land forms, population density and rate of increase, religions, languages distribution of Chinese and land utilization. Other maps on physical background and on economic development are in preparation. Dr. Broek hopes to finish the draft of the text and the balance of the maps during the first half of 1944 before he returns to the University of California, Berkeley.

In recent months, the American council has published only one research volume, Benjamin H. Kizer's The United States-Canadian Northwest, and has one other in press, Walter Radius' United States Shipping in the Pacific, 1914-40. However, many American authors have contributed to the International Research Series.

Other American council projects now in process are:

Labor in the Philippines by Kenneth K. Kurihara with an introduction by Catherine Porter

Japanese in the United States by Carey McWilliams

Japanese in Hawaii by Andrew Lind

Labor in China by Israel Epstein

During 1944, the American council plans to initiate the following new projects:  
Consequences of the economic development of China for American economy  
Steps toward the development of self-government in dependent areas  
Postwar treatment of Japan  
Postwar organization and security in the Pacific  
American relations with India

AMERICAN COOPERATION IN POSTWAR EDUCATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION  
IN THE FAR EAST*Regional programs*

The New York office, as the center of American council research and publication, has also been carrying forward a program of local activities in New York City. In addition to the informational services rendered by its library and staff, it has been holding a series of off-the-record luncheon meetings for the business community. The speakers recently have included Ambassador William Phillips, James Yen, H. J. Timperley, Col. Evans Carlson, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, K. C. Mahindra, E. C. Carter, W. L. Holland.

During the winter it will extend this type of meeting to the general membership and to uptown groups as was done in the case of the reception for Mrs. Roosevelt on her return from the Pacific and for Mr. Carter.

In the school field the New York office has sponsored one teachers' conference this fall and is cooperating with the Foreign Policy Association and the League of Nations Association in holding two student conferences. In addition, the staff has taken the lead in teachers' meetings in New York City and nearby cities, helping to introduce teaching methods and materials on the Far East to the social-studies courses.

Mention should also be made of the fact that the New York staff has been working more closely with outside agencies, such as the press, the radio, and the publishing firms. Through these associations, it has been able to make a further contribution to American knowledge of the Pacific.

The New York office of the IPR moved to new headquarters in November. The more adequate library space will make it possible for the IPR to improve its facilities as a reference center on the Far East. With this end in view, a trained librarian is joining the staff and special funds will be sought to round out the present collection of books and periodicals. While the new offices do not afford space for large meetings, they do provide a more convenient place for small conferences.

The Washington office, a branch of the New York office, has undertaken the largest program of study groups. With the concentration of Far Eastern specialists in the capital, the study groups have offered a welcome opportunity to many to discuss the current and impending problems in the Pacific.

The first series has been conducted to parallel a study group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs working on a similar agenda. It has dealt with the colonial problem as an issue in Anglo-American Far Eastern relations and with economic problems in Southeast Asia. As an offshoot of the former discussions, a special 2-day conference was held on the future of American-Philippine relations.

At present a group is working on the future of Japan, and in the next few months there will be similar programs dealing with India, American-Chinese relations, and American Far Eastern policy. It is hoped that the last topic will also be examined by study groups under the other regional offices.

In addition to the study-group program under the direction of Dean William C. Johnstone, the Washington office is holding a series of lectures for the American council membership. The schedule has included lectures by Edward C. Carter and William L. Holland, Foster Bain, the Lord Hailey, and Sir Frederick Whyte. Those projected for the spring will include James Yen and a panel discussion on Korea.

Through these activities, the Washington office is serving a real need of both the American council and the Pacific council in providing an informal and unofficial meeting ground for the many people now working in the far-eastern field in Washington. The enthusiasm with which it has been greeted speaks well for its program.

It should further be added that as Washington is a national center for news services dealing with foreign affairs, the American council has been able as never before to get the results of its work to a wider public through the standard channels of public information.

The San Francisco Bay region division has throughout the year found itself under constant pressure to supply information from its library, to furnish speakers for outside organizations and for the radio. It has risen to the occasion exceedingly well and is widely utilized by all types of organizations.

Its program of luncheon meetings have had a good attendance—averaging 77 and the speakers have included Sir John Pratt, Owen Lattimore, Dr. John Condliffe, Dr. John Badeau, Sir George Sansom, Gerald Winfield, Hon. W.

Cameron Forbes and Nila Magidoff. The San Francisco group also held a series of four businessmen's round-table discussions under the leadership of far-eastern specialists.

In November Dr. Ernest B. Price was appointed director of the bay region division, and with the backing of the bay region committee is launching a very much enlarged program. New headquarters were immediately obtained to permit staff and library expansion. The core of the program remains the locating, assembling, making usable, and encouraging the use of facts concerning the Pacific area. This implies an enlarged program of conferences and meetings as well as greater participation in the American council research program.

The strengthening of the bay region group in 1944 will be an immensely valuable asset in the total American council program and should provide stimulus to IPR on the entire Pacific coast.

In Chicago, the American council has its offices in the International Relations Center where it can cooperate with other organizations in the field of foreign relations. Its independent program has, as was the case last year, concentrated on a series of lectures or seminars for teachers and two student conferences. As before, the attendance has been regular and large.

The Chicago regional office has also had a series of round-table meetings, in cooperation with the Library of International Relations. At these meetings, various specialists on the Far East have been presented.

Hawaii, after a period in which war activities made it difficult for the IPR to have a full program, is again undertaking work in the school field, lecture meetings, and discussion groups. Nineteen hundred and forty-four should see a real increase in the activity, bringing it back to the prewar level.

The Pacific Northwest and southern California have also been virtually inactive in the past year, because the far-eastern personnel has been drained off to the war. Now, however, both groups are planning a revival of regular programs for 1944.

#### CONCLUSION

In the last half of 1943 the American council has been laying a firm foundation throughout its regional offices for programs geared directly to American wartime and postwar needs. In the months following Pearl Harbor, the pressure for information and personnel in the war agencies overwhelmed the IPR and, in a degree, thrust aside its long-term program of research and public education. Now, despite its loss of personnel, it has restored the balance and is responding more adequately to the large popular demand and need for public information and discussion of the Pacific area. Its popular pamphlets, its school program, its discussions and study groups, and its projected research plans all reflect the type of service which is sought of the American council. In the course of 1944, the American council hopes to bring this program into full effect. The financial resources of all its regional offices are improving and its membership is growing. To the extent that it can meet and hold the interest of various American groups—teachers, businessmen, news commentators, and far eastern specialists both in and outside of Government service—the American council will carry out its function of improving America's capacity to win the war and build the peace in the Pacific area. In this work, it profits enormously from its association with the other IPR councils in the Allied countries around the Pacific. It is the hope of the American council that this association can be strengthened during the coming year.

HARRIET L. MOORE, *Acting Secretary.*

JANUARY 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you have it identified by Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated January 1944, headed "Addenda to the Report, IPR in Wartime."

It has a mimeographed signature of Harriet L. Moore, Acting Secretary.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to refresh your memory, if I might.

In 1941, do you know whether or not Mr. Joseph Barnes, in August of 1941, wrote a pamphlet, "America and the Soviet Union by Joseph

Barnes and Harriet Moore," six pages, Institute of Pacific Relations, 5 cents?

The reprint from the Far Eastern Survey in tracing the recent history of the American-Russian relations gives material not readily available elsewhere. The author's main thesis is that the basic paradox of the Soviet-American relations has been that a deep and important parallelism of national interest between the two countries has produced only infrequently any effective cooperation between their Governments.

I ask you whether or not you did write such a pamphlet for the public schools.

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall that pamphlet. If I wrote it, it is around somewhere.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether that was censored by any one before it was sent in to the public schools?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't know what procedure was used on that.

Senator FERGUSON. This leaves the people who had students in the public schools in the position that they now find themselves; that this article being written, cosponsored by you, or written partly by you, under your name, with the fact that you now refuse to answer as to whether or not you were or were not a Communist as to that time.

Is that true? You do refuse to answer as to whether or not you were or were not a Communist at the time, in August 1941, when that pamphlet was written by you and Mr. Barnes? Is that true?

Mrs. GELFAN. I decline to answer that question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that whole document go into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive the whole thing.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 408" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 408

ANNOUNCING RESOURCE PACKETS FOR SECONDARY-SCHOOL TEACHERS AND STUDENTS ON THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EAST SELECTED BY COMMITTEE ON MATERIALS FOR TEACHERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION AND THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, 744 JACKSON PLACE, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Good neighbors \* \* \* open door \* \* \* reciprocal trade \* \* \*  
Panay incident \* \* \* embargo \* \* \* appeasement \* \* \* Chiang  
Kai-shek \* \* \* Caribbean \* \* \* Burma Road \* \* \* hemisphere  
solidarity \* \* \* Nine-Power Treaty \* \* \* Havana Conference  
\* \* \* League of Nations \* \* \* Japan's new order \* \* \* tariff  
\* \* \* totalitarian penetration \* \* \* the Philippines \* \* \*

#### RELATED PUBLICATIONS FOR TEACHERS

(Prepared by the Committee on Materials for Teachers in International Relations and Published by the American Council on Education)

1. The Teacher and International Relations. 19 pages, June 1941. Council \* \* \* \$0.10. Discussion of responsibilities of teachers in the present international emergency.

2. **American Isolation Reconsidered.** 208 pages, July 1941. Council \* \* \* \$0.50. Traces history of American neutrality from 1793 to 1941 and points out issues involved in decisions about peace and war. Includes more than 60 pages of original documents related to these issues. Specific classroom activities are suggested.

THE COMMITTEE ON MATERIALS FOR TEACHERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION

Philip Bradley, Queens College, Chairman

Howard W. Anderson, Cornell University  
J. Thomas Askew, Armstrong Junior College  
Dorothy Borg, Institute of Pacific Relations  
Francis J. Brown, New York University  
Marie J. Carroll, World Peace Foundation  
Edward M. Earle, Institute for Advance Study, Princeton  
Charles Gosnell, Queens College  
Ross Hoffman, Fordham University  
Erling M. Hunt, Teachers College, Columbia University  
Philip C. Jessup, Columbia University  
Tyler Kepner, Brookline (Mass.) High School  
Walter C. Laves, University of Chicago  
William W. Lockwood, American Committee for International Studies, Princeton University  
William T. Stone, Foreign Policy Association  
Harrison C. Thomas, New York City Public Schools  
Ruth Wanger, South Philadelphia High School for Girls

THE WHY? WHAT? AND HOW? OF "RESOURCE PACKETS"

**Why?**

Teachers today have a responsibility to guide students in an honest consideration of the international scene in which the foreign policy of the United States is being forged. This is not any easy task, but it cannot be avoided. On the street, in the home, in the theater, everywhere students hear and participate in discussions of events in Europe, the Far East, and Latin America. These questions cannot help but be brought into the classroom.

To obtain authentic interesting materials on international developments which teachers and students can use is difficult. Research organizations and distinguished scholars have prepared penetrating analyses of the problems which face us, but most of this material is not written for secondary-school students.

**What?**

To investigate this situation, the American Council on Education 2 years ago appointed a Committee on Materials for Teachers in International Relations. The committee asked the Foreign Policy Association and the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations to assist it by selecting materials to provide teachers with helpful background data and immediately useful classroom pamphlets on the United States and Latin America and the United States and the Far East.

The Latin-American packet contains 10 items—9 new authentic pamphlets plus a specially written syllabus for the teacher which coordinates the pamphlets by outlining the problems in this area, provides a bibliography of supplementary resources—and suggests specific classroom activities. The complete unit sells at \$1.50, postage paid. The cost of the separate items, if ordered from the publishers, would be \$2.20.

The Far East packet contains 10 items—9 pamphlets plus a similar syllabus. This complete unit sells at \$1.50, postage paid. The cost of separate items would be \$2.95.

**How?**

Each teacher and each school will determine how the packets can be best fitted into the class program. Many teachers have indicated that they will use them as units in civics classes or history classes. Others are using them as supplementary readings in these or other classes. Some libraries will make special exhibits of the packets. Their use is almost unlimited in a school which seriously tries to face the problems of the place and stake of the United States in the world scheme.

*Resource packet on the United States and Latin America (\$1.50 postage paid)*

Price on each  
item if ordered  
separately

1. Syllabus for Teachers on the United States and Latin America. 20 pages, October 1941. The Council..... \$0.10  
Contains: (1) an outline of the most important factors in the field; (2) an annotated bibliography; (3) suggested classroom activities. The pamphlets in the resource packet are integrated by page or section under relevant headings—for reading reference, class assignments, or individual reading. It represents expert judgment of the research staff of the Foreign Policy Association.
2. Challenge to the Americas, by John I. B. McCulloch. 64 pages, October 1940. FPA..... .25  
Up-to-date study of contemporary relations between Central and South America—strategic, political, and economic. Special attention is given to the bearing of European colonies in the Americas on United States foreign policy.
3. Look at Latin America, by Joan Raushenbush. 64 pages, November 1940. FPA..... .25  
Convenient handbook of essential facts about our neighbors to the south—their geography, resources, trade, economic and social progress, transportation, and military defenses. Twenty-five maps and charts accompany a brief text.
4. The Good Neighbors: The Story of Two Americas, by Delia Goetz and Varian Fry. 96 pages, June 1941. FPA..... .25  
Brief, simply written summary of the history of the Americas from Columbus to the present, illustrated with excellent maps and charts.
5. Progress of Pan-American Cooperation, by Howard J. Trueblood. 16 pages, February 1940. FPA..... .25  
Summary of the history of the Pan-American movement, the results of the inter-American conference, and discussion of problems of inter-American relations.
6. The Resources and Trade of Central America, by A. Randle Elliott. 12 pages, September 1941. FPA..... .25  
Careful, incisive analysis of the economic stake which the United States has in the resources and trade of the Central American peninsula. Our dominant position in the region is analyzed in the light of the most recent statistics—down to 1941.
7. Economic Defense of Latin America, by Percy W. Bidwell. 96 pages, May 1941. World Peace..... .25  
Up-to-date survey and analysis of the economic problems inherent in the United States trade and diplomacy of Latin-American countries. Valuable charts and statistical tables provide information not available elsewhere. Appraises current policies and new economic agencies developed to promote collaboration in the over-all defense of the Western Hemisphere.
8. The Americas: South and North. 120 pages, March 1941. Survey Graphic..... .50  
Brilliant series of articles on the relations of the American peoples and countries in the present crisis. Photographs and illustrations of Latin-American art. Presents vividly the psychological and cultural factors in the development of understanding between the Americas.
9. Eighth International Conference of American States. 110 pages, April 1939. Carnegie Endowment..... .05
10. Second Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics. 72 pages, September 1940. Carnegie Endowment..... .05  
Two collections of documents provide the teacher and students with the basic official materials for an understanding of present policies of cooperation. Invaluable sources both for teacher reference and classroom discussions. Cover the most important diplomatic agreements of the war period.

Total..... 2.20  
Complete packet for..... 1.50

Quantity orders for the complete packets should be sent to the Council: American Council on Education, 744 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.

Order for copies of individual pamphlets should be sent directly to the publishers listed below, who will be glad to quote discounts on quantity orders for individual titles.

Foreign Policy Association, 22 East Thirty-eighth Street, New York City.  
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 405 West One Hundred and Seventeenth Street, New York City

Survey Associates, Inc., 112 East Nineteenth Street, New York City  
World Peace Foundation, 40 Mount Vernon Street, Boston, Mass.

*Resource packet on the United States and the Far East (\$1.50 postage paid)*

*Price on each  
item if ordered  
separately*

1. Syllabus for Teachers on the United States and the Far East. 18 pages. October 1941. The Council..... \$0.10
2. America and the Soviet Union, by Joseph Barnes and Harriet Moore. 6 pages. August 1941. IPR..... .05  
This reprint from the Far Eastern Survey in tracing the recent history of American-Russian relations gives material not readily available elsewhere. The authors' main thesis is that "the basic paradox of Soviet-American relations has been \* \* \* that a deep and important parallelism of national interest between the two countries has produced only infrequently any effective cooperation between their Governments."
3. American Policy in the Far East, 1931-41, by T. A. Bisson. 153 pages. (Revised edition) October 1941. IPR..... 1.75  
A well known expert on the Orient traces the pattern of United States Far East policy, analyzes the Sino-Japanese struggle since 1931, and discusses Japanese-American trade friction, the collapse of naval limitation and problems of Philippine independence. Contains 34 documents.
4. Showdown at Singapore? by W. W. Lockwood and Michael Greenberg. 31 pages. May 1941. IPR..... .15  
Study of interests and policies of various powers in the Pacific area. Dealing with the United States, the authors state: "The outcome in the Far East turns increasingly on the decision of the United States. The question is not only whether Japan is to be stopped but in what way and for what purposes."
5. Shadow Over Asia, by T. A. Bisson. 96 pages. April 1941. Headline Book Series, FPA..... .25  
Traces history of Japan's resistance to democratic influences and recent course of her road to Empire. Gives an invaluable account of the rise of militant Japan.
6. America's Stake in the Far East, by Miriam S. Farley. 23 pages. 1938. Reprinted October 1941. IPR..... .10  
Provides the only simple, comprehensive summary of the United States economic stake in the Far East. Answers such questions as: Size of our Far East trade. With whom we trade. Are our trade and investments a source of conflict?
7. Our Far Eastern Record, by William W. Lockwood. 48 pages. Vol. I, January 1940. IPR..... .15  
The highlights of our relations with the Far East in recent years are given in this reference digest of American policy through selections from official statements and documents, trade tables, records of the Gallup polls, etc.
8. Our Far Eastern Record, by William W. Lockwood. About 48 pages. Vol. II, November 1941. IPR..... .15  
The story taken to January 1940 by volume I is brought up to date in volume II. United States Far East policy is seen in its wider setting as America faces a two-ocean challenge.
9. Philippine Emergency, by Catherine Porter. 78 pages. October 1941. IPR..... .15  
Written in the author's usual vivid style, Philippine Emergency discusses the problems of Philippine defense and gives background material on the internal politics of the islands, the Independence Act, and the crucial problem of American-Filipino trade.



*Resource packet on the United States and the Far East (\$1.50 postage paid)—*  
Continued

	<i>Price on each item if ordered separately</i>
10. America Faces Japan, by William C. Johnstone. 32 pages. October 1941. Oxford University Press-----	\$0. 10
Up to date analysis of our foreign policy in the Far East. Our political, economic, and strategic relations with Japan are emphasized especially in view of the Axis treaties.	
Total-----	2. 50
Complete packet for-----	1. 50

Order for copies of individual pamphlets should be sent directly to the publishers listed below, who will be glad to quote discounts on quantity orders for individual titles:

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

Foreign Policy Association, 22 East Thirty-eighth Street, New York City.

Oxford University Press, 114 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify this letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Owen Lattimore as a document taken from the Institute of Pacific Relations files, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter dated April 8, 1940, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, marked "Urgent" addressed to Owen Lattimore, signed by Edward C. Carter. It is a photostat of a carbon copy.

Mr. MORRIS. The last document we introduced into the record has not been properly identified by Mr. Mandel, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mandel, would you relate what that document was?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a folder taken from the files of Raymond Lyman Wilbur, once the head of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is marked "Announcing resource packets for secondary school teachers and students of the United States and Latin America and the United States and the Far East, selected by Committee on Materials for Teachers in International Relations of the American Council on Education with the assistance of the Foreign Policy Association and the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations."

Mr. MORRIS. Did you, as a matter of fact, take that document from the files of Mr. Wilbur?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was such literature out?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, I knew there was promotional literature.

Senator FERGUSON. That was promotional literature?

Mrs. GELFAN. So it says.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think you ever saw that before?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall this particular thing.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean the promotional literature.

Mrs. GELFAN. I saw some promotional literature.

I don't recall this whole particular batch of things.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this next letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is addressed "Dear Owen," and is signed by Edward C. Carter, dated April 8, 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a copy of that last letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember reviewing a book by Mr. Grajdanzev?

Mrs. GELFAN. Reviewing a book?

Mr. MORRIS. Referred to in that letter.

Mrs. GELFAN. In what letter?

Mr. MORRIS. The letter just mentioned.

Mrs. GELFAN. This does not say I reviewed a book of Grajdanzev. It said I read a book review written by Grajdanzev.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the review submitted to you, Mrs. Gelfan?

Mrs. GELFAN. Apparently; I don't recall this incident.

Mr. MORRIS. So you can add no testimony to this?

Mrs. GELFAN. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Will that letter be received?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 409" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 409

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,  
New York, N. Y., 8th April 1940.

*Urgent.*

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,

300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR OWEN: On reading Grajdanzev's excellent reviews of the three Russian statistical books, I had the feeling that others might think that Grajdanzev had not quite done himself justice. I therefore submitted the reviews to Miss Harriet Moore and she has very kindly sent me comments under date of April 5. I enclose an extract of her letter.

I am sending this in duplicate in case you want to pass it on to Grajdanzev. You may, however, decide that it is better for you yourself to do a little editing. I don't think it is in Grajdanzev's best interests to have the review put precisely as it is.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here a letter which bears the initials of H. M. which was written from 744 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D. C., and it is addressed to Hilda Austern.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify this as a letter having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated December 7, addressed to "Dear Hilda." It has no signature. The initials "H. M." are in the corner.

Mr. MORRIS. Will this be admitted, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 410", and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 410

(Penciled initial:) HM

744 JACKSON PLACE NW.,  
Washington, D. C., December 7, 1943.

DEAR HILDA: Settling down to the routine of any job is pretty hard after last week, but I'm trying.

I was wondering what you would think of the Secretariat or the American Council (I don't know in what sphere this would come) running a small meeting for the non-Pacific Council people in Washington from the various national groups—Chinese, Filipino, British, etc.—to hear Mr. Carter and Bill Holland speak. I have had several requests for such a meeting. For example, people like Howard Daniel, Daniel Lew, Rajchman, and others like them would be very much interested. Let me know what you think of this, please.

What was the name of your contact in the headquarters, Army Service Forces? Was it Beukema? The reason I ask is that we have sent a letter to the Washington office saying that they are mailing us a copy of the ASTP's Atlas of World Maps. We have not received it yet; is this the business you were working on, or is this something else?

I had a note from Katrine Parsons saying she is much better. It seems that she had developed quite a sinus infection which ran her down considerably. She sends all of you her love.

When does Laura arrive?

My best to you all,

Sincerely,

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us whether or not as a matter of fact you did write that letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir. I don't believe I did write that letter.

Mr. MORRIS. It does not appear conclusively, Mr. Chairman, that Mrs. Gelfan did write that letter. The only indication is the initial, H. M., in the corner.

Is it your testimony you did not?

Mrs. GELFAN. No; I didn't write it.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your belief that means you simply got a copy of it?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. It has been received without explanation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who did write that?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there anything on that to help you make up your mind who might have written it?

Mrs. GELFAN. No. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have here a series of letters and I think, in the interest of time, I would like to have them introduced into the record if they will be identified by the witness. We can save time.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would do that.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter from Carter to Owen Lattimore, dated August 31, 1945. There is one paragraph here wherein Mr. Carter is speaking of Mr. Zukhov. He says:

Zukhov made three trips of many score of kilometers to come in to Moscow for long conversations with me. Both Motilev and Voitinsky were too far away to be able to come in. Communications are still frightfully strained. I had a long talk with Vice Commissar Lossovsky and among other things discussed with him the new opportunity for the Pacific Institute. He undertook to see that proper aid and facilities were given by the Academy of Science to Zukhov now that the situation in the Far East and the Pacific is "clarified".

The word clarified is in quotes, Mr. Chairman.

He had read with warm interest Solution in Asia, which I had sent him on publication. He begged that I give him Harriet Moore's galley proof Soviet Far Eastern Policy.

Do you have a copy of that?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that letter in the record? Could it not be identified?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify that, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here some photostats of letters from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated the 31st of August 1945, addressed to Owen Lattimore, signed Edward C. Carter, and also to be addressed to Mr. Horace Belshaw, Mr. Ifor B. Powell, Andrew Grajdanzef, Miss Harriet Moore, RDC, WDC, and HA.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by "also to be sent to"?

Mr. MANDEL. There is an attached photostat which says, "Letter to Owen Lattimore also sent to."

Mr. SOURWINE. And then it lists those names?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, and gives the same date.

Mr. SOURWINE. May that go in, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive it.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 411" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT 411

31.8.45

Letter to Owen Lattimore also sent to—

Mr. Horace Belshaw, 1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York, N. Y.

Mr. Ifor B. Powell, 1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York.

Andrew Grajdanzef, 1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York.

Miss Harriet Moore, 58 Park Avenue, New York, N. Y.

(Penciled initials:)

RDC  
WDO  
HA

c/o AMERICAN EMBASSY,

Grosvenor Square, London W. 1, 31st August 1945.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,  
*Johns Hopkins University,  
Baltimore, Maryland.*

DEAR OWEN: Your letter in response to my cable has luckily awaited me here. What you have written is most helpful.

The trip from the Bering Straits through Velkol, Seinechan, Yakutsk, Ninji-Illinsk, Krashnoyarsk, and on to Omsk, Kazan to Moscow cannot be reported until I see you face to face. The anthropological and historical people in Yakutia were most cooperative. In almost every guest house my host remarked on pointing out my bedroom: "Willkie, Wallace, Lattimore, and Molotov slept here"! The trip to the Donbas with its mines, industries, and devastated locomotive works needs many pages.

Zukhov was most interesting and cooperative. He has moved the Pacific Institute office from Razin Street to Volhonka 14. The Pacific Institute suite is number 330. Voitinsky is in the same building on the second floor. Motilev has a large office suite in the central building of the Moscow University—the second Moscow university has now been merged into the single great institution.

Unfortunately I arrived in Moscow for the first fortnight in four years when the academic people were free to take a holiday. Zukhov made three trips of many score of kilometres to come in to Moscow for long conversations with me. Both Motilev and Voitinsky were too far away to be able to come in. Communications are still frightfully strained. I had a long talk with Vice Commissar Lossovsky, and among other things discussed with him the new opportunity for the Pacific Institute. He undertook to see that proper aid and facilities were given by the Academy of Science to Zukhov now that the situation in the Far East and the Pacific is "clarified." He had read with warm interest "Solution in Asia," which I had sent him on publication. He begged that I give him Harriet Moore's galley proof "Soviet Far Eastern Policy." He wanted to read Tamagna's article on China's postwar finances. He seemed to be familiar with Japanese attacks on the I. P. R. and on the Secretary General and asked whether the American and British people took the I. P. R. as seriously as the Japanese. He has a high regard for Zukhov.

The Pacific Institute has received almost every I. P. R. publication, though those of the past six months have not all arrived. I presented Zukhov with the collection that Ruth Carter entrusted to me and Lossovsky gave me his word of honour that he would pass on to Zukhov the manuscript of Harriet Moore's book; he hinted that he supposed Miss Moore would add a final chapter in the light of the vast changes that synchronized with my visit to the U. S. S. R.

I found that some highly placed official in every Commissariat that I had to work with was broadly informed as to the work of the I. P. R., and fairly beamed that I had so timed my visit as to arrive in Moscow on the very day

that the U. S. S. R. went to war with Japan. Litvinov remembered that I reached Manchuria on September 17, 1931, and Peking on July 3, 1937. Losovsky was from Missouri as to the Emperor's capacity to lead Japan toward democracy. I talked at length with an American marine engineer who helped install the machinery for the Amur ferry boat which was a prerequisite to the strategy of encircling Korea and Manchuria. He and his Soviet colleagues had to complete the ferry before August 30. They made the date; and he crossed the river on the ferry with its first load of thirty freight cars destined to cross to Soviet Skiya Gavan, and of course the first trip was followed by innumerable subsequent trips with munitions and other essentials that had come in vast quantities along the Trans-Siberian to Kharbarovsk then to Konsomolsk for ferry transshipment across the Amur. According to my best sources of information the Baikal-Amur railway does not yet run into Konsomolsk, all munitions and other war material for Soviet Harbour were coming into Konsomolsk by way of Kharbarovsk.

The Soviet Ambassadors to China, Vinogradov and Vostov, were in Moscow while I was there and made an appointment to meet me, but through no fault of theirs I had to forego the privilege of seeing them because of a conflict of dates.

Anna Louise Strong was of course completely mystified by the Sino-Soviet agreements. Edgar Snow was not so pessimistic, and of course Eddie Gilmore thought it represented superstatemanship on the part of Moscow, Chungking, and Washington. Borodin took the same line as Byrnes and Gilmore.

The Lenin Library people whom Ruth Carter wanted me to see were also away on holiday. I did, however, see the assistant to the chief librarian of the Foreign Language Library, who is eager to get by gift or exchange every one of the I. P. R. publications.

I received Harriet Moore's cable proposing an exchange of visits between Urnov and Rubin. This I conveyed orally and in a formal letter to Kemenov of Boks. Confidentially I may say that he was the only person I met in the Soviet Union who showed complete incompetence to understand either the I. P. R. or R. R. He lives in a rarified atmosphere of what he calls "international cultural contacts," but his definition of culture excludes almost everything except the fine arts in a restricted meaning, and internationalism to him means principally for the Western World to hypnotise itself into the belief that Soviet art and music surpasses anything else on the planet. He is fabulously hospitable when it comes to the opera, lavish dinners, and ballet and radio stars; but when it comes to achieving what I would call serious objectives his capacity for inaction is unlimited. In the past two years by a commendable act of will he was made tremendous progress in learning English. It may be that when he uses the English language as a tool for studying English and American thought he will become more competent. This linguistic achievement is all to his credit for his work drives him terribly.

I read between the lines that he can't spare Urnov for a long time and that Miss Moore should rely on Mikhailov and Gromov to get a visa for Rubin.

All Americans who are hoping to visit the Soviet Union should remember that the housing and care of foreign visitors is still a terrific problem and will continue to be for at least another year. There are so many new embassies, so many many new international commissions with visiting foreigners that you discover that ministers from the Middle Powers have to be housed in a single bedroom in one of the hotels. The housing shortage in every city I visited was unbelievably great, and the Russians are so hospitable they simply won't let foreigners rough it, even though the foreigners bravely assert that if they can only get a visa they will take pot luck with the masses. Americans who are loudest in such protestations howl the worst when the first bed bugs march in on them.

I am afraid the foregoing will not answer one percent of your questions. The answers to the rest must wait till I return, but don't for heaven's sake think that I have all the answers to the rest must wait till I return, but don't for heaven's sake think that I have all the answers.

Gratefully yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you receive a copy of this?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't remember this particular letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Zukhov?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir. I don't believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Lossovsky?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. If the witness has no comment to make on that, I suggest we go to the next one.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify this document as a letter from the IPR files, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of a document dated November 6, 1943, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Miss Rose Yardumian, from Harriet L. Moore.

Mr. MORRIS. I show you that letter and ask you if you can recall having written that letter?

Mr. SOURWINE. While the witness is studying the letter, may it be offered for the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 412" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 412

NOVEMBER 6, 1943.

MISS ROSE YARDUMIAN,  
*Institute of Pacific Relations,*  
*744 Jackson Place, Washington 5, D. C.*

DEAR ROSE: I am writing this just to recapitulate what we decided the other day when you were here. If I have got something twisted, please let me know. The enclosed memos deal with the financial and administrative arrangements.

1. In order to take fullest advantage of the return of ECC and WLH, the following activities should be planned:

(a) Press interview to be arranged by RWR and AJ.

(b) A dinner for about forty Congressmen and other leading people in Washington for ECC and WLH at the first opportunity.

(c) An Amco membership meeting for all Washington members for ECC and WLH. Also to be arranged as soon as possible. For these two events (b and c) AJ will go to Washington to help with the arrangements.

(d) A small meeting with Army and Navy education people to discuss the further need for educational work among the troops now stationed in India and China.

(e) Radio engagements for ECC and WLH.

(f) A meeting for the Pacco representatives in Washington. According to Hilda, this doesn't have to be done in the immediate future..

2. In re study groups:

(a) WCJ is to draft four or five questions to serve as the basis for regional study groups or conferences on American policy to be organized by Amco in the course of 1944.

(b) WCJ will talk again to Zafra regarding the joint American-Philippine conference.

(c) The question of a joint American-Dutch conference has been dropped.

(d) WCJ will send us the agenda for the American Council study group on Japan and Rose will send us as soon as possible the preliminary list of those to be invited to them.

3. It was agreed that it would be advisable to get a hotel room for the meetings so as to be sure to have a place for the study groups even if it costs somewhat more than the former meeting room.

4. It was agreed that it would be advisable to send out a letter announcing the opening of the Washington office and the projected plans for that office. One such letter should go from the American Council to the Americans in Washington who have used the IPR. The other should go from ECC to the various non-Americans in Washington (I will draft such a letter for the American Council for your approval and will then try to get it signed by either Sproul or Calkins).

5. It was agreed that we should try to work out with Joy Hume some arrangement whereby she can assist Rose Yardumian in contact work in Washington.

I trust this covers the general picture but if there are corrections, please send them to me.

Sincerely,

HARRIET L. MOORE, *Acting Secretary.*

Mrs. GELFAN. I think I recall that letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall making the recommendations that appear in that letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall—these things were worked out jointly.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you wrote the letter, you did make the recommendations?

Mrs. GELFAN. This does not say they were recommendations made by me. This says we were recapitulating what we decided the other day.

I don't know who "we" was.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

In order to take the fullest advantage of the return of ECC and WLH, the following activities should be planned.

Is not that making a recommendation?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, because it says "this just to recapitulate what we decided the other day when you were here."

These were the decisions taken. I don't remember who "we" were.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Rose Yardumian one of the "we"?

Mrs. GELFAN. She apparently was present.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you remember anyone else present?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you identify these various initials: ECC?

Mrs. GELFAN. Some of them I can. This is Mr. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. W. L. H.?

Mrs. GELFAN. Mr. Holland.

Mr. SOURWINE. R. W. R.?

Mrs. GELFAN. It may be Russian War Relief.

Mr. SOURWINE. A. J.? You don't know?

Mrs. GELFAN. I can't think who it might be. I undoubtedly did know.

Mr. SOURWINE. W. C. J.?

Mrs. GELFAN. I prefer not to guess at these things, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what that meant at the time you wrote it?

Mrs. GELFAN. I obviously knew at the time I wrote it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know, or do you know now, what it meant when you wrote it?

Mrs. GELFAN. I think it is William Johnstone. I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. How did Johnstone spell his name? Is it s-t-o-n?

Mrs. GELFAN. This man spells his name s-t-o-n-e, I think, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to proceed to the next one.

Will you identify this letter as a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 20, 1943, addressed to Miss Rose Yardumian and signed "Harriet L. Moore, Acting Secretary."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will this be introduced?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 413" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 413

OCTOBER 20, 1943.

MISS ROSE YARDUMIAN,  
*Institute of Pacific Relations,*  
744 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.

DEAR ROSE: You are probably so busy that you don't need any letters from us with suggestions. I trust that the moving went smoothly and that you have finally been able to find someone to help you with stenographic problems. What is the story on the telephone? Have you got a number?

We are here trying to decide what additional study groups should be undertaken. I imagine that we will be writing to Bill very shortly and will send you a copy.

The IPR has been invited to send someone to the Informational Conference on the Relief and Rehabilitation Program of the United Nations. I am sending them your name and you should definitely go. You might drop in and get a copy of the program at the office of the chairman of the Organizing Committee, Dr. Esther Caikin Brunauer, 714 Evans Building, 1420 New York Avenue NW. Dr. Brunauer is in charge of the arrangements and, as you know, knows all about the IPR and you should meet her anyhow. I am writing to find out if it will be possible for an additional person to go. If so, probably I will ask Bruno as he is working on the OFRRO reports at present.

All's well here though we are very busy and seem a bit distracted. As soon as you have worked out the library list, please send it along and we will try to get the things to you very quickly.

I hope you are not having too much trouble over the living arrangements. I am sorry that the original scheme didn't work out as we had hoped.

Sincerely yours,

HARRIET L. MOORE, *Acting Secretary.*

hm/dl.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall of having written that letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall this letter. I undoubtedly wrote it.

Mr. MORRIS. You will not deny you wrote it?

Mrs. GELFAN. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any comment to make on that letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, in connection with this hearing today, whom did you consult before you came down here?

Mrs. GELFAN. No one, sir, except my lawyer. I didn't speak on the phone to anybody.

Mr. MORRIS. You didn't speak to anybody?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Your counsel is with you?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel, have you been identified on the record?

Mr. REIN. I don't think I have. My name is Davie Rein.

Senator FERGUSON. Where is your place of business?

Mr. REIN. 711 Fourteenth Street, Washington, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. You are practicing with a firm there?

Mr. REIN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the name?

Mr. REIN. Forer & Rein.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, did you consult with Henry Collins in connection with your appearance here?



Mrs. GEFLAN. Today?

Mr. MORRIS. Did you consult with Henry Collins in connection with your being subpoenaed by this committee to appear here in Washington?

Mrs. GEFLAN. I spoke to him. I told him——

Mr. MORRIS. You asked him for advice; did you not?

Mrs. GELFAN. I suppose so.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you, or did you not?

Mrs. GELFAN. I saw him shortly after I received your letter asking me whether I would be available for testimony. I told him I had received such a letter and we chatted about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he give you advice as to how to conduct yourself before this hearing?

Mrs. GEFLAN. No, sir. He suggested I should have a lawyer.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he suggest what lawyer you should have?

Mrs. GELFAN. He named several lawyers as possibilities.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he name your present lawyer?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Henry Collins has been identified by Whittaker Chambers as an associate of Alger Hiss?

Mrs. GELFAN. I saw it in the papers.

Senator FERGUSON. You talked to Mr. Collins about your constitutional rights?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall discussing that with him.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall that?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it mentioned at all with Mr. Collins?

Mrs. GELFAN. It might have been. I don't recall precisely. We chatted very briefly.

Senator FERGUSON. Is he a lawyer?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is his business now?

Mrs. GEFLAN. He is a writer.

Senator FERGUSON. Where does he live?

Mrs. GELFAN. Bronxville.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know the occasion that you got in touch with Mr. Collins on this matter?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell us why you went to Mr. Collins?

Mrs. GELFAN. I certainly can. I was trying to buy a house in Bronxville. I asked Mr. Collins who his real-estate agent was. That was the connection in which I got in touch with Mr. Collins.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have the letter about coming here to testify at that time?

Mrs. GELFAN. I had Mr. Morris' original letter asking me as to my availability for testimony. I did not have a subpoena at that point.

Senator FERGUSON. Had Mr. Collins ever had any connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. Not as far as I know.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you contributed money to the following organizations: The American League Against War and Fascism?

Mrs. GELFAN. That one I don't remember whether I ever did.

Mr. MORRIS. You cannot recall contributing \$400 to the American League Against War and Fascism?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you contribute to the American rescue ship?

Mrs. GELFAN. Which was the American rescue ship?

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall that? It is a Spanish relief organization.

Mrs. GELFAN. I contributed to the Spanish Relief Organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you remember contributing to the American-Russian Institute?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Approximately how much money?

Mrs. GELFAN. I have no idea over the years. A fair amount.

Mr. MORRIS. Approximately? Was it \$10,000?

Mrs. GELFAN. I would be surprised if it was that much.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you be surprised if it was more than \$5,000?

Mrs. GELFAN. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Where would you get funds in that amount to contribute?

Mrs. GELFAN. From my family, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You obtained them from your family if they were contributed?

Mrs. GELFAN. No. I don't want to—my family has given money. I am free to spend it as I wish.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you state your question again so that she will have it clearly in mind?

Mr. MORRIS. My last question was: Would you be surprised to realize you contributed more than \$5,000?

Mrs. GELFAN. I said "no."

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask a question?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was all the money which you contributed to the organizations named your own money at the time you contributed?

Mrs. GELFAN. Of course.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not make contributions on behalf of someone else or act as an intermediary?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So if any money was given by you to any of these organizations, you had not solicited or obtained it from anyone else to be given under your name?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you were giving it as your own?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then your statement it may have come from your family was to indicate the family had given it to you not for this cause?

Mrs. GELFAN. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember contributing to the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you mean you contributed?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't deny it. I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember contributing to the Abraham Lincoln Brigade?

Mrs. GELFAN. I probably did, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions.

Senator FERGUSON. I find in this book some documents dated as late as August 14, 1945. That would indicate that it was published after that date.

Mrs. GELFAN. Those were put in after it was in proof.

Mr. SOURWINE. By this book you are referring to what, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. The Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931 to 1945, by Harriet L. Moore.

Do you have anything that you want to give to the committee now—any information?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel that you have had a fair hearing?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It has been complete, as far as you are concerned?

You do not want to add anything to it?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the committee will recess subject to call.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed, to reconvene subject to call of the Chair.)

# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER  
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 4:20 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur V. Watkins presiding.

Present: Senator Watkins.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we were to have three witnesses here today, but due to a misunderstanding we have only one, and which witness has been heard in executive session, as you know, earlier today.

Senator WATKINS. I understand.

Mr. MORRIS. The other two, Mr. Len DeCaux and the former Mildred Price, both will be heard on Monday in executive session.

Senator WATKINS. This witness has been sworn in executive session. Does counsel think it is necessary to have her sworn again in public session?

Mr. MORRIS. I would suggest it, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. It may be surplusage, but we can do it anyway.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give in the matter now pending before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate of the United States will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. BARNES. I do.

**TESTIMONY OF KATHLEEN BARNES, MIDDYLANDS, NEW HARTFORD, CONN., ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH FORER, ESQ., WASHINGTON, D. C.**

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, will you give your full name and address to the stenographer, please?

Mrs. BARNES. Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, Middylands, New Hartford, Conn.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, where were you born?

Mrs. BARNES. In England.

Mr. MORRIS. What town in England?

Mrs. BARNES. Bladon-Dobshire.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you become an American citizen?

Mrs. BARNES. In 1930, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your marital status now?

Mrs. BARNES. I am divorced—well, single.

Mr. MORRIS. How many times have you been married?

Mrs. BARNES. Once.

Mr. MORRIS. To whom where you married?

Mrs. BARNES. Joseph Fels Barnes.

Mr. MORRIS. When were you married to Mr. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. I married Mr. Barnes in 1928, and we were divorced, I think, in 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1935. And you have since not remarried?

Mrs. BARNES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, were you ever a staff member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. BARNES. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you commence that relationship?

Mrs. BARNES. In, I think it was, the fall of 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now, at that time, was Mr. Barnes an employee of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't think so. I think he had left just before.

Mr. MORRIS. He had been secretary; is that right?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. He had been secretary up until what year?

Mrs. BARNES. Up until 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. So it is your testimony that your employment with the institute commenced at a time subsequent to his departure?

Mrs. BARNES. That is as I recollect it. I don't know, there might have been some slight overlapping in technicalities, but I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you made any visit to Moscow?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell the committee the number and the duration of each visit?

Mrs. BARNES. I was there twice, once in—I don't remember how many months I was all the time in Moscow. I think about three and a bit, the first time.

Mr. MORRIS. Three and a bit months?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes, three and a part of a month. And the second time I was there—my impression is that it was something like 2 months. I can't remember exactly.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you there on behalf of the institute?

Mrs. BARNES. Was I there on behalf of the institute?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mrs. BARNES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you do any work in Moscow for the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't think so; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, have you read the testimony within which your name has appeared before this committee?

Mrs. BARNES. I have.

Mr. MORRIS. And you understand that you were named by one of the witnesses here as a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. BARNES. I do so understand.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, were you in fact ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. BARNES. I refuse to answer because of my privilege under the fifth amendment not to testify against myself.

Senator WATKINS. Are you afraid if you answer that truthfully it might incriminate you?

Mrs. BARNES. I suppose that is—that is a different phraseology of the same thing, is it not?

Senator WATKINS. In answer to my question, I think you know what I asked.

Mrs. BARNES. Yes, I think so, yes.

Mrs. MORRIS. When did you terminate your relationship with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. BARNES. In 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you still a member of the institute?

Mrs. BARNES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you do not subscribe to the publications any more?

Mrs. BARNES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, did Mr. Carter ever recruit you or ask you to do any work for the Government in the early part of the war?

Mrs. BARNES. Asked me to do any work for the Government? I suppose you refer to a letter there in which he sent some sort of a questionnaire as to—something about the National Resources Planning Board.

I do not recollect particularly receiving that letter from Mr. Carter. I may have. I do recollect filling in a questionnaire from the National Resources Board.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce into the record a letter from Mr. Edward C. Carter addressed to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, dated September 24, 1940?

Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate that that is a document of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. That is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated September 24, 1940, addressed to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes from Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you receive that in the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator WATKINS. That will be received in the record and marked in the next sequence with an identifying number.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 414" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 414

SUNSET FARM,  
Lee, Mass., September 24, 1940.

**Mrs. KATHLEEN BARNES:**

DEAR KATHLEEN: On behalf of the National Resources Planning Board, the American Council of Learned Societies is preparing a roster of scientific and professional personnel who can use what are described as "unusual" languages.

You, of course, come in this category, and I am wondering whether you have any objection to my listing your gifts. Would you let me know how many of the following nine functions you would feel competent to fulfill in case Uncle Sam needed you:

1. Radio listening.
2. Radio speaking.
3. Intensive teaching of languages.

4. Reading foreign-language newspapers and other printed materials.
5. Censoring handwritten and typewritten correspondence.
6. Translating technical materials into English.
7. Translating into foreign languages.
8. Work with natives, either in the United States or abroad.
9. Organizational and administrative work connected with the above.

Have you by any chance received a copy of the ACLS communiqué on this matter direct?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter? I would like to ask Mrs. Barnes a few questions on it.

Mr. MANDEL. The letter reads:

DEAR KATHLEEN: On behalf of the National Resources Planning Board, the American Council of Learned Societies is preparing a roster of scientific and professional personnel who can use what are described as "unusual" languages.

You, of course, come in this category, and I am wondering whether you have any objection to my listing your gifts. Would you let me know how many of the following nine functions you would feel competent to fulfill in case Uncle Sam needed you?

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is enough, Mr. Mandel. Thank you.

Mrs. Barnes, can you recall Mr. Carter writing this letter to you?

Mrs. BARNES. No; I don't recall receiving the letter. It is quite possible he did, but I just don't happen to remember it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anyone associated with the American Council of Learned Societies?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes; I mean, I did know somebody on the National Council.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Mortimer Graves?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know the project Mr. Mortimer Graves undertook to supply personnel for the National Resources Planning Board?

Mrs. BARNES. I may have known at the time, but I have no recollection now.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not deny receiving this letter, though, do you?

Mrs. BARNES. I do not deny receiving that; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Does this letter refresh your recollection to anything about this episode?

Mrs. BARNES. I do remember filling out—what do you call it—a questionnaire from the National Resources Planning Board asking my abilities.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any follow-up from the National Resources Planning Board?

Mrs. BARNES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you do, in fact, during the war, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. I was a mother of a young child, and worked for the Red Cross; ran a victory garden.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you work for the Government at all?

Mrs. BARNES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. I am a writer, a free-lance writer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record a document from the Institute of Pacific Relations from W. W. L., which are the initials of Mr. Lockwood, to various staff members of the Institute of Pacific Relations including one K. B., whom, I presume, is Mrs. Barnes.

Mr. Mandel, would you authenticate that that is an official document from the files of the Institute?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated March 27, 1942, to a number of individuals whose initials are listed, among them being K. B., and it is from W. W. L.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you read the pertinent sections from that?

Mr. MANDEL. (reading):

The newest Government project calling for study of the Far East is a School of Military Government being organized under the auspices of the War Department. This is to be located at the University of Virginia under the direction of Maj. H. C. Dillard and J. I. Miller. These two gentlemen called on me Tuesday to ask the cooperation of the IPR in advice on materials, personnel, and curriculum. The purpose of this school is to train officers in the techniques and problems of military government in areas taken over from the enemy.

Another paragraph reads as follows:

Dillard and Miller would like our assistance at several points. Immediately they would like suggestions on far eastern personnel available and competent to give instruction, at least for this first summer period. I would be glad to have suggestions as to historians, political scientists, geographers, etc., who might be considered in this connection.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, do you remember receiving that memorandum?

Mrs. BARNES. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you deny that you received that memorandum?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't deny it, I have no recollection of the whole matter.

Mr. MORRIS. You will notice the date of that, Mrs. Barnes, is 1942.

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony you were not an employee of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. BARNES. No; I wasn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of anybody else, any other staff member of the IPR, who had the initials K. B.?

Mrs. BARNES. I am not at all familiar with the staff of the IPR after I left it at all.

Mr. MORRIS. But it is your testimony that you were not at that time an employee of the institute?

Mrs. BARNES. That is right. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, where were you on March 27, 1942?

Mrs. BARNES. I imagine in New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the institute send on copies of memorandum up to you after you terminated your employment?

Mrs. BARNES. Not that I recollect at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Did anyone, in fact, ask you for recommendations for personnel for the military government?

Mrs. BARNES. I have no recollection of such a happening.

Mr. MORRIS. And yet you do not deny that you have seen such a memorandum?

Mrs. BARNES. I can't deny a thing, if I don't recollect it at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, this was a document from the file of the institute, was it not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept that into the record?



Senator WATKINS. I will accept it in the record, but I might say that it is not of very much weight unless it is connected up in some other way. In a court, it probably would not be received in evidence without some connecting link to tie it in.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, it is not admissible in connection with Mrs. Barnes, Mr. Chairman, but I think it is admissible of the fact that Mr. Lockwood did circularize the employees of the institute with a view toward their getting recommendations for military government.

Senator WATKINS. For that purpose, I think, for whatever value it has, it will be put in the record, and it will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 415," and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 415

MARCH 27, 1942.

To: KB	GET	WLH
KRCG	DB	ECC
MSF	PEL	MG
CP		

From WWL:

The newest government project calling for study of the Far East is a School of Military Government being organized under the auspices of the War Department. This is to be located at the University of Virginia under the direction of Maj. H. C. Dillard and J. I. Miller. These two gentlemen called on me Tuesday to ask the cooperation of the IPR in advice on materials, personnel, and curriculum. The purpose of this school is to train officers in the techniques and problems of military government in areas taken over from the enemy.

As the war progresses, and as the military forces and successful large areas will be freed from Axis domination and will require provisional military administrations. In many respects the policies followed in this interim period may set the mold for long-term postwar economic and political readjustment.

It is proposed to provide a selected group of officers with general background training for this job. The first course will begin in June and run for approximately three months. The curriculum will include elementary training in the organization of the Army and the War Department and legal procedural problems, and historical experience where it seems applicable. As men are ticketed for various areas they will be given intensive background courses in the history, geography, resources, economic and political organization of the areas in question.

Dillard and Miller would like our assistance at several points. Immediately they would like suggestions on far eastern personnel available and competent to give instruction, at least for this first summer period. I would be glad to have suggestions as to historians, political scientists, geographers, etc., who might be considered in this connection.

In the second place they want help in building up a library of teaching materials. On looking over my shelf of recent IPR books, they decided that they should have virtually all of our books, periodicals, and reports. I am sending them a complete list, eliminating only those things that clearly are not useful, and in addition including suggestions regarding non-IPR materials.

The headquarters of the School of Military Government at present are in the new Armory Building, 10th and B Streets SE, Washington, D. C. (War Department Extension 71951).

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, were you ever a director of the American-Russian Institute?

Mrs. BARNES. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. For what period of time?

Mrs. BARNES. I can't remember exactly.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the American-Russian Institute in 1941?

Mrs. BARNES. I think I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a contributor to Soviet Russia Today?

Mrs. BARNES. I have written for it; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been a member of the editorial board of the American Quarterly on the Soviet Union?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes. I think I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mrs. Barnes, we introduced into the record in open session before this committee a compilation of your works in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations which appears as exhibit No. 185, part 2, page 645. You have that compilation in front of you?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you acknowledge that that appears to be an accurate compilation of your contributions to the institute?

Mrs. BARNES. You mean the fact that I did write these things?

Mr. MORRIS. That you did write those things.

Mrs. BARNES. Yes, it is my impression so.

Mr. MORRIS. As far as you know, that is an accurate compilation?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes. You may have left something off.

Mr. MORRIS. But, in the short time that you have had to study it, it seems to be an accurate compilation of your contributions?

Mrs. BARNES. It seems to me that I did write these things; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, do you recall making a contribution to Pacific Affairs in December 1935 in connection with an article written by Hansu Chan for the publication China Today?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any experience with the publication China Today at that time?

Mrs. BARNES. What do you mean by experience with it?

Mr. MORRIS. Well, had you any dealings with the magazine China Today?

Mrs. BARNES. I have been trying to think of this since the executive session, trying to remember that. I don't remember writing them letters.

Mr. MORRIS. And yet you did digest an article that appeared in China Today for that publication, did you not, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. Digest it for—

Mr. MORRIS. An article that appeared in China Today for the Pacific Affairs of December 1935?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. So, therefore, you must have read at least that issue of China Today?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now can you tell us to what extent you had been a reader of China Today at that time?

Mrs. BARNES. Frankly, I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any dealings with the editors of China Today?

Mrs. BARNES. That is what I think I have been thinking of, and I think I probably did.

Mr. MORRIS. What editors?

Mrs. BARNES. Pardon?

Mr. MORRIS. What editors?

Mrs. BARNES. Well, I cannot absolutely recollect who were the editors at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, did you know Mr. Field at that time, Mr. Frederick V. Field?

Mrs. BARNES. I knew Mr. Field at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that he was an editor of China Today?

Mrs. BARNES. Did I know it at that time? I do not know.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Chi?

Mrs. BARNES. I did not know any Mr. Chi at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that he was an editor of China Today?

Mrs. BARNES. That Mr. Chi was an editor of China Today? At that time, I did not know Mr. Chi.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Mr. Chi was the author of the article signed Hansu Chan?

Mrs. BARNES. At that time; no.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you learn that Mr. Chi was the bearer of the name Hansu Chan?

Mrs. BARNES. I do not remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you estimate when you first learned it, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. No; frankly, I can't estimate it, but I should say it must have been quite a time ago.

Mr. MORRIS. How long after 1935, the date of this article?

Mrs. BARNES. I should think several years.

Mr. MORRIS. What were the circumstances of your learning that Mr. Chi used the name Hansu Chan?

Mrs. BARNES. I can't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would try, for us, Mrs. Barnes, please.

Did you ever personally meet Mr. Chi?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he tell you that he was Hansu Chan?

Mrs. BARNES. Not that I recollect; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, did you know that China Today was a Communist publication?

Mrs. BARNES. When did I know it?

Mr. MORRIS. At any time?

Mrs. BARNES. An official Communist publication?

Mr. MORRIS. No, a publication that was Communist in orientation.

Mrs. BARNES. I don't know what you mean by how it was oriented.

Mr. MORRIS. A magazine that supported the purposes and the ideals of the Chinese Communists.

Mrs. BARNES. What was the original question?

Mr. FORER. That is the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, that is the question. Did you know at any time that the magazine China Today was a supporter of the ideals and the purposes of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. BARNES. It is very hard to recollect what one thought about a thing. I think I must have thought at some time that it tended in that direction; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Chi ever tell you that he was associated with China Today?

Mrs. BARNES. Not that I recollect.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall, as a matter of fact, who did tell you that Mr. Chi was in fact Mr. Hansu Chan?

Mrs. BARNES. I can't recall anybody.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Field tell you?

Mrs. BARNES. Not that I recollect.

Mr. MORRIS. Apparently we can't proceed any further on that score, Mr. Chairman. Apparently we have asked Mrs. Barnes to extend herself as much as possible to recall how she did know that Mr. Chi was in fact Hansu Chan.

Mrs. BARNES. And frankly, I cannot remember.

Senator WATKINS. That will have to be her answer, if it is the best answer she can give.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have read into the record the little paragraph which bore the signature "Kathleen Barnes" in the December 1935 issue of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. Mandel, would you read that into the record, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from page 477:

#### ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

In the last issue of Pacific Affairs, there appeared an article by Harold Isaacs entitled "Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution: A Marxist View." The September number of China Today carried a direct answer to this article, written by Hansu Chan. This answer is intended to refute both Mr. Isaacs' conclusions and the premises upon which they are based. It is so challenging and so vital to any student of Far Eastern affairs that it should be presented to those who read the first article and who might otherwise not know of this rebuttal. An abstract of Mr. Chan's answer follows.

Kathleen Barnes is signed under that statement.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, was that intended to be an official Stalinist refutation of a Trotskyist version of China society?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't know that it is an official Stalinist rebuttal. I would say that it tended to be a Stalinist thing, and the other one a Trotskyist thing; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, how well known was it that Mr. Chi wrote under the name of Hansu Chan for China Today?

Mrs. BARNES. I am sure I can't answer that question.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of anyone else in the Institute of Pacific Relations who knew that Hansu Chan was in fact Dr. Chi?

Mrs. BARNES. Well, if I knew I suppose quite a lot of other people did.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say it was a matter of common knowledge?

Mrs. BARNES. I frankly don't know. I mean, I cannot remember. I cannot remember this distance back. I am sorry.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, I am going to have introduced into the record, principally for your recognizing the authenticity of the letters, a series of letters, and if you have no comment to make on them we can simply put them into the record and let it go at that.

Mrs. BARNES. I can't guarantee the authenticity of things.

Mr. MORRIS. No, but you can make whatever comment that is accurate on each one of these.

This, Mr. Chairman, is a letter to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes from Mr. E. V. Harondar, dated June 20, 1935.

Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate that that is a copy of a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 20, 1935, addressed to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes and signed by E. V. Harondar, Secretary, Council of the U. S. S. R., Institute of Pacific Relations, 20 Razin Street, Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, do you recall having received that letter?

Mrs. BARNES. Is that the one I saw a little while ago?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. I showed you all of these letters.

Mrs. BARNES. I don't recall receiving it, but I doubtless did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Harondar?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't think I ever met him; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know who he was?

Mrs. BARNES. Mr. Harondar was the Secretary, I think, of the Soviet Council. No, I never met him. I am sure I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. This is on the letterhead of the council of the U. S. S. R. Institute of Pacific Relations, 20 Razin Street, Moscow, dated June 20, 1935. But you can give no testimony to this letter?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't recollect any. I don't recollect receiving it, but I doubtless did.

Senator WATKINS. The letter will be received as a part of the record.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 416" and is as follows:)

COUNCIL OF THE U. S. S. R.,  
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,  
20 Razin Street, Moscow, June 20, 1935.

Mrs. KATHLEEN BARNES.

*American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,*

*129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City, N. Y., U. S. A.*

DEAR MRS. BARNES: In Mr. Kantorovich's absence I am acknowledging receipt of your letter of May 24. Mr. Lattimore's book mentioned therein has been just received, but the History of the Russian Revolution is still on its way to Moscow. As soon as it is received we will make arrangements to have them reviewed in compliance with your request.

We were not writing to you about the books you sent us pending receipt of all publications listed in your letter. Only a part of these arrived so far and I am trying to trace the rest of them through the Moscow post office. However, the list of these books as well as those of them we have already received clearly indicate that this consignment constitutes a most interesting and valuable contribution to our library, for which please accept our sincerest thanks. We are endeavoring to collect a set of books which would represent an adequate compensation for the collection you sent us—and I have to confess that this is not an easy task. A few days ago we sent you a complimentary copy of the last issue of U. S. S. R. in Construction devoted to the Soviet Far East and a brief handbook of economic information entitled "The U. S. S. R. in Figures." Both will probably be of interest to you and the fact that they are published in English will render their use possible to non-Russian speaking members of your staff.

Further referring to our previous correspondence concerning data for Mr. Cressey I take pleasure in informing you that the other day a consignment of maps containing, (1) soil map of the European part of the U. S. S. R., (2) soil map of the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R., (3) map of the forests of the European part of the U. S. S. R., (4) geological map of the European part of the U. S. S. R., (5) geological map of the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R., (p. 25), (6) hypsometrical map of the European part of the U. S. S. R., (7) map of quaternary deposits, left Moscow for U. S. A. These maps have been addressed to the American Council in New York.

Sometime ago we received a letter from the library of the Academy of Science of the U. S. S. R. asking for information as to the possibility of further continuation of their exchange relations with you. We could only refer them to you direct, stating that our considerations concerning this matter have been made known to you by our letter of March 10.

As soon as all the books listed in your communication are received here I will write you again. I hope that by this time I will be able to advise that the next consignment of our books left Moscow for New York.

Sincerely yours,

[s] E. HARONDAR  
E. V. HARONDAR, *Secretary.*

Mrs. BARNES. Do you want me to—

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, if you have anything, Mrs. Barnes, to add to this in any way, we would appreciate very much your comment.

Mrs. BARNES. That does talk about this exchange of books between the Soviet Council and the American Council, which we were sending books, one to the other, and I was building up the Russian-language library which we had in the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. In other words, you were engaging in the exchange of literature with the Soviet Council?

Mrs. BARNES. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And I think that first paragraph, Mr. Chairman, which does, in fact, cover an exchange.

Mrs. BARNES. Yes, it seemed to. He was talking about a shipment of books that he had sent, and they were hoping to send us one back that would be equally useful.

Mr. MORRIS. It says here:

In Mr. Kantorovich's absence I am acknowledging receipt of your letter of May 24.

So apparently you had written to Mr. Harondar, then Mr. Harondar could not have been the secretary at that time, could he?

Mrs. BARNES. What is he signed as?

Mr. MORRIS. Secretary.

Mr. Lattimore's book mentioned therein has been just received, but the History of the Russian Revolution is still on its way to Moscow.

Who is the author of the History of the Russian Revolution?

Mrs. BARNES. I haven't the slightest idea.

Senator WATKINS. As a writer, do you not keep pretty well acquainted with the books that are coming out in this particular field, and the names, at least, of the authors?

Mrs. BARNES. Well, I mean, I did at that time, yes; but no longer.

Senator WATKINS. You do not remember now?

Mrs. BARNES. I certainly don't remember, no.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, I have here a copy of a letter from Mr. Edward C. Carter to you, dated April 16, 1938.

Mr. Chairman, will you accept this into the record?

Senator WATKINS. It may be received as a part of the record.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 417" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 417

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,  
New York City, April 16, 1938.

Mrs. KATHLEEN BARNES,  
Office.

DEAR KATHLEEN: Your friend Sturgeon, who is still giving 80 to 90 percent of his time to the fisheries question, desired the following:

1. To have me tell you yet again how admirable he thought your article in the Far Eastern Survey.

2. To have me understand how tactfully and efficiently you handled everyone in Seattle.

3. To have me assure you that he was disappointed that you had not yet carried out your announced intention of visiting Washington and seeing him.

4. To have me request you to let him know when your big study would be (a) finished, (b) published.

5. To have me tell you that he assumes you know of the study being made by Bingham of Harvard on the jurisdictional aspect of fisheries which, pre-

sumably, is to be published in August. If you have not happened to hear it, he thought you would want to get in touch with Bingham in the near future.

With my very best congratulations, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate the authenticity of that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy of the letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the carbon copy being from the files, dated April 16, 1938, addressed to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, and signed by Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall receiving this letter?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't recall, but I doubtless did. It is 14 years years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. I understand. May that go into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator WATKINS. It has gone into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here a letter from Kathleen Barnes to Frederick Field, from Seattle, Wash., dated August 21, 1937, on the letterhead of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is the original of the letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated August 21, 1937, addressed to "Dear Fred" and signed "Kate," and the typewritten signature "Kathleen Barnes."

It is on the letterhead of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, can you recall having written that letter?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't recall writing it, but I undoubtedly did.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that appear to be your signature?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes, it looks like my handwriting and my type.

Mr. MORRIS. May this be received?

Senator WATKINS. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 418" and is as follows:

#### EXHIBIT No. 418

Telephone, PLaza 3-4700

Cable, InPAREL, NEW YORK

#### AMERICAN COUNCIL INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 129 EAST 52D STREET, NEW YORK CITY

#### Officers:

Carl L. Alsberg, Chairman  
Wallace M. Alexander, Vice Chairman  
Miss Ada L. Comstock, Vice Chairman  
Frederick V. Field, Secretary  
Charles J. Rhoads, Treasurer  
Miss Hilda Austern, Assistant Treasurer

#### Research Staff:

Kathleen Barnes  
Miriam S. Farley  
Russell Hall  
William W. Lockwood, Jr.  
Catherine Porter  
Russell G. Shiman

#### BARONESS APARTMENTS,

1005 Spring St., Seattle, Washington, August 21, 1937.

DEAR FRED: Commenting on your letter to Bill Lockwood re change or no change in our activities now that things have broken into action in our realm of interest, I agree with your point of view. I heartily endorse a pamphlet. It should sell like hotcakes. In fact I think we had better do it quickly before someone else does a bad one.

The present unpleasantness certainly comes as no surprise to any of us. The work we have undertaken was all begun while this thing was brewing. If it was important enough then, it should be important now. If there is any value to our

endeavors at the acquisition and dissemination of the drier forms of knowledge, it is, I hope, a permanent one. However we will have to meet more demands of a current nature than we have in the past. Inevitably we will be looked to as fountainheads of wisdom on all topics, from military strategy to the prevention of typhus and camp-followers. Also, somebody might as well get something out of situations such as these and it is a change for us to capitalize on the fact that the Far East is on the forefront of the news and hence of people's minds. Anything that can be turned out in written form or spoken will be of value both to dissemination of fairly correct information and to enhancing people's respect for the I. P. R., also it may be hoped to cause them to loosen the strings of their money bags. The question of how much of such extra work we can do is another thing. It takes so infernally long just to do one thing let alone several.

The tone of my letters seems unfortunately serious. Also my verbiage gets worse. Sorry.

A war would start when the office was in the middle of summer vacations. I hope it is not getting you down too much, you and Bruno and whoever else are there. How's New Hartford?

Too bad about Reischauer. Also too bad about Levanovsky & Co.

Fish are getting me down. Are you coming to the conference?

Sincerely,

[s] Kate  
KATHLEEN BARNES.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, did you ever work at the Institute of Oceanography for the U. S. S. R.?

Mrs. BARNES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any dealings with it?

Mrs. BARNES. It may have been one of the organizations that I sent material to, and they sent books on fish.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you engage in a fishing research project for the institute?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us something about that, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. That was a study of the fisheries of the North Pacific, North Pacific Fisheries was the name of the book, and I am surprised that you don't have it down on this list, by the way. Shouldn't the book be on this list?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, it should be, Mrs. Barnes.

Mrs. BARNES. And it was inspired by the—I don't know if you recollect at that time there was quite a certain feeling in the papers about Japanese fishing off the coasts of Alaska in such a way that they were outside, I think, the 3-mile limit, so that they were in—if you consider the 3-mile as the legal position—they were outside the position.

But there was a feeling among the people interested in fish that they were so fishing that they were destroying or cutting down on the salmon runs, which, as you probably know, come into the various rivers up in Alaska.

It seemed it was a potential source of friction between this country and Japan, and I wrote an article about it, and from that grew the desire that a book should likewise be written on the subject, which I proceeded to work on.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the Institute of Oceanography in Moscow interested in the statistics acquired in the study?

Mrs. BARNES. I haven't the slightest idea.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, there was an exchange of information with the Soviet Council of the IPR on this project, was there not, Mrs. Barnes?



Mrs. BARNES. I don't recollect so. I don't remember it.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not remember exchanging statistics and facts found as a result of this project with the Soviet Council of the IPR?

Mrs. BARNES. They undoubtedly got a copy of the book when it was printed.

Mr. MORRIS. How about the statistics gleaned from the project itself?

Mrs. BARNES. No. They were in the book, I mean, the book was full of statistics.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. But there was a whole study undertaken by the Institute, was there not, Mrs. Barnes?

Your book was not the only compilation of the results of the project?

Mrs. BARNES. That particular project which I did was—I mean, that was the only thing as the result of the work I did, and there was another man working on it, too—I mean Gregory. That was the only one on that.

Then I believe there was a legal study undertaken on whether the 3-mile was the limit or whether the 12-mile was the limit, and probably the international rights.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Mr. Gregory? Can you identify him for the record, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. Mr. Gregory was a professor in Seattle.

Mr. MORRIS. And who was the one who undertook the legal study?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't remember the person's name.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it your testimony that you cannot recall the extent to which the results and the statistics and the compilations on this project were interchanged with the Soviet Council?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't think anything was interchanged, that I recollect, at all. Everything that was pertinent and valuable for the study went into the book which they ultimately got. That is all I know of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Mrs. Barnes. But it was the practice of the Russian Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations to engage with the American Council of the IPR and exchange bits of information, studies, projects, and the like?

Mr. BARNES. I suppose they got notification of the projects, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. But you have seen in the testimony here of open sessions extensive incidents of that, have you not?

Mrs. BARNES. I am sorry, I have not read all of it.

Mr. MORRIS. But that which you have read, you certainly noticed that some of it involved you, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. I think that is quite different. The stuff that my name was involved on was the question of exchanging books in order, as I said before, to build up this library which I was building in the institute, for the purposes of study.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Now you got the books out of the Soviet Council, did you not?

Mrs. BARNES. I got books from the Soviet Council.

Mr. MORRIS. And you in turn sent books over to the Soviet Council?

Mrs. BARNES. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all I am asking you.

Mrs. BARNES. But you said whether I sent over figures and statistics and things like that.

Mr. MORRIS. But in these books, the fishing project thing, was a mess of statistics, was there not?

Mrs. BARNES. I said they undoubtedly got the book, did I not? They undoubtedly had the Government reports on the fishing which I had gotten those reports from. They may have, I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. What of those other books and documents that were mentioned in the testimony, those involving, for instance, the Manual on the Panama Canal?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't recollect the incident, but undoubtedly they asked for it, and I would send it to them if it was a thing that was publicly printed and I was able to get it.

Mr. MORRIS. So, as a matter of fact, there was a practice engaged in of exchange of information and exchange of books between the Soviet Council of the IPR and the American Council of the IPR?

Mrs. BARNES. Exchange of books; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And memoranda?

Mrs. BARNES. Undoubtedly there were letters written by one council to the other; yes. But I don't remember any sections taken out of books before they were published being sent around.

Mr. MORRIS. No; but there was no implication whatever of that, Mrs. Barnes.

Mrs. BARNES. I am sorry. I must have completely misunderstood.

Mr. MORRIS. I will show you a letter from Mr. Jerome D. Greene, on the letterhead of Harvard University, dated March 29, 1935, addressed to Mrs. Joseph Barnes, Institute of Pacific Relation, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y., which letter discusses the Rockefeller Foundation interests and the sponsorship by the Institute of Pacific Relations of a Russian language school to be held in the summer of 1936.

Can you recall receiving that letter, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. I undoubtedly did. I mean, I have no clear recollection of receiving it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you authenticate that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the stationery of Harvard University, dated March 29, 1935, addressed to Mrs. Joseph Barnes and from Jerome D. Greene.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you receive that into the record?

Senator WATKINS. It will be received and made a part of the record.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 419" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 419

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,  
Cambridge, Mass., March 29, 1935.

Jerome D. Greene, Secretary to the Corporation, to University Hall.

Mrs. JOSEPH BARNES,  
*Institute of Pacific Relations,*  
*129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MRS. BARNES: Thank you for your letter of March 21 in answer to my inquiry about intensive language courses in Russian, Chinese, and Japanese during the summer of 1936.

I shall confer with Professor Cross about the possibility of a Russian Language School in the summer of 1936. As the sponsorship of the Institute of

Pacific Relations has proved a valuable factor I should hope it might be continued, even if we should organize the Russian Language School here ourselves and without drawing on any funds of the IPR except such as its sponsorship might help us to get from a foundation. While I am not in a position to say what the Rockefeller Foundation will do in this respect and am rather careful to dissociate myself from all applications for the benefit of Harvard University as I am a trustee and a member of the executive committee of the Foundation, I see no impropriety whatever in having the application made with the IPR's endorsement and at least nominal cooperation. After all, if the money should be available there is no harm but positive good to come from having a Russian language course given both in the East and in the West the same year, provided enough teachers can be found to go round.

I am even more interested in the prospect of a summer course in Japanese and Chinese, though I have not discussed the matter very fully here as yet.

I think these intensive foreign language courses constitute one of the best services which the IPR has rendered, first by its initiative and second by its help in getting financial support.

Sincerely yours,

JEROME D. GREENE.

P. S.—I enclose an extra copy of this letter so that you can forward it to Mr. Field if you think best.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us to what extent you were acquainted with that particular language project?

Mrs. BARNES. I was acquainted very well with it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about it briefly?

Mrs. BARNES. We organized a school of intensive teaching of the Russian language, and I believe later—yes, I know later on—it was followed by a school of the intensive teaching of the Chinese language and a school of the Japanese language.

This Russian school sort of pioneered what was regarded as the intensive method of having people sit down and study for 5 or 6 hours a day on the language study.

We felt that they did get a great deal more in a short time that way, and it was a good way to learn the language. I think we had that Russian language school for about 2 or 3 years.

We felt it was valuable for promoting understanding of the problems of the Pacific.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in connection with that last point, where there was a seeming misunderstanding between the witness and myself, I would like to have read into the record a letter from Mr. E. C. Carter, apparently written from the steamship *Chitral*, dated January 24, 1935, addressed to "Dear Fred." It is addressed to Mr. F. Field, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: Here is the list which the Institute of Oceanography in Moscow gave me, indicating precisely what American fisheries publications they already have. As I have already written you, I told them that you or Mrs. Barnes would undertake to get sent to them any glaring omissions, and that, in addition, you would see what could be secured from commercial firms engaged in any aspect of the fish business.

I am sending this letter by air mail with a typed copy of the list which our friends in Moscow gave me. I am sending the original list by ordinary mail, by way of confirmation.

Sincerely yours,

E. C. CARTER.

Does not that, Mrs. Barnes, indicate that there was an extensive exchange on the subject?

Mrs. BARNES. That, I believe, was long before the fisheries book which we were discussing was begun, and the Institute of Oceanog-

raphy—I don't recollect. It may very well have been a contributing member to the Council of the Institute over there.

I mean, I just hazard a guess on the thing, and I wanted material on fisheries. If they hadn't gotten a complete one, I undoubtedly got them for them. But it had nothing to do with my work, which I think we got mixed up on before.

Mr. MORRIS. This is already introduced into the record as exhibit 187 (pt. 2, p. 648). There is no need for going into it.

But Mr. Carter points out, as I have already stated:

As I have already written you, I told them that you or Mrs. Barnes would undertake to get sent to them any glaring omissions.

Is that not a clear indication that you were engaged, on January 24, 1935, in a practice of seeing that the Soviet Council of the IPR or the Institute of Oceanography were getting extensive statistics on the fishing industry?

Mrs. BARNES. I got confused on this thing now. Does not that indicate that I was sending them stuff?

Mr. MORRIS. That you were in the practice of seeing to it that the Soviet Council or the Institute of Oceanography were being supplied with statistical information on the fishing industry?

Mrs. BARNES. It sounds so; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Does this letter not recall anything along those lines to you, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. I do have some recollection, I do have some recollection of getting very colorful folders, you know.

Mr. MORRIS. So, as a matter of fact, you did, in addition to sending your volume over, you did send some other information on the fishing industry?

Mrs. BARNES. So it would seem. But my point is that was before the volume was even begun, and had no connection therewith. I am sorry.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the extent to which Mr. Field also sent statistics on the fishing industry?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't think Mr. Field sent anything. I think he would hand it over to me.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you were the practical assistant to Mr. Field on this project?

Mrs. BARNES. It was my department; yes. And whatever statistics I sent them, I am sure, were, you know, printed statistics, the fisheries department—

Mr. MORRIS. Then you were in contact with commercial firms in order to obtain considerable information along that line, were you not?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't think I got considerable information from commercial firms at all. I think I may have gotten some folders.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here, Mrs. Barnes, a letter from Mr. Frederick V. Field to Mr. Carter. That is dated San Francisco, April 19, 1935.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have a copy of your letter of April 16 to Kathleen Barnes which conveys to her the praise which Sturgeon of the State Department had for her Far Eastern Survey article on fisheries. I notice in point No. 5 that you refer to a fisheries study by Bingham of Harvard of which you assume Kate is informed. This is without doubt our own American Council study of the jurisdictional aspects of the fisheries question which is being conducted by Bingham, who may have once attended Harvard, but who is now at Stanford.

If I am mistaken in this, please let me know, for it would be somewhat alarming at this late date to discover that another Bingham and this one at Harvard was producing the same thing which our Bingham was producing at Stanford.

Does that letter indicate that as late as 1938 you were still engaged in this fisheries project?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't know when I began it. But I don't think I began it until 1937. You mean the fisheries project of writing that book on fisheries?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mrs. BARNES. It wasn't begun until 1937. I was working on it in 1938. And I believe you asked me before, did you not, of the name of the person who was doing the legal work.

I conclude from that that it was Bingham.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that be received in the record after authentication by Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original on the letterhead of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 19, 1938, San Francisco, to Mr. Edward C. Carter from Frederick V. Field, signed "Fred."

Senator WATKINS. It will be received as part of the record.

(The letter referred was marked "Exhibit No. 420" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, our exhibit No. 58 (see pt. 1, p. 262), which was introduced in the public record on August 2, 1951, discussed at length here a division of people interested in Russian studies. It says:

The fourth group consists of the few people who are already familiar with the institute record in the Soviet Union or could be made so. Harriet Moore and Kathleen Barnes are about the only ones already familiar, and they both have the advantage of being good students who have not got the academic jitters about bolshevism.

Do you remember reading this memorandum?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes; I read it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comment to make on that?

Mrs. BARNES. Except I don't remember knowing an awful lot about the institute, its work, and all, at that particular time.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. Barnes, do you remember attending a meeting that was held in honor of Sir Stafford Cripps?

Mrs. BARNES. I remember seeing that reference. It is quite possible I was there. I can't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you not recall that you attended a rather intimate party on behalf of Mr. Cripps?

Mrs. BARNES. I am sorry, I don't know. It is quite possible.

Senator WATKINS. May I inquire, you seem on so many of these points that you do not remember, you do not recall. You say it may have happened.

Surely, a party of this kind you would remember, would you not?

Mrs. BARNES. What was the date?

Senator WATKINS. Even if it was quite a while ago.

Mrs. BARNES. Frankly, really—I mean, I really don't know. I mean, I would have gone, I would have no hesitation in saying I did go, but I just don't happen to recollect it, that is all.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been to any intimate parties given on behalf of Sir Stafford Cripps?

Mrs. BARNES. I can't recollect.

Mr. MORRIS. When I say "intimate party," I have here the list, Mrs. Barnes. It is composed of 32 people who attended, apparently.

Mrs. BARNES. I am sorry.

Mr. MORRIS. I will show you exhibit No. 217, which appears at page 687 of part 2 of the public hearings.

What is the date of it, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. 1940, April 2. That is 12 years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. That memorandum indicates that you were there, does it not, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. It indicates that I was invited or suggested as a person to go. And I say quite frankly I may very well have gone, but I just frankly don't recollect it. That is all.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WATKINS. The chairman does not have any. Do you want to recess?

Mr. MORRIS. Recess.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in recess subject to the call of the chairman.

(Whereupon, at 5:10 p. m., Friday, February 8, 1952, the hearing was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)



# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 4:15 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur V. Watkins presiding.

Present: Senator Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will resume the session. Call your witnesses.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. DeCaux.

Senator WATKINS. You have already been sworn in executive session before this committee?

Mr. DeCAUX. That is correct.

## TESTIMONY OF LEONARD DeCAUX, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, DAVID REIN, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your full name, for the record?

Mr. DeCAUX. My name is Leonard DeCaux.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your address, Mr. DeCaux?

Mr. DeCAUX. 5 Beekman, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present position?

Mr. DeCAUX. Managing editor for the magazine March of Labor.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is the editor?

Mr. DeCAUX. John Steuben.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is the stockholder of the corporation that edits that publication?

Mr. DeCAUX. I do not know the names of the stockholders. The president is Mr. Vincent Halinan.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. DeCaux, have you been a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DeCAUX. I have.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you join the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DeCAUX. I think it was in 1942. My memory is vague on dates, because I have not been able to refresh it from papers out in California, so I ask to be excused if I guess at some of the dates.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony that it would approximate the time of your joining the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DeCAUX. I believe it was.



Mr. MORRIS. Are you presently a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DECAUX. No.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you resign?

Mr. DECAUX. I never resigned; I just stopped paying dues.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you stop paying dues?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't remember exactly. That must have been around 1947 or 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, have you been a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DECAUX. I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall what years you were a member of the board of trustees?

Mr. DECAUX. Not exactly. I think it was just after the war, but I am a little vague on those dates. I do not recall exactly. I believed I served two terms.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you born, Mr. DeCaux?

Mr. DECAUX. In New Zealand.

Mr. MORRIS. What year?

Mr. DECAUX. 1899.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you educated at Harrow School?

Mr. DECAUX. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Oxford University?

Mr. DECAUX. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Brookwood Labor College?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you married to Carolina Abrams?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you marry her on July 14, 1928?

Mr. DECAUX. I believe that was the date.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you come to the United States in 1921?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. When were you naturalized?

Mr. DECAUX. In 1928.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever work for the Committee of Industrial Organizations?

Mr. DECAUX. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did you hold for that organization?

Mr. DECAUX. I held the position of publicity director and editor of the CIO News for the Committee for Industrial Organization and its successor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

Mr. MORRIS. Until what year?

Mr. DECAUX. Until 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you sever connection with that organization at that time?

Mr. DECAUX. I resigned.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the reason behind your resignation?

Mr. DECAUX. I resigned to do some writing.

Mr. MORRIS. While you held the aforesaid positions, Mr. DeCaux, were you closely associated with Mr. Lee Pressman in that organization?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, may that question be suspended for a moment, with the chairman's permission?

Senator WATKINS. It may be.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want us to understand, Mr. DeCaux, that you have told us the whole truth with regard to your resignation from your position with the CIO?

Mr. DECAUX. I told you the reason that I resigned and that it was announced. I didn't go into what might have happened between Mr. Murray and myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us have the whole truth.

Mr. DECAUX. I was asked to resign by Mr. Murray.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us why?

Mr. DECAUX. We had some differences.

Mr. SOURWINE. About what?

Mr. DECAUX. In regard to the public relations of the CIO and on account of the CIO News.

Mr. SOURWINE. In what way?

Mr. DECAUX. Mr. Murray was not specific. He said he was not satisfied.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. DeCaux, testimony has been given before this committee by two witnesses, Mr. Whitaker Chambers and Mr. Louis Budenz, to the effect that you have been in the past a member of the Communist Party.

Would you tell this committee whether or not in fact you have been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. DECAUX. I claim the privilege of declining to answer the question under the fifth amendment of the Constitution on the ground of possible self-incrimination.

Senator WATKINS. By refusing to answer that question, are you afraid if you answer it truthfully it might incriminate you?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes, sir; on the grounds it is possibly self-incriminating.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. DeCaux, I have here from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations a letter dated November 16, 1945, from Mr. Dennett to Mr. Edward C. Carter.

Mr. Chairman, will you have this received in the record after it is identified by Mr. Mandel?

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Mandel, do you identify this?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated November 16, 1945, to E. C. C. from R. D.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, so the record may be clear, this carbon copy as it exists, being the carbon copy of an original, the whereabouts of which we are not aware, this particular carbon copy itself was found in the Institute of Pacific Relations files; is that right?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is not a copy of something that was found in the files?

Mr. MANDEL. Correct.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 421," and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 421

NOVEMBER 16, 1945.

To: ECC.

From: RD.

Answering your memorandum of November 15, the following is a list of the trustees whom I have met, with the number of times I have met them indicated in parentheses:

B. C. Allen (5)	Henry R. Luce (2)
Eugene E. Barnett (a score)	Charles E. Martin (a score)
Pearl S. Buck (4)	James L. McConaughy (a score)
Robert D. Calkins (a score)	Frank R. McCoy (7 or 8)
J. P. Chamberlain (2)	Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin (7 or 8)
Allan K. Charles (4)	Lawrence Morris (a score)
Len DeCaux (7 or 8)	Mrs. Ada Comstock Notestein (a score)
Edwin R. Embree (5)	Philo Parker (4)
Brooks Emeny (a dozen)	W. S. Rosecrans (2)
John Fairbank (7 or 8)	Chester Rowell (1)
Frederick F. Field (a score)	Lawrence D. Seymour (a dozen)
Galen Fisher (a dozen)	Robert G. Sproul (4)
Huntington Gilchrist (a score)	Elbert D. Thomas (2)
Henry F. Grady (2)	John Carter Vincent (7 or 8, plus Hot Springs)
Mortimer Graves (6)	Brayton Wilbur (a dozen)
Jerome D. Greene (2)	Ray Lyman Wilbur (4)
J. W. Greenslade (8 or 9)	Payson Wild (none since he became a trustee)
G. Ellsworth Huggins (a score)	Mrs. Louise Wright (7 or 8)
Benjamin H. Kizer (a dozen)	Admiral H. E. Yarnell (5 or 6)
Owen Lattimore (a dozen)	
Charles F. Loomis (at Hot Springs)	

Of these, Charles, Emeny, Fairbank, Fisher, Kizer, Lattimore, Sproul, Brayton Wilbur, and Mrs. Wright have visited the office, in addition to the members of the executive committee, all of whom, I believe, have been here at one time or another.

In some cases the meetings mentioned above have been casual as, for example, with Henry Grady but, in most instances, I talked specific IPR business with these trustees. My most intensive talks have been with the Bay region members, most of whom I saw a number of times during my visits and, particularly, at the time of the San Francisco Conference.

I have only seen the trustees listed above.

**Mr. MORRIS.** Mr. DeCaux, this is an estimate or what purports to be an estimate of the number of times Mr. Dennett, who was then secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations, estimated that he dealt with the various members of the board of trustees at that time.

I think you have a copy before you. You will notice that indicates:

Answering your memorandum of November 15, the following is a list of the trustees whom I have met, with the number of times I have met them indicated in parentheses: \* \* \*

Len DeCaux (seven or eight).

**Mr. Chairman,** that was introduced in the record as evidence of the extent to which Mr. DeCaux was active in the Institute of Pacific Relations as manifest by this particular document.

**Senator WATKINS.** Who is R. D.

**Mr. MORRIS.** That is Raymond Dennett, then secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

**Mr. SOURWINE.** Is it your testimony that you did meet with Mr. Dennett seven or eight times?

**Mr. DECAUX.** I do not recall how many times I met him. It is possible, if he said so, I met him that many times. I don't recall.

**Mr. MORRIS.** Mr. DeCaux, I would like to call your attention to our public exhibit No. 132 (see pt. 2, p. 494), which was introduced at the open hearings of August 16, 1951.

That was a copy of an IPR document, of a letter sent by Mr. Philip C. Jessup on August 1, 1944, to Mr. Raymond Dennett, Secretary of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, wherein Mr. Jessup made a recommendation for people who should be selected as delegates to the then forthcoming conference of the IPR at Hot Springs.

Mr. DeCAUX, I think you will notice in the second paragraph your name appears. Is that right, Mr. DeCAUX?

Mr. DeCAUX. This is a copy of it, is it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; that is right.

Mr. DeCAUX. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. DeCAUX, do you, as a matter of fact, know that Mr. Jessup recommended you as a delegate to the Hot Springs conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DeCAUX. I was not aware of who recommended me at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony that you did not know who recommended you?

Mr. DeCAUX. I do not recall any knowledge at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you remember being invited to act as a delegate?

Mr. DeCAUX. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Who invited you to act in that capacity?

Mr. DeCAUX. I don't recall the name.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you, as a matter of fact, act as a delegate to the Hot Springs conference?

Mr. DeCAUX. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet with the caucus that the American delegation held prior to that conference?

Mr. DeCAUX. I believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you participate in the conference?

Mr. DeCAUX. I probably did.

Mr. MORRIS. Approximately how many people caucused at that time?

Mr. DeCAUX. I don't recollect the occasion, but I assume I did attend.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the whole delegation caucus?

Mr. DeCAUX. I don't know. I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. DeCAUX, I have here a letter which Mr. Mandel will authenticate.

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original of a letter dated November 24, 1943, addressed to "Dear Harriet" and signed "Rose," on the letter-head of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that taken from the files of the Institution of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that in the record?

Senator WATKINS. The exhibit may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 422" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 422

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

New York    Washington, D. C.    Chicago    San Francisco    Honolulu  
129 East Fifty-second Street

NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

PLaza 3-4700

744 JACKSON PLACE, NW.

Washington, D. C., November 24, 1943.

DEAR HARRIET: Thanks for last letter which I had hoped to answer long ago; you straightened out everything very nicely. I am so sorry that I was hasty in thinking the three of you had planned the Amco program at lunch that day. Alice may have told you that we sent out a letter which she drafted, a copy of which I enclose which refers to Bill as director of the Washington study program and to me as Washington representative. Bill has not been using me as a stenographer: it's just that the job requires one. But anyhow, we have a new girl now and she may work out all right.

The excitement about your coming marriage is pretty sharp. And, of course, everyone sends you best wishes, etc. When are you and spouse heading in direction of Washington? Soon, I hope.

Mary is leaving Washington on Thursday presumably by air for India. We won't believe it until it all happens? KP left Washington for Salt Lake on Monday evening; the moving etc. in New York left her very tired and she was in no condition to face the Red Cross which I think is a horrid organization anyhow.

The past week has been very exciting. The response to the press luncheon is very good; at least a dozen people have already called me about the general Amco meeting and the invitations just went out on Monday. Len DeCaux took me to lunch and we had an interesting chat for 2 hours in which he told me confidentially that the right wing of the CIO through the Committee for Democratic Action is planning to concentrate on IPR as a liaison organization. Sounds like fun. I await the attack. Nothing has happened yet so I am taking the initiative and inviting Ray Walsh and Kenneth Crawford who lean in that direction (and who are influential in right-wing CIO thinking) to the Japan Amco meeting and to the general Amco membership meeting.

A very curious thing happened yesterday. Kenneth Landon of the State Department and a girl from FEA (intelligence) and someone from OSS all called me in the course of the morning and asked about the "structure of the American Council of the IPR." I read the three of them the statement in the front of new books and am sending them the statement and the Amco report. At first I thought it might be the stirrings of an investigation. Last night Alvin told me about the call from FEA, that someone had asked him about the IPR and he referred her to me. I then told Alvin about the Landon call and he called Landon whom he knows very well and it seems as though it is all due to the Hill dinner, that the top people in OSS, FEA and State invited just didn't know what kind of an organization the IPR was and put people to work on finding out what we were. So I gather that there is nothing to worry about, that it was just a routine question, but funny that all three should come in the same morning.

I think it would be swell if CP could come down for the press luncheon and meet some of these boys. Any chance?

DeCaux gave me some information on CIO people and AFL and I will try to get to work on them as soon as possible.

It was very nice to see Hilda and Art and Andrew yesterday and I hope very much that I'll be seeing you soon.

Yours,

Rose.

Mr. MORRIS. From the copy that you have, Mr. DeCaux, will you read for the committee the third sentence in the fourth paragraph?

Mr. DECAUX. You want me to read through the whole record?

Mr. MORRIS. Begin with "Len DeCaux took me to lunch."

The fourth paragraph begins: "The past week has been very exciting." Do you have that paragraph Mr. DeCaux?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the particular sentence beginning with your name?

Mr. DECAUX (reading):

Len DeCaux took me to lunch and we had an interesting chat for 2 hours in which he told me confidentially that the right wing of the CIO through the Committee for Democratic Action is planning to concentrate on the IPR as a liaison organization. Sounds like fun. I await the attack. Nothing has happened yet, so I am taking the initiative and inviting Ray Walsh and Kenneth Crawford who lean in that direction (and who are influential in rightwing CIO thinking) to the Japan Amco meeting and to the general Amco membership meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall taking Rose Yardumian to lunch on or about November 24, 1943?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't recall the conversation.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember having a conversation with Rose Yardumian to the effect she has written in this letter?

Mr. DECAUX. I do not recall the details.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, Mr. DeCaux, that you did not take Miss Yardumian to lunch?

Mr. DECAUX. I did not say that.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Miss Rose Yardumian?

Mr. DECAUX. I believe I did. The name is familiar to me now. It suggests somebody I knew but I don't recall her personally. The thing is a long time ago and I met so many people I do not recall the circumstances exactly or her exactly.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did Rose Yardumian hold at that time?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she secretary of the Washington office of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't know. I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember any strategy that would involve an opposition between the Committee for Democratic Action and the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't know. My memory is very vague on that. I don't recall what is meant by the Committee for Democratic Action.

Senator WATKINS. Who is Rose?

Mr. MORRIS. Rose Yardumian, we presume.

Mr. Chairman, we have here a letter which Mr. Mandel will identify.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon of a letter found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 21, 1942, written to Mr. Robert W. Barnett, Institute of Pacific Relations, from William W. Lockwood, secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. This paper was found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that right?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. This is exhibit No. 115 (see pt. 2, p. 445) of the open hearings of August 14, 1951. On the copy of the letter that you have before you, Mr. DeCaux, I refer you to the fourth paragraph which reads as follows:

I also invited Len DeCaux, CIO publicity director and editor of the CIO News. He immediately gave his tentative acceptance. I got a very favorable impression from conversation with him, and Michael knows him.

Do you remember attending the Mount Tremblant conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know who the Michael is that is referred to in that paragraph?

Mr. DECAUX. No; I am not sure who is meant by that.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Michael Greenberg?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't recall anyone by that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Michael Lee?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't recall the name. It is possible.

I have met a great many people in the course of my conferences and CIO duties, and so forth and so on, on other occasions. When I say don't recall anyone or may say I don't know them or place them, it is possible I may have met some of these people at some conference or convention or some place. That applies to many people.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know who recommended you as a delegate to the Mount Tremblant conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DECAUX. My memory is that it was the secretary and I do not exactly recall his name.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the secretary?

Mr. DECAUX. This letter stated it was Lockwood. It may have been Lockwood.

Mr. MORRIS. Two paragraphs down from there it reads:

In the opinion of Hiss, Coe, and Despres, we ought to get Berle or Acheson or both. More about this later, too.

Do you know from your experience in the Institute of Pacific Relations that those three gentlemen, Hiss, Coe, and Despres, were advisers on Institute of Pacific Relations matters?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't recall anything about those gentlemen except I believe I met Mr. Coe at some conferences.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Mr. Coe?

Mr. DECAUX. Mr. Frank Coe I met at some conferences. I don't know if that is the one referred to.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did you hold at the Mount Tremblant conference?

Mr. DECAUX. I simply attended there as a delegate and took part in the discussion.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, our exhibit No. 104 (see pt. 2, p. 425) of the open hearings of August 14, 1951, dated November 30, 1942, begins in paragraph 1—this is a memorandum to Mr. Carter, copy for Mr. Jessup, and it is from William W. Lockwood:

In response to your request for the designations of the American Council members of the Mount Tremblant committees. I am putting down the following suggestions. These should be reconsidered at Mount Tremblant after checking with Jessup, so they are merely tentative for the present.

The last one listed is publications committee—tentatively, Len DeCaux.

Did you serve as head of the publications committee at the Mount Tremblant conference, Mr. DeCaux?

Mr. DECAUX. I think I did. I don't recall serving in any official capacity. It is possible that I was placed on some committee and was not active on it, but I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you associated with the Federated Press at any time?

Mr. DECAUX. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did you hold in the Federated Press?

Mr. DECAUX. I was in charge of the Washington Bureau of the Federated Press in the years 1934 and 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you make any effort to coordinate a program between the Federated Press and the Institute of Pacific Relations during the period you held that particular designation?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't recall having done so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record at this time a series of releases issued by the Federated Press, which Mr. Mandel will identify for our record.

Mr. MANDEL. These are releases of the Federated Press of various dates beginning with February 1941, found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. What is claimed for these?

Mr. MORRIS. This, Mr. Chairman, purports to be a series of articles which bear the following caption: "Written for"—and the name of the paper is blank—"and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's."

We have one opinion by Andrew Roth. The second is written by Janet K. Howie, who is described as research associate, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations. Andrew Roth is identified as the author of numerous articles on India and Indochina. The third is by Jack Shepherd. Mr. Shepherd is identified as an Australian and has lectured at the University of Sydney.

The fourth is by Dorothy Borg of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

The fifth is by Dorothy Borg, member of the research staff, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

The sixth is by Miriam S. Farley, research associate, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

The next is by Harriet L. Moore, not further identified on this pamphlet.

The next is by Harriet Moore, executive secretary, American-Russian Institute.

The next is by Virginia Thompson, research associate, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

The next is by Chen-han Seng, editor of Far East Bulletin, special correspondent to Federated Press.

The next is by Catherine Porter, member of the research staff, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

The next is by Andrew Roth, author of numerous articles on India and Indochina.

May they be incorporated in the record?

Senator WATKINS. They may be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 423" and are as follows:)



[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 1. Jan. 3, 1941]

## LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

By MIRIAM S. FARLEY, Research Associate, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations

One of the most impressive buildings in Tokyo is the Diet building, a magnificent white marble structure completed in 1936. On Jan. 20 the Japanese diet will meet in this building for what may be the last session it will ever hold. As the chief citadel of the democratic movement in Japan, the diet has been under attack for many years. Now there is talk of eliminating it altogether. It may survive as a cog in the new Japanese-style fascist state but it will not be a real democratic parliament.

The Japanese diet has never enjoyed nearly so much power as the American congress or the British parliament. Nevertheless, after the adoption of a constitution in 1889 there was steady, if slow, progress toward genuine democracy.

Universal manhood suffrage was achieved in 1925. In the 1920's the political parties for the first time obtained a real voice in the government. During these years Japan's international policies were more liberal and peaceful than they have been since.

But Japanese democracy was unable to withstand the blasts of the post-1929 depression. In recent years the diet has been so weakened that it has become little more than a rubber stamp for the government in power.

Nevertheless it at least provided a forum for the expression of opinion. Last spring one intrepid member, Takao Saito, created a sensation when he ventured to cast doubt on the righteousness of Japan's war in China. The authorities do not want any more such incidents.

During 1940 a long step toward emasculation of the diet was taken by elimination of the political parties, all of which voluntarily voted to disband. Try to imagine congress functioning in Washington without Republicans or Democrats. But in the coming session of the diet there will be no political parties.

The political parties fell an easy prey to the wave of militaristic reaction because they had never put down deep roots among the people. The two big parties, the Seiyukai and Minseito, were commonly considered the creatures of the big business combines like Mitsui and Mitsubishi.

They defended the interests of private business against the encroachments of a militarized state. But they did not represent the interests of the long-suffering peasants and the ill-paid workers of Japan. Hence the people had little confidence in them and were not too sorry to see them disappear.

There were several small workers' and peasants' parties, which made remarkable gains in the 1936 and 1937 elections. But they were still weak and were swept away in the wave of reaction which followed the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war.

It is usually unsafe to judge Japanese politics by western standards. But even in Japan, recent political history has shown that in times of stress democratic institutions are in danger of being wiped out unless they have a wide base of popular participation and unless they serve the interests of the many rather than the few.

—mfs-alc

CLEVELAND—(FP)—Pres. Roosevelt was requested Dec. 30 to force Harris-Seybold-Potter Co., beneficiary of a \$200,000 defense contract, to comply with the national labor relations act. The request came from the United Electrical Radio, & Machine Workers (CIO), with whom the firm has refused to deal.

—wd-jp-alc

NEW YORK—(FP)—A new union shop agreement covering 6,000 workers in 217 electrical fixture and lamp plants was signed by Local 3, Intl. Bro. of Electrical Workers (AFL).

cha-jp-alc

[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 4. Jan. 8, 1941]

## LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

By HARRIET MOORE, Executive Secretary, American-Russian Institute

The Soviet interest in keeping the war as far as possible from its borders is at present centered in southeastern Europe, where today only Turkey and Bulgaria remain between the war and the Black Sea, the southern frontier of the U. S. S. R.

Soviet relations with these two countries have been in marked contrast to those of czarist Russia. Though both fought against Russia in the first World War, Bulgaria had long been one of the Slavic states under a kind of patronage from Russia, while the Turkish empire was the traditional enemy of the czars in their southward expansion around the Black Sea.

After the revolution the positions were reversed. The Bulgarian government, fearing that its people might follow the example of their Slav cousins in Russia, did not even establish diplomatic relations with the U. S. S. R. until 1934 when first faced with Hitler's Germany. The New Turkey, however, in its battle for national independence and reconstruction following the collapse of the old Ottoman empire in the last war, found in the Soviets a lasting friend.

In the present war, Bulgaria is again heavily subjected to German pressure, and Turkey is bound by a mutual assistance pact to England. The Soviets were disturbed and displeased when Turkey made this arrangement, despite the loophole which Turkey had left to free it from any obligation that might bring it into conflict with the U. S. S. R. The Russians felt that by entering the pact, Turkey would be sucked into the fighting, thus bringing war close to the Soviet south.

Aside from the fact that Turkey actually borders on the oil-rich Caucasus, it also controls the Dardanelles, key to the Black Sea approach to the Ukraine and Caucasus. Were Turkey to enter the war, it could open the straits to the British navy.

The Black Sea is not only a frontier for the U. S. S. R., but a most important route for internal and foreign trade. Oil, manganese, and the fruits and wines of the Caucasus are exchanged across its waters for the coal and iron, the grain and cement of the Ukraine.

Foreign trade also continues on the Black Sea. To have it invaded by belligerent fleets would greatly complicate the position of the Soviets, who well remember that in 1918 the Germans landed in the Caucasus, only to be displaced from the oil fields a year later by the British and French, converging from the east across the Caspian Sea from Persia and from the west through the Dardanelles and across the Black Sea.

For these reasons, the Soviets have exerted their influence to keep the war out of this region; to keep the Dardanelles closed to warring navies. Through increased trade, the U. S. S. R. may be able to help Bulgaria and Turkey protect their economic independence which has been seriously threatened by the wartime disruption of trade. In the case of Bulgaria, the Soviets have also given it diplomatic support, as in approving the return of Dobrudja from Rumania, so long as this could be achieved without fighting.

hm-alc

## REPUDIATES ACCUSATION AGAINST UNION MEN

SACRAMENTO, CAL.—(FP)—James Thorne, whose "confession" of helping to creosote houses built by nonunion labor caused the arrest of four Oakland carpenters (now out on a habeas corpus writ), has repudiated his statement.

Thorne says he was forced to sign by the police after being held three days in jail with no food or bed-clothing.

madf-alc

[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 2. Feb. 5, 1941]

## LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's

By VIRGINIA THOMPSON, Research Associate, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations

In ancient Siam there were seven classes of slaves, and even the freemen were required to perform services for the state and for their patrons. Hence there was no labor problem.

But with the growth of the rice export trade in the late 19th century, slavery gradually lost its economic basis. By 1905, when the change was complete, about a fourth of the nation was economically and socially dislocated.

For years Siam was known as the country in which labor costs were higher than anywhere else in the East. Thousands of Chinese streamed into Thailand to do the work that the native population was unable or unwilling to perform. But a rise of nationalism, coupled with higher immigration fees, has cut down the influx of Chinese to the point where a labor shortage may ultimately be expected.

Out of 8,000,000 occupied persons listed in the census, well above 80% are engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry, and only a little more than 2% in industry. Wages of farm workers range from 23¢ a day in the north to 46¢ in the south. When paid on a seasonal basis, a worker earns in prosperous times from \$36 to \$55, plus board and lodging, for six months' services.

The Chinese prefer the piecework system, under which an energetic coolie can make as much as \$77 a month by dumping paddy into baskets, compared with earnings of \$10 to \$21 for a day laborer.

An odd aspect of the Siamese economic system is that, reversing conditions in the West, the Siamese bourgeois is the one who works steadily, while it is the peasant who has many unoccupied months—too often spent in drinking, gaming and brigandage. The government has made a small beginning toward technical training for workers and establishing employment offices. But the goal of the average Siamese remains a post in the civil service. Although the government has recognized the danger of developing an exclusively Siamese white-collar class, it has so far done little to avert it.

Chinese workers in the rice mills of Bangkok organized a series of strikes in the 1930's, directed against a cut in pay. The government intervened at the workers' request, but no real headway was made in the struggle for fair wages. A permanent committee to deal with labor problems was established, however, to be followed by a general labor survey.

In 1938 the national assembly overwhelmingly defeated a bill to bring hours, wages and social insurance up to the standards prevailing in other countries. The defeat is explained by the indifference of the nationalistic Siamese to improving the welfare of the Chinese who compose most of the working population. On the other hand the assembly adopted a measure to reserve for Siamese workers about half of the job openings in certain fields.

Thailand still has nothing worthy of being described as a labor movement, although there is a degree of organization among the industrial workers of Bangkok. These form about 1% of the total working population.

Conditions among agricultural workers are far worse. Nothing has been done to improve their status or to assure a more abundant supply of manpower to develop the vast uncultivated lands of the nation.

The alternative to cheaper and more abundant labor is the use of mechanical power, but this is difficult for rice farming and in any case the cost of fuel is prohibitive. The government will soon face a reckoning on its policy of cutting down Chinese immigration without providing for replacement.

—vt—alc  
BIRMINGHAM—(FP)—The Steel Workers Organizing Committee (CIO) has signed contracts covering 1,000 workers at the local plants of the U. S. Pipe & Foundry Co. and Southern Cement Co. sl—jp—alc

[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 2. Feb. 14, 1941]

## LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

(By CHEN HAN-SENG, Editor of Far East Bulletin)

(Special Correspondence to Federated Press)

HONGKONG—(FP).—The fate of China may depend upon the outcome of a civil war that has begun in the southern part of Anhwei province, about 300 miles southwest of Shanghai. In this area, around the village of Mowling, Chinese troops have turned their guns upon other Chinese troops, renewing the fratricidal conflict that has broken out from time to time during the past two years.

Those attacked were part of the New Fourth Army, which includes both Communist and non-Communist elements. About 100,000 troops of this army had moved northward across the Yangste river, as ordered by the national government at Chungking.

Left behind were 4,000 troops attached to the headquarters of the New Fourth, and about 6,000 members of the non-fighting establishments—the political training school, hospitals and so on, including many women and children. The commanders of this body of 10,000 negotiated with Gen. Ku Cho-tung, head of the Third War Zone, for safe conduct across the river.

While negotiations were under way, three divisions of the Ninth Army and five other divisions—80,000 troops in all—began to close in on the 4,000 soldiers. By Jan. 3 the remnant of the New Fourth Army was completely surrounded within an area of 10 square miles.

On Jan. 6 the eight encircling divisions suddenly swooped down on the trapped soldiers and their followers. Immediately—and on two succeeding occasions—the commanders of the New Fourth and the Eighth Route Armies sent joint telegrams to the Natl. Military Commission in Chungking, appealing for cessation of hostilities. Chungking replied that the war zone commander, Gen. Ku Cho-tung, had been instructed to let the New Fourth proceed northward. But at the same time fighting was continued around Mowling with the greatest ferocity.

In their joint telegram of Jan. 13, the commanders of the Eighth Route and New Fourth asked the Chinese public who was disobeying orders and who was breaking the national solidarity. They pointed out that while their troops were holding the Japanese on important battlefronts, they were attacked from the rear by Chinese troops under Chungking's command.

Madame Sun Yat-sen and other Chinese leaders sent a similar message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. They told him that the real enemy of the Chinese is the Japanese invader. But in spite of these appeals, the fighting continued until Jan. 13, when the 4,000 besieged troops ran out of ammunition.

Out of 10,000 people, more than 4,000 were killed and wounded and 2,000 captured. Commander Yeh Ting was seriously wounded; Deputy Commander Han Ying was slain. Also killed were many cadets, political workers, technicians, nurses, and children.

The main body of the New Fourth Army, north of the Yangste, is now facing annihilation, together with the fighters of the Eighth Route Army. Nearly 800,00 Kuomintang troops are ready to launch a bitter internecine war against these two armies.

Since this huge force represents almost half of the Kuomintang armies, it is plain that if the civil war spreads there will be no troops adequate to resist the Japanese. The Japanese would then be able to pull out more troops from China for their expansion policy in the south Pacific.

While the Communist party of China demands the restoration of the New Fourth Army to its official status and a subsidy to the families of those killed and wounded, public opinion throughout the nation requires a measure of justice and harmony. Significant is the comment of the British-owned South China Morning Post (Hongkong) of Jan. 21: "The Communists have contributed appreciably to the discomfiture of Japan, and from all accounts they have a better conception of China's fundamental needs than have those leaders in whose minds feudal ideals still persist . . . Thousands who follow the red banner seek only a decent livelihood . . . Perhaps the most persuasive gesture would be the parallel enforcement of stricter discipline within the ranks of the Kuomintang." —chs—alc

[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 2. Feb. 19, 1941]

## LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

By ANDREW ROTH, Author of Numerous Articles on India and Indochina

Indochina has emerged from the obscurity of small items buried in the back pages of the American press into the full glare of front-page headlines.

Friction between the unofficial Anglo-American alliance and Japan has reached a new intensity. The fate of Indochina is a key to future developments in the area.

Indochina's importance is largely strategic. From northern Indochina, where Japan obtained bases last September, Japanese planes have taken off to bombard the Burma road and southwest China. In addition, Japan has taken steps to obtain Camranh bay, Indochina's partly developed naval base on the southeast coast, and Saigon, a smaller but completed base further south.

Possession of these bases would not only help Japan to outflank the defenses of the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies, but also bring Japan within 750 miles of Singapore—the British Gibraltar of the East.

It was largely because Indochinese officials refused to give up these bases that Japan encouraged Thailand to attack Indochina, paving the way for Japan to step in as "mediator." The peace conference between Thailand and Indochina is now going on in Tokyo and Japan is expected to emerge as the winner, with the possibility of obtaining bases in Thailand—as well as Indochina—as payment for its mediation.

Most discussions of Indochina have ignored the fact that the nation's 23,000,000 inhabitants have aspirations of their own. As in China and India, the great mass of the Indochinese people are peasants, impoverished by a tremendous burden of high taxes and low returns. In Indochina the economy was largely owned by the Bank of Indochina, whose political representative in France was Paul Baudoin, foreign minister in the Reynaud cabinet and also in the early days of the Petain regime.

The development of the nationalist movement in China in the twenties and the effect of the depression of 1929 promoted agrarian discontent in Indochina. This culminated in an uprising of Indochinese troops at Yenbay in 1930, with sporadic fighting continuing in 1931. The rebellion was ruthlessly suppressed, but the basic cause—peasant poverty—was not removed.

That unrest still exists in Indochina was demonstrated by a series of riots and demonstrations which occurred throughout the state in November and December of 1940. In the Saigon area alone more than 1,000 "rebels" were arrested, 200 of them being lined up and shot at the Saigon airport. The desire on the part of the Indochinese to be free from the bondage of either the Japanese or the French may yet play an important part in southeast Asia, the Balkans of the Far East.

ar-alc

## FINGERPRINTING AFTER CONVICTION ONLY, JUDGE RULES

KANSAS CITY, Mo.—(FP)—Labor leaders who have sought to enjoin the police from fingerprinting them unless they are convicted of a felony lost their injunction suit, but won their point.

Judge Ben Terte refused to grant the injunction because he said the labor leaders had not shown that they were in danger of wholesale fingerprinting.

On the other hand, he ruled that police had no right to fingerprint anyone unless convicted. His ruling effectively blocks and indiscriminate fingerprinting by the police. Police officials will seek to change the law at the current session of the legislature.

ssw-hls

[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 2. March 5, 1941]

## LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

BY CATHERINE PORTER, Member of the Research Staff, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations

The unskilled Filipino worker can hardly be worse off than he is now even after the islands achieve independence. This is true, despite the fact that the entire standard of living in the Philippines will be greatly lowered.

Sugar, which has paid high dividends and has contributed a large share of government revenue, has paid low wages to its common laborers. Many studies, both governmental and private, have been made of this side of the industry; some have never been released.

An important report was made a few years ago by I. T. Runes, who obtained information from 173 families in leading sugar-growing provinces. The annual income of the average family of five persons was found to be \$90—or \$1.73 a week.

More than half of the families were in debt; savings accounts and insurance were unknown. These same conditions apply to at least 760,000 persons, even if we assume that they are not characteristic of other industries and other areas.

An equally important study of rice farmers revealed that the 93 families investigated had an annual income of \$140, about two-thirds of which was in money. The average expenditure for the year was \$128.50, leaving a small margin for savings. The standard of living was extremely low, however, and the food was described as a "starvation diet."

In the last year or two the Department of Labor has conducted investigations of wages in various industries. In the abacá (hemp) industry, strippers earned from 7½¢ to 20¢ daily; classifiers, as much as 50¢ or \$1. Coconut planters earned from 12½¢ to 20¢, usually with two meals included; driers, about 40¢, huskers, 75¢. The minimum for unskilled agricultural workers in general was 6¢ for women and 10¢ for men, with board; the maximum was 50¢.

The government effort to set a minimum wage of 50¢ a day for laborers on public works was gradually defeated by the large numbers of men attracted from the fields and mines. So that more men could be employed, wages were frequently reduced to 30¢ and in some cases even this was cut in half. It should not be overlooked that this form of employment is frequently temporary or at best part time.

There is evidence that the mining industry is striving to set better wage standards. A study of 28,000 laborers revealed that more than two-thirds received between 50¢ and 75¢. Since mining is the one industry that shows promise of progress under present conditions, the wage trend here is one hopeful sign in a generally depressing picture.

cp-alc

## DIAMOND CUTTERS WIN \$150 SCALE IN NEW PACT

BROOKLYN—(FP)—Diamond cutters, polishers, and setters won 30% wage increases in a new 6-month industrywide pact signed by the Diamond Workers Protective Union (AFL).

The agreement covers 450 regular and piece workers in 48 New York, Philadelphia and Cincinnati shops. Top rate is \$150 a week.

In addition to the raises, weekly bonuses of from \$10 to \$50 are paid, the exact amount depending on the shop. Weekly scales under the new pact range from \$60 to \$150, said DWPU Pres. Jules Verbeeck.

Although there is at present a shortage of polishers in the industry, there is still a considerable number of cutters unemployed, he said.

jv-jp-alc

[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 4. March 28, 1941]

## LOOKING AHEAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

By DOROTHY BOGG, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations

An appeasement group in China is willing to make peace with Japan. This group, led by reactionary government officials in high positions, gained the upper hand last summer when Great Britain closed the Burma Road.

At that time the country went into the doldrums and the appeasers seized the opportunity to weaken the progressive elements in China. They were motivated also by the rapidly growing economic crisis which threatened to sweep them out of power. By attacking Communist elements in the New Fourth Army, they stirred up a conflict which has led the country to the brink of civil war.

Japan has been trying to bolster the appeasement group in China. She knows that civil war means victory for Japan. Above all, she wants to end the China Incident so she can take advantage of the European conflict to fulfill her dreams of expansion in southeast Asia. These plans naturally fit in with Germany's and there have been recent reports that the Nazis intend to present peace terms at Chungking.

The groups which stand out against the appeasers are the mass of the people, the Communists, and the bulk of the army. Chou En Lai, Communist leader, has stated that it was "ridiculous" to suppose that the Chinese Communists would stop fighting the Japanese if Russia signed a nonaggression pact or even an alliance with Japan. In regard to the population throughout free China, the suffering seems to be far greater than is generally realized.

All observers say the destruction of villages by bombing is appalling, poor transportation has led to scarcity of food, inflation is making itself felt, and the burden of refugees—often estimated at 40,000,000—is increasingly severe.

It is in terms of the people at large that America is said to hold the balance in China. If the people are downhearted, the appeasement group is strengthened and may achieve its aims. If the people see hope ahead, they pick up courage and are ready to fight the war to the end.

The strong stand taken by the U. S. and Great Britain in the last weeks must have acted as a tonic to the Chinese people. American assistance may well tip the scale against civil war and a consequent deal with Japan.

db-alc

## WESTINGHOUSE READY TO NEGOTIATE WAGE BOOST

NEW YORK—(FP)—Negotiations for a national contract and a general 10¢ hourly increase for 40,000 employes of the Westinghouse Mfg. Co. will start during the first week in April, announced Sec.-Treas. Julius Emspak of the United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers (CIO).

He said the firm, which has led the fight against putting a union agreement in writing, had agreed to negotiate. Emspak's announcement was made after a conference of UERMW delegates from 22 Westinghouse plants.

ue-jp-alc

## EMPLOYER TROUBLE A NATIONAL PROBLEM, CIO NEWS SAYS

PHILADELPHIA—(FP)—The CIO News of March 31 carries a front-page "summary of employer trouble throughout the U. S." The paper says:

"The obstinate refusal of big business employers to bargain collectively or to observe the federal law today has precipitated a number of serious situations throughout the U. S."

hcf-alc

[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 2. April 9, 1941]

### LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

By JANET K. HOWIE, Research Associate, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations

Australia, whose entrance into the industrial field has been very recent, is now engaged in a program of large-scale production that will permanently change the whole basis of her economic structure.

Although it is too soon to judge the exact effects of the war on Australian labor, the trend is toward longer hours and greater employment. A strenuous effort is being made to maintain a balance between wages and cost of living but the situation is growing constantly more difficult.

Before the war the normal working hours were 44 hours for 5 days and wages were about \$20 to \$23 a week for the metal trades. Since the war, engineers have been working 12-hour shifts for a 72-hour week; overtime has jumped their wages to around \$40 a week. Toolmakers and coppersmiths often work the entire week-end, and boilermakers now average 56 to 60 hours a week.

The basic or minimum wage established by the courts is \$14.50 for Sydney and Melbourne (slightly less for other districts). Overtime and margins for skill have greatly increased the actual amounts received.

In spite of the rise in nominal wages, however, there has been a slight fall in real wages during the first year of the war. The cost of living has risen 4.7% and the indices for food and clothing have risen 3.8% and 10.2%, respectively. This has occurred in spite of the efforts of the Price Fixing Commission to maintain normal price levels.

The price rises hit those not engaged in war industries most seriously as they are maintaining the official 44-hour week and are not receiving the high overtime pay.

Longer hours, price rises, and constant war strains have caused the outbreak of many strikes. Total strikes during the March quarter of 1940 numbered 110 and affected 94,000 workers, showing a loss of 489,000 working days. The average strike lasts about 5 days, although many are merely 1-day stoppages for a show of strength.

Such strikes as the long and bitter coal strike of May 1940, however, cause much disturbance and unemployment. Most of the walk-outs have been in the heavy steel industries and among the shipyard workers. Grievances generally concern wages, hours, and dilution of skilled crafts.

Strikes do not receive public sympathy, for the arbitration system has been accepted by both labor and management, but they are not denounced with such vehemence as defense strikes in this country. Most of the strikes are settled by a compromise, but workers' requests that the basic wage be raised were recently refused.

The power of the federal Arbitration Court has been extended to intrastate disputes and its awards have been made binding on the entire industry instead of merely the company in which the dispute arose. Whether these powers will be continued after the war is impossible to say.

Since arbitration is compulsory, there is no need for a cooling-off period as advocated by employers in this country. Private agreements are sometimes made between company and union officials but generally the agreements are handed down by the industrial courts and are binding on both parties. Should Premier Molotov visit Hitler in Berlin and Foreign Minister Halifax reports to state of Queensland, where striking is illegal.

These strikes do not indicate any attempt on the part of organized labor to hinder the war effort. The official Labor party, whose main support is the trade-unions, is wholeheartedly supporting the administration's war effort under Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies. Labor holds half the seats in the all-important Advisory War Council.

jkh-db-alc



[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 3. Nov. 13, 1940]

## LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

By JACK SHEPHERD

EDITOR'S NOTE.—Mr. Shepherd, an Australian, has lectured at the University of Sydney.

The new Australian cabinet, formed after a month of negotiations, has no Labor members. This is of particular importance because Labor was offered four or five posts in the cabinet and, since the September elections, is the largest single bloc in parliament.

The new cabinet, like its predecessor, is made up of members of the United Australia party and the United Country party; these groups, which represent the more conservative urban and rural elements respectively, have a majority of two over the combined Labor forces in the house of representatives.

Delay in the appointment of the new cabinet has been due largely to the efforts of Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies to induce Labor leaders to take part in a National government. These efforts began in the dark days immediately after the fall of France when there was a widespread popular demand for a government representing all the major parties.

But the Labor party, led by John Curtin, while prepared to give full cooperation in the war effort, has steadfastly refused to forego its independence or to risk the aggravation of rifts in its own ranks by accepting the cabinet seats offered.

The basis of the Labor party's attitude was indicated on June 21 when Curtin declared his belief that the interests of the country "could always best be served by the Opposition doing its work as an opposition so long as it remained in opposition, and as a government when it became a government."

Though the September elections considerably increased Labor's strength in parliament, its gains were not big enough to give it a majority capable of forming a cabinet of its own. Even before the elections, however, the Labor party had indicated its willingness to serve on a War Advisory Committee and this offer has now been accepted by the prime minister.

The aim of the committee is to insure effective labor collaboration in Australia's war effort. The council will have on it four members of the inner cabinet and four members of the Labor Opposition.

In view of Labor's increased strength in parliament and the narrowness of the government's majority, the Australian Labor party should be able to exert its influence on national policy a good deal more effectively in the future than it has in the past.

-js-alc

## RED SMEAR AGAINST WRIGHT EVAPORATES AS ACCUSERS RETRACT

By Federated Press

UTICA, N. Y.—(FP)—Two officials of the Dairy Farmers Union (unaffiliated) retracted charges of communism made against DFU Pres. Archie Wright and admitted that the attempt to smear Wright originated with groups trying to smash the union.

The two officials are Frank M. Brill and Sam Schou. An investigation by a union committee, including the two men, resulted from the charges. Wright filed a \$200,000 slander suit against Brill and Schou, which he withdrew when the committee issued a statement acquitting him.

The investigation proved that "all of the propaganda spread throughout the milkshed has been wholly inspired by antiunion, antifarmer interests whose sole purpose seems to be the disintegration of the union," the committee's statement said.

"Our investigation shows that all rumors that Wright is a Communist, or has communistic tendencies, are absolutely false, and without foundation."

fu-jp-alc

[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 2. Nov. 27, 1940]

## LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

By HARRIET L. MOORE

The position of the Soviet Union in the European war is a key question today. Premier Molotov visits Hitler in Berlin and Foreign Minister Halifax reports to Parliament that there is at last some chance of the conclusion of a British-Soviet trade agreement. How is this possible?

The Soviets have declared from the outset that they are neutral and are ready to trade with any nation. But the mystery surrounding the Soviet attitude toward the Anglo-German war arises out of the contrast with its clear-cut anti-aggression stand in regard to China, Ethiopia, Spain and Czechoslovakia. It gave substantial aid to the Spanish government; offered single-handed military assistance to the Czechs on the eve of Munich; and it continues to give China more help in trade and credits than any other country. Now in Europe it maintains neutrality and offers trade to both sides.

The Soviet explanation is that it regards the Anglo-German war as a conflict of rival imperialisms, one seeking to gain world dominance and the other to retain it. In the outcome of such a war it claims no interest and hence its desire for normal commercial relations with both belligerents.

To date only Hitler has been willing to deal with the Soviets on their terms: he sent his top-ranking diplomat to Moscow; gave in to the Soviet protest on its exclusion from the Danubian conference; gave priority as far as possible to Soviet trade.

On the other hand Britain has sent only second-rank diplomats to Moscow and until recently has ignored Soviet protests on minor matters. It has also hesitated to establish trade relations and in its government remain men who, deeply suspicious of the U. S. S. R., brought about the Munich settlement, nonintervention in Spain, and temporary closing of the Burma road—all of which ran counter to Soviet interests. In short, although the U. S. S. R. has been ready to negotiate with both sides, Germany has been more ready to meet this offer and consequently German-Soviet relations have been more fully developed.

On the other side of the picture is the fact that up to the present all the Soviet moves in Finland, Poland, Rumania, and the Baltic states have immediate military significance only in terms of Soviet-German conflict. The Soviet press continues to urge the utmost in defense preparations against the "capitalist encirclement" and a glance at the map shows that Germany and Japan are the two nations "encircling" the U. S. S. R.

Defense measures taken by the Soviets range all the way from increasing the standing army to lengthening the working day from seven to eight hours, except in dangerous occupations where it remains six or seven hours. While the manufacture of consumers' goods has been sacrificed to the interest of defense industries, the grain harvest this year is estimated at 112,000,000 tons, little below 1939. It is the third largest crop in Russian history and grain continues one of the basic factors of Soviet economic strength.

All these signs of defense preparedness only underscore the fact that strategically the Soviets are well aware of the dangers to them in an overwhelming German or Japanese victory.

Whether or not the Soviets will abandon their neutrality both in Europe and Asia will depend on the direct danger of attack on their borders. Whether, while remaining neutral, they will decide to favor one warring power in Europe against the other, just as they favor China against Japan, may depend on such developments as revised British policy toward India, or the practical results of Labor Minister Ernest Bevin's speech urging that Britain, to win the war, must aim to obtain "social security" for the whole community. The British Government's willingness to deal with the U. S. S. R. is of course basic to any change in present Soviet practice in European affairs.

-hlm-alc

SAN FRANCISCO—(FP)—Factory employment in California was 22% higher in October 1940 than in October 1939.

-sir-jp-ms

[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 2. Dec. 4, 1940]

## LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

(By Andrew Roth, Author of numerous articles on India and Indo-China)

Unrest is on the march in India today, with the organized labor and peasant movements leading a fight for peace, independence, and improved living conditions which threatens to assume the proportions of the American revolt in 1776.

Tension reached a new high at the beginning of November when Jawaharlal Nehru, former president of the Indian Trade Union Congress and second only to M. K. Gandhi in the All-India National Congress, was given four years of "rigorous imprisonment" for advocating peace and independence for India.

Nehru will not be alone in prison. He has joined thousands of labor and peasant union leaders, and many active members of the All-India National Congress and of such progressive units within the congress as the Forward Bloc and the Congress Socialist party.

Whether Nehru will survive his term is doubtful. Already Swami Sahajanand, general secretary of the All-India Kisan Sabha (Peasant Union), has died in prison after being sentenced to three years of "rigorous imprisonment."

The ferment in India is based on two factors: stark poverty and the desire for independence. Even before the outbreak of the current war, the Indian standard of living was on a par with the most impoverished southern sharecropper. The average family in India, excluding the top 1% of landlords, industrialists, and native princes, had an income of \$20 a person a year.

During the course of the present war, the British have converted India into a vast arms plant. Armaments production has increased twelvefold. Conscription of labor has been instituted.

Despite increased war orders the purchasing power of the Indian masses has declined. Thus the American consul at Bombay has reported that the cotton piece-goods industry, one of the most important consumption industries in India, "has been declining for several months as a result of the increased cost of living for industrial workers and a steady decline in prices paid to farmers."

The Indian workers and farmers are not bearing the brunt of the war willingly or even passively. In October 1939, 90,000 Bombay workers, under the leadership of the Girni Kamgar Textile Union, carried out a 1-day political strike against the war and the repressive measures of the British government.

This set off a wave of strikes which affected virtually every industrial town in India and resulted in the arrest of the leadership in virtually every militant union. The fight against the war and the attacks on the labor-union movement have resulted in the welding of the Indian labor movement after an 11-year split. The unified Trade Union Congress declared in its main resolution:

"Participation in war which will not result in the establishment of freedom and democracy in India will not benefit India—much less will it benefit the working class of India."

The news dispatches from India do not feature news of the organized laborers and peasants. Yet it is only on the basis of their resistance to further attacks on their living standards that Indian news can be interpreted. ar-alc

MACON, GA.—(FP)—When a wage-hour-law violator is caught, he cannot merely promise to cease violating the law in the future and escape an injunction against future violations. So ruled U. S. Judge Bascom Deaver in enjoining the Carpenter Lumber Co., of Eatonville, Ga., from future wage-hour-law violations. -wh-jp-lac

SAN FRANCISCO—(FP)—The instalment system has been okayed by the NLRB. The Carlisle Lumber Co., in Washington, said it couldn't pay \$150,000 in back wages to 148 employees discharged in 1938. Instalments over five years were allowed. madf-alc

[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 5. Dec. 26, 1940]

### LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

By DOROTHY BORG, Member of the Research Staff, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations

Will China's united front hold? This is the question which dominates everything in China today. If the united front breaks, the war of resistance to Japan is lost. It is this fact which has kept Communists and Kuomintang together for the last four years.

From 1926 to 1937, China was split wide open by civil war. Chiang Kai-shek, as head of the Chinese government and leader of the Kuomintang, waged one annihilation campaign after the other for the extermination of the Communists.

There seemed to be an insuperable gap between the two parties. The Kuomintang consisted of wealthy landowners, bankers, and industrialists; the Communists received their main support from the peasants. Throughout the civil war, however, the Communists insisted that "Chinese must stop fighting Chinese" and join forces in opposition to Japan.

Finally, at the end of 1936, during the famous kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek, the Communists persuaded the generalissimo to accept their view. The annihilation campaigns ceased, the united front was formed, and China prepared for the conflict with Japan.

Seven months later the Sino-Japanese war broke out and Japan, to her overwhelming surprise, was faced with a strong, united China. Instead of conquering China in a quick triumphal march, Japan now finds herself bogged down in a major struggle that seems to have no end.

Throughout the war the record of the united front has had its ups and downs. Reports have leaked out of fighting between government troops and "red" soldiers. Moreover the fundamental differences between Communists and Kuomintang still exist.

The Communists have instituted many reforms in the areas under their control. They have tried to ease the almost intolerable burden of the peasant, who constitutes 85% of China's population.

They have reduced rents by 25%, passed laws against the eviction of tenants, reapportioned taxes on a fairer basis, and placed a 10% maximum on all interest rates. Formerly the Communists confiscated and redivided the estates of wealthy landowners but this practice has been abandoned since the formation of the united front.

In the past the central government violently opposed the methods of the Communists. What its position is today no one can tell. The government's main aim is to win the war and in line with this policy it seeks to maintain a balance between all political groups.

The most important point is that despite a long history of bitter enmity and opposing views which may or may not be reconciled some day, both Communists and Kuomintang realize that they cannot win the war without each other's assistance. For this reason, the united front is likely to hold at least until the end of the fight against Japan.

-db-alc

KEWANEE, ILL.—(FP)—The Kewanee Mfg. Co. signed its first agreement with the Intl. Bro. of Boiler Makers, Iron Shipbuilders & Helpers (AFL) following a 2-month strike.

1-jp

TRONA, CAL.—(FP)—The Intl. Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers (CIO) won an NLRB election among employes of the American Potash & Chemical Corp. The IUMMSW received 476 votes as against 102 for an AFL union and 103 for a company union.

cn-jp

NORFOLK, VA.—(FP)—The Bro. of Railway Clerks (AFL) defeated an 18-year-old company union in a Natl. Mediation Board poll among 2,450 employes of the Norfolk & Western Railroad.

-1-jp

Mr. MORRIS. As I say, these purport to be publications put out under the joint auspices of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Federated Press.

Mr. DeCaux, did you participate in what purports to be an operation between the Federated Press and the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations which brought about the release of the aforesaid releases?

Mr. DeCAUX. In what year?

Mr. MORRIS. The first is February 19, 1941; the next is April 9, 1941; the next is November 13, 1940; March 28, 1941; December 26, 1940; January 3, 1941; November 27, 1940; January 8, 1941; February 5, 1941; February 14, 1941; March 5, 1951; and December 4, 1940.

Mr. DeCAUX. I am pretty sure I did not. I was not connected with the Federated Press at that time, nor the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know of this project?

Mr. DeCAUX. I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall any project jointly undertaken by the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Federated Press?

Mr. DeCAUX. I do not recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you receive those in the record?

Senator WATKINS. They may be received.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire on a different subject, or would it break Mr. Morris' trend of thought?

Mr. MORRIS. Go ahead.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned Mr. Vincent Halinan earlier. Do you remember?

Mr. DeCAUX. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you regard him as in any sense your employer?

Mr. DeCAUX. I am not sure what exactly constitutes an employer relationship. I understand he is president of the board and I have only just become associated with the magazine. I suppose in that sense that makes him my employer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know if he actively participates in the management of March of Labor?

Mr. DeCAUX. I don't know to what extent he participates.

Mr. SOURWINE. He has other interests?

Mr. DeCAUX. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is a practicing attorney?

Mr. DeCAUX. I understand so.

Mr. SOURWINE. In California?

Mr. DeCAUX. That is my understanding.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is the editor of March of Labor?

Mr. DeCAUX. John Steuben.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he the editor at the time you came with the magazine?

Mr. DeCAUX. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first become connected with the magazine?

Mr. DeCAUX. In January of this year, last month.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not form a connection with the magazine in August of 1951?

Mr. DeCAUX. In August of 1951?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DeCAUX. I may have contributed some articles previously to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You may have contributed some articles previous to August 1951?

Mr. DECAUX. No; previous to the time of coming on the staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not become a regular contributor, a steady contributor, beginning with August 1951?

Mr. DECAUX. Steady is a little bit of an exaggeration. I contributed a book review and an article, if that can be called steady.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no arrangement with the magazine to be a steady contributor?

Mr. DECAUX. I agreed that I would contribute articles when I could.

Mr. SOURWINE. I show you the August issue of the March of Labor. On the masthead, do you see the paragraph referring to yourself about halfway down the page, the left-hand column? Will you read that?

Mr. DECAUX (reading):

Starting with this issue, Len DeCaux will become a steady contributor to our magazine. Len and his writings are known from one end of the country to the other. As editor of CIO News and CIO publicity director for many years, he made many contributions in the CIO. Welcome, Len, to our family.

Mr. SOURWINE. Having read that, do you want to expand in any way in answer to the question whether beginning in August 1951 you had a regular connection with the magazine?

Mr. DECAUX. I had a connection as a contributor of occasional articles.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there compensation attached to that?

Mr. DECAUX. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your understanding? What was the consideration for which you agreed to be a regular contributor?

Mr. DECAUX. I agreed to help the magazine because I liked it and to contribute articles from my area when I found anything of interest.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they agree to pay for what you contributed?

Mr. DECAUX. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you not in fact contributed articles to this magazine before August of 1951?

Mr. DECAUX. Not that I recollect.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see. So you were, in a sense, merely a person who submitted articles to the magazine beginning August 1951 and your actual connection came in January of this year?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. To your knowledge, is anyone connected with the management or administration of this magazine connected in any way with the Communist Party or with communism?

Mr. DECAUX. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Steuben has any connection with communism?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Halneman has any connection with communism?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record a letter from Val, a letter which Mr. Mandel will identify.

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 28, 1935, addressed to "Dear Bill" and signed "Val."

Mr. MORRIS. Is there another letter attached to that, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Attached to this is a letter addressed to Dr. Lewis L. Lorwin, dated February 9, 1938, and the typewritten signature is William W. Lockwood, Jr.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. DeCaux, I read from this letter of October 28, 1935:

The local FP man, Len DeCaux, is a good friend of mine, and a damned good person. (Please reverse order of above.) We discussed that People's Press only last Saturday—but chiefly we talked about that amazing A. F. of L. convention.

Were you a friend of Val Lorwin?

Mr. DECAUX. Val Lorwin I knew; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Lewis Lorwin?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't recollect having met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Anthony Jenkinson?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes; I think.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Anthony Jenkinson doing at that time?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't recollect.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he connected with the Allied Labor News?

Mr. DECAUX. He may have been connected with the Allied Labor News Service.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the Allied Labor News Service connected with the Federated Press in any way?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't believe it was at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Subsequently did it become allied?

Mr. DECAUX. That I don't know for certain. I have heard reports to that effect.

Mr. MORRIS. What reports did you hear?

Mr. DECAUX. Simply there was some connection between the two but I don't know of my own knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. What connection did you hear existed between the two organizations?

Mr. DECAUX. That they have the same office or something like that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may these be received in the record?

Senator WATKINS. They may be received in evidence.

(The two letters referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 424 and 424A" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 424

FEBRUARY 9, 1938.

Dr. LEWIS L. LORWIN,  
1230 New Hampshire Avenue, Washington, D. C.

DEAR VAL: Thanks very much for the crime file, which I hasten to send on to Fred Field. Before consulting any of your character witnesses we will be sure to let you know.

I haven't seen Tony Jenkinson since you left and I am wondering if he turned up looking for a bed.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

## EXHIBIT No. 424A

(Penciled note: FVF return to WWL).

1230 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE, Washington, October 28, 1935.

DEAR BILL: I write in some haste, lest I fail entirely to write. You are a splendid fellow. Thanks for your check; it is thrilling to get these contributions from people of moderate income; I boil when I think of Taft's luncheons at which millions were raised. What do you say—since you offered complete choice south of the Mason-Dixon line—to dividing your check between the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union and Commonwealth College at Mena, Ark.? I shall assume this is your intent unless I hear otherwise.

Thanks likewise for your job assist. I am now a pensionary of Uncle Sam, in Hammy's Consumers' Division, where once held forth your friend Jim Abrahamson. I have not yet become accustomed to the notion of working for the Government; maybe I shan't last long enough ever to get used to it. Hammy hopes to salvage the Division from the collapse of the NRA, of which it is part, in April. At present I am working on the magazine, *The Consumer*, which is in its second issue, and doing press releases, etc. Hammy was much interested in my idea of doing a price study on cotton; I may get around to it, though I do not see how I could very well do it in the 3 or 4 months ordinarily available for a price study. Nevertheless the idea holds me: what do you think of it? You have no doubt seen others of the price studies (confidential though they have been)? \* \* \*

I shall put you down as a subscriber for *The Cons.*

Your typewriter shall be delivered. It may even get to the metropolis.

I have seen a sample issue of Palmer's *People's Press*. I wish it much luck, though I think the efforts of its editors might be better spent, and I think it will probably fail. If it is to be merely muckraking and pictorial, and not openly partisan, why will the average bozo read it rather than the more attractive and fuller *Mirror or News*? Anyway how are you going to plaster it over the newsstands where the average worker will get a chance to prefer it to the *Mirror*? That requires a million dollars. The local FP man, Len De'aux, is a good friend of mine, and a damned good person. (Please reverse order of above.) We discussed that *People's Press* only last Saturday—but chiefly we talked about that amazing A. F. of L. convention. The latter was omitted from the *People's Press* somehow, though it was the week of the Atlantic City jamboree.\*

Again, many thanks for your various efforts, Bill. I hope I may see you in New York. The arrival of what the papers call "a million dollars worth" of Van Gogh (penciled note—at the Met. beginning 5 Nov.) gives me another reason for trying harder to get transport some week end, though these be busy days. Best to Jinny,

(Signed). VAL.

(Penciled note: N. B. I am still maintaining the Taft office, and doing a few days a week on that.

\*The Socialist (all is much improved).

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember attending a luncheon for Michael Lindsay in April 1946?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Washington Office?

Mr. DECAUX. It is possible; I attended some luncheons. I don't recollect who were present.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Sourwine, do you have any more questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. None, sir.

Senator WATKINS. The witness may be excused.

Call your next witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Harold Coy.

Mr. Chairman this witness has already been sworn.

Senator WATKINS. The record may show that she was sworn in executive session.



**TESTIMONY OF MRS. HAROLD COY (MILDRED PRICE COY), ACCOMPANIED BY HER COUNSEL, JOSEPH FORER, WASHINGTON, D. C.**

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your full name and address?

Mrs. COY. Mildred Price Coy.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present residence?

Mrs. COY. 57 Split Rock Road, South Norwalk, Conn.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your husband's occupation?

Mrs. COY. He is a writer.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you the executive secretary of the China Aid Council?

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been named as executor under the last will and testament of the late Agnes Smedley?

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you heard, Mrs. Coy, the testimony before this committee from the witnesses, Elizabeth Bentley and Louis Budenz to the effect that you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. FORER. Is the question whether she had heard it?

Mr. MORRIS. Whether she heard or read testimony before this committee to the effect that she was in the past a member of the Communist Party.

Mrs. COY. I read the testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Coy, were you in fact ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question because of my privilege under the fifth amendment not to testify against myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you at the present time a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. COY. I am not a member of the Communist Party.

Senator WATKINS. With reference to that declination, are you afraid if you answer the question that Mr. Morris asked of you, if you answered that truthfully it might incriminate you?

Mrs. COY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party at any time during the year 1951?

Mrs. COY. I must decline to answer that question for the reasons previously stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party during the year 1950?

Mrs. COY. I must decline to answer that question for the reasons previously stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party prior to 1950?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer for the same reasons.

Mr. SOURWINE. You realize, do you not, that when you have chosen to testify with respect to the question as to whether you are now a member of the Communist Party and you have stated that you are not, and subsequently you are asked if you were a member during the most recent year and you claim your privilege, that you are liable to leave the inference that you were a member during the year 1951?

Mrs. COY. If that is the inference you wish to draw, there is nothing I can do about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party last week?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question for the reasons previously stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party this morning?

Mrs. COY. I was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party at midnight last night?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question for the reasons previously stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want this committee to understand that you may have left the Communist Party as recently as midnight last night?

Mrs. COY. I don't want you to understand anything, Mr. Sourwine. You will have to draw your own inference.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are disavowing present membership in the Communist Party?

Mrs. COY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you have disavowed membership in the Communist Party this morning, that is, on the morning of February 11, 1952?

Mrs. COY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you are refusing to answer the question as to whether you were a member of the Communist Party on midnight, February 10, 1952; is that correct?

Mrs. COY. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you making that refusal with advice of counsel?

Mrs. COY. I have consulted counsel, but it is my own decision.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that this record may be complete, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully request that the witness be directed to answer the most recent question; that is, with regard to the membership in the Communist Party at midnight on February 10, 1952.

Senator WATKINS. The Chair directs you to answer that question.

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question because of my privilege under the fifth amendment not to testify against myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MERRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify the following three letters as letters taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a handwritten card directly from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated April 18, 1942, marked "ECC from Y. Y. Hsu," and also an original letter dated May 23, 1942, addressed "Dear Mr. Carter" from Yung-ying Hsu, and is exhibit No. 101 from our open hearing held on August 14, 1951.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those are two separate documents?

Mr. MANDEL. They are two separate documents.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are they both documents which you took from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations now in possession of this committee?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I offer these two letters for the record. Senator WATKINS. Those exhibits may be received in the record. (The card referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 425" and is as follows. For the letter referred to as exhibit No. 101, see pt. 2, p. 415.)

## EXHIBIT No. 425

(The following is taken from a penciled card :)

SATURDAY, APRIL 18, '42.

ECC. From: Y. Y. HSU:

WLH saw me and we discussed Chinese Labor situation in general. But he forgot to check with me to whom the Labor Law excerpts were given. It was given to: Mr. Sweetland of CIO, Miss Anderson and Gurlack (one copy) of Y. W. C. A., Miss Price and Mrs. Snow. They have all asked me about the problem.

Right now I am analyzing unions reported in "Ministry of Economic Affairs Bulletin," and may finish a report on this early next week. I'll also study the problem further and report to you from time to time.

Mr. MORRIS. The first letter reads—this is signed by Yung-ying Hsu:

Enclosed please find a memorandum which Miss Mildred Price worked out with my assistance. She has submitted a copy to Mr. Mills of the CIO Greater New York Industrial Council. The memo is written, by the way, on Mr. Mills' specific request.

Miss Price would like to have a conference with you to discuss the same problem. She also suggests my participation.

Mrs. Coy, do you know Mr. Saul Mills?

Mrs. COY. I knew him several years ago, I guess. I haven't seen him in about 10 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall his asking you to perform the following task on May 23, on or about May 23, 1942?

Mrs. COY. Frankly I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. William Holland?

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Mr. Holland an officer of the China Aid Council?

Mrs. COY. He was in 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Sol Mills active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. COY. Is he active?

Mr. MORRIS. Was he active?

Mrs. COY. To my knowledge I don't know a thing about that.

Mr. MORRIS. When Mr. Mills asked you to do this particular thing, as indicated in the letter, was he then acting within the orbit of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. COY. I just don't know. I don't know a thing about it, I really don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Another one of these letters, Mrs. Coy, reads:

WLH—

this is presumably William L. Holland—

saw me and we discussed Chinese labor situation in general. But he forgot to check with me to whom the labor law excerpts were given. It was given to: Mr. Sweetland of CIO, Miss Anderson and Gurlack (one copy) of YWCA, Miss Price and Mrs. Snow. They have all asked me about the problem.

Do you remember consulting Mr. Y. Y. Hsu on such a problem as indicated by this letter?

Mrs. COY. I don't remember it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Y. Y. Hsu?

Mrs. COY. I did know him at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Y. Y. Hsu a member of the Chinese Communist Party?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question for the same reason I stated before, that it might incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. You feel that if you answered the question whether or not Y. Y. Hsu was a member of the Chinese Communist Party that would incriminate you?

Mrs. COY. Yes; I feel that way.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a member of the American Communist Party?

Mrs. COY. I refuse to answer for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Dr. Chi?

Mrs. COY. Yes. You mean the man you asked me about?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mrs. COY. He was a member of the China Council board of directors.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether he was a member of the Chinese Communist Party?

Mrs. COY. Not to my knowledge, I don't. Just to be frank with you, I didn't know Dr. Chi very well when I first came there, but I just had very little knowledge of him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mrs. Coy, do you want the committee to understand that it is your position with respect to certain parties that you will answer questions as to whether you knew them to be members of the Communist Party but with regard to certain other parties you will not answer the question, refusing to answer on the grounds of possible self-incrimination?

Mrs. COY. Sorry, I don't understand your question.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have refused to answer certain questions put to you with regard to whether certain named persons were members of the Communist Party, claiming the privilege of self-incrimination; is that right?

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have attempted, to the best of your ability to answer questions put to you with regard to whether certain other named persons were members of the Communist Party. Is that right?

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you are attempting to make a distinction on the basis of what you knew about a person; is that correct?

Mrs. COY. I will have to examine each question that you ask me separately.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is your counsel telling you what to say?

Mr. FORER. Senator, I do not think that is a proper question.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not a Senator.

Mr. FORER. I was addressing my remarks to the Senator.

Senator WATKINS. It is perfectly all right for you to advise on the legal question but you must not suggest the answer. The witness is sworn to testify and tell the truth and you are not a witness but we are permitting counsel to advise on legal questions only and not to put words in the mouth of the witness.

Were you suggesting any answer?

Mr. FORER. You are assuming that.

Senator WATKINS. I am not assuming anything.

Mr. FORER. I am advising my client as to her legal rights. I do not think it is proper for Mr. Sourwine to make such insinuations. That is the only point I want to make.

Also, it seems to me, Mr. Sourwine, some of your questions are quite unclear.

Senator WATKINS. They may be unclear or not, depending on the point of view, but the witness may say whether she understands them or not without asking counsel whether she understands them or not.

Mrs. COY. I didn't get the implications. I thought my counsel understood it and could tell me what the question meant.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you do not understand the question, please tell me and I will try to make it understandable.

I am not endeavoring to confuse you.

Senator WATKINS. May I instruct the witness that you are entitled to consult your counsel on legal questions only but not what you shall say in the answer.

Mrs. COY. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I continue for just a moment, Mr. Chairman?

Senator WATKINS. You may continue.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to make this perfectly clear so that you will understand what I am asking you about.

On some of the names that you have been asked about, you have refused to answer the questions as to whether they were Communists or you knew them to be Communists. Is that right?

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. On other names you were asked about people you did not know to be Communists you stated you did not know whether they were Communists.

Mrs. COY. I said not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. When a name was mentioned and you were asked, "Is that person a Communist," and you had no information on the subject, you have fully and frankly told the committee you did not know.

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking: Does that indicate that you are making a distinction, that you are answering the committee's questions with regard to named individuals if they are people whom you did not know to be Communists but that you are refusing to answer the question with regard to certain other named individuals? Is that not true?

Mrs. COY. I don't really know whether to say "yes" or "no." I don't want to say "yes" if it isn't so. I did claim the privilege on some people and some people I didn't. So if that is it, that is what I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you claiming that privilege with regard to persons named when you have some knowledge as to whether they are or not Communists?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question on the grounds of the fifth amendment, not to testify against myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you have no knowledge as to whether one of the named persons is or is not a Communist, is there any reason you should refuse to answer that question?

Mrs. COY. It seems to me that the questions are directed in such a manner to try to get me to surrender my privilege. I just don't want to do that, Senator.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have answered such questions about certain people when in fact you had no knowledge as to whether they were or were not Communists; is that correct?

Mrs. COY. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your persistence in refusing to answer questions with regard to certain other persons is because you feel you need to do that in order to protect your privilege; is that right?

Mrs. COY. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have had advice of counsel in connection with that?

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, on that point also I respectfully request that the Chair direct the witness to answer the questions with regard to the named persons with respect to whom she has previously refused to answer.

Senator WATKINS. It is not clear to me, Mr. Sourwine, just what information you wish to elicit from the witness.

If you will make it specific now—it is somewhat argumentative and a matter of conclusion from what the witness has said about this thing and what she has refused to say about others.

Do you have some specific case you want to ask about?

Mr. SOURWINE. We can raise the issue with one name.

Senator WATKINS. Will you ask the question as to one name which was refused previously?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Y. Y. Hsu is or was a Communist?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question for the reasons previously stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. In view of the fact that this witness has here answered such questions with regard to certain other named persons, I ask that the Chair direct the witness to answer this question.

Senator WATKINS. Are you afraid that if you answer that question truthfully it might incriminate you?

Mrs. COY. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. It seems to me, Mr. Sourwine, it would be useless for the Chair to order under the circumstances. On the ones she answered and gave an answer probably she was sure they would not incriminate her but if she says if she answered it truthfully it might, she is entitled to claim privilege.

Mr. SOURWINE. The request that the Chair direct the witness to answer was not with the thought that the witness would then answer, but merely to meet the technical requirement that the Chair has directed an answer to the question. Otherwise, you have acceptance of the witness' privilege by the committee and you have no provision of law to cover the refusal.

Senator WATKINS. On that ground, I direct you to answer the question.

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer for the reason previously stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Coy, do you know Elizabeth Bentley?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question on the reasons previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Elizabeth Bentley testified before this committee that you were the organizer of the far-eastern unit of the Communist Party?

Mrs. COY. I read that in the transcript.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the testimony that Miss Bentley gave on that score true and accurate so far as you know?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question for the reason previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Louis F. Budenz?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question for the reason previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you act as speaker for the Communist Party, Branch 1, Fifth Assembly District, in New York, on November 16, 1936?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question for the reason previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions of this witness.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. No more questions, sir.

Senator WATKINS. The witness may be excused.

Mr. MORRIS. I have one other question.

Were you active in the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question for the reason previously stated.

Senator WATKINS. Call your next witness, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the next witness is Mr. Maxwell S. Stewart.

Senator WATKINS. I think the record will show that he was sworn in executive session.

You may proceed with your questions.

**TESTIMONY OF MAXWELL S. STEWART, JACKSON HEIGHTS, N. Y.,  
ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, JOSEPH A. FANELLI, WASHINGTON, D. C.**

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, will you give your residence to the reporter?

Mr. STEWART. My residence is 9309 Twenty-fifth Avenue, Jackson Heights, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. STEWART. Editor and economist.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is your employer?

Mr. STEWART. Public Affairs Committee.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the Public Affairs Committee?

Mr. STEWART. The Public Affairs Committee publishes pamphlets, summarizing research on social and economic problems.

Senator WATKINS. Are you an officer of that organization?

Mr. STEWART. I am; yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. What is your position?

Mr. STEWART. I am secretary.

If the chairman wishes, I can introduce a statement about the organization.

Mr. MORRIS. It will not be necessary.

Are you now an editor of the Nation magazine?

Mr. STEWART. I am not.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you sever your connections with the Nation magazine?

Mr. STEWART. About 2 years ago, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you worked with the United States Government at any time?

Mr. STEWART. I have not been formally employed. I believe I was listed as an adviser in the War Manpower Commission but it was an unsalaried position and I had no responsibility, no duties.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you consultant with the War Manpower Commission?

Mr. STEWART. Consultant.

Mr. MORRIS. During the years 1943 and 1944?

Mr. STEWART. I believe it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, did you ever act as editor of the pamphlet series for the Institute of Pacific Relations pamphlets?

Mr. STEWART. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. For what period of time, Mr. Stewart?

Mr. STEWART. There were two periods of time actually, one a series of pamphlets put out by the Webster Co., which I edited in 1942, I believe, for a period of 6 weeks or so, and then again in 1947 for about a year.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first join the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Stewart?

Mr. STEWART. As I recall it, my first affiliation was about 1932 when I was elected at that time to honorary membership and I was elected to membership.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you presently a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. STEWART. I am.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you the husband of Marguerite Ann Stewart?

Mr. STEWART. I am.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Marguerite Ann Stewart ever the secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. STEWART. She was.

Mr. MORRIS. When did she act as secretary?

Mr. STEWART. I am not absolutely sure of the date but my impression is that it was 1947 and 1948 for a period of about 1 year.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you heard that your association with the Institute of Pacific Relations has been disavowed by a man who was formerly the executive secretary, Mr. Clayton Lane of that organization?

Mr. STEWART. I heard it just about an hour ago in executive session for the first time.

Mr. MORRIS. The question was asked you?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would identify this letter for us, for the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter taken from the collection of Ray Lyman Wilbur, dated May 10, 1949, addressed to Senator Jack B. Tenney, signed Clayton Lane, Executive Secretary.



Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that in the record?  
 Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 426" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 426

[Copy for Dr. Wilbur]

MAY 10, 1949.

Senator JACK B. TENNEY,

*Chairman, Fact Finding Committee on Un-American Activities,  
 State Legislature, Sacramento, Calif.*

MY DEAR SENATOR: Since writing you last on April 27, acknowledging receipt of a copy each of the Third Report and Fourth Report of your Committee on Un-American Activities in California, I have read carefully all references I could find in these reports to this institute and to persons connected with it or formerly connected with it.

The statements in these reports which particularly led your committee to the conclusion that this institute was a Communist-front organization were presumably those referring to the American People's Fund and to the pamphlet, *Land of the Soviets*.

My letter to your committee of March 10 informed you that this institute no longer receives contributions from the American People's Fund. Mr. F. V. Field has no connection of any kind with this institute.

Neither Maxwell Stewart nor Marguerite A. Stewart has any connection with the IPR. The pamphlet, *Land of the Soviets*, is regarded by this office as out of date in many respects. It is no longer available to the public although we have many copies of it. No publication by this institute today on such a subject would contain material of the kind to which your report objects in its comment on this pamphlet.

I trust your committee will shortly conclude, and state publicly, that it no longer finds occasion to regard the activities and associations of the American Institute of Pacific Relations with apprehension or concern. Such a statement would greatly assist my efforts here to restore confidence in and support of activities in the American national interest as well as in the interest of objective research, on very complex and important matters.

I enclose for your information and for your committee's files copies of some letters received since my last letter, expressing informed opinion on the value of the functions and current activities of the American IPR. Your attention is also once more invited to my letter to members of this institute, dated December 17, 1948, transmitting a full statement of what the American IPR is and is not. A copy was sent you with my letter of March 10, but another is now enclosed for your convenience.

While in Washington last week I had a long discussion with our newest trustee, General Marshall, on our activities and research projects. It will perhaps interest you to learn that the general particularly emphasized the need for this institute to reach a much wider public with its publications. He is very well informed about our current and projected programs and has a high opinion of them.

Sincerely yours,

CLAYTON LANE, *Executive Secretary*.

Enclosures: Letter to Counterattack, December 17, 1948.

Letters from: Lockwood.

Taylor.  
 Chamberlain.  
 Welles.  
 Sinclair.  
 Wright.  
 Murphy.  
 Hansen.  
 Durdin.  
 Thorp.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, do you have a copy of this letter before you?

Mr. STEWART. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, was this on original letter which is in the files?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of an original carbon from the files of Ray Lyman Wilbur.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a signed carbon?

Mr. MANDEL. No, sir; it was a typed signature.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that this be introduced in the record as evidence of the fact that what purports to be a carbon of such original letter is actually in the Wilbur files but not as evidence that such a letter was signed by Clayton Lane until it has been identified by Clayton Lane.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received with that qualification.

Mr. STEWART. May I comment on that letter now?

Mr. SOURWINE. By all means, Mr. Stewart.

Mr. STEWART. At the time this letter was written I was a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations but only a member, not a staff member. Marguerite Ann Stewart was not a member. I think she had resigned by that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. She had resigned as secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations or as a member?

Mr. STEWART. I think as a member. We have only one membership in the family now. However, Mr. Lane, I think the same year, invited me to a discussion group at the Institute of Pacific Relations. I participated to some extent in that discussion group. So apparently Mr. Lane simply made a mistake. I know of no other way of putting it. I did not know Mr. Lane well but I have met him. He certainly must have known possibly subsequent to this that I was a member. He may not have known at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you testifying that Mr. Lane's statement here, "Neither Maxwell Stewart nor Marguerite Ann Stewart has any connection with the IPR" is an inaccurate statement?

Mr. STEWART. I am testifying as far as myself it is an inaccurate statement.

Mr. MORRIS. Also, Mr. Lane neglects to mention the fact that both you and Mrs. Stewart had been active prior to May 10, 1949, in the Institute of Pacific Relations, does he not?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, will you read the fourth paragraph of that letter, please? Will you read it aloud to the committee?

Mr. STEWART (reading):

Neither Maxwell Stewart nor Marguerite A. Stewart has any connection with the IPR. The pamphlet, *Land of the Soviets*, is regarded by this office as out of date in many respects. It is no longer available to the public although we have many copies of it. No publication by this institute today on such a subject would contain material of the kind to which your report objects in its comment on this pamphlet.

I might state that the rest of that paragraph is correct, so far as I know.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that the Institute of Pacific Relations considered the *Land of the Soviets* as out of date in many respects?

Mr. STEWART. Not only that but, as a matter of fact, my wife who wrote the pamphlet asked that it be withdrawn 2 or 3 years before this letter was written.

Mr. MORRIS. Your wife wrote the pamphlet and you edited it; is that right, Mr. Stewart?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you been a sponsor for the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born?

Mr. STEWART. I have made an effort to find the answer to that question, a very considerable effort. The effort included a visit to a man who was executive secretary of the organization, a study of my own files, and consultation with other people, and as far as I can discover I was never connected with the organization. That was also the testimony of this man.

Senator WATKINS. Do you have any memory with respect to it?

Mr. STEWART. I have only a dim memory that such an organization existed but no memory that I ever—

Senator WATKINS. You were not active in any way?

Mr. STEWART. I am certain I was never active in it.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any evidence available to this committee that might possibly contradict the testimony of the witness on that point, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a copy of an article appearing in the Daily Worker on Monday, October 28, 1940, in which Maxwell Stewart is listed among 350 noted Americans supporting the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born.

Mr. STEWART. I am aware of that particular letter because I saw it in the record. I might state that it is possible that that is correct but I think very unlikely. The name American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born is a name which would have appealed to me. If I had been asked to join it at that time, I might have possibly done so. But, as I say, I have no recollection of ever participating in it. I am certain that I never attended any meetings. I am certain I never had any direct connection with it. I am morally certain that I never had any connection with it whatsoever.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you been a member of the National Board of the American Council on Soviet Relations?

Mr. STEWART. In 1943, I accepted such membership. I later resigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you ever been a member of the executive committee of the American League Against War and Fascism?

Mr. STEWART. I was so listed from 1935 for some years but I never participated in the organization. I never participated in the meetings. I never participated in the organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been sponsor of the American League for Peace and Democracy?

Mr. STEWART. My understanding is that that is the same organization.

Mr. MORRIS. It is the same organization but it has had a different name during different periods of time.

Mr. STEWART. My understanding is that they carried over the names that the American League for War and Fascism had.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any connection with it after the names were carried over?

Mr. STEWART. I had no connection but I knew they carried my name over. The organization then turned into the American Peace Mobili-

zation. After the Nazi-Soviet Pact I had no connection with it whatsoever. My name was not carried, I am sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been a member of the board of directors of the American-Russian Institute from 1939 to 1950?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you been a member of the national advisory board of the American Youth Congress?

Mr. STEWART. I was, along with a lot of distinguished Americans.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you been a member of the board of directors of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. STEWART. I was active in the formation of that organization in 1945, was elected a member of the board of directors, but I resigned as a member of the board of directors in late 1945 or early 1946, before taking a position as editor of the IPR pamphlet. I resigned because I had a feeling that a person who was connected with that position should not have any connection with an action organization. I might say, after I resigned, the organization changed character drastically and was subsequently put on the Attorney General's list, but that change took place years after I had any direct connection with it.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you listed as a consultant by that organization in 1950?

Mr. STEWART. No; not in 1950. I have, in case you are interested, a letter of resignation which I believe is dated 1948 which I will be glad to submit at the proper time.

Mr. MORRIS. I think it would be appropriate to show that he resigned in 1950.

Mr. STEWART. I resigned in 1948. I protested against the use of my name in this connection. I have several copies of that.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be received?

Senator WATKINS. That may be received.

(The letter referred to appears at the conclusion of Mr. Stewart's testimony. See p. 2690.)

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been sponsor for the Council of Pan-American Democracy?

Mr. STEWART. My name is listed. I never was active in that organization.

Mr. MORRIS. You deny that you were sponsor for the Council of Pan-American Democracy?

Mr. STEWART. My answer is that I believe I was so listed but I was never active in the organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you acquiesce on the use of your name?

Mr. STEWART. I did on one occasion only.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the National Committee of the Friends of Soviet Union?

Mr. STEWART. I was not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, were you a member of the National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners?

Mr. STEWART. I believe that for 1 year I belonged to that organization. I don't recall that I had any official position in it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, were you a sponsor for the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship?

Mr. STEWART. Didn't I answer that question before?

Mr. MORRIS. No; the other is the American Council on Soviet Relations. This is the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship.

Mr. STEWART. Then my answer is wrong on the other one. I got these mixed up. This is the organization that I sponsored in 1943 in company with several Senators, several members of the Cabinet, and many other distinguished Americans.

Subsequently, I resigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a speaker for the North American Committee To Aid Spanish Democracy?

Mr. STEWART. My impression is that I gave one speech to them, but I have never been able to confirm that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, do you know now that the 10 organizations, that you have acknowledged at least some association with in the past, have been listed by the Attorney General as being subversive organizations?

Mr. STEWART. I know they have. The citation came in most cases many years after I left the organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know at the time you were associated with each organization that each was so listed by the Attorney General as a subversive organization?

Mr. STEWART. At the time I was a member of these organizations they were not so listed, and consequently I could not have known.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask a question at this point?

Is there any of these organizations, having them all in mind that you have been asked about here today, which at the time you were a member of or associated with, that to your knowledge was connected in any way with communism or with the furtherance of Communist aims?

Mr. STEWART. Certainly not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, were you associated with the China Aid Council?

Mr. STEWART. I have no recollection of any association with that organization as a member of China Aid Relief.

However, I did see in your record a photostat showing me as a sponsor back in 1938. I was at that time active in four or five organizations which were interested in supporting China, resisting Japanese aggression. This was not one of the organizations I was active in, but I can well concede that I might have allowed my name to be used in an organization devoted to relief for China at that time, but I had—no; I did not participate in that organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you participate in the Mother Ella Reeve Bloor forty-fifth anniversary banquet?

Mr. STEWART. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who Mother Bloor was?

Mr. STEWART. I made an investigation and discovered it. I did not know when I was first confronted with that name, but I know now.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any evidence available to the committee that would tend to contradict the evidence given by the witness?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a printed copy of an announcement of the Mother Ella Reed Blore forty-fifth anniversary banquet held on Friday, January 4, 1936, at the Hotel Lismore in New York, Mother Ella Reed Blore being a well-known Communist leader at the time and among the list of sponsors is Maxwell S. Stewart.

Mr. STEWART. I am quite aware of that. I have seen that same statement. I am not able to throw any light on it, but I can state categorically I did not attend such a meeting.

Senator WATKINS. Did you allow the use of your name as sponsor?

Mr. STEWART. I have no recollection of doing so.

I would be very doubtful I would.

Senator WATKINS. You would not deny you had?

Mr. STEWART. No; I wouldn't deny it, because I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember signing a New Masses letter to the President? That is not a very adequate description of the letter, but Mr. Mandel will further identify it.

Mr. MANDEL. In the New Masses of April 2, 1940, there appeared a petition to the President, at that time President Roosevelt, in behalf of the New Masses, a magazine with your name attached.

Mr. STEWART. I have some recollection of that. As I recall it, it was what seemed to be a freedom-of-the-press issue, and as an editor of a liberal weekly it seemed to me a suitable thing for me to associate myself with.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that New Masses was a Communist magazine at that time?

Mr. STEWART. Yes; I certainly did, but it seemed to me the freedom-of-the-press issue was paramount.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, it may be of small importance; but, since that letter has been discussed and since it appears to be worthy of asking questions of the witness, is it desired that the text of that letter be inserted in the record at this point?

Senator WATKINS. Do you have the text here, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Is it a long letter?

Mr. MANDEL. No, sir.

Senator WATKINS. It may be inserted.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 427" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 427

[New Masses, April 2, 1940]

The petition to the President, printed below, was initiated by the following committee: Elliot Paul, chairman; Franz Boas, Theodore Dreiser, Rockwell Kent, Corliss Lamont, George Seldes, Maxwell S. Stewart, and Dashiell Hammett. As we go to press, more signatures are arriving in the mail and will be published later.

To President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT:

In periods of crisis, those civil liberties which are the foundation stone of a free society are endangered. Today, in the face of international crisis, it behooves us, as loyal Americans, to examine critically and expose to the light all threats against democracy at home.

External vigilance is the price of democracy, and we must critically analyze any governmental attack on the rights of Americans to maintain dissident opinions which inevitably results in the destruction of civil rights for all.

The recent raid, without warrant, on the veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, the abortive indictments in Detroit for recruiting for Loyalist Spain, the badgering of Communist leaders, the attacks by the Dies committee on consumer and labor groups, are all part of the rapidly accumulating evidence of a tendency to pervert the spirit while pretending to adhere to the letter of the Bill of Rights.

This same tendency exists in the perversion of the function of the special grand jury now convened in Washington, D. C., to investigate alleged military espionage. This investigation was initiated by the former Attorney General, by the wide-

spread publication of an extraordinary letter accusing a number of organizations and individuals of serious crimes. This unprecedented procedure was sharply condemned by the Washington Post as a breach of the constitutional rights of citizens. The subsequent public announcement by the special prosecutors that such investigation "would be used as a clearinghouse" inevitably created a suspicion that even an inquiry might be perverted into a witch hunt directed against those whose views express differences with the Government.

The New Masses is not mentioned in the letter of the Attorney General, but this has not prevented the grand jury from devoting much of its time to questioning editors and of New Masses. Day after day, testimony is taken having no possible relation to the crimes under investigation, but intended to uncover the witnesses' views on current social and political problems. In this respect, it is really a Dies committee in another form. The continuances of this procedure might drive New Masses out of existence by frightening its readers and supporters, by harassing its editors, and by exhausting the meager funds of the magazine. It is, in fact, a war of nerves which will lead to the destruction of the freedom of expression of dissident opinion.

In the World War the suppression of the Masses, the barring from the mails of other publications, came after the entry of this country into the war. Today the move to silence free opinion is terrifyingly faster. It is a portent of war and a portent of wider suppression. Many of those who petition you, Mr. President, do not agree with the social and political views of New Masses but we recognize that the rights guaranteed in the Constitution cannot be denied to any group without undermining these rights themselves, and thereby making them insecure for all.

In your recent message to the Nation on its seventy-fifth anniversary, Mr. President, you said: "It does not matter whether one agrees with the Nation or not. The important thing is that everywhere and always—particularly in a democracy—minorities shall have a means of expressing themselves." That, Mr. President, is a genuine affirmation of the elementary human and civil rights of all Americans and we urgently call upon you to apply it—"everywhere and always."

We respectfully request you, Mr. President, to exert your influence to end this attack on freedom of the press and prevent its repetition in the future.

(Signed) Gordon W. Allport, Professor of Psychology, Harvard University; Frank E. Baker, President, State Teachers College, Milwaukee, Wis.; Joseph Warren Beach, Chairman, English Department, University of Minnesota; Dr. George H. Bishop, Professor, Washington University, St. Louis; Marc Blitzstein, Composer-Playwright, New York; Franz Boas, Professor of Anthropology, Columbia University; Louis B. Boudin, Attorney, New York; Lyman R. Bradley, Assistant Professor of German, New York University; Millen Brand, Writer, Barto, Pa.; Harold Chapman Brown, Professor, Stanford University; Edwin Berry Burgum, Professor, New York University; Lester Cohen, Writer, Doylestown, Pa.; Bruce Crawford, Editor and Writer, Charleston, W. Va.; Henry Wadsworth Longfellow Dana, Lecturer and Writer, Cambridge, Mass.; Edward C. Delafield, Jr., Vice President, Modern Age Books, New York; Theodore Dreiser, Author, Hollywood; W. E. B. DuBois, head, Department of Sociology, Atlanta University, Ga.; Henry Epstein, Solicitor General, New York State; Abraham Flexner, Director Emeritus, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University; Franklin Folsom, Executive Secretary, League of American Writers, New York; J. J. Fulton, Stirling Professor, Yale University; Lewis Gannett, Literary Editor, New York Herald Tribune; Dr. A. L. Goldwater, Physician, New York; Mordecai Gorelik, Scene Designer, New York; William Gropper, New York; Dashiell Hammett, writer, New York; Frank H. Hankins, Professor, Smith College of the City of New York; Benjamin Harrow, Professor of Chemistry, College of the City of New York; Melville J. Herskovitz, Professor of Anthropology, Northwestern University; Philip M. Hicks, Professor, Swarthmore College; William W. Hinckley, former chairman, American Youth Congress, Bethesda, Md.; Kenneth E. Hoover, Minister, Shrub Oak, New York; Ellsworth Huntington, Professor, Yale University.

William Lloyd Imes, Clergyman, New York; Robert Josephy, Book Designer, Bethel, Conn.; Van Dusen Kennedy, Instructor in Economics, Swarthmore College; Rockwell Kent, Artist, New York; Dr. John A. Kingsbury, Social Worker, Shady, N. Y.; Arthur Kober, Writer, New York; Corliss Lamont, Author, New York; Ring W. Lardner, Jr., Writer, Hollywood; Paul H. Lavietes, Assistant Professor of Medicine, Yale University; M. Levi, Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan; Philip Loeb, Actor, New York; J. B. Love, NYA Administrator, Butte, Mont.; Robert Morss Lovett, Governor, Virgin Islands; William M. Malisoff, Professor of Biochemistry, Polytechnic Institute, New York; Albert Maltz, Author and Teacher, New York University; Kirtley F. Mather, Professor of Geology, Harvard University; Edward G. Maxted, Priest of the Episcopal Church, Pascagoula, Miss.; H. L. Mencken, Writer, Baltimore, Md.; Catharine Meyer, Teacher, Vassar College; Paul Mueschke, Associate Professor of English, University of Michigan; William S. Noble, Minister, North Baltimore, Ohio; Katherine Macy Noyes, Urbana, Ill.; William Albert Noyes, Noyes Laboratory of Chemistry, University of Illinois.

Harvey O'Connor, Writer, Chicago; Shaemas O'Sheel, Writer, Red Hook, Dutchess County, N. Y.; Sam Ornitz, Writer, Los Angeles; Elliot Paul, Writer, New York; William Pickens, Director, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; Alan Porter, Teacher, Vassar College; Israel Putnam, President of I. Putnam, Inc., Elmira, N. Y.; Walter Rautenstrauch, Professor of Industrial Engineering, Columbia University; Gardner Rea, Artist, Brookhaven, N. Y.; Anton Refregier, Mural Painter, New York; Paul Robeson, Singer, New York; Earl Robinson, Composer and Choral Director, New York; Wellington Roe, Writer, Staten Island, N. Y.; Harry Sacher, Lawyer, New York; Margaret Schlauch, Teacher, New York University; Edwin Seaver, Author, New York; George Seldes, Writer, Wilton, Conn.; Helen Seldes, Wilton, Conn.; Howard Selsam, Professor, Brooklyn College; Harlow Shapley, Professor of Astronomy, Harvard University; George H. Shull, Professor, Princeton University; Herman Shumlin, Stage Director and Producer, New York; Rev. F. Hastings Smyth, Superior, Society of the Catholic Commonwealth, Oratory of St. Mary and St. Michael, Cambridge, Mass.; Alice D. Snyder, Professor of English, Vassar College; Moses Soyer, Artist, New York; Raphael Sayer, Artist, New York; George Soule, Editor, New Republic; Philip Stevenson, Writer, New York; Donald Ogden Stewart, Writer, Carmel, Calif.; Maxwell S. Stewart, Associate Editor, the Nation; I. F. Stone, Associate Editor, the Nation; Hans Otto Storm, Engineer, Palo Alto, Calif.; Paul Strand, Photographer, New York; Dirk J. Struik, Associate Professor of Mathematics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.

Helen Tamiris, Dancer, New York; C. Fayette Taylor, Professor of Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Frederick Thompson, Manufacturer, San Francisco; Edward C. Tolman, Professor of Psychology, University of California; Jean Starr Untermeyer, Writer, New York; Harold C. Urey, Professor of Chemistry, Columbia University; Stuyvesant Van Veen, Mural Artist and Anthropologist, New York; Charles H. Wesley, Professor of History, Howard University; James Wechsler, Assistant Editor, the Nation; Howard W. Willard, Illustrator-Designer, New York; Susan H. Woodruff, Lecturer, Member DAR, New York; Richard Wright, Writer, Crompond, N. Y.; Art Young, Artist, Bethel, Conn.; Leane Zugsmith, Writer, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you ever been the editor of a publication, China Today?

Mr. STEWART. Not an editor; a contributing editor something like that.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long were you contributing editor of China Today?



Mr. STEWART. My impression was 1938-41. I have here a letter of resignation that I wrote in 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you at that time know that China Today was a Communist publication, Mr. Stewart?

Mr. STEWART. I did not think it was a Communist publication. In the days I was connected with it, it was engaged in support of China against the Japanese aggression.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know the principal editor of the publication, Max Granich?

Mr. STEWART. I have here a letter resigning from the publication after Max Granich became editor.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you were not a contributing editor at the same time that Max Granich was managing editor?

Mr. STEWART. There was some overlapping. I resigned very shortly after he became editor.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did he become editor?

Mr. STEWART. My impression is that it was just a few months before my letter of resignation.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you send that letter of resignation?

Mr. STEWART. May I introduce the letter of resignation at this time?

Senator WATKINS. You may.

Mr. STEWART. I can give you the date of it, March 18, 1941.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the date of the letter?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You sent it on the same day?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. The copy may be received.

(The letter referred to appears at the conclusion of Mr. Stewart's testimony. See p. 2670.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Knowing now that the letter is March 18, 1941, when is it your testimony that Mr. Granich became associated for the first time with China Today?

Mr. STEWART. I said I don't recall that, but my impression is that he became associated perhaps one or two issues before this.

Mr. SOURWINE. As long as 3 months?

Mr. STEWART. I don't remember at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been as long as 6 months?

Mr. STEWART. It could have been a deal longer as far as my memory is concerned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been as long as 2 years?

Mr. STEWART. No, certainly it could not. I can't precisely fix the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been as long as 1 year?

Mr. STEWART. I feel very confident it wasn't as long as 1 year. You might prove otherwise, but I doubt it.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the editors of the publication while you were a contributing editor?

Mr. STEWART. It was a man named Eugene Shackner.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his official title?

Mr. STEWART. He was the editor.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether a man named J. W. Phillips was editor during the time?

Mr. STEWART. He was not, nobody by that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether a man named Hansu Chan was editor of China Today while you were editor?

Mr. STEWART. I don't recall he was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Hansu Chan was a pseudonym used by a man named Dr. Chi?

Mr. STEWART. Yes. I am not sure when I became aware of that, but I had become aware of it.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you become aware of that?

Mr. STEWART. I have been reading the record of these hearings and it may have been there I became aware of it or it may have been a long time. I did meet sometime in 1930 Chao Ting Chi, but I don't recall the date.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you read the testimony of Mr. Budenz before this committee that he met you in the office of the Nation some time in the early 1940's?

Mr. STEWART. I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall as a matter of fact whether you ever met Mr. Budenz in the office of the Nation in the early 1940's?

Mr. STEWART. I am quite certain that I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you deny meeting Mr. Budenz in the office of the Nation?

Mr. STEWART. I never met Mr. Budenz as far as I know at any time, any place, under any circumstances.

At that time I was not working at the Nation full time. I went down half a day a week, I did not receive any callers at the Nation office, so it is entirely unlikely I could have met him. I think it entirely unlikely I could have met him and forgotten about it. Incidentally, as I would like to introduce in the record a little later, my position at that time was strongly in opposition to communism, so it is highly unlikely that the editor of the Daily Worker would be looking me up.

Mr. MORRIS. Was your opposition to communism so strong that you feel now that your participation in the activities of the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy after the Second World War can be reconciled with that?

Mr. STEWART. You will note my letter of resignation. I think that answers it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, do you have any evidence on whether or not Mr. Earl Browder had directed Louis Budenz to consider you to be a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. STEWART. In view of the statement I just made, that my position was very strongly opposed to communism at that time, and it is in the public record that I was writing not one article but many articles directly opposed to the Communist position, I think it is very unlikely that Earl Browder would send Budenz to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you retain your position of antagonism to the Communist Party and its aims from that day until the present time?

Mr. STEWART. I certainly did.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever a member of the Communist Political Association?

Mr. STEWART. I was not.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever a member of the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. STEWART. I was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever write or approve for publication any pro-Communist propaganda?

Mr. STEWART. I certainly did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, I have here before me the masthead of the magazine, China Today, which lists as contributing editor Mr. Theodore Draper. Do you know Mr. Theodore Draper?

Mr. STEWART. I don't recall ever hearing the name before.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lawrence Hearn?

Mr. STEWART. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Frederick Spencer?

Mr. STEWART. I don't know anybody by that name.

Mr. SOURWINE. By what name did you know him?

Mr. STEWART. I don't know anybody by that name.

Mr. MORRIS. T. A. Bissen?

Mr. STEWART. One of my best friends.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Mr. T. A. Bissen ever used the name Frederick Spencer?

Mr. STEWART. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Frederick Field ever used the name Frederick Spencer?

Mr. STEWART. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Field?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Field well?

Mr. STEWART. Not well, but I know him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know at any time that Mr. Field was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. STEWART. I have no knowledge on that.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any knowledge now that Mr. Field is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. STEWART. I know he was contributor to the Daily Worker and editor of New Masses, but I have no knowledge whether he was a member of the Communist Party, but I might assume he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet Mr. Field that would indicate to you at the time he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. STEWART. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Victor Yakhontoff?

Mr. STEWART. I have met him.

Mr. MORRIS. What were the circumstances of your meeting Mr. Yakhontoff?

Mr. STEWART. It was a social affair of some sort. I only met him once, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever write to the New Masses?

Mr. STEWART. I wrote an article in 1929.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever written book reviews for New Masses since that time?

Mr. STEWART. I believe a book review on Collective Security appeared somewhere in 1938.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you write a book review for New Masses in 1935?

Mr. STEWART. That I do not know. That was asked me for the first time in executive session and I had no information on it at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you sign a letter under New Masses auspices on November 26, 1940, demanding the release of Mr. Prestes?

Mr. STEWART. I have no information on that. I obviously wouldn't do anything if New Masses asked me to.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write a book review for the New Masses, July 2, 1935, reviewing Louis Fischer's book Meet the Soviet Citizen?

Mr. STEWART. That is what I thought I was asked a moment ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked if you did in 1935 write a book review for the New Masses.

Mr. STEWART. That I have no information on.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did write a book review for New Masses in 1939?

Mr. STEWART. I thought it was 1938.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did write in 1938?

Mr. STEWART. On collective security; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they ask you to write a review?

Mr. STEWART. Yes; it was a book on collective security. I was taking a strong collective security position at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Then you did write something for New Masses?

Mr. STEWART. Yes. I answered that before.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, is there any other evidence you feel should be put in the record at this time?

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Stewart, did you ever sign a letter in protest against the barring of Communists from the Civil Liberties Union?

Mr. STEWART. I happen to have a copy of that letter here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you offer it for the record?

Mr. STEWART. Surely. I cannot put my hand on it right now.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, if I may, one or two questions for foundation.

Is that the only copy of letters that you have written and statements that you have made that you brought here with you?

Mr. STEWART. No. I have several other things I would like to introduce later on.

Mr. MORRIS. I should like to ask that all of those things be made available to the committee here.

Mr. STEWART. That is fine. Thank you very much.

Senator WATKINS. They will be received.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the chairman please, I did not mean to offer them for the record at this moment. It is sort of in the nature of a spontaneous duces tecum. I wanted to ask that the material that was brought by the witness be made available to the committee staff for examination.

Senator WATKINS. Since certain statements have been made by the witness about his relationship to these organizations, I think it is only fair that he be permitted to put them in.

Mr. STEWART. I have a statement showing the contrast between my writings and those of the Communists in the period between 1931 and 1941, which contrasts my position with that of the Communists at a very crucial period.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did we get that letter that was asked for?

Mr. STEWART. I haven't found it yet, but you will.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not mean to interrupt the presentation but the reporter has a lot of exhibits to keep track of.

Mr. STEWART. I have several other things I would like to introduce. I have that document some place. I cannot lay my hand on it right now.

Mr. SOURWINE. While the witness and counsel are looking for that letter, might I make a brief comment with regard to another matter?

An earlier witness here today had some testimony with regard to the Federated Press. I am informed by Mr. Mandel that the American Federation of Labor a number of years ago had a committee which investigated the Federated Press and filed a report thereon which was released to the public, and I respectfully suggest that the Chair instruct Mr. Mandel to secure an authenticated copy of that report and that it be placed in the record at the point where the Federated Press was a part of the witness' testimony.

Senator WATKINS. You want the entire report printed in the record or do you want it made an exhibit in the case or just merely filed?

Mr. SOURWINE. As the Chair wishes.

Senator WATKINS. I do not know at the moment. I do not know how long it is going to be.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would the Chair instruct Mr. Mandel to procure an authenticated copy and later on pass on the question of where it goes in the record?

Senator WATKINS. Yes, I will ask Mr. Mandel to do that. Whether it is actually printed in the record or not will depend on its length and whether it is material.

The same may be done with respect to Mr. Maxwell S. Stewart's statement, Maxwell S. Stewart versus the Communist Line—A comparison. It is a rather lengthy document. It may be filed as an exhibit in this investigation and if considered to be material we can have it printed, but it is rather lengthy.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 428" and is as follows (see p. 2670 for Maxwell Stewart versus the Communist Line):)

#### EXHIBIT No. 428

FEBRUARY 12, 1952.

Mr. WILLIAM GREEN,

*President, American Federation of Labor, Ninth Street and Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. GREEN: On June 2, 1923, a subcommittee of the American Federation of Labor, consisting of Messrs. Matthew Woll, G. W. Perkins, and Chester M. Wright made a report on the Federated Press. Would you kindly send us a certified copy of this report for insertion into our records?

Your cooperation will be appreciated.

Kindest regards and all best wishes.

Sincerely,

EVA B. ADAMS,

*Administrative Assistant to Senator Pat McCarran.*

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[Letterhead of American Federation of Labor]

WASHINGTON 1, D. C., February 15, 1952.

Miss EVA B. ADAMS,

*Administrative Assistant to Senator Pat McCarran, United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MISS ADAMS: Replying to your letter dated February 11, I enclose a copy of a report on the Federated Press as of June 2, 1923.

The copy which I am sending you was taken from the official proceedings of the 1923 convention of the American Federation of Labor and was signed by Messrs. Matthew Woll, G. W. Perkins, and Chester M. Wright.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) WM. GREEN,  
*President, American Federation of Labor.*

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR CONVENTION, 1923

REPORT ON FEDERATED PRESS

The Cincinnati convention authorized your executive council to have an investigation made of the reportorial and news policy of the Federated Press. We directed President Gompers to have that investigation made. He appointed a committee for that purpose. The committee conducted this investigation and reported as follows:

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 2, 1923.

Mr. SAMUEL GOMPERS,  
*President, American Federation of Labor,*  
*Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SIR AND BROTHER: In accordance with your request we undertook an inquiry into the policies, methods, and general affairs of the Federated Press, in accordance with Resolution No. 82 adopted by the last annual convention of the American Federation of Labor at Cincinnati, Ohio.

We made careful examination of the files of the Federated Press which were put at our disposal by Mr. Carl Haessler, managing editor. We should like to say that in every respect Mr. Haessler was courteous and obliging during the course of our inquiry in Chicago.

The Federated Press is an incorporated organization of labor publications, serving at the present time 75 publications, which are as follows:

B. of L. E. Journal, Eteepain, Federated Press Bulletin, Galesburg Labor News, Illinois Industrial Review, Labor Advocate (Racine), Labor Herald, Labor Unity, Laisve, Midwest Labor News, Milwaukee Leader, Minneapolis Labor Review, New Majority, Ny Tid, Oklahoma Leader.

One Big Union Bulletin, Peoples Voice, Radnik, Tom Mooney's Monthly, Toveri, Truth.

Tyomies, Voice of Labor, Volkszeitung, Uj. Elore.

Advance, Alba Nuova, American Railroad Worker, B. C. Federationist, Canokia Valley News, Dawn, Detroit Labor News, Free Voice.

Fur Worker, Headgear Worker, Illinois Miner, Industrialist, Industrial Solidarity, Industrial Worker, Iowa Farm and Labor News, Labor Advocate (Tacoma), Labor Age, Labor Journal.

Labor Leader, Llano Colonist, Miami Valley Socialist, Minnesota Union Advocate, Newark Leader, New York Call, Panvor, Pennsylvania Worker, Plebe, Prosveta.

Railroad Amalgamation Advocate, Seattle Union Record, Searchlight, Spravednost, Tri-City Labor News, Vilnis, West Virginia Federationist, Williamson County Miner, World Tomorrow.

California Oil Worker, Train Dispatcher, Upholsterers' Journal, Railway Clerk, Electrical Worker, Producers' News, Maritime Labor Herald.

In addition to these newspaper clients, the Federated Press service is furnished to about 200 local unions and central bodies and to somewhere between 40 and 50 individuals. These take the service mainly as a means of assisting the Federated Press, the local unions and central bodies paying \$1 per week each for the service, the individuals paying \$20 a year, and having no right to republication of any of the material in the service.

The Federated Press maintains staff correspondents in Washington, New York City, Berlin, Moscow, Sydney, Mexico City, and Chicago, and it has correspondents in other cities in the United States who are paid space rates.

It would be possible to enter into a lengthy and detailed analysis of the material furnished by the Federated Press to its various member publications, but this would not be nearly as illuminating as Mr. Haessler's own statement of the Federated Press policy.

As he stated it to us, the policy of the Federated Press is to attempt to report the news of all pretending-to-be factions or wings of the labor movement and to admit to membership in the Federated Press publications representing all factions and wings of the movement. It is regarded by the Federated Press as desirable that there should be on the board of directors representatives of all trends of thought in the labor movement.

Having this statement, we endeavored to get from Mr. Haessler a definition of the term "labor movement" as used by the Federated Press. We were given to understand that within the meaning of that term the Federated Press includes all protesting minorities and that the question of whether these minorities are revolutionary in character or not has nothing to do with the case.

On this point Mr. Haessler furnished us with a copy of a letter which he had written in answer to an inquiry dealing with his policy as managing editor. The following paragraph from that letter is illustrative of his attitude as he states it:

I shall work as managing editor of the Federated Press as long as I am permitted to carry out my conception of its proper function, which is, I believe, to be a cooperative labor news service catering impartially and cordially to every group in the labor movement. I have tried to cut out the factional news and reports of internal union strife that is of no concern to labor as a whole, though wads of such news come to the desk. I have tried also to proportion the news so that all labor elements may have an opening in our columns if they wish it.

This we believe to be an accurate presentation of Federated Press policy, but we cannot refrain from pointing out that the phrase "all labor elements" includes all of the various revolutionary elements outside of the American Federation of Labor, hostile to the American Federation of Labor, hostile to democratic principles in general, and in open warfare in an effort to undermine and destroy the American Federation of Labor.

It appears furthermore to be the Federated Press policy to give as much weight and importance to any protesting minority as to the bona fide trade-union movement in the matter of news. Thus we observed that day after day the Federated Press carries much more news in relation to the doings of various protesting minorities than it does in relation to the activities of the bona fide trade-union movement. We observed furthermore that news stories relating to the trade-union movement are not infrequently handled in such a manner as to reflect discreditably upon the trade-union movement.

It is true that when one or two of these instances were called to Mr. Haessler's attention he manifested a desire to make correction. However that may be, the fact remains that under the policy of the Federated Press every agency or organization which may lay claim to a labor designation is entitled to representation in the news service of the Federated Press on a basis of importance equal to that of the trade-union movement. Every destructive, revolutionary agency finds a ready entree to the Federated Press service as long as it makes claim to a labor designation.

The board of directors of the Federated Press is so composed as to make any policy other than the one now in force impossible. Without entering into a detailed discussion of the personnel of the directorate, it is apparent that a majority of the present directors would in any test be either hostile to the American Federation of Labor or lukewarm toward it. Among the directors are W. A. Foster and Arne Swabeck whose philosophy is well known and with whom a majority of the directors probably will generally be found in sympathy.

In connection with the general policies of the Federated Press it is worth noting that the European manager is Mr. Louis Lochner, who, during the World War, was at the head of the notorious People's Council, the head and front of the pacifist propaganda. It is perhaps also worthy of note that general European news, and particularly British news, is supplied to the Federated Press by the London Daily Herald, concerning whose connections with the Soviet authorities there were some months ago most astonishing revelations.

It was pointed out to us that A. F. of L. publications might change the policy of the Federated Press by the simple expedient of becoming members in numbers sufficient to outvote the present majority.

There are two things to be said about this. First, not less than four-fifths of the present members must vote for the admission of an applicant; and second, even though a sufficient number of editors loyal to the principles of the American Federation of Labor should become members of the Federated Press, they would, by so doing, vote themselves into an indebtedness of approximately \$48,400, and it is our frank opinion that this would indeed be an unfortunate acquisition.

The Federated Press service is sent daily to clients in the form of printed sheets. In addition to the daily printed sheet a monthly bulletin is issued which serves as a house organ. The daily service carries a series of articles under the caption, "Economic news service," and these are gathered together and printed on a single sheet once a week.

In addition, the Federated Press issues what it calls chain papers, there being at present four of these. In these chain papers one page is reserved for local news of the community for which the paper is issued while the remaining pages are made up entirely of material carried in the Federated Press service during the week.

Samples of all of this material are attached to this report, together with a copy of the bylaws and copies of the monthly bulletin containing the names of clients and the current annual budget which provides for expenditures amounting to \$100,000, providing that amount of money can be secured.

We found throughout the Federated Press service a continued domination of the news by articles relating to the IWW, the so-called amalgamation movement, "political" prisoners, the Communist Party, the Workers' Party, the Socialist Party, and Russian affairs. That is to say that there is a continuous tide flowing through the Federated Press service of a pro-Soviet, pro-Communist, prerevolutionary, anti-American Federation of Labor character.

We found in a long series of issues, under the standing heading, "Labor trials," a constant repetition of stories about IWW cases, Communist cases and the Michigan syndicalist cases. Typical of this column is the issue of May 18, containing under this heading stories about the trial of Ruthenberg in Michigan, a story about political prisoners, and a story about the troubles of the spectacular Upton Sinclair in California. In another issue the column covered IWW cases in Los Angeles and San Francisco; criminal syndicalism cases in Gary, Ill.; and a story from New York about political prisoners.

The issue of May 5, 1923, fairly well typifies the general policy of the Federated Press. The columns of the daily service are 14 inches long and there are six columns. Few stories run more than 8 inches and any story running from 6 to 8 inches is therefore an important story from the Federated Press point of view. In this issue 40 inches were devoted to various "isms" while the contents of but 10 inches related to real trade-union activity. In the same issue there were small items, totaling from 6 to 8 inches, of what might be termed real or bona fide labor news, in addition to the article on economics which in this case dealt with the Pennsylvania Railroad.

Among other things in this day's issue was a news story discussing the strike of the Marine Transport Workers, using the name of the International Seamen's Union and the Marine Transport Workers in such a way as to make no proper distinction between the IWW organization and the bona fide trade-union.

It is true that our instructions confined us to the editorial and news policies of the Federated Press, but the Garland Fund had been so much in discussion and had been the basis of a news story in which in our judgment the president of the American Federation of Labor received unfair treatment that we deemed it advisable, in view of these and other facts, to make some inquiry in this direction and to include the results in this report.

We cannot refrain from including here a letter which has some bearing on the situation inasmuch as it was addressed by a member of the board of trustees of the Garland Fund to a member of the executive board of the Federated Press who is also a member of the board of trustees of the Garland Fund, though neither held these respective positions at the time the letter was written. The letter is as follows:

JUNE 30, 1922.

Mr. WM. Z. FOSTER,  
118 North La Salle Street, Chicago, Ill.

DEAR BILL FOSTER: Thanks for yours of the 26th. I can't add to what I have said about Costello's relation to the Federated Press. I do wish you could make the effort to straighten things out before you go west—or work on it at long distance, if that can be done. Costello ought to be generous enough to not stand in the way of a really able man taking his place. Can't you persuade him?

I am delighted with the prospects and progress of your league. Of course, the future belongs to your bunch.

Yours always,

(Signed) ROGER BALDWIN.



It should be explained in relation to the above letter that Mr. Costello was the then managing editor of the Federated Press, later succeeded by Mr. Haessler.

The last two sentences of the letter of course constitute the most important portion of the letter in connection with this report. They make the type of influence wielded by at least two members of the Garland Fund which has agreed to give \$15,000 to the Federated Press and which has already given a substantial portion of that amount.

Taking up again the analysis of Federated Press policy, we find in the issue of May 9, in a story printed under a Washington date line, the following: "European labor is warned by Samuel Gompers not to expect cooperation from organized labor of the United States in general strikes as a means to economic or political advancement." Of course, the statement actually issued by the president of the American Federation of Labor had to do entirely with general strikes as a means of preventing war and did not deal with strikes in any sense in connection with economic developments.

It would be possible to proceed with analysis of a great many of the issues of the Federated Press but there would be, it seems to us, no point to an endless repetition of the same story. An analysis of issue after issue can only lead back to the conclusion that the Federated Press lends itself continuously to the spreading of doctrines subversive of the best interests of the American working people as expressed in the bona fide trade-union movement, and that this condition is going to continue. The personnel throughout the organization makes this clear, and the record of its conduct proves the case beyond any shadow of doubt.

We are aware of the fact that a small number of publications purporting to be bona fide trade-union publications are members of the Federated Press, subscribe to its service and print it in part or in whole. We make the assertion, however, as emphatically as we may and without qualification, that no publication can follow the policy of the Federated Press as expressed in its daily service and remain loyal to the fundamental principles set up as the standard of constructive trade-unionism by the American Federation of Labor. There should be harmony and united action along constructive lines before we can be entirely successful in the fulfillment of our mission and the attainment of our aim in the labor movement.

Respectfully submitted.

(Signed) MATTHEW WOLL,  
G. W. PERKINS,  
CHESTER M. WRIGHT.

Mr. STEWART. Did I introduce the letter to Mr. Max Granich? I want to introduce that. I am not sure whether it is the one I passed out or not.

Senator WATKINS. This particular one I referred to a moment ago will be made a part of the file, but it will not be printed for the moment.

Mr. STEWART. Here is the letter to the Civil Liberties Union which I would like to introduce. I think I have introduced most of the material.

Mr. SOURWINE. The witness was asked about this letter and he stated he had a copy.

It was requested that he supply that copy for the record.

Senator WATKINS. This is "Complete Text of Open Letter to the American Civil Liberties Union." It may be received in the record.

(The material referred to appears at the conclusion of Mr. Stewart's testimony. See p. 2683.)

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a letter which you wrote?

Mr. STEWART. It is a letter of which I was one of a number of signatories.

Mr. SOURWINE. At whose request did you sign?

Mr. STEWART. I have no idea.

Senator WATKINS. But it stated your views?

Mr. STEWART. It stated my views.

Mr. SOURWINE. This material which the chairman has accepted as part of the file of the committee headed "Maxwell S. Stewart Versus the Communist Line—a Comparison" is an analysis prepared by you?

Mr. STEWART. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. That, of course, has already been made part of the file in this case. We will determine later whether we will have it printed or not.

The witness has offered a letter, copy of a letter dated March 18, 1941, to Mr. Max Granich, editor of China Today. That may be received as part of the record.

(The letter referred to appears at the conclusion of Mr. Stewart's testimony. See p. 2670.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that a letter written by you, Mr. Stewart, to Mr. Granich?

Mr. STEWART. It was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you been a contributor to the publication, Soviet Russia Today?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been active in the American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, otherwise known as Indusco?

Mr. STEWART. I was chairman of it for a number of years.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you consider that organization to have been influenced in any way by the Communist Party?

Mr. STEWART. Definitely it is anti-Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you active in the American Society for Russian Relief?

Mr. STEWART. No; I never participated in that organization. I am not sure whether that is Russian War Relief or not, but I didn't participate in any pro-Russian organization of that type.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have just a few more IPR letters taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations which I would like to have introduced in the record at this time.

Mr. STEWART. May I introduce one or more documents in the record?

Senator WATKINS. Yes.

Mr. STEWART. I have introduced this comparative document showing excerpts from my writings. I would like to introduce a lengthy excerpt of an article titled "Luxury or Liberty" in the Nation of 1941 which expresses a position which could not be more strongly opposed to the Communists at that time.

Senator WATKINS. It may be filed.

(The article referred to appears at the conclusion of Mr. Stewart's testimony. See p. 2684.)

Mr. STEWART. I have also an editorial which I wrote, titled "Half Aid to Britain," which was somewhat earlier at that time and again it shows me very strongly opposed to the Communists.

Senator WATKINS. It may be included in the files without at this time being incorporated in the record.

(The document referred to appears at the conclusion of Mr. Stewart's testimony. See p. 2688.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, if the witness is willing, if that is his desire, I suggest that everything he submits here today be incorporated not necessarily into the record but in the appendix of these hearings.

I think we should do that in fairness to Mr. Stewart, who has asked that these things be made available to us.

Senator WATKINS. That will be the order.

Mr. STEWART. I certainly appreciate that.

Mr. MORRIS. I do not think the other letters are very important. We can introduce them in the record at any time.

Senator WATKINS. If there is nothing further, the committee will stand in recess.

Mr. STEWART. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 5:45 p. m. Monday, February 11, 1952, the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

(The following material through p. 2690 was offered by Mr. Stewart:)

MARCH 18, 1941.

Mr. MAX GRANICH,

*Editor, China Today, 168 West Twenty-third Street,  
New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MAX: As I look over the March issue of China Today, I am somewhat perturbed by the general tone of several of the articles.

I should not care if it were not for the fact that my name appears as a member of the editorial board and, as you know, the editorial board has not been called into session for some time. I think this is most unfortunate in view of the change in the tone of the magazine; and, under the circumstances, I think it best that I resign as a member of the editorial board and request that my name be removed from it.

This does not mean that I shall be unwilling to cooperate with you in the future. It merely means that I am unwilling to appear to take responsibility for something over which I actually have no control.

Sincerely yours,

MAXWELL S. STEWART.

MSS:RG  
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#18cio

#### MAXWELL S. STEWART VERSUS THE COMMUNIST LINE—A COMPARISON

Here indicated are statements reflecting the Communist line (principally from the New Masses) as compared with the statements of Maxwell S. Stewart for the same period (principally from the Nation of which magazine he was then an editor for the period 1935-41). Most of the editorial material to which reference is made was unsigned. However, these pieces are so marked in the Nation's files. Since the following report is pertinent to the charges against Mr. Stewart, special emphasis is given to the relative position on collective security, isolationism, economic aid, military preparedness, and the Far East.

(NOTE.—In order to shorten the report, it has been necessary to use excerpts. However, every effort has been made to avoid distortion and to retain the flavor of the entire article.)

#### THE COMMUNIST LINE

#### WRITINGS OF MAXWELL S. STEWART

#### COLLECTIVE SECURITY

1931-35

#### JAPANESE ATTACK MANCHURIA

Communist position on collective security during this period not clear-cut.

During the Japanese attack on Manchuria, 1931-32, Maxwell Stewart took a strong stand in favor of collective security in the pages of World Tomorrow, of which he was a contributing editor.

## THE ETHIOPIAN WAR

## Communist position not clear-cut.

[Editorial in the Nation, September 4, 1935, entitled "Sanctions or war?"]

Mussolini may shake his fist threateningly at Great Britain when the latter talks of sanctions, but if the United States and the League powers take a common stand he will have little choice except to seek a face-saving compromise. Such a stand is the one guaranty against a war that may destroy all that is left of Western civilization.

[Editorial in the Nation, November 20, 1935, entitled "Helping Mussolini Win His War"]

The recent action of the League of Nations Sanctions Committee, adding oil, coal, iron, pig iron, and steel to the list of war materials which should be barred from Italy, makes it little short of criminal for the United States to delay further in taking steps to restrict the export of these commodities to Italy. \* \* \* We are in the unenviable position of being responsible for supplying Mussolini's airplanes and tanks with fuel for their bombardment of Ethiopian villages.

[Editorial in the Nation, December 18, 1935]

It can scarcely be denied that the subject of oil has become the pivot around which all hope of building a system of collective security turns. The effort to create a world organization capable of enforcing the peace may fail, but it must not be because the United States neglected to carry its share of the burden.

## ATTITUDES AFTER RUSSIA ENTERS LEAGUE OF NATIONS

1936-1939

The Communist began to strongly advocate collective security.

The New Masses, July 25, 1939—It is intolerable that adherents of collective security should still be charged with making war \* \* \*. The assumption that the United States can isolate itself from world events is untenable.

Stewart's writings in the Nation continue to support collective security.

## THE EUROPEAN WAR BEFORE THE GERMAN INVASION OF THE SOVIET UNION

September 1939 to June 1941

## THE HITLER-STALIN PACT

[August 22, 1939, editorial in the first issue of the Nation published after Hitler-Stalin Pact]

August 1939: Immediate reaction to Hitler-Stalin Pact in the New Masses confused and indeterminate.

The impact of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact has blown to pieces all international calculation. Its echoes resound as wildly in Chungking and

## THE EUROPEAN WAR BEFORE THE GERMAN INVASION OF THE SOVIET UNION—continued

Tokyo as in Danzig and London. We discuss on a later page the fateful European implications of the agreement. In Asia it may, ironically, have some useful byproducts.

[August 22, 1939, Signed Book Review in same issue of the Nation]

No matter what their personal preferences, the citizens of the democratic states must accept a high degree of totalitarianism if they are to defend themselves against nations that are organized solely for war purposes \* \* \*. We are left with a feeling that what is most needed is a complete change in the mentality and morale of the democratic states \* \* \*. They must realize that essentially the war has already begun.

## GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR

[The New Masses, July 16, 1940]

\* \* \* The New Masses has maintained from the beginning that victory for either side in the imperialist conflict would be a catastrophe for the people of all countries and for the cause of genuine democracy.

[An editorial in the New Masses, October 1, 1940, entitled "Why Vote for War?"]

\* \* \* In our opinion the danger to the American people lies in the fact that a war has developed in several parts of the world. A war whose purpose is the revision of relations among the big imperialist powers, a war for the hegemony over weaker peoples, for the exploitation of colonial markets—an imperialist war \* \* \*.

The real danger arises because the American capitalist class is lusting to participate in this revision of world relations on a basis most favorable to itself \* \* \*.

If the American people are to reject the policy of their own worst enemies who have visited the disaster of crisis and unemployment on American life for the past 10 years \* \* \* it seems to us that we must evolve a foreign policy among these general lines:

(1) *Withdrawal of all economic and political support for one side or another in the present war; the renewal of full neutrality of word and deed.*

(2) The abandonment of economic and military penetration in the hemisphere; the encouragement of industry for the Latin-American peoples, the division of landed estates, develop-

[Editorial in the Nation, September 16, 1939, entitled "American Neutrality"]

In issuing two separate neutrality proclamations, the President sought to dramatize the inconsistency of America's position with respect to the war. The first reflected our determination to remain out of the war, a possibility which is not irreconcilable with our desire for an ultimate allied victory. The invoking of the Neutrality Act, on the other hand, threw the weight of American policy on the side of Hitler. Already its effects are apparent. Approximately half of the 1,400 planes ordered in this country last spring by England and France have been held up by decree. Another 1,500 have been ordered subject to cancellation if the embargo is not lifted.

The President has been outspoken in declaring that application of the arms embargo amounts to strengthening Hitler's hand. By allowing ordinary commercial credits and short-term obligations to be extended to belligerents, he has gone as far as his discretionary power under the act permits to make the burden on the Allies and American business as light as possible. In taking this action the President appears to recognize what should now be clear to everyone—that *we shall have to aid England and France by all means short of war. Defeat for the Allies would seriously undermine American security. It would bring Hitlerism to our very door. Realistically analyzed, our choice is not between aiding or not aiding Britain; it is whether we are to send ample material now or by re-*

## GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR—continued

ment of education, and collaboration with the popular and democratic forces among them.

*stricting this aid increase the likelihood of sending men later.*

[Editorial in the Nation, October 7, 1939, entitled "Embargo Battle Begins"]

*Such a program \* \* \* represents a program of independence from the ambitions of British or German imperialism, independence from the ambitions of American imperialism.*

[The New Masses, December 3, 1940]

Our opposition to a British victory or American participation does not rest \* \* \* on partiality for the other side. The fact is that we do not favor either side. It insults the intelligence, the strength, the power of the American people to say that the choice is support for either side \* \* \*. We are profoundly convinced that none of the problems of Europe will be served by the victory of British imperialism. \* \* \*

The struggle for the revision of the Neutrality Act has begun on the floor of the Senate. \* \* \*

All these changes will make it more difficult for England and France to obtain needed supplies in this country. The sole change of benefit to the Allies is the section placing arms, ammunition, and implements of war on a cash-and-carry basis similar to that proposed for all other exports to belligerents. Some authorities go so far as to insist that the introduction of cash-and-carry restrictions on trade in materials other than arms will more than offset the gains the Allies may expect from the repeal of the arms embargo. Already British and French shipping is being taxed to the utmost. Continued losses from submarine warfare may create such a shortage of ships that the Allies will be unable to purchase needed raw materials, to say nothing of airplanes and other primary war equipment. Limiting credits to a 90-day period, without renewal, may also seriously hamper trade \* \* \*. It now appears that the chief struggle will occur over the section permitting 90-day commercial credit. Although this provision is highly restrictive as it stands, isolationists are determined to bar all credits on the ground that they are inconsistent with the Johnson Act \* \* \*. The prohibition of short-term credits would drastically limit our ability to supply France and Britain with the materials they require. *Any weakening of the Allies, as has been previously suggested in these columns, is bound to intensify the conflict. We trust that regardless of senatorial oratory, Congress will be realistic enough to face the issue in those terms.*

*What is at stake in this war is not the Nation, but capitalism \* \* \*. It is not democracy but imperialism \* \* \* which stands or falls in this war.*

[Editorial paragraph in the Nation, May 4, 1940]

Von Ribbentrop's attempts to defend the Nazi invasion of Norway by accusing the British of harboring similar designs has hardly improved Germany's moral position before the world. There is considerable internal evidence that the documents presented in the White Book are forgeries. George Fielding Elliot, for example, has pointed out 12 ways in which the alleged "operation orders," said to have been found on a British officer captured near Lille Ham-

## GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR—continued

mer, depart from the style stipulated in the Field Service Regulations of the British Army. But establishment of the authenticity of the documents would not greatly aid the Nazi case. For while Von Ribbentrop accuses the British of having planned by April 6 and 7 to send troops to Norway, it is evident that the German soldiers who were landed at Norvik were actually under way several days before this. The German charge, moreover, appears to fall down completely before the fact that a week actually elapsed after the German invasion before the first British troops were landed, and that these landings bore all the earmarks of hasty and inadequate preparation. Nothing is said in the White Book, it may be added, about a British threat to Denmark; yet the Nazi occupation of Denmark was obviously part of the same prearranged plan as the seizure of Norway.

[Editorial paragraph in the Nation, July 12, 1940]

Mr. Stimson understands the risks of active assistance to Great Britain and is well acquainted with the legal difficulties involved in the type of aid which he suggests. *But more clearly than anyone else in public life, he has recognized the danger to our security that will arise if Britain falls and aggression remains unchecked.*

Prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany the New Masses opposed all aspects of defense, including conscription. When the first conscription bill was introduced, the New Masses of July 9, 1940, carried a two-page article on "Every person favoring peace and civil liberties should understand the terms of the Burke-Wadsworth conscription bill."

It began and continued with a long, involved story about John Jones, his father and his 18-year-old brother, all of whom would have to register. It elaborated on every possible eventuality that might happen to them if conscriptions were adopted, stressing the fact that if one of them should "grumble" he might be arrested \* \* \* might be imprisoned for five years and fined \$10,000 \* \* \*.

Passage of the bill puts one phase of M-day into operation.

[Signed article in the Nation, August 3, 1940. (See photostat of this entire article in appendices; it was one of three examples taken from my writings to prove my isolationism.) "Conscripting America"]

*The brutal logic of events during the past few weeks has swept away many illusions long cherished by those who call themselves liberals or progressives. Pacifism has become a luxury which we dare no longer enjoy. Few of us who fought armament bills in the past have come out against the President's recent unprecedented defense program. The fate of France with its Popular Front reforms has even raised the question of how far we dare go in ameliorating working conditions when faced by a potential enemy whose strength is based on a slave economy.*

\* \* \* Let us arm to the limit against Nazi aggression.

[Editorial in the Nation, August 24, 1940, entitled "New Defense Frontier"]

The President's action in arranging with Prime Minister King for the establishment of a permanent joint defense

## GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR—continued

board has gained popular approval on both sides of the border. A few of our isolationists have expressed misgivings at a step which binds the United States in a military pact with a country which is an active belligerent in the European war, but it is generally recognized even in isolationist circles that the United States dare not stand by and allow Canada to fall into the hands of a hostile power \* \* \*. *Our real frontier for the purposes of defense lies in the British Isles.*

[Editorial in the Nation, August 31, 1940, entitled "A Year of War"]

Although isolationists are still vociferous, the widespread approval given to the proposed sale of over-age American destroyers to Britain reflects a striking change in American public opinion. Since the collapse of France, many Americans have come to recognize that our fate as a Nation is closely tied to Britain.

During the entire Hitler-Stalin Pact period 1939-41, the New Masses, as usual, contained no objective reporting of Russia, but instead consistently editorialized its reports of world developments so as to make it appear that Russia was always right, the other nations always wrong.

[Editorial in the Nation, September 22, 1939]

The logic of events might stimulate the western democracies to redouble their aid to China to offset Soviet influence. *In the event of a general European war, the responsibility for preserving China from either Soviet or Japanese domination would fall primarily on the United States.*

[Editorial in the Nation, February 17, 1940]

The Allies seem to be finding it increasingly difficult to regard the U. S. S. R. as strictly neutral but have yet to decide whether they would gain by treating it as an open enemy. Should they take this step and carry Turkey with them, the Caucasus would be the obvious point to strike. The seizure of this region would deprive Russia of its chief oil resources and would be an end to the German hopes of obtaining supplies. At the same time it would check any Soviet attempt to move against the Iranian and Iraqi oil fields or in the direction of India.

[Editorial paragraph in the Nation, September 21, 1940]

The only country in a position to challenge Germany in Rumania is the Soviet Union. But there is little in recent Soviet-German relations to suggest that Moscow is willing to risk war by opposing this step in Hitler's *drang nach Osten*.



## ATTITUDE TOWARD FRANCE AND THE SPANISH REFUGEES

**Background:** After the Spanish War tens of thousands of refugees streamed across the French border and took up asylum in France. They were still there during the Hitler-Stalin pact period.

In 1940 the Communist press launched a vicious attack on France for its treatment of these refugees. (See photostat of *New Masses*, editorial of April 2, 1940.) This was part of overall Communist policy to discredit and attack the western Allies.

In Nation editorials throughout this period Stewart took issue with the Communist point of view, pointing out that France had done and was doing more for the refugees than any other country, and deserved credit and aid—not criticism—for its efforts.

## NEUTRALITY ACT AND LEND-LEASE

The *New Masses* was consistently against repeal of the Neutrality Act and lend-lease. The following excerpt is but one example of many of the editorial approaches taken.

[The *New Masses*, January 21, 1941, "the Lease-Lend Dictatorship"]

\* \* \* What began as a lease-lend plan—by itself an evasion of the Neutrality and Johnson Acts—has emerged as a gargantuan scheme for adjourning representative government and placing in the hands of one man unlimited power to commit acts of war in defiance of the Constitution. \* \* \* It is breath-taking, this soaring blueprint of fascism.

[Editorial paragraph in the *Nation*, December 21, 1940]

Hope for repeal of the Neutrality Act to give increased aid to Britain is heightened by the forthright plea of Representative Sol Bloom.

[November 30, 1940, editorial paragraph in the *Nation*]

This is no time for the United States to play Shylock. If Britain needs credits, we should give them on the most modest terms possible. The least we can do is to make it possible for Britain to fight our battles for us.

[December 21, 1940, editorial paragraph in the *Nation*]

Congress alone has the authority to see that Britain receives the full assistance, short of war, that this country is capable of providing. In view of the emergency, it should face this issue before considering any other legislation.

[January 4, 1941, editorial in the *Nation*, entitled "Tasks Before Congress"]

Foremost among the issues before Congress is, of course, our policy with respect to the war and aid for Britain. \* \* \* The President's radio address has set the keynote, but it remains for Congress to make the basic decisions. It is evident that the Neutrality Act will have to be either revised drastically or repealed. Of the two alternatives, repeal seems the most honest and the safest, since it would restore the traditional basis of inter-

## NEUTRALITY ACT AND LEND-LEASE—continued

national law as a guide for American foreign policy. Repeal of the Johnson Act may not be necessary to carry out the President's plan of sending arms to the British, but it is a bad law, and its existence only serves as an inducement to subterfuge or lack of realism in facing the immediate problems of foreign policy. It should be repealed.

## AID TO BRITAIN

[January 28, 1941, an editorial in the New Masses entitled "A Travesty on 1776"]

1776 is a symbol of the American Revolution, of the great democratic war against British tyranny. Today it has been converted into a symbol of the Roosevelt counterrevolution, of the reactionary war alliance with Britain against \* \* \* Germany and Italy. The new dictatorial lend-lease bill, H. R. 1776, is tagged "liberty, democracy, and antifascism." Its real meaning is booty, power, war, and fascism. \* \* \*

The fundamental lie lies in the concealment of the fact that not German imperialism alone threatens the American people \* \* \* but the struggle for \* \* \* world domination among rival imperialists \* \* \* it is capitalism, the profit lust of a small group of supermonopolists that is the aggressor everywhere. The fascism of Wall Street speaks with brutal arrogance in H. R. 1776. That is why Thomas W. Lamont's Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies is for it.

[April 8, 1941, the New Masses]

On April 5 and 6 several thousand men and women are gathering in New York. They come from all parts of the country to plan peace for the American people. They speak for nameless millions and they stand against America's rulers who have driven our country into virtual undeclared war \* \* \*

[April 8, 1941, the New Masses]

It is admitted, even by many interventionists, that fully 85 percent or 90 percent of our people are opposed to participation in the imperialist conflict. \* \* \* While the majority \* \* \* are against participating, they favor aid to Britain. They do not yet understand \* \* \* that there is a fundamental contradiction of this attitude—that aid to one side in the imperialist struggle must inevitably frustrate those who wish to remain at peace.

[March 8, 1941, editorial in the Nation entitled "Half Aid to Britain"]

*The Senate's delay in passing the aid-to-Britain bill provides a dramatic but tragic illustration of the inability of our legislators to sense either the magnitude or the imminence of the threat to England and the United States from the coming Nazi offensive. It is almost as if there were some fatalistic force which had decreed that in our action in this crisis, as in others, shall be too little and too late. The full force of the Nazi fury is destined to fall in not more than 60 days; every hour counts. There would not be time under the best of circumstances to send Britain anything like all the aid it needs, but every plane, gun, destroyer that can be rushed to the other side will be vital to Britain's defense. And if Britain succeeds in beating off the initial attack, the struggle will have just begun. For it may be assumed that Germany will stake everything on obtaining a decision before the year's end.*

*Few Americans seem as yet to be aware of the amount of aid that must be given if Britain is to survive the year. Germany not only has an immense head start in military and economic preparations, but its armament production is still far and away above that of the British. \* \* \**

The plain fact is that the United States must deliver, as Fritz Sternberg has pointed out in his "Fivefold Aid to Britain," some \$1,000,000,000 worth of supplies to the Empire each month. This is from four to five times what we are now sending. *But we cannot possibly attain the \$1,000,000,000 a month figure unless we are prepared to make drastic sacrifices in domestic consumption. Our preparations for defense so far have proceeded on the assumption that a country like America can have both guns and butter. Any contrary opinion is treated in some circles as a betrayal of liberalism. It is*

## AID TO BRITAIN—Continued

true that if our national income were raised to \$100 billion a year, we could well afford to devote a quarter of it to national defense and aid to Britain and still have sufficient to meet all our normal consumer demands. Such a goal is within our reach, but it cannot be attained in 1941. *And we cannot afford to wait.* \* \* \* The priorities established last week in the aluminum industry are expected to reduce materially the use of the metal in cooking utensils. This is the first and only sacrifice American consumers have been asked to make for defense. It is, of course, wholly incommensurate with what is required. It is time we realized that unless we are willing to deprive ourselves of luxuries now we may be forced to make infinitely greater sacrifices following a British defeat.

[May 6, 1941, the New Masses]

\* \* \* The majority of the American people are waking up from day to day to the realization of what's in store for them . . . (they) now realize that they have been brought to the very brink of war. \* \* \* *And they don't want war.* \* \* \*

The President \* \* \* has gone too far \* \* \* his commitments to the British are already so profound that he cannot retain control over British policy without going the whole hog. Yet it would be fatal to participate in the war bearing in mind this domestic opposition.

[May 10, 1941, editorial in the Nation]

The President's order to the Maritime Commission to assemble 2,000,000 tons of shipping to aid Britain in the Battle of the Atlantic raises hopes that the shipping problem is at least being tackled with the energy it demands. Of course the Maritime Commission cannot create ships, but it can divert vessels used in coastwise or Great Lakes service to overseas service and, if necessary, transfer them to foreign registry. The Lake shipping available is unfortunately limited to ships that can travel through the present St. Lawrence canals. In the case of coastwise vessels the only problem is that of organizing rail traffic to care for the extra burden. The 69 Danish, Italian, and German ships recently seized in our ports will be available as soon as Congress responds to the President's request for enabling legislation. \* \* \* The general practicability of the President's plan for a shipping pool to aid Britain is shown by the speed with which the Maritime Commission obtained the release of 25 tankers for British use, with promise of 25 more within a brief period. Although there has been no confirmation so far of the reported arrival of American ships at Suez, American supplies are known to be getting through to Egypt. This is, at least, a good start in the most crucial phase of defense and aid to Britain.

[June 21, 1941, editorial in the Nation (issued 4 days before the Soviet Union was invaded by Hitler), entitled "Letting Britain Down"]

After the President's words a few weeks ago about the necessity for getting aid to Britain \* \* \* the figures on the first 3 months of the Lend Lease Act were a profound shock. The total value of shipments \* \* \* was \$75 million—very far from the \$1,300 million \* \* \* we were supposed to provide \* \* \* and still farther from the \$1 billion a month which, according to conservative estimates we must furnish Britain if American assistance is to offset German superiority in arms production \* \* \*

#### AID TO BRITAIN RELATED TO AID TO CHINA

[November 19, 1940, an article in the New Masses entitled "New Conspiracy Against China"]

To regard aid to Britain and aid to China as interchangeable or synonymous is a dangerous illusion. The war in Europe is between Great Britain, the greatest imperialist power in the world, and a country \* \* \* ambitious to replace Great Britain in that role \* \* \* while China is fighting for her national independence.

[November 23, 1940, an editorial in the Nation entitled "Aid to China Is Aid to Britain"]

A few months ago many American observers were urging that the United States move its battle fleet into the Atlantic, either as potential aid to Britain or as a protection to the United States in case of a British defeat. With the passing of the danger of an immediate invasion of Britain that argument no longer has even partial validity. On the contrary, it has not become clear that the maintenance of our fleet in the Pacific as a bulwark of a strong far eastern policy is not only highly important to our own defense but essential to the successful defense of Great Britain. In order to maintain its supremacy in the Mediterranean and safeguard Suez, Britain has weakened its far eastern defenses by transferring naval units from the Far East and troops from Australia, New Zealand, and India. Needed troops have also been withdrawn from the defense of the British Isles. Much larger forces are required. Most of these must come from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada by way of the Indian Ocean. But Japan's recent evacuation of important territory in south China and concentration of its forces on the islands of Hainan and Formosa can only be interpreted as preparation for further adventures in the South Seas. There are reports of a Japanese ultimatum to French Indochina which, if accepted, would give Japan an important and needed naval base at Saigon, almost halfway to the East Indies. Faced by this immediate threat, the British dominions will be compelled to keep back forces for home defense, and there is danger that the immense resources of India may be cut off by a Japanese naval blockade.

## AID TO BRITAIN RELATED TO AID TO CHINA—continued

Prompt action by the United States in sending naval reinforcements to the Philippines and at least a small contingent to the vicinity of the Singapore base would forestall this threat. For it is clear that there can be no attack on the East Indies if a strong American naval unit is in a position to cut off the Japanese expeditionary force from its base. Increased aid for China by the United States can also play a large part in checkmating Japan's aggressive intentions in the South Seas. But without at least potential naval support we could not be certain that our shipments to China would reach their destination.

If Japan can be checked, the dominions, together with India, can in all probability take care of the Axis threat to Suez. And *a strengthening of the British defenses in that vital zone offers the best hope of persuading Turkey to throw its resources into the Mediterranean struggle. The cost of all of this to the United States, it will be noted, is negligible as compared with what might be involved if Britain's life-line were severed.* Quite apart from the fate of Britain, it is clearly to our interest to preserve China and prevent Japan from making further incursions in the South Seas which would threaten our vital supplies of tin, rubber, antimony, and tungsten. That such a policy is almost of utmost importance to Britain is our good fortune in this day when choices are usually between evils.

[December 3, 1940, the New Masses, a 2-page spread entitled "Aid to Britain Today, War Tomorrow"]

The title to this article is an accurate indication of the contents. It upheld an isolationist policy on the part of the United States, ending the war as an imperialistic venture.

## REARMAMENT AND LIVING STANDARDS

[October 8, 1940, editorial in the New Masses]

Try as they will to blur class differences and sing "national unity" this armament program is being speeded up in the interest of those who will reap the profits, and not for the masses who will sacrifice their health and well-being, and possibly their lives.

[March 25, 1941, the New Masses]

\* \* \* Hundreds of war contracts have been signed, but between July 1940 and February 1941 just 21 corporations have received amounts of more than \$100 million each. \* \* \* How those war industrialists must laugh now—they who squirmed under Ney's questions a few years ago. \* \* \* Nobody asked \* \* \* "friend or foe?" Certainly not "Democrat or Fascist?" There was just one password: profits.

[August 3, 1940, article in Nation entitled "Conscripting America"]

\* \* \* The fate of France with its Popular Front reforms has even raised the question of how far we dare go in ameliorating working conditions when faced by a potential enemy whose strength is based on a slave economy. \* \* \* Let us arm to the limit against Nazi aggression.

[February 1, 1941, editorial in the Nation]

The conscription of labor in Britain, recently announced by Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labor, seems on the face of it a retreat from the relatively enlightened social policy followed by the British Government in recent months. Yet there are compelling reasons why some such step should be taken. \* \* \* *Some compulsion seems, therefore, defensible as an emergency measure.*

(See photostat of signed Nation article, "Luxury or Liberty?", May 24, 1941.)

## ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINA AND JAPAN

**Background:** There was a united front between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists until the incident of the new Fourth Army in the winter of 1940-41. Following this the Communists became increasingly critical of Chiang Kai-shek and were never again reconciled to his leadership. (See excerpt, the New Masses, February 11, 1941). Throughout these years Stewart in the Nation consistently supported a united China with Chiang as leader. He held that the important thing was unity but urged domestic reforms. At this time everyone—Stewart, Chiang and the Communists were agreed that the United States should not send help to Japan.

[February 11, 1941, the New Masses]

The crisis in China is coming to a head. After last week's report of the massacre of the new Fourth Army leadership on the south bank of the Yangtze River comes a confirmation and "justification" of this action from Chiang Kai-shek himself. \* \* \* We have been pointing out in editorials since the currency loan to China that Washington has the decisive hand in the current crisis.

[January 18, 1941, an editorial in the Nation entitled "China In Danger"]

*The issues which divide the groups are basic and cannot be resolved in the midst of a life-and-death struggle with Japan. But it is clear that whatever happens unity must be maintained. By taking definite steps to extend political democracy within China, Chiang would provide a safety valve for all forms of domestic discontent.* \* \* \*

Of equal importance, if China is to be saved from defeat, are measures to relieve the acute economic situation. Here responsibility falls primarily upon the United States. Immediate assistance on a large scale—or even news that such aid was on the way—would lessen the discontent and prevent a collapse at Chinese resistance.

[October 26, 1940, an article in the Nation entitled "We Need Not Fight In Asia"]

The real danger of our position at the moment lies not in the fact that we have dared oppose Japan's dream of empire, but in the fact that we have not adopted strong enough measures to make our opposition effective. \* \* \* Continuation of a piecemeal policy may well lead to war since the State Department seems incapable of vigorous action which will prevent war. Should we draw back before it is too late? The answer to that can be found in the experience of Great Britain, which has learned that each retreat before Japan's threats is followed by new demands more severe than those previously considered a menace. Appeasement can provide no safeguard against war.

(NOTE.—The title of the above article was cited by the Friends of Democracy as proof of my isolationism—M. S. S.)

## AFTER THE SOVIET-JAPANESE PACT

April 13, 1941

Between January 21, 1941, and March 18, 1941, the New Masses had eight long articles and editorials in praise of China. *In mid-April the Soviet-Japanese Pact was signed.* On April 22, there was a two-page article on the Soviet-Japanese Pact representing it as a great Soviet victory for peace. After this date *The New Masses* almost completely ignored China and Japan except for one mention until June 2, 1941—the date the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union.

[April 29, 1941, the New Masses (a few weeks after the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Pact)]

The pact raises the question of the future of American policy in the Far East. Do the American people realize where a pernicious man like Sumner Wells, an overconfident gambler like Franklin Roosevelt are getting us? Having appeased Japan they now prepare to fight her. They have snubbed the U. S. S. R., tried to buy off Japan at her expense, and now they ask the people to carry on two wars in different parts of the world at the price of their living standard and their lives.

[April 26, 1941, an editorial in the Nation entitled "Will Japan Move South?"]

The week that has passed since the signing of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact has brought only conflicting guesses as to its significance in terms of immediate Japanese policy. Some observers are certain that Japan will take advantage of the pact to launch its long-expected drive into the South Seas. Others seem equally confident that Japan has drawn a blank, and that it is in no better position than before to risk war with the United States.

In view of these conflicting interpretations, the interview with Toshio Shiratori, special adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office, published elsewhere in this issue is worth careful reading. Mr. Shiratori speaks for the extremists who have largely controlled Japanese foreign policy in recent years. He is obviously attempting to make the American people see the logic of Japanese expansionist dreams.

Except for their unusual candor, Mr. Shiratori's remarks follow the pattern of other recent Japanese statements. They represent an effort to appeal to isolationist sentiment by alternating threats with visions of a Greater America which is to coexist with a Greater East Asia and New Order in Europe.  
\* \* \* *The United States still has it within its power to throttle Japan, militarily and economically, by imposing an iron-clad embargo on the export of oil, steel, and other essential war materials.* \* \* \*

## RUSSIA ENTERS THE WAR

June 22, 1941

[July 1, 1941, the New Masses (1 week after Soviet Union has been invaded)]

The mortal issued is joined. A conflict has begun of titanic military and political proportions, a conflict which climaxes and overshadows the successive crises since the First World War.  
\* \* \* While the armed forces of the First Workers Republic test the strength and endurance of the Fascist host, the people on this side of the Atlantic will have the opportunity to test who are the real anti-Fascists.

[September 30, 1941, the New Masses]

\* \* \* It is good to hear from Averell Harriman \* \* \* that hundreds of American planes are arriving on Soviet soil. *But the plain fact is that American aid, both for Britain and the Soviet Union, is still a shadow of what it ought to be.*

## COMPLETE TEXT OF OPEN LETTER TO THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

MARCH 19, 1940.

We appeal publicly to the American Civil Liberties Union to rescind its recent purge resolution as unworthy of its traditions and incompatible with its principles.

In the past, loyalty to the Bill of Rights in America has been the sole requirement imposed by the Civil Liberties Union on its members and its officers, and this should continue as always to be its only criterion. In the two decades of its existence the union has concentrated its energies on one job and one job alone—the defense of civil liberties at home. It has steadfastly refused to go beyond that task. It has resisted, as inconsistent with its fundamental aims, any attempt to involve it in questions concerning civil liberties abroad or forms of government. As a result, it has the broadest kind of support from persons holding all sorts of divergent political views and has kept its ranks undivided by questions with no direct bearing on its purposes. During those 20 years its enemies would have been happy to divert the energies of the union from defense of civil rights at home to endless debate on events abroad. They seem to have succeeded at last.

We believe that by the purge resolution the American Civil Liberties Union encourages the very tendencies it was intended to fight. It sets an example less liberal organizations will not be slow to imitate. It places the prestige of our foremost defender of civil liberties behind the idea that Communists or Communist sympathizers or that infinitely extensible category of "fellow traveler" are properly to be barred from certain types of offices and treated as less than first-class citizens.

The resolution "regards it as inappropriate" for any persons to serve on the governing committees or the staff of the Civil Liberties Union "who is a member of any political organization which supports totalitarian dictatorship in any country, or who by his public declarations and connections, indicates his support of such a principle." This category, according to the resolution, includes not only Communist, Nazi, or Fascist parties but "inactive organizations with obvious antidemocratic objectives or practices, such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Silver Shirts, Christian Front, and others."

These standards are extremely loose and broad. When the Civil Liberties Union opposed the original resolution for the Dies committee investigation, it objected properly that the terms of that resolution were "dangerously vague." But the categories now established by the Civil Liberties Union itself are vague enough to satisfy Dies himself and far more dangerous because they come from an organization whose function is to defend civil liberties.

The real effect of this resolution is to give the union an opportunity to purge itself of Communists and those suspected of any sympathy with Communists. The reference to Nazis and Ku Kluxers and Silver Shirts can hardly be taken seriously since, unlike the Communists, they have never fought for civil liberties in this country. They do not believe in civil liberty here or anywhere else now or at any other time.

They would no more join the Civil Liberties Union than they would the B'nai B'rith or the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The union, by "barring" them from office, has taken a less-than-momentous step.

Furthermore, this resolution, like the type of "loyalty" legislation the union has fought so often, does not confine itself to members of the Communist Party. It applies to all those who support "totalitarian dictatorship" in any country. What is a totalitarian dictatorship? Is wartime France, with its concentration camps, and its rigid controls of fundamental rights, democratic or totalitarian? And is not the American Civil Liberties Union necessarily ruling at those faithful Catholics, who, following the policy laid down by their church, approve the Fascist regimes in Spain and Italy?

The word "support" is never too clear, but what is one to say of the reference to any person who "by his public declarations and connections indicates his support of such principle"? What is meant by "connections" and what are sufficient indications? What are "native organizations with obvious antidemocratic objectives or practices"? What is "obvious" to one man may well be obscure to another. Many of our greatest newspapers have in the past few years denounced the Democratic Party under Franklin D. Roosevelt for "obvious anti-democratic objectives" and the President has often been accused, as have many Presidents before him, of antidemocratic "practices." On the other hand, would



a stockholder in a corporation given to obviously undemocratic practices be barred by this resolution, a stockholder in Girdler's Republic Steel, for instance?

The phrasing of the resolution is dangerous; its context is worse. The Civil Liberties Union was founded in 1920. The Soviet Union was established in 1917 and with it the "dictatorship of the proletariat." We are told that Communists are to be barred from office or employment in the Civil Liberties Union because, while fighting for civil liberties in America, they accept their suppression in Soviet Russia. Why, then, did the Civil Liberties Union wait until 1940 before seeking to bar them?

"The answer," the Civil Liberties Union said in a letter to its friends, "is to be found in the entirely new direction of the Communist movement since the Nazi-Soviet pact." But civil liberties within the Soviet Union were no different before the pact than after. One could not print an opposition paper in Moscow in August 1939, before the pact, or after it, in September 1939. In any case, what does the pact have to do with American civil liberties?

Could it be that the majority of the national committee and board of directors of the Civil Liberties Union is taking sides in the developing European conflict? Is their real objection an objection to the position of the Soviet Union in that conflict? Has that question anything to do with the need for defending civil liberties in America?

The phrasing of the purge resolution is so wide as to make the Civil Liberties Union seem a fellow traveler of the Dies committee. Its context is such as to make it seem that the Civil Liberties Union has been unable to keep its head in the kind of crisis that is the greatest danger to civil liberties.

The Civil Liberties Union is too valuable an organization and too precious a symbol. We ask it to turn back from this far-reaching step away from its traditions. We call upon it to rescind the purge resolution. We urge it to continue itself, as in the past, to civil liberties at home and leave international politics to other organizations.

The Civil Liberties Union has often found it necessary to mobilize public sentiment in order to defend civil liberties. Never before has it been necessary to mobilize public sentiment in order to defend civil liberties within the Civil Liberties Union.

The Civil Liberties Union was formed in 1920 to fight postwar hysteria. It would be a great pity if it were now to become the victim of prewar hysteria.

(Signed by) Robert Morss Lovett, John T. Bernard, Franz Boas, Howard Costigan, Theodore Dreiser, Prof. Henry Pratt Fairchild, Robert S. Lynd, Carey McWilliams, Rev. Dr. A. T. Mollegan, Prof. C. Fayette Taylor, Charles S. Ascher, William T. Cochran, Henry T. Hunt, Gardner Jackson, Maxwell S. Stewart, I. F. Stone, James Wechsler.

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[From the Nation, May 24, 1941]

#### LUXURY OR LIBERTY?

(By Maxwell S. Stewart)

We are about to shift our defense program into high gear. During the first six or eight months after the collapse of France we operated in low. In the past few months we have been in intermediate—gradually gaining speed but still not ready for the all-out effort the President promised. The delays have been inevitable. A year ago the United States did not have, in any sense of the word, an armament industry. Factories had to be built or reconditioned, tools made, raw materials obtained, and the errors and breakdowns that go with any new enterprise overcome. Now that the construction has been completed in large part and production has started, we are faced with the real test of what we can achieve. *For it is plain that if Britain is to be saved, and our own defense assured, we must reach productive heights during these next few months undreamed of a year ago.*

During the first year of the defense program it has been widely assumed that the United States, unlike Germany, could have both guns and butter; that no essential sacrifice would be required. All we had to do, some argued, was to put our 9 or 10 million unemployed to work in the armament industries. We would then have the greatest armament industry in the world without any interference with the production of goods for everyday living. They completely disregarded the fact that the unemployed were mostly unskilled, and that we lacked tools and

equipment for the defense industries. As a matter of fact, we did expand our production of consumers' goods during the period in which our armament program was in low gear. Our clothing and shoe industries operated at well above their 1939 levels. Meat consumption rose sharply, despite higher prices. The production of automobiles in the last quarter of 1940 was more than 30 percent higher than in the last quarter of 1939. This situation continued into the early months of 1941. Consumer purchases of luxury articles increased even more rapidly than production. Instead of making a sacrifice for national defense, the American people as a whole were profiting from it. In that sense they deserved the Nazi gibe of being war profiteers.

Even in money terms America's contribution to national defense and aid to Britain has so far been insignificant in comparison with the contributions made by the British or with those wrung from the German people for war purposes. In the fiscal year just ending we spent approximately \$6 billion for defense. In the coming year the amount may reach \$20 billion. Even this last figure is less than one-fourth of our national income. In contrast, England is spending £4 billion a year, or 60 percent of its total income. Canada also is devoting considerably more than half its national income to defense. Germany is spending at the rate of 72 billion marks a year, or nearly two-thirds of its national income. And this is not half the story. In any discussion of relative sacrifices it must be remembered that the German economy has been on a war basis since 1933. This has given the Reich a tremendous head start. *If the democracies are to win, they must not only match present German armament production—including that of the occupied countries—but they must make up the lead that Germany gained while they slept.* In the long run, American plus British capacity will greatly surpass anything that Germany can hope to achieve, even through the exploitation of the New Europe. However, it is not capacity but present production which counts. The war will, in all probability, be won or lost by production in the next six or eight months.

#### URGENCY AND LIVING STANDARDS

*If we had eight years to build up our armaments, as Germany has had, there would be no reason why we should not have both guns and butter.* A national income of \$100 billion is well within our reach. With a quarter of this devoted to defense, we could have the greatest war industry in the world. And the \$75 billion which remained would give us, at present prices, a standard of living appreciably higher than has yet been attained in this country. But we do not have eight years; it is more a matter of eight months. Barring inflation, the national income this year will be in the neighborhood of \$85 billion. If we are to get \$13 billion worth of defense materials, plus \$7 billion worth for Britain—and these are minimum figures—it is evident that we shall have to cut deeply into that section of our income which now goes to provide consumer wants. In other words, we shall have to curtail our standard of living. The cut, on the basis of the foregoing estimates, would be some \$5½ billion, or about 8 percent. It may turn out to be much greater. It ought to be greater during these next six or eight crucial months. If our aid to Britain and the empire is to offset German arms superiority, it should average approximately \$1 billion a month. It has yet to reach a third of that amount.

Any suggestion that the American people must cut their standard of living provokes a violent reaction in certain circles. By many it is regarded as a betrayal of liberalism. Some even see it as a threat to democracy, arguing that since democracy depends upon voluntary cooperation rather than compulsion, we must demonstrate its superiority by providing both guns and butter. Those who argue in this manner ignore the time element. They either deny or disregard the plain mathematical facts outlined in the preceding paragraph. Yet, to a certain extent, we must admit the truth of what they say. It is clearly against the interest of national defense, to say nothing of the more general objectives of democracy, to impose sacrifices which will undermine the health and efficiency of the American people. The third of the nation which the President has described as ill fed, ill clothed, and ill housed cannot be further deprived of essentials without the basic strength of the country being undermined. Already steps have been taken to improve the diet and housing conditions of these groups in the interest of defense. Further steps will doubtless have to be taken; and this may require some increase in the production of essential articles for consumption.

But there are many ways in which the "American standard of living" can be cut without sacrifice of essentials. It is not only the poor who have benefited from

the wartime expansion of business. The well-to-do have gained as much or more. Net corporation profits, after deduction of taxes, were 27 percent higher in 1940 than in 1939. They have continued to rise in 1941. Although complete statistics are not available, it would seem fair to say, on the basis of such figures as automobile sales, that there has been a relatively larger gain in expenditures for luxury goods than for necessities. It is somewhat startling to find that well over 15 percent of our total manufacturing production last year consisted of what is known technically as consumers' durable goods. These include automobiles, electric refrigerators, furniture, heating equipment, musical instruments, radios, and jewelry. To cut down the production of such goods for a year or two could hardly cause hardship. For we have enormous stocks on hand. There are some 27,000,000 passenger automobiles on the roads today. Half of these are less than five years old, and nearly three-fourths are new enough to possess a substantial amount of unused mileage. The stock of durable goods in the hands of consumers exceeds \$30 billion in value. With this reserve to go on we should be able to divert as much as \$4 billion worth of durable-goods production to national defense annually. To strengthen further the case for such action, it happens that the consumers' durable goods industries are among our most efficient. They possess a disproportionate amount of the country's skilled labor and effectively harnessed horsepower.

#### FOUR WAYS TO CUT DOWN BUYING

More realization that consumer sacrifices are necessary is not, however, enough. Much depends on the way in which they are effected. The four methods most commonly used for limiting consumer purchases in time of emergency are (1) high prices, (2) direct control of production, (3) priorities, and (4) rationing. The first, which is also the one most frequently employed—allowing prices to rise and thus curtail consumption—is the least satisfactory. Although there can be no doubt of its effectiveness, the goal is achieved almost entirely at the expense of the low-income groups. The well-to-do pay the increased prices, grudgingly perhaps, and pare their savings accordingly. This runs counter to the government's plan for financing defense by tapping the savings of individuals. A more serious objection is found in the fact that increased prices under present conditions are bound to lead to inflation. A rise in the cost of living is certain to be followed by demands for higher wages, and any substantial rise in wages would make further price advances inevitable. Thus the cycle of inflation is started.

A much more reasonable method of attacking the problem is for the government to restrict or prohibit the output of the things that compete with defense production. It should take such action regardless of whether the competition is in machine tools, necessary raw materials, or skilled labor. The most obvious example of such competition is that offered by automobiles. Here our record is disgraceful. Whereas Germany stopped the production of private cars in the first week of the war, American automobile production for the week ending May 11, it has just been announced, was 132,000 cars, the highest for any week since 1937. We have been told that production of 1942 models will be cut 10 percent and possibly 20 percent. But why should it not be cut 100 percent?

So far we have been able to conserve crucial commodities for defense uses merely by applying a system of priorities. But although priorities should be rigorously applied to cut down, say, the use of aluminum in consumer goods, they are ill adapted to bring about a general reduction of consumption. They may lead to sudden and marked price increases in the restricted articles; and they cannot bring a general reduction in consumption. They merely divert purchasing power from the restricted articles to others which are perhaps less crucial to the defense effort. If people cannot buy aluminum pans, they will buy some other kind. Enamel ware is, as a rule, cheaper than aluminum, but most people will spend the difference on something else—thus maintaining the total drain on the country's productive resources.

In an effort to avoid undue hardship while effecting a general reduction in consumption, the European belligerents have employed an elaborate system of rationing and price fixing. Although it is perhaps the most satisfactory of the methods commonly used to restrict consumption, rationing also has its limitations. It has the advantage of being fair, but it is by far the most cumbersome and costly means of limiting consumption; and, like priorities, it fails to strike at the root of the evil. For if the amount of money that people can spend for many essential articles is restricted, they will tend to spend the amount they have thus saved for other things, chiefly luxuries and nonessentials—which is precisely what we should seek to prevent.

## THE DIRECT ATTACK

The best way to avoid this is to attack purchasing power directly. This may be done by a combination of three methods: namely, taxation, compulsory savings, and restrictions on consumer credit. It must be noted, however, that curtailment of purchasing power would supplement, not replace, direct cuts in production.

Of the three methods, taxation is undoubtedly the most important. Taxation not only curtails consumer buying power but diverts to the government money that would normally be spent for everyday living, permitting the government to use it directly for defense. This is exactly what we should seek to do. The effectiveness of this method depends, however, on the *kind* of taxes which are imposed. Taxes which fall primarily on the low-income groups are undesirable because they tend to curtail expenditures for food, health, and other essentials while leaving the demand for luxury articles, which are bought chiefly by the well-to-do, virtually untouched. Progressive taxes, on the other hand, such as income, inheritance, and excess-profits taxes, which fall chiefly on the higher-income groups, tend to cut into savings and to restrict expenditures for luxuries. In theory the necessary curtailment in the consumption of durable goods and nonessentials could be accomplished solely through an increase in progressive taxes. But if we are at all realistic, we must recognize that there are definite limits to the tax increase that any Congress will vote. And that limit at the moment is far short of the English tax rate.

Compulsory saving provides a supplementary method of tapping excess purchasing power. This rather unique device was strongly urged upon England at the start of the war by John Maynard Keynes, Britain's most celebrated economist. Keynes early saw that the volume of consumer goods would have to be cut, and urged that the government reduce the amount of money in people's pockets to correspond by deferring a part of the wages and salaries of all persons with incomes above a specified level. By this means he sought to avoid the undesirable social consequences of financing the war by conventional loans. The Keynes plan, in modified form, has been adopted in England. It might well be tried here.

The third approach to the problem is peculiarly adapted to America. It happens that a very large proportion of our consumer purchases, particularly of durable goods, are made on credit. The total volume of consumer credit in the United States is probably well over \$9 billion and may have risen as high as \$10 billion. Automobile financing alone accounts for more than two billion, excluding the cars bought on loans obtained from commercial or personal finance companies and credit unions. Loans to encourage the purchase of household equipment account for another billion or billion and a half. Advances by regulated small loan companies and industrial banks, and the personal loans of commercial banks total considerably more than \$1 billion—of which a large part is used to finance retail purchases. Since the total production of consumers' durable goods is less than \$6 billion a year, it is safe to say that more than half of these goods are sold on time. It seems therefore that restrictions on consumer credit would go a long way toward achieving the cut in consumer expenditures that is necessary to match cuts in production. And the reduction would take place precisely in the area where it is most desirable.

## NO MORE INSTALLMENT SELLING

Complete elimination of installment selling would seem justified under the circumstances. We might start, however, by outlawing it in certain fields, such as in the sale of new automobiles. In addition, a very considerable reduction in the amount of consumer credit could be effected if banks were compelled to curtail their advances to the various consumer-credit agencies. Most of these agencies are dependent on the commercial banks for a considerable proportion of their funds. Possibly as much as one-third of all our consumer credit rests on short-term bank loans. Since the banks are already subject to strict control by the Federal Reserve System, restrictions on this type of loan would be relatively easy to apply and enforce.

To be fully effective the restrictions on the banks should be supplemented by direct limitations on installment credit. It would be desirable, for example, to stiffen the requirements for down payments. Or the length of time allowed for payment might be cut. If a down payment of 50 percent were required for all installment purchases and the length of the repayment period were cut in

half, it is probable that a 50-percent reduction in installment sales could be effected. In automobiles alone this would mean a reduction of \$1 billion a year in sales. The total curtailment in the demand for durable goods would probably be nearly twice this amount.

A similar tightening-up process might be applied to charge accounts and cash loans. Department stores could be instructed to insist on all charge accounts being paid within thirty days. Since most accounts run considerably longer at present, such a provision would bring about a substantial contraction in the volume of time sales. Restrictions on cash loans present somewhat greater difficulties. In some instances they might cause real hardship. But inasmuch as personal loans are often used as a substitute for installment financing, some kind of parallel limitation is clearly necessary. Shortening the period of repayment would perhaps be the least objectionable means of achieving this purpose. An increase in interest rates would hardly lead to any appreciable reduction in the number of loans, and would place an undesirable burden on many needy families.

The only objection to restrictions on consumer credit is that their effectiveness may be temporary. Given time, many families could save up enough money to pay cash for a new car or a new refrigerator. And since they would save interest and installment charges, they would have more money than ever to spend. But it would not always work out this way. Experience has shown that most families simply do not save for large expenditures unless they are compelled by some such device as installment selling. Barred from instalment purchases by rigorous down-payment requirements, such families would probably spend more for food, clothing, health, and other day-to-day necessities. This, of course, would work in the interest of national defense. In general, the families which are able to pay cash for large purchases are to be found in the high and upper-middle income groups. Left to their own devices, they would undoubtedly spend a substantial part of their income for automobiles and other types of durable goods. Spending of this type could be discouraged by imposition of a heavy tax—possibly as much as 100 percent—on such articles, compelled to by some such device as installment selling. Barred from installment

*Adequate defense cannot be secured if our desire for comfort must be pandered to. Even less can we furnish the aid which Britain and China so desperately need and which we must give them for the sake of our own future. Unless we deprive ourselves voluntarily of needless luxuries at this time we may find ourselves compelled to make vastly greater sacrifices later on—sacrifices comparable to those imposed on the populations of the Axis countries.*

#### HALF AID TO BRITAIN

(By Maxwell S. Stewart)

[From the Nation]

The Senate's delay in passing the aid-to-Britain bill provides a dramatic but tragic illustration of the inability of our legislators to sense either the magnitude or the imminence of the threat to England and the United States from the coming Nazi offensive. It is almost as if there were some fatalistic force which has decreed that our action in this crisis, as in others, shall be too little and too late. The full force of the Nazi fury is destined to fall in not more than sixty days; every hour counts. There would not be time under the best of circumstances to send Britain anything like all the aid it needs, but every plane, gun, or destroyer that can be rushed to the other side will be vital to Britain's defense. And if Britain succeeds in beating off the initial attack, the struggle will have just begun. For it may be assumed that Germany will stake everything on obtaining a decision before the year's end.

Few Americans seem as yet to be aware of the amount of aid that must be given if Britain is to survive the year. Germany not only has an immense head start in military and economic preparations, but its armament production is still far and away above that of the British. With the addition of the resources of the conquered territories, Germany has achieved a capacity for steel production that is approximately double that of Britain. America's resources are infinitely greater than those of Germany and the rest of Europe combined, but our shipments to Great Britain, though well above the peacetime level, are infinitesimal when compared with Germany's advantage. *And they have been declining in recent months.* The peak in American exports to Britain was in August when they reached approximately \$125,000,000. September recorded

a decline to \$103,000,000; in October they were \$107,000,000; in November \$102,000,000; and December was the worst month of all, with but \$101,250,000. Even at the August rate, the volume of American deliveries to the British Empire was less than the economic gain which Germany is deriving, month by month, from the conquest of France. If the advantages gained from the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Holland, and Belgium are taken into account, it is clear that Hitler is drawing twice as much from the conquered territories as England and the Empire are obtaining from the United States.

The plain fact is that the United States must deliver, as Fritz Sternberg has pointed out in his Fivefold Aid to Britain, some \$1,000,000,000 worth of supplies to the Empire each month. This is from four to five times what we are now sending. And this is not a need to be fulfilled in 1942 or 1943 when the arms program gets fully under way. The need will be greatest during the next few months; after that we can perhaps afford to slacken up a bit. But we cannot possibly attain the \$1,000,000,000 a month figure unless we are prepared to make drastic sacrifices in domestic consumption. Our preparations for defense so far have proceeded on the assumption that a country like America can have both guns and butter. Any contrary opinion is treated in some circles as a betrayal of liberalism. It is true that if our national income were raised to \$100,000,000,000 a year, we could well afford to devote a quarter of it to national defense and aid to Britain and still have sufficient to meet all our normal consumer demands. Such a goal is within our reach, but it cannot be attained in 1941. And we cannot afford to wait. Barring inflation, the maximum national income likely for this year is \$85,000,000,000. If we are to get \$12,000,000,000 out of this for Britain and another \$10,000,000,000 or \$12,000,000,000 for our own defense, it is obvious that we shall have to sacrifice some of the luxury goods we otherwise would consume. Germany stopped the production of private motor cars the day that war started. England took similar action last fall. But the United States, supposedly in the midst of a gigantic effort to build up its defenses, turned out more cars in January and February than in the corresponding months of any of the past few years. The priorities established last week in the aluminum industry are expected to reduce materially the use of the metal in cooking utensils. This is the first and only sacrifice American consumers have been asked to make for defense. It is, of course, wholly incommensurate with what is required. It is time we realized that unless we are willing to deprive ourselves of luxuries now we may be forced to make infinitely greater sacrifices following a British defeat.

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HAGUE, N. Y., April 6, 1944.

DEAR RAYMOND: I shall be willing to read the Borg manuscript, and also the Chu one if, in fact, it is ready to be read, which I doubt from the way you write about it.

I could see Miss Borg at the Roosevelt Friday morning about nine-thirty if that is convenient for her. Then we could talk about it at lunch if there is anything to say.

Maxwell Stewart's booklet seems to cover very well the ground about the internal conditions in China. Probably the Chinese will not like it but it seems to me that he almost went out of his way to give all the extenuating circumstances and to qualify the criticisms. It ought to do some good even in Chungking. There may be enough new developments between now and the end of the year to require some additions or supplements to the text but I should suppose it would do for the documentation for the next conference. It's about the best booklet I have seen out of the IPR.

Affectionately,

(Signed) TYLER.

(Longhand note to MSF and MAS:) Tyler is not prone to make comments of this sort—I know, having been around him these many years. I think you are due a bow!—R. D.

DECEMBER 15, 1948.

Miss MAUDE RUSSELL,

*Executive Director, Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy,  
111 West Forty-second Street, New York 18, N. Y.*

DEAR MISS RUSSELL: I have just noticed that my name is listed on the "Spotlight" as a "consultant." Will you please see that it is removed. At no time have I ever been "consulted" about any aspect of the magazine's content or policy, and I feel that it is both misleading and unfair that my name should be listed. I have come to feel that one's name should be associated only with work in which one can actively participate and I am not in a position to participate in the committee's activities.

Yours sincerely,

MAXWELL S. STEWART.

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9309 TWENTY-FIFTH AVENUE,  
Jackson Heights, L. I., N. Y., December 6, 1948.

Mr. LOUIS F. BUDENZ,

*Dean's Office, Fordham College,  
New York 58, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. BUDENZ: You and I have never happened to meet nor have we had any contact with one another. And in a sense that is the reason for my writing to you.

In a letter written by Alfred Kohlberg to William Bullitt, Mr. Kohlberg quotes you as informing him that I am a member of the Communist Party. Since you were at one time a leading member of that party and were, I assume, in a position to be acquainted, by name at least, with the prominent people who were members of the party, you must know that there is no basis for such a statement so far as I am concerned—for I have never in any way been connected with the Communist Party.

I should appreciate any light you can throw on the origin of this misstatement.

Sincerely yours,

MAXWELL S. STEWART.

# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 3:15 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur V. Watkins, presiding.

Present: Senator Watkins.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in session. The record will show that we have already held the executive session and that we are now holding an open session or public session.

Mr. MORRIS, have you any witnesses to be sworn?

Mr. MORRIS. Just Professor Poppe, and as he has already been sworn in executive session, Senator, there would be no need of his taking the oath in open session today.

Senator WATKINS. The record will so show.

## TESTIMONY OF PROF. NICHOLAS N. POPPE, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE, WASH.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Poppe, will you give your full name and address to the reporter?

Mr. POPPE. I am Nicholas N. Poppe, spelled P-o-p-p-e; born 1897 in Che Foo, China. I got my education, primary, secondary, and university education in Russia. I was professor of oriental languages in Leningrad, and a visiting professor.

I came sometimes to Moscow where I had an opportunity to see people in various Communist universities.

Mr. MORRIS. What are you doing now?

Mr. POPPE. At the present time, now, I am professor of Far Eastern languages of the University of Washington in Seattle, Wash.

Mr. MORRIS. Where you a professor in the Soviet Union?

Mr. POPPE. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you give us some of your more notable positions that you held in the Soviet Union; just the outstanding ones, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. I was a full professor of the University of Leningrad from 1925 to 1941. I was simultaneously full professor of the Institute of Oriental Languages at Leningrad which first, at the beginning, was an open university or school for everybody and, after 1930,



became a Communist high school for training Soviet agents of the foreign office, trade, and so on, for oriental countries. I was simultaneously corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, and the head of the Mongolian Department of the Academy of Sciences.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your specialty, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. My specialty is Far Eastern languages. Those comprise Mongolian, Tibetan, Turkish; and I have also a certain knowledge of the languages of the natives of Manchuria; and of the history and literature of the names of peoples.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now, Professor, as such, you were a full-fledged Soviet professor who was empowered to teach and train Communist students?

Mr. POPPE. I was after a clearance, as everybody had to undergo such clearance. I was admitted, or to say it better, I remained in that school which from a usual one was transformed into a Communist one. Some people were purged and removed from there.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Professor, when did you come to the United States?

Mr. POPPE. I came in 1949.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1949?

Mr. POPPE. 1949.

Mr. MORRIS. Who helped you come to the United States?

Mr. POPPE. It was the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party, Professor Poppe?

Mr. POPPE. No, I have not been.

Mr. MORRIS. You have never been a member of the party?

Mr. POPPE. Never have been.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Poppe, we are engaged in an investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations and in the possibilities of whether there were forces at work influencing our far eastern policy. We have had testimony before this committee that the Institute of Pacific Relations was putting out pamphlets which stated that the Chinese Communists were not, in fact, real Communists.

Mr. Mandel, will you point out portions of these pamphlets that have come up in recent days along those lines?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from a pamphlet entitled "China Yesterday and Today," by Eleanor Lattimore, edited by Margaret Ann Stewart and published as a cooperative project by the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and the Webster Publishing Co., on page 108:

When we speak of the Chinese Communists we should remember that they stand for something rather different than what is ordinarily meant by the word "Communist." They are not advocating the Russian system for China and, unlike the Russians, they maintain the system of private property and enterprise in the areas under their control.

Mr. MORRIS. And one other one, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. This is from a pamphlet entitled "Wartime China," by Maxwell S. Stewart, published by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, page 45:

As China is not like any other country so Chinese communism has no parallel elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other countries and you can also find resemblances to the "grass-roots" populist move-

ments that have figured in American history. Because there is no other effective opposition party in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many progressive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx or Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Communists as "agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices."

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Poppe, have you been in a position to testify today on the question of whether or not the Chinese Communists have in fact been real Communists?

Mr. POPPE. I have not testified to this fact, but I can do it here.

Mr. MORRIS. I say are you prepared to testify here today?

Mr. POPPE. I am, yes. It is incorrect to say that the Chinese Communists are not real Communists. They are Communists, but the communism in China is at the present time in another stage. It is in its initial stage when any Communist revolution is in the first place an agrarian revolution in undeveloped countries where there is no industry.

In industrial countries it takes immediately the shape of a proletarian revolution with 5-year plans, slave labor, and so on. In agrarian countries the Communists have to solve problems which usually are solved in other countries by democratic revolutions.

A democratic revolution gives freedom to the peasant, abolishes slavery or serfdom, and gives the peasant the farmer's land. This was achieved in Russia in 1870. This was achieved at the beginning of the past century in Germany, and so on, but it was never achieved in China because China lived in feudal conditions and only through revolution at our time could solve this problem.

It happens that the Communists were the first to handle this problem.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, the question addressed to you though was were the Chinese Communists in fact real Communists?

Mr. POPPE. They are.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. First of all, I could observe the coming into existence of the Communist Party of China. It is known that at the beginning of 1920—say 1919 and 1920—there was no Communist Party in China. Very soon after the Russian revolution the Soviets under Lenin discovered that Communist revolution in the west would not be possible.

The Bavarian and Hungarian Republics collapsed, and thus the only hope was to try elsewhere. In China the situation was favorable because China lived at that time in a peculiar condition created by the inequalities with other powers. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who tried to create a new order for China, did not get much help from the outer world.

It was Lenin who offered him the recognition of the new order in China, the abolition of the inequalities concluded by the Czarists Government with the Chinese Government, and so on, and, when Sun Yat-sen asked him to help him to organize his party, it was Borodin who was sent to China to help Sun Yat-sen officially, but in reality to divert the development of the Kuomintang Party from its line to a Communist line.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, in your teaching were you able to observe Chinese Communists being trained in Moscow?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, I shall testify on this subject. In 1921, two special schools were established in Moscow. One was the Stalin University of the Toilers of the East. The other was the Chinese University of Sun Yat-sen, the Sun Yat-sen Chinese University.

There is a brief statement about the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in the small Soviet encyclopedia in volume 4, page 455:

The Communist Stalin University of the Toilers of the East established in Moscow on April 21, 1921. Its task is the training of qualified party workers from the ranks of toilers of the eastern nationalities who are able to apply the methods of Marxism, Leninism to the practice of the revolution in the struggle of the Socialist system. The Communist University consists of the sectors of the Soviet and non-Soviet East. In the first sector representatives of 72 nationalities receive training. Since 1926, a scientific research association has been connected with the university which published the journal *Revolutionary East*.

I may add that this university, the University of the Toilers of the East, had in its ranks Communists from all the eastern countries except China. The Chinese Communists were trained in the Sun Yat-sen University. That was established at the same time.

The subjects studied at that university were Marxism, Leninism, the History of the Russian Communist Party, the History of Imperialism, the History of the Colonial World Under Imperialism, elements of Marxist philosophy such as dialectic materialism, and also economics.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, approximately how many Chinese Communists per year would be trained?

Mr. POPPE. 1,000 Chinese Communists were accepted every year. The course was 2 years and, after a study during 2 years, they graduated and were sent to China where they established local study groups and local schools so that the training of the Communists both in Moscow and in China by the graduates from that school was something which can be compared to a geometric progression.

During 20 years it was about 20,000 graduates from the Moscow University alone.

Mr. MORRIS. From the Sun Yat-sen University?

Mr. POPPE. From the Sun Yat-sen University.

Senator WATKINS. When did that start?

Mr. POPPE. In 1921, it started. I have fortunately got here in the Library of Congress a list of the publications of the Sun Yat-sen University. This pamphlet should be translated, I think, fully, but I shall give only a few titles of books and articles published by them.

Senator WATKINS. What language is it in now?

Mr. POPPE. This is in Russian.

Senator WATKINS. What you are attempting to do now is to give some translations and quotations?

Mr. POPPE. I will give you a translation of a few titles of books published by them, if necessary.

Senator WATKINS. Were you in a position to know what was going on in this university?

Mr. POPPE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Suppose we do that later. We would like to get the personalities first. Could you tell us who some of the Chinese Communists were who were trained there in Moscow?

Mr. POPPE. Li Li-sian.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know Li Li-sian was trained in Moscow?

Mr. POPPE. Because I saw him.

Mr. MORRIS. You saw him. Who else?

Mr. POPPE. The writer, Emi Siao.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that E-m-i S-i-a-o?

Mr. POPPE. Yes. E-m-i is his first name. S-i-a-o is his last name.

Mr. MORRIS. Who else, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. The first one was Li Li-sian. Shall I spell the next?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, please.

Mr. POPPE. L-i L-i-s-i-a-n.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Chou En-lai trained in Moscow?

Mr. POPPE. No; I don't think so. He came for short times, but he never got a training as a regular student.

Mr. MORRIS. But you saw him in Moscow, however?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, on several occasions. Oh, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he there on official Communist business?

Mr. POPPE. He came to the Comintern. He came to the University of Sun Yat-sen to see his people being trained there, and offered to attend some important party meetings.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he was there on official Communist Party business?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, of course.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mao Tse-tung?

Mr. POPPE. Mao Tse-tung came occasionally for very short times, several times, but he never studied there.

Mr. MORRIS. He used to visit Moscow on official Communist business?

Mr. POPPE. Before the Long March, which was in 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you therefore testify, Professor Poppe, that the Chinese Communists were, in fact, trained in Moscow?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, I can.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it fair to say that your testimony that Chou En-lai or Mao Tse-tung, were not trained there, but participated in the training and had regular party meetings and conferences in Moscow?

Mr. POPPE. They delivered, of course, some speeches to the Chinese students there, so that, if this is part of training, they did train.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, when these Communists finished their training in Moscow, did they go back and engage in various Communist Party assignments in Asia?

Mr. POPPE. Yes. There they created cells, trade-unions. Some of them became political commissars in the Chinese Red Army. Some of them were workers, carrying on the so-called land reform in the Soviet-occupied parts of China, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the NKVD, which is the Soviet security organization, oversee the training of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. POPPE. No. It was the Comintern. They were only checked by the NKVD, of course, but NKVD did not train them.

Mr. MORRIS. That was a Comintern operation?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, a Comintern operation.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in a position to observe the NKVD school in Moscow?

Mr. POPPE. No; I did not. This was a very complicated matter. People, mainly Russian subjects, went for training, say in far eastern matters, and then, after they got knowledge of the languages and the conditions in the countries concerned, they were sent to special NKVD schools, where they were trained only on matters as to how to carry out subversive activities, and so on.

But I have not finished my testimony about the Chinese Communists.

Some of them, a large group, was also trained in the Leningrad Tolmachoff Academy.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you mind spelling that, please?

Mr. POPPE. T-o-l-m-a-c-h-o-f-f. That later on was moved to Moscow and became known as Lenin Academy. That was the political academy of the Red Army. They trained only political commissars, the Russian and Foreign Red Armies. Among other subjects they had to study also the organization of guerrilla warfare and the barricade warfare in various countries.

This became known to me because one of the people who was teaching Russian to Chinese students there happened to see a map of Berlin, and on another occasion, of Tokyo, with red and blue circles, and crosses, and so on, and, when he asked one of his students about the meaning of those maps, he was answered "These are the strategical points in Berlin" and so on; where it would pay to build barricades, in the event of a revolution. So this was part of the curriculum that was carried on there, but not in those universities, the University of the Toilers of the Far East, or Sun Yat-sen, because those trained only civilians.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Could you tell us approximately how many students were trained each year on the Tolmachoff University?

Mr. POPPE. Well, the Chinese group was not very large, about 50 students every year.

Mr. MORRIS. About 50 every year?

Mr. POPPE. Fifty; yes. The others were Russians and various nationalities. There were at least 3,000 students.

Mr. MORRIS. Were any of the other Asiatic nations represented in the Tolmachoff University?

Mr. POPPE. Yes—Turks.

Mr. MORRIS. Japanese?

Mr. POPPE. Japanese—well, very few, but they were also mainly Chinese.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever an adviser to the Red Army, Professor Poppe?

Senator WATKINS. Before he leaves that, may I ask at what time was this Tolmachoff Academy operating, about which you are testifying?

Mr. POPPE. Well, that is around 1935 to, say, 1940; 1934, '35 or '36.

Senator WATKINS. I notice that you referred to Berlin and Tokyo.

Mr. POPPE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. What was the Tokyo situation? What were they teaching there?

Mr. POPPE. They were teaching also in the event of revolution in Japan, that there would be street fighting, as to where the Communist organizers should place the machine guns and build their barricades, so everything was done for the event of a possible revolution. Those barricades in Tokyo, as it is known, were never used, were never built.

Senator WATKINS. What about the people who were to carry it out? Were there some Japanese there?

Mr. POPPE. Japanese, yes; and Russians also.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you finished?

Mr. POPPE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever an adviser to the Red army?

Mr. POPPE. Well, only at one occasion, when, after the fights on the Mongolian and Manchuko frontier, the Soviets, the Mongols, and the Japanese created a Mixed Frontier Commission in the city of Chita, in eastern Siberia, where they met and discussed the frontiers, but there was evidence that the frontiers were where they were supposed to be, and the Japanese claimed they were further to the west, the Soviets claimed they were further to the east, and so on; and after all those controversies, General Bogdanoff came to Leningrad and to the Oriental Institute, discussed this matter with the party secretary and the latter introduced me to him, and told him that I was an expert on those areas. So I was told to take all the old ancient maps of the eighteenth century, drawn by French Jesuits in the eighteenth century, Chinese and Mongolian maps made in the early nineteenth century, and so on, and compare where the frontier was; and I was a bit surprised that the Soviet claims were justified.

Mr. MORRIS. You think they were justified?

Mr. POPPE. They were; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In the creation of that map, Professor, did the NKVD take any interest in your work at all during that time?

Mr. POPPE. Not in these maps, of course, because they were not drawn by me and they were not for publication, but, in general, mapping and publication of maps is controlled by the NKVD. The only agency publishing maps and permitted to do so is the chief geographic and geodetic department of the NKVD. They check all the maps and publish them, even an archaeological map. For instance, I added an archaeological map to one of my books, and that map had to get first an approval of the NKVD because the cities, the frontiers, and also some other points there were indicated there.

Mr. MORRIS. Well now, Professor, do you remember the rather large-scale project that was undertaken by the Soviet authorities, to produce a Soviet world atlas?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, I do remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that, please?

Mr. POPPE. Well, the atlas is an enterprise on a very large scale, and a special publishing house was created to compile and publish that atlas. It was Professor Motylev who headed that atlas.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us who Professor Motylev is?

Mr. POPPE. Professor Motylev is a party member.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that he is a Communist Party member?

Mr. POPPE. A Communist Party member, and an economist; not a physical geographer, a scientist of very little significance, but an outstanding party organizer, and a man who knows how to run an organization under Soviet conditions. He was trusted greatly and he was ordered not to compile, because he himself alone was not able to do this, but to establish a group which would compile that atlas, and to supervise the publication of that atlas. The result of that work was published in 1937. It is a big Soviet world atlas, technically done

very well, but, as anything in the Soviet Union, it had also to comply with the Marxist-Leninist line of thinking.

Senator WATKINS. At this point, may I ask you this question, Professor: Did you obtain what you are testifying to now by some personal contact with this man that you have mentioned, this very able party organizer, or is that just a general reputation?

Mr. POPPE. It was his general reputation. I did not know him personally. It was his general reputation, that he was an outstanding organizer.

Senator WATKINS. Did you know about this work that he was doing through some personal contacts with it?

Mr. POPPE. Of course, I knew how they were doing this work because lots of people were working there, and I know also the publication itself. I have seen it. I have used it, and so on. I know what that atlas is.

Senator WATKINS. Do you have a copy with you?

Mr. POPPE. It is here. It is a wonderful piece of work, technically, very beautiful; and the work was started very early in the early 1920's, and at Lenin's request. Lenin ordered that a large atlas be published, which would go along the Marxist-Leninist line, which would show the world as divided by the imperialists and as exploited by the imperialists, and so on. This volume contains in its first part the physical geography of the world in general, the hemispheres, and suns and stars and so on; and then the Soviet Union. There we find maps of everything, the plants and animals and population, and industry and so on.

Senator WATKINS. Did you produce that atlas here? That is apparently volume I.

Mr. POPPE. Only one appeared. The second has not appeared as yet.

Senator WATKINS. Did you produce it or did you get it from the Library of Congress?

Mr. POPPE. That is the property of the Library of Congress, I guess. This is not my copy.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you get this particular copy?

Mr. POPPE. Mr. Mandel gave it to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify where this volume came from?

Mr. MANDEL. This volume of the Soviet great atlas comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Mr. Motylev was in fact associated with the Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. POPPE. Yes; he was.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. POPPE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that his reputation in Moscow was that he was predominantly a Communist Party man rather than a scientist?

Senator WATKINS. How could you ascertain that? Was it generally known?

Mr. POPPE. It was generally known. Of course, I have not seen his identity cards showing whether he was a party member or not, but it was known; it was generally known that Professor So-and-so is an

outstanding party member. Professor So-and-so is a nonparty member.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he referred to in the Soviet press at the time as a party member?

Mr. POPPE. The press never identified anybody. It was never said, for instance, by the Russian newspapers, that someone was a party member or was not; but it was known. For instance, every week they had party meetings and, of course, some people were permitted to attend them and the others were not. So, of course, obviously, those who were permitted, it was only the party members. Sometimes they had open meetings; then everybody attended them.

Senator WATKINS. Did you ever attend any of these meetings?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, of course, I attended also some open meetings, when I was told to do so, because a very important matter had to be discussed.

Senator WATKINS. Did you take part in the discussions?

Mr. POPPE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Did you attend any of these meetings that were not open?

Mr. POPPE. No; never.

Mr. MORRIS. That was open for party members?

Mr. POPPE. Only for the party members, and sometimes even for the bureau members alone, so even the party members did not know everything.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Professor, do you know a man named Voitinsky?

Mr. POPPE. I know him very well. Voitinsky is an outstanding Communist, a member of the Comintern, a man who played a very important role in Chinese affairs. He in his youth was an organizer of parties of guerrillas against the White Russian armies in Siberia. Later on he became a member of the staff of the Soviet Foreign Office, and played a very important role in the far eastern development. Then he became one of the directors of the Communist Academy which later on was merged with the Russian Academy of Scientists, and became the nucleus of the future Academy of Scientists. He was also the director of various institutes in the Academy of Sciences, chief editor of the magazine *World Policies and World Economics*. He is the right-hand of Stalin's number one economist, Varga.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, would you tell us whether he was himself a Communist party man?

Mr. POPPE. He was a party man, a member of the Comintern, and in 1936 and 1937 he conducted a purge of the Academy of Sciences, and many people who worked together with me in my institute, my assistants, were purged, simply in consequence of his accusations.

Senator WATKINS. What do you mean by purge? What was the purge?

Mr. POPPE. It was in 1936 and 1937, in connection with Stalin's destruction of Zinoviev, Borodin, and all the other well-known Communists. A great purge was started in all the agencies, and all the universities, and so on. I can only say, to give you an idea of what it was in my Institute of Oriental Study, that we had 94 scientists and 37 of them were arrested and disappeared forever; 37 out of 94.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was that, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. 1937; Voitinsky delivered a speech in our institute where he severely criticized this man and that man, and so on, and a few



days later there was the elimination of all those people. So he was the one who gave the green light for those arrests.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, do you know that this same Mr. Voitinsky was an official of the council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. POPPE. He was; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you know that, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. It was known because he was listed among the members in printed editions of that institute, and also in the magazine published by the Institute of Pacific Relations here in the United States, the Pacific Affairs. There, among the members of the foreign directors, the managers of the foreign branches, Voitinsky was mentioned as a member of the Soviet Union, the representative of the Soviet Union in the Pacific Relations Institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Kantrovich?

Mr. POPPE. I never met him, but I read many papers written by him, and articles. Later on he fell into disgrace and disappeared, was eliminated.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether he was an official of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. POPPE. Yes; he was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in order to bring this down to the subject under which the investigation has been carried on, I think it would be appropriate at this time if we would introduce into the record several reports from the files that we have of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which show the relations between the American representatives of the Institute of Pacific Relations and these persons about whom we have been discussing today.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed in that manner.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document for us, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Memorandum of informal conversation at the Communist Academy, Volkhonka 14, Moscow, May 26, 1934."

I read sections of this:

The following were present: Voitinsky, Abramson, Barnes—  
which might be Kathleen Barnes—

Carter. Voitinsky served for a time in the revolutionary movement in China. Abramson studied in the University at Vladivostok. \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. There is nothing to indicate that that is Kathleen Barnes?

Mr. MANDEL. Except that that is the period when she was in Moscow. It corresponds with this period.

Then it states:

Carter and Barnes invited Abramson to write an article for the September Pacific Affairs. \* \* \* They invited Voitinsky to write for the December issue on the land problems on Soviet China. \* \* \*

Mr. Voitinsky said that he believed the IPR could be of very great help to him in getting information and printed reports. \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. Have you seen this document before today, Professor Poppe?

Mr. POPPE. I think I have seen the photostat which Mr. Mandel is reading.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; that is the one he has in his hand. Could you supplement the information on this report in any way for the committee? I mean, do you know Mr. Abramson, who is mentioned there?

Mr. POPPE. Yes; I knew Abramson.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Abramson an official of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. POPPE. I think of the Russian branch of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. That is what we mean.

Mr. POPPE. Yes, he was.

Mr. MORRIS. You know nothing, however, about this particular meeting, do you, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. I don't know anything about this meeting, and the matters discussed here are not of primary importance from my viewpoint.

Mr. MORRIS. And therefore you would have no occasion to know of these things.

Mr. POPPE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. But you do know who Mr. Voitinsky and Mr. Abramson who are mentioned in this report are?

Mr. POPPE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the same Mr. Voitinsky that you are talking about?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, it is the same. I know his first name is Gregory and his second name is Nahum.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 430" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 430

#### MEMORANDUM OF INFORMAL CONVERSATION AT THE COMMUNIST ACADEMY, VOLKHOVKA 14, MOSCOW, MAY 26, 1934

The following were present: Voitinsky, Abramson, Barnes, Carter. Voitinsky served for a time in the revolutionary movement in China. Abramson studied in the university at Vladivostok, has lived in China, and speaks and reads Chinese.

1. Carter and Barnes invited Abramson to write an article for the September Pacific Affairs on the romanization of Chinese. They invited Voitinsky to write for the December issue on the land problems of Soviet China or the land problems of China generally.

2. Discussion took place regarding the invitation which Carter and Barnes had extended to the librarian of the Communist Academy Library to prepare each quarter an eight-page bibliography of the more important books and articles written in the Soviet Union on the problems of Soviet Asia, the Far East and the Pacific. Pending conversation on May 28 between Carter and Barnes on the one hand, and the present Communist Library librarian and bibliographer on the other, it was proposed that the librarian of the Communist Academy prepare the bibliographical notes for Pacific Affairs, but where critical appraisal of the more important books or articles was desirable, that these should be undertaken by those in the Communist Academy who, like Voitinsky and Abramson, have expert knowledge of the Far East.

3. Mr. Voitinsky said that he believed the IPR could be of very great help to him in getting information and printed reports on the following subjects:

(a) The inner situation in Netherlands India—the economic interdependence of the peasant and the city worker, and also the interdependence of these on capital and trade in Holland. The whole situation as portrayed in official documents in Netherlands India and in Holland would be of the greatest interest to the Communist Academy. The academy would also welcome information on the nationalist movement in Netherlands India. At the moment the academy has no Dutch-speaking member, but could easily get all Dutch documents translated.

(b) He would appreciate all the information the IPR can send him regarding the agrarian movement in Japan and the financial dependence of Japan on other countries. He would like to compare Lenin's thesis on Japan, which he feels is stated in algebraic terms transformed into arithmetical terms, through a study of finance and trade. He would like very much more information than is at present available on the evolution of the labor movement and the close relation between the village and the city. He believes that it is desirable to study the middle class of Japan, which he understands contains a large number of people who simultaneously fulfill the roles of landlord, petty manufacturer, and small money lender, constituting for Japan a distinct class of "petite bourgeoisie." Freda Utley has done some work in this field, but Voitinsky is eager to have very much more. The Communist Academy is placing very much more emphasis in the historical background in Japan and in other countries than formerly. Voitinsky wants more studies of the Character of the Meiji Restoration (1868). Some in the academy believe that the prevailing Japanese historical interpretation of this period is inaccurate and misleading, just as they believe that Korean history as interpreted in Japanese-inspired textbooks is inadequate. They believe that this may be true of Japanese-inspired textbooks in Manchoukuo.

(c) Voitinsky wants both economic and historical material on the Japanese colonies.

(d) Both Voitinsky and Abramson would like copies of Rajchmann's China report to the League of Nations and in fact copies of all the material which the League has on China. They want to get a copy of an economic report made for the Nanking government by League experts of economic and social conditions in the province of Kiangsi.

(e) Abramson spoke of the difficulty of getting certain Chinese publications which are not properly listed or which for a variety of reasons have a limited circulation.

4. Voitinsky reiterated his willingness to cooperate in securing articles for Pacific Affairs. He could see no possible objection in principle to members of the academy furnishing articles. Carter and Barnes explained that normally articles should be of 4,000 words and that the standard fee for such articles was \$50. They emphasized that they wished to have the academy apply three criteria to such articles: First, that they be orthodox from the Communist point of view; second, that they are to be written by the very best authorities; third, that they be important and of general interest.

5. Carter referred to the new atlas of China which he was taking to London with a view to discovering whether an English edition was possible. Voitinsky said that an English edition would be of greater value than the Chinese edition. Carter undertook to send Voitinsky a copy of the large Chinese edition as soon as it was formally published, and also a copy of the English edition if and when published. Mr. Abramson accepted the invitation of Carter and Barnes to visit Mr. Carter's room in order to inspect the new Chinese atlas. This Mr. Abramson did.

6. Mr. Barnes, in passing, mentioned one aspect of the language problem of the IPR and took occasion to refer to basic English and its important role in facilitating the work of those who desire quickly to get a knowledge of normal English.

7. Mr. Voitinsky expressed interest in Lattimore's forthcoming book on the Mongols.

8. Mr. Carter expressed the hope that it might be possible for the IPR to have in Moscow for a part of each year an IPR representative with a knowledge of Russian who might continue to develop the interchange of books and articles which had been started by Mr. Barnes. Both Mr. Voitinsky and Mr. Abramson spoke with sincere appreciation of Mr. Barnes' helpfulness, his good command of Russian and his genuine acceptability. They promised to give the same cooperation that they had given to any qualified IPR representative whom Mr. Carter might send to continue the work which Mr. Barnes had begun. Mr. Abramson agreed to accord the facilities of the library in the academy to any fully qualified research workers from any of the IPR countries who had a working knowledge of Russian and who came with Mr. Carter's credentials.

9. Mr. Voitinsky expressed the hope that it might be possible for the IPR, apart from its formal publishing program, to appoint correspondents in different countries who might supplement more formal studies by individual reports. Mr. Barnes was not certain that a satisfactory system for such reports could be easily arranged.

10. Mr. Abramson indicated that on the occasion of Mr. Carter's next visit to Moscow he would like to see him and would do all in his power to facilitate the objects of his visit.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this as a paper taken from the Institute of Pacific Relations' files?

Mr. MANDEL. This is the original of a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Report of visit of Secretary General to Moscow," which would be presumably E. Carter, dated December 20-31, 1934."

In this document is mentioned:

Dr. V. E. Motylev, the chairman, as director of the Great Soviet World. \* \* \* Voittinsky, the vice chairman, as head of the Pacific Ocean cabinet of the Communist Academy—

and others.

Mr. MORRIS. You will notice here that the chairman of this meeting was Dr. V. E. Motylev. He is listed here as the chairman and director of the Great Soviet World Atlas. Is that the same Mr. Motylev about whom you have been testifying?

Mr. POPE. It is the same.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. S. S. Joffe?

Mr. POPPE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. A. S. Swanidze?

Mr. POPPE. I only heard about him. I read something. He was not a scientist at all. He was director of a bank and, if I am not mistaken, was involved in those financial business, so that I don't know much about him, but he was an outstanding party member as he was one of the Soviet heads of the finances in the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you read sections of that report, bearing on the Soviet atlas?

Mr. MANDEL. This paragraph is from page 14 of that report. It says:

The aim of the atlas is to give a Marxist-Leninist cartographic picture of the world, i. e., a comprehensive picture of the epoch of imperialism and particularly the period of the general crisis of capitalism.

Mr. Morris, to show the importance of this atlas in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, I have a review here of the atlas by Owen Lattimore and I would like to read a paragraph, if I may.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, do you think that appropriate at this time?

Seantor WATKINS. You may do so.

Mr. MANDEL. This is from the September 1938 issue of Pacific Affairs, review of the Great Soviet World Atlas.

Senator WATKINS. Published by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir; and this a review signed by "O. L.", and I read one paragraph:

The historical message, in short, of which special mention is made in the introduction, is extended to demonstrate the superiority of socialism as practiced in the Soviet Union with the deliberate purpose of arrival at a future communism over the capitalism of the rest of the world. The method, it must be conceded, is formidable. It is not vulgar propaganda, but scientific argument on a plane that commands full intellectual respect.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you finished reading from that, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, could you tell us whether or not any elements of propaganda crept into the preparation of the atlas?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, of course; much propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about that, please?

Mr. POPPE. Well, first of all the atlas gives not always a true picture of the world, and the maps themselves are propaganda. For instance, there is one map which shows Outer Mongolia. It is my field. I know Outer Mongolia very well, and, therefore, I am entitled to mention this country in the first place.

One of the maps shows the world as economically dominated by various imperialist countries.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "dominated" exactly what do you mean by that?

Mr. POPPE. Just exactly what they mean; that a country is economically being exploited by imperialist countries. The imperialist countries get raw material from their invested capital.

Mr. MORRIS. How does a chart or map show that?

Mr. POPPE. Various colors, red, green, blue, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. Give us a concrete example.

Mr. POPPE. For instance, the United States is amber, and countries being exploited by the United States are also amber or they are striped with amber, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you indicate that on that particular page there?

Mr. POPPE. On this particular page, Outer Mongolia, is a country completely absorbed and integrated in the Soviet economic and political system. It is a Soviet satellite, but instead of presenting it in the same color as the Soviet Union, they give it the yellow color, as China, with those amber stripes, which means that the United States import and export from Outer Mongolia.

This is not true. Outer Mongolia had a trade with the United States. By 1926 or very soon after—I even knew a man by the name of Carter. He was a representative of one of the American firms there in Outer Mongolia. He was expelled by 1929 or 1930 from Outer Mongolia, just as all other foreigners were, and the atlas was published in 1937, after the last American had been expelled from Outer Mongolia. And Mongolia is shown as a country trading with the United States, for instance.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that published?

Mr. POPPE. 1937. So it was 10 years after the expulsion of the foreigners from Outer Mongolia.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there other instances such as that?

Mr. POPPE. There are other distortions, of course. For instance, let us take one of the railroads which existed in reality here in the Soviet Union by 1935 or 1936, but which is not shown here, and that railroad was vital for the Soviets during the Hitler invasion. I will find this map here—

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, while Professor Poppe is looking for that, I would like to have introduced into the record this letter which Mr. Mandel will identify as a document taken from the files of the institute.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed with its introduction.

Mr. POPPE. Here is a railroad which is not shown here. From here [indicating] to here [indicating]. This railroad is not shown. It is very important, strategically and economically.

Mr. MORRIS. Pointing from 35° to 40° longitude, on what page?

Mr. POPPE. 163. This line was cut by the Germans here [indicating] and nevertheless the supplies rolled from here along this line to this line, to Moscow. You see, the lend-lease Liberty vessels came here.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony then that this map, as it is presented in this atlas, is not an accurate map?

Mr. POPPE. It is not accurate.

Mr. MORRIS. You know from your own experience that there is a railroad there, not depicted.

Mr. POPPE. Yes, I know.

Mr. MORRIS. What reason do you give for that not being on this map.

Mr. POPPE. That is strategically important, and it could not be shown for everybody; and a scientific atlas should be more accurate, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. Your testimony is that this is not an accurate atlas in that certain important and strategic railroads are not listed therein?

Mr. POPPE. I would formulate it so that things which should not be known to everybody are not shown here in this atlas.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this last letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "ECC" presumably E. C. Carter, to CH-s, presumably Chen Han-seng, dated April 18, 1938.

This is a big day in the life of the IPR for the first volume of Dr. Motylev's great Soviet World Atlas has today arrived. Two precious copies have come, one addressed to Holland and one addressed to me. Here, for your close perusal for a few hours is Holland's copy. Keep it safely and see that it is locked up at night.

Senator WATKINS. Who is CH-s?

Mr. MORRIS. Chen Han-seng.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 431" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any other evidence of Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the world geography or history in that atlas that you would care to call to our attention, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. Yes. For instance, there is a map, the Imperialist Division of the World, the penetration by the Imperialists, from the year so-and-so to the year so-and-so, and there are various such maps.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Mr. POPPE. Several.

Mr. MORRIS. That you have noticed in this particular volume?

Mr. POPPE. Yes. The red slips here show the pages.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the organization Voks?

Mr. POPPE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us what that was?

Mr. POPPE. V-o-k-s, spelled in Russian. This was the old union organization for the cultural relations with other foreign countries. Its aim is the purchase of foreign literature and publication of that literature in the Soviet Union; second, exportation of Soviet literature; third, invitation of important scholars, artists, painters, musicians, dancers, and so on, from other countries; let them travel and make their performances, and so on; and the same also for the Soviet dancers and singers going abroad.

This agency would not invite the first, the best, person, no matter how important or artistic he was. Of course, they checked him thoroughly and only after they got an approval from the NKVD, they could invite him and send him tickets and so on. The importation of foreign literature was, of course, important, because we did not get foreign currency and we, the scientists and other intellectuals, could not get literature from abroad, and besides it was a bit dangerous to get books directly from our foreign colleagues. Therefore, this was a very fortunate solution of the problem. Foreign professors, of course, sent their books to that organization, and the organization forwarded it to people whom those books might concern.

Once I got a letter from the French Professor Haganower, who wrote me that he was sending his books and articles through Voks. Then there came a phone call from the Voks and they said:

We have got some books for you and we shall forward them to you tomorrow, but two items could not be forwarded for censorship reasons. They will remain here, but we would appreciate it very much if you fully acknowledge the receipt of all of the books.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Professor, did you know a man named Arosev?

Mr. POPPE. He was the head of Voks.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that Voks was the organization that had general supervision over the exchange of literature between various countries?

Mr. POPPE. Literature and people.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to call your attention to the fact that our exhibit No. 37 in part 1, at page 187, which represents the minutes of the founding meetings of the Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R., taking place on July 28, 1934, in Moscow, that there were present at that meeting, we have (1) the president of the institute, Prof. V. E. Motylev, about whom we have testimony today; vice president, Mr. Voitinsky, about whom we have had testimony here; and No. 3, Mr. I. S. Arosev, chairman of the Society for the Cultural Relations with Other Countries.

He is the gentleman about whom you have just given testimony?

Mr. POPPE. He is.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us whether or not, Professor Poppe, you know anything further about the exchange of books with the United States, for instance?

Mr. POPPE. Well, I don't know exactly what their activities were in this field.

Mr. MORRIS. You just know the general nature of Voks; is that right?

Mr. POPPE. I know the general nature, because I myself got my books from France and Germany through them.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, was that operation supervised by the Communist Party?

Mr. POPPE. Yes; of course it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it highly political or cultural?

Mr. POPPE. In the Soviet Union everything is political because the scientists and the students were always told that there is no science outside of policies. All science is political and so also they considered the culture as part of their policies.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the last few days we have been having testimony in connection with the exchange of books and the exchange

of information engaged in between the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I wonder if you would receive into the record today several of these letters? Mr. Mandel, will you identify them as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed with the introduction of these letters.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy, the actual carbon copy, which comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

This document is dated January 23, 1939. It comes from the San Francisco address, addressed to "Dear Harriet" that being addressed to Miss Harriet Moore from Bruno Lasker.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the pertinent paragraph, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

DEAR HARRIET: After receiving your letter of the 16th, I went to see Mrs. Isaacs to find out to what extent we could perhaps rely on the San Francisco office of your institute to supply us with literature about the Soviet Union for our exhibition. \* \* \*

and further comment—

\* \* \* of next importance from the educational standpoint are, of course, the periodicals, and I am very grateful to you for your offer of the American Quarterly of the Soviet Union, and of the Bulletin of the Soviet Union—

and then he asks for further Soviet literature.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that be received into the record?

Senator WATKINS. It may be received into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 432" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 432

1795 CALIFORNIA STREET, SAN FRANCISCO

JANUARY 23, 1939.

Miss HARRIET MOORE,

*The American Russian Institute,  
56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR HARRIET: After receiving your letter of the 16th, I went to see Mrs. Isaacs to find out to what extent we could perhaps rely on the San Francisco office of your institute to supply us with literature about the Soviet Union for our exhibition. Although Mrs. Isaacs has been most helpful, it appears that the help we can expect from her is exceedingly limited for two reasons: First, that she herself does not have very much of the Russian literature in her institute library; and second, that she must keep the little she has on hand, particularly in a year when, like every other institution in San Francisco, the ARI must expect a larger number of visitors than usual, some of them intent on serious study.

Mrs. Isaacs will, however, from time to time supplement what I can get from publishers for special temporary displays with loans from her excellent library on Russia and the Soviet Union in English, and whatever else she may have, including the atlas which apparently no one else in San Francisco can afford to buy.

Speaking about the atlas, do you happen to know whether the edition planned with Cressey's captions and notes in English is likely to come out this year, or have you any other suggestion as to how I might obtain a copy of the atlas for the duration of the exhibition?

Of next importance from the educational standpoint are, of course, the periodicals, and I am very grateful for your offer to send us copies of the American Quarterly of the Soviet Union and of the Bulletin of the Soviet Union. You are quite right that not only current numbers but also back files would be of use, if the back numbers could be kept together in some sort of folder or loose-leaf cover.



The real difficulty begins, however, when I am inquiring for copies of Soviet Russia today, Soviet Land, the U. S. S. R. in Construction, and Creative Art; perhaps also the monthly Arctic Periodical. Apparently, since at Mr. Carter's suggestion I am not attempting to get these periodicals through official sources, one would have to get them from the New York offices of the SRT publications, Bookniga and Voks, but I am a little afraid that any letter from me would receive no attention at all in these quarters. Some of these periodicals actually have had special numbers relating to the Far East and to Siberia. There is also an illustrated ethnographic journal, and, above all, there is International Literature in English. Some years ago that journal had a magnificent article on the modern development of Japanese literature (the finest thing of the sort I have ever read, full of sly humor and yet informative and reliable).

Apparently, the Soviet Union is getting out a good deal of material in English without attempting to propagate it except through commercial channels. This may be a virtue, especially when compared with the hideous generosity of the Japanese and Manchukuoan Governments, but it means that the great majority of the American people never see anything at all printed in the Soviet Union.

Although this may not perhaps appeal very much to your scholarly mind, I believe one of our first functions is to acquaint the American public with the fact that good books are published in Russia, books that can be enjoyed by people irrespective of their social or political creed. If it were at all possible, therefore, I should like to feature some of those beautifully printed and illustrated books that have come off the Soviet presses in recent years, even though possibly the subjects of some of them may not bear directly upon the Pacific. For example, I would go a little beyond the boundary to include the wonderful Prince Igor book in a display of books on the legends of Pacific peoples. I might even stretch a point and sneak in a really beautiful book about European Russia in a special display on folk arts or the like.

Considering how strong the anti-Communist feeling still is here on the coast, I would, if I were a propagandist for better relations, use such books as I have named as a first step to associate the minds of even ordinary people with something other than purges, armaments, and steel works when they think of the Soviet Union.

The point of all this is to inquire whether, in some way or other, you could not secure for our book exhibition a representative sample of literature, both books and periodicals, printed in Russia and as far as possible relating directly to Siberia and the Pacific, but also including more general works perhaps, if outstanding examples of good book-making.

Enclosed is a copy of the form letter which I wrote for you in December, but which I did not send at that time because I wanted, first, to find out whether it might not be possible to secure works from the Soviet Union without giving you so much trouble. Not knowing how easy or how difficult it may be to comply with our wishes as expressed above, but being quite convinced that you will do your best, may I not leave this whole problem in your lap? If you cannot secure anything of use for our purpose, I shall feel that, even through direct correspondence with the various commercial Soviet agencies, I could not have done better. But perhaps you can secure at least some significant contributions, or persuade someone to lend us the back numbers of some of the periodicals I have named.

Yours very sincerely,

BRUNO LASKER.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have another?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated November 21, 1934, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to "Dear Harriet," presumably Harriet Moore, signed by Edward C. Carter.

Excerpts from this letter read as follows:

Yesterday I received your cable reading as follows: Send complete list institute publications. Have asked me for specific answers to questionnaire sent to you. Especially interested in exchange of publications and afraid you uninterested. General answer desirable now. Details when you arrive. Moore.

Last evening I cabled you in a cable as follows: Mailing you list gathering publications rapidly as possible. Profoundly interested. Tell Kantorovich his publications should be sent Pacific Council, New York, not Honolulu \* \* \*

and further on:

This morning I have included in a cable to Field the following message: "Moore Moscow cables Kantorovitch eager have you send books promptly, your memorandum November 8." Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, would you receive that in the record? Senator WATKINS. It may be received in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 433" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 433

CHATHAM HOUSE,

10 St. James' Square, London SW. I., November 21, 1934.

DEAR HARRIET: Yesterday I received your cable reading as follows:

"Send complete list institute publications. Have asked me for specific answers to questionnaire sent to you. Especially interested in exchange of publications and afraid you uninterested. General answer desirable now details when you arrive. Moore."

Last evening I cabled you in a cable as follows:

"Mailing you list gathering publications rapidly as possible; profoundly interested. Tell Kantorovitch his publications should be sent Pacific Council New York not Honolulu. Writing. Carter."

Last evening also I sent you by air mail two copies of the latest printed list of IPR publications. With this letter I am sending two more. Enclosed also is a copy of Fred Field's memorandum to me of November 8, which is simply for your information, and need only be made known except in general terms until the system is working. This morning I have included in a cable to Field the following message:

"Moore Moscow cables Kantorovitch eager have you send books promptly your memorandum November 8. Carter."

At the meeting of the IPR committee at Chatham House yesterday I presented the first two parts of the following statement:

COOPERATION WITH THE NEWLY FORMED SOVIET GROUP

The new Soviet group has offered to collect and send to the Pacific Council's library a complete set of all publications in the U. S. S. R., books, booklets, and magazines, on the Pacific and the Far East. Most of these, of course, are in Russian. In return, the Soviet group expects that the IPR will supply them with a complete set of all publications issued by the institute and by the different national groups affiliated with it. My request to you, therefore, is that—

(1) You may consider making available a full set of Chatham House publications bearing on the Far East and the Pacific, to begin to serve as the nucleus of the British section of the Moscow library of the IPR.

(2) I would like to meet a few members of Chatham House and others in the United Kingdom who are specializing in the problems of Soviet Russia today, more particularly including those who are studying Soviet, far-eastern, and Pacific questions.

(3) I venture to hope that ultimately it may be possible for Chatham House to secure as a staff member someone with an intimate knowledge of present-day Soviet Russia and a mastery of the Russian language. Such a staff member, preferably rather highly trained in the field of economics, would be of value in making available to Chatham House the results of far-eastern Soviet research and in communicating to the IPR headquarters in Moscow, in the Russian language, such contribution as the Royal Institute has to make to scientific work in the Soviet Union.

The third I will discuss at a later meeting. With reference to part 1, the committee expressed general approval but said that the Chatham House shelf was now so long that the request must first be considered by the finance committee and then by the publications committee. It is perfectly clear that a good many of the Chatham House publications will be available, but it is not certain whether there will be a sample of everything, for example, the big History of the Peace Conference. They assured me that every one of the Chatham House publications are in the library of the Communist Academy in Moscow. Professor Webster, who supported my proposal, emphasized the importance of having at least two sets of Chatham House publications in Moscow and urged affirmative action. If

Chatham House should run into some snag, I suppose some of the Chatham House publications would be provided by Field if coming within the scope of his memorandum to me of November 8. I could, of course, get a substantial discount on all Chatham House publications, but I feel pretty optimistic with reference to getting a favorable decision from Chatham House within the next fortnight.

Having changed the depository for the Pacific Council's Russian library from Honolulu to New York makes it psychologically slightly more difficult for Chatham House to donate a long shelf of expensive books to Moscow when all Russian volumes that are to be sent in exchange are to be housed in the office of the American Council. I have explained that the library, though housed there, will be maintained as the Pacific Council Russian library and that the American Council is providing for the library full service and cataloging and that the American Council is paying one-half of the salary of the special deputy librarian of the Russian section.

Of course, I am hoping that the Soviet group will send some important books to Chatham House. There are three members of the Chatham House staff who can read Russian titles, two of whom can read Russian well.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Poppe, did Voks also supervise the travel of individuals?

Mr. POPPE. Yes; they did. And I remember very well I had great difficulties when the Finnish scholar, Professor Kechtunan, came together with another professor, Professor Posti, to Leningrad.

They wanted to travel in an area populated by various Finnish people and tribes, and they were permitted only to travel in one area, but not to go to another area, and by Voks I was told, "Please try to dissuade them from going to that area. We would not like them to go to that place."

Mr. MORRIS. Who would make a determination as to whether an individual should go to, say, Mongolia?

Mr. POPPE. It would be NKVD and the Russian foreign office.

Mr. MORRIS. Would that be planned by Voks?

Mr. POPPE. Voks could not decide what foreigner could go to another foreign country. Mongolia is, officially, a foreign country.

Mr. MORRIS. Were explorers allowed into Mongolia?

Mr. POPPE. After 1926 they were not allowed. I remember there was in 1926 Roy Chapman Andrews from the Field Museum, the noted paleontologist, and geologist, from the United States. And the other was also in 1926, the painter, Roerich, who established a museum in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. They were allowed to go into Mongolia?

Mr. POPPE. They were, in 1926. Then, prior to that time, Dr. Lindgren, a Swede, was there, but after 1926 nobody was permitted.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. I know because a colleague of mine, the Hungarian Ligati, was not permitted to go to Mongolia; so, he had to go around the whole world to China, and then from there into Chinese Mongolia, but not into Soviet Mongolia.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would receive into the record at this point a letter which Mr. Mandel will identify as having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Mandel, would you read the first few paragraphs of that.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed with that matter.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated September 12, 1937, addressed to Owen Lattimore, from Edward C. Carter.

This is to report on my conversation with Motylev regarding your trip to Mongolia. Motylev is as eager as ever to have you make the trip. He wants to arrange things so that you and he can go together. Because of exceptionally heavy pressure on him in connection with completing the next page of the atlas, this year is quite out of the question for him to go to Mongolia. Had he been free, he would have come to the Soviet Far East to meet me, but atlas pressure tied him to Moscow. He sent Bremman, the Secretary-General of the U. S. S. R. Council, who speaks Japanese, and Krasavtsev, who speaks Chinese. As one is a party member and one a nonparty member and each has had the richest kind of personal experience, both in the Soviet Union and in the Far East, they made an exceptionally useful, delightful, and informing combination.

As I think you know, Motylev arranged for me to go to several places in the Soviet Far East to which no non-Soviet citizen has ever been invited. The people in the British and American Embassies in Moscow were most envious, and wanted to use my visit as a precedent to get permission to go to places like Komsomolsk themselves. It seems that the justification for my going was as the chief executive of an international organization, in which a representative Soviet scientific organization is an active member.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, have you any comment to make on the two facts in those paragraphs; namely, that Mr. Motylev had invited Mr. Lattimore to make a trip to Mongolia, and the other one that Mr. Carter was taken to several places in the Soviet Far East to which no non-Soviet citizen has ever been invited?

Mr. POPPE. I don't know whether Mr. Motylev invited Mr. Lattimore to make that trip. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. You see, the second sentence here is: "Motylev is as eager as ever to have you make the trip."

Mr. POPPE. I don't see here an indication that he had invited him. He was perhaps simply anxious to get permission for him after having received an application from Owen Lattimore; so I don't know. Who applied first? Was it Motylev who offered that trip or Owen Lattimore, who had asked about permission to go to those countries? But, anyhow, I know that trips to Mongolia were connected with extreme difficulties, and in 1937, although I was not only a Soviet citizen, but I was also head of the Mongolian studies in Russia, I was not permitted to travel to Outer Mongolia. I did not get the traveling pass.

Senator WATKINS. Did you try to get one?

Mr. POPPE. Well, the president of the Academy of Sciences asked me to go to Mongolia. I was not quite well. I was very reluctant, but he said "Go, go, go." I made an application and there was a refusal from the NKVD—"No pass for you."

Senator WATKINS. Did they give a reason?

Mr. POPPE. They never give reasons.

Senator WATKINS. They just denied it?

Mr. POPPE. Simply denied it.

Senator WATKINS. Does this have any significance to you: that Owen Lattimore was able to go on this trip?

Mr. POPPE. I don't know whether he went on it. I only see in this paper that there was a conversation about a trip to Mongolia, but whether he had succeeded in getting permission to go to those places or not, I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether or not when Lattimore did, in fact, subsequent to that time, go to Mongolia, after 1937?

Mr. POPPE. After 1937. I read in one of his articles that he had gone to Ulan Bator, the capital of Outer Mongolia, from China to Moscow, but it seems to me that it was during the war.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any other direct knowledge, other than Mr. Lattimore's writings, of whether or not he went to Mongolia?

Mr. POPPE. He does not mention in those books which I have read, his trip to Outer Mongolia. He has lots about Mongolia.

Mr. MORRIS. You see, Professor, his books are accessible to this committee, and we can learn from those books whether or not he said that he went to Mongolia. But do you, as a matter of fact, know whether or not Mr. Lattimore ever went to Mongolia?

Mr. POPPE. In those books, the situation in Asia or the inner Asian frontiers of China, and so on, in all those books, it is the travel in Mongolia. And there is also a book, *Across the Desert*, or something like that, and he mentioned Mongolia, but it is always Inner Mongolia, belonging to China, and not controlled by the Soviets.

Mr. MORRIS. Apart from his books, Professor, do you know from your own experience whether or not Mr. Lattimore ever went to Mongolia?

Mr. POPPE. In one of his articles——

Mr. MORRIS. Not from his articles; do you know from your own experience?

Mr. POPPE. No; I don't know anything. I only read this one article, that he had passed through Ulan Bator, the capital of Outer Mongolia, during the war.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, has this last letter been introduced into the record?

Senator WATKINS. I do not know, but it may be, if it has not been.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 434" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 434

HOTEL RICHMOND,  
*Geneva, September 12, 1937.*

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,  
*33A Ta Yuan Fu Hutung, Peiping, China.*

DEAR OWEN: This is to report on my conversation with Motylev regarding your trip to Mongolia. Motylev is as eager as ever to have you make the trip. He wants to arrange things so that you and he can go together. Because of exceptionally heavy pressure on him in connection with completing the next stage of the atlas, this year is quite out of the question for him to go to Mongolia. Had he been free he would have come to the Soviet Far East to meet me, but atlas pressure tied him to Moscow. He sent Bremman, the Secretary-General of the U. S. S. R. Council, who speaks Japanese, and Krasavtsev, who speaks Chinese. As one is a party member and one a non-party member, and each has had the richest kind of personal experience both in the Soviet Union and in the Far East, they made an exceptionally useful, delightful, and informing combination.

As I think you know, Motylev arranged for me to go to several places in the Soviet Far East to which no non-Soviet citizen has ever been invited. The people in the British and American Embassies in Moscow were most envious and wanted to use my visit as a precedent to get permission to go to places like Komsomolsk themselves. It seems that the justification for my going was as the chief executive of an international organization in which a representative Soviet scientific organization is an active member.

Motylev had been planning to go to the Nanking meeting of the Pacific council and was hoping that if this were possible he might be free soon after to go to Mongolia with you.

Now, of course, the war situation makes the future for him and the institute most uncertain, so that for the time being it will be a good scheme for you to

make your plans for next year in such a way that, if Motylev can go to Mongolia and if the war situation makes it possible for him to get your permit and for you to go, a Mongolian trip would be a possibility. But, until we know more than we do now as to the duration and consequences of Chinese resistance and Japanese endurance and Soviet involvement, there is nothing to do but keep plans flexible as you and I have formed the habit of doing during recent years.

With reference to Pacific Affairs the atmosphere was totally different from that which characterized our discussions when you and I were in Moscow. At that time, you will remember, Motylev was on the offensive, particularly because of the Isaacs article and relationship. This year Motylev and Bremman were not even on the defensive. They humbly admitted that they had not carried out their promises to you and me and their obligations to the institute and that there was no use of their offering the excuse that it was difficult to get Soviet citizens to write for Pacific Affairs when neither of them had themselves found time to write articles. They wanted me to explain to you that they were thoroughly ashamed of their failure to send articles and they made the most solemn kind of resolves to themselves write and send you something in the near future.

I told them that both you and I wished that the Voitinsky article had been sent to Pacific Affairs instead of being published in Tikhii Okean. I said that we both felt that it was precisely the kind of article that we wanted in Pacific Affairs, whereupon Motylev meekly admitted that Voitinsky had written the article especially for Pacific Affairs, that Bremman and Voitinsky were keen to have it sent to you, but that Motylev felt that the other councils would regard it as too provocative and tendencious and so had it shifted to Tikhii Okean. Bremman, of course, was delighted that you and I sided with him. I think that the incident has this value that Motylev now has a concrete example of what we all would like from the Soviet Council in Pacific Affairs.

Bremman, who at that time had only seen the first issue of Amerasia, felt that the policy of the magazine promised to be defeatist and that, instead of educating American public opinion in the realities of the Far East situation, it was likely to intensify the ostrichlike attitude of the American people and the American Government. I told him that I felt sure that both you and Fred would welcome incisive criticism of Amerasia, in case they wished to contribute an article on the subject to Pacific Affairs. I cabled Fred to send Motylev the whole file of Amerasia from the beginning.

I read between the lines that they welcomed my suggestion that if they didn't think the time had come for them to be the first council to come out with an article analysing Japanese policy, they might render a very great service by an article analyzing either American or British policy.

You will have gathered by now that the Soviet IPR extended to me every possible facility and courtesy throughout my stay in the Soviet Union. The members of no council have made more comprehensive plans for a visit of an officer of the international secretariat or incurred as great expense.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—Perhaps I ought to add that Motylev may not find it easy to get permission for you to go to Mongolia. It took him weeks finally to get permission for me to go to certain parts of the Soviet Far East, and I gathered from what he said that he anticipated even more effort would be required in the case of Mongolia. But he is so definitely committed to getting the permission so that he and you can go together that nothing further needs to be done except to leave everything in his hands.

Copies: W. L. HOLLAND.  
HARRIET MOORE.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify that, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon of a letter, the carbon being taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated August 15, 1937, to Albert Sarraut, signed by Mr. Carter.

Mrs. Carter, Miss Ruth Carter, my secretary, and I have recently arrived in Moscow from North China.

We saw in Peiping the beginning of this deplorable war between China and Japan. In the Soviet Far East the U. S. S. R. IPR gave me the very great privilege of visiting not only Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and Birobidjan but also the new city of Komsomolsk, hitherto unvisited by any European or American foreigner.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Poppe, will you comment on the accessibility that Mr. Carter seems to have had in these various remote sections of the Soviet Union, as evidenced by this and the preceding letter?

Mr. POPPE. Those areas in the Far East were completely closed to everybody, and even the citizens of the Soviet Union were not permitted to go to those restricted areas, and this is because of their strategic importance and also because they were the main concentration camps and it was highly undesirable for the Soviet to let anybody see them.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept that last letter into the record?

Senator WATKINS. We will receive this into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 435" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 435

HOTEL METROPOLE,  
Moscow, 15th August 1937.

M. ALBERT SARRAUT,

*President, Comité d'Etudes des Problemes du Pacifique,*

*13 Rue de Four, Paris VI, France.*

DEAR M. SARRAUT: Mrs. Carter, Miss Ruth Carter, my secretary, and I have recently arrived in Moscow from North China. We saw in Peiping the beginning of this deplorable war between China and Japan. In the Soviet Far East the U. S. S. R. IPR gave me the very great privilege of visiting not only Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and Birobidjan but also the new city of Komsomolsk, hitherto unvisited by any European or American foreigner.

Before going to the Soviet Union we visited Japan, China, the Philippines, and Hongkong. In China I visited Canton in the south, Chungking and Chengtu in the far west (Szechwan), Nanking and Shanghai in the Yangtze Valley, and Peiping in the north. En route to Vladivostok I visited Mukden and Hsingking in Manchuria, and Seishin and Rashin in Korea.

After completing our visit here we plan to visit Geneva, Paris, the Netherlands, and London.

If you desire it, I would greatly appreciate the privilege of meeting the English-speaking members of the Comité d'Etudes des Problemes du Pacifique someday to tell them of some of my observations on this visit to the Far East.

Which of the following dates would be best for you for such a meeting—September 1st, or September 7th, or September 9th, or September 17th, or September 28th, or September 30th?

Perhaps you would send me a telegram, "Carter, Metropole, Moscow," indicating what date would be most convenient for you for such a meeting.

In addition to meeting your English-speaking members, I will, of course, on some date convenient with them, desire to discuss with M. Levy and M. Dennery, among others, the questions mentioned in the enclosed memorandum.

Looking forward with great eagerness to the privilege of seeing you again and also Levy, Dennery, Laurent, and Touzet, I am with deep appreciation of your friendship,

Very sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether or not Mr. Kantorovich, about whom you have given testimony today, was ever purged?

Mr. POPPE. He was purged and disappeared.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you know about it?

Senator WATKINS. Let me ask you this question: When you say "purged," for the purposes of the record, does that mean he was killed?

Mr. POPPE. "Purged" is, so to say, he evaporated and disappeared.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, he was just taken out and lost?

Mr. POPPE. He simply disappeared. Yesterday he was and today he is no longer. That is a purge.

Senator WATKINS. It does not necessarily mean he was killed?

Mr. POPPE. No; perhaps put in a concentration camp. It is, I would say, "eliminated."

Senator WATKINS. I think we know what you mean.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a carbon taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is undated, and it says, "Copies for W. L. H. for 'IPR Notes.'"

In case Kantorovich did not write you direct, this is sent for your information. I do not think it means any change in U. S. S. R. I. P. R. policy, as I gathered last December that Kantorovich's appointment was only temporary—

then follows a letter signed by A. Kantorovich, to E. C. Carter headed "Council of the U. S. S. R. Institute of Pacific Relations."

DEAR CARTER: This is to announce to you that both for personal reasons, and because of pressure of literary work which lately has been more and more insistent, I have decided to resign my position as Secretary-General of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations—

and the rest follows:

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that into the record?

Senator WATKINS. That may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 436" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 436

Copy for W. L. H. for "I. P. R. Notes."

In case Kantorovich did not write you direct, this is sent for your information. I do not think it means any change in U. S. S. R. I. P. R. policy as I gathered last December that Kantorovich's appointment was only temporary.

E. C. C.

COUNCIL OF THE U. S. S. R.,  
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,  
20, Razin Street, Moscow,

Mr. E. C. CARTER,  
*Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations,  
Care of Grand Hotel, Auckland, New Zealand.*

DEAR CARTER: This is to announce to you that both for personal reasons and because of pressure of literary work which lately has been more and more insistent, I have decided to resign my position as Secretary-General of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Since Mr. Motylev is leaving for the Far East for a couple of months, the affairs of the institute will be for the present in the hands of Mr. G. W. Voitinsky whom the mail and cables will reach at the address: 20, Razin Street, Moscow.

It goes without saying that I shall remain in close touch with the activities of the Soviet council of the institute and that, in my from now on unofficial capacity, I still look forward to meeting you in Moscow whenever your many duties will involve another visit to our country.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) A. KANTOROVITCH.

Mr. MORRIS. On that last point, Professor, we have one more letter here which I think should go into the record, because it is on the accessibility granted to Mr. Carter to travel extensively in remote areas.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a mimeographed memorandum and taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations; headed "Mr. Edward C. Carter, Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations."



I will read sections of the document:

Mr. Carter, who is one of the leading experts on the political and economic developments in the countries of the Far East, has recently returned from an extended trip through China, Japan, Manchuria, and the Soviet Far East. He revisited China in the spring of 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that into the record?  
Senator WATKINS. That will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 437" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 437

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER, SECRETARY-GENERAL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

129 East Fifty-Second Street

NEW YORK CITY

Plaza 3-4700

Mr. Carter, who is one of the leading experts on the political and economic developments in the countries of the Far East, has recently returned from an extended trip through China, Japan, Manchuria, and the Soviet Far East. He revisited China in the spring of 1937. After meeting Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at headquarters in Kuling, he made a study of prewar Chinese opinion on a Nation-wide basis. Mr. Carter was in Peiping, ancient capital of imperial China, when the war broke out.

In Japan, Mr. Carter was given a reception by the Foreign Minister. He was entertained by prominent leaders of business and finance, by officers of the Army and Navy and by Prince Konoye himself. He had unusual opportunities to cast a glance "backstage" in one of the most hectic hours of Japan's recent history.

In Manchuria, members of the Manchukuo government gave a number of very illuminating interviews to Mr. Carter, who visited the new capital, Hsinking, as well as the newly established, highly strategical Japanese naval base at Rashin in the northern tip of Korea.

In the far-eastern region of the Soviet Union, Mr. Carter's experiences were most unique and enlightening. He was the first foreign guest to be invited to certain sections of that heavily guarded portion of the U. S. S. R., notably Komсомolsk, the city of Russia's youth. He made an interesting and unusual trip through the Amur region and met officers of the Red army forces stationed in that area. In Birobidjan, Mr. Carter had a revealing discussion with some of the outstanding Soviet citizens about the degree of religious freedom in the U. S. S. R.

Before returning to the United States of America, Mr. Carter spent some time in Europe where he met a number of European statesmen including members of the French Cabinet, the Colonial Minister of Holland, and Sir Frederick Leith-Ross. While in Geneva recently, Mr. Carter talked with Mr. Wellington Koo, chief Chinese delegate to the League of Nations, and many other experts on the Far East.

Mr. Carter will spend a few weeks in the United States before he has to return to the Far East next year, in connection with an international research conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this next document?

Senator WATKINS. Are we going to have comment on this by the witness?

Mr. MORRIS. That, Mr. Chairman, I intend to group with the previous two that have been introduced into the record, and upon which the witness has made comment. That is, on the accessibility granted to Mr. Carter to go to these remote places.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a hand-written document on the stationery of the Kokusai Hotel in Seishin, Chosen; that would be Japan, would it not?

Mr. POPPE. Seishin, Chosen, is Korea.

Mr. MANDEL. The letter is dated July 17, 1937. It is addressed to "Dear Bill" and signed "Edward." I read a section of the letter:

If you go to Manchuria, see Ludden, the American vice consul in Mukden.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you begin with the preceding sentence?

Mr. MANDEL. The preceding paragraph reads:

Owen had a wonderful time with Mao, etc.

Owen is in fine form. I had long talks with Peffer in Peiping and Mukden and with Bisson in Peiping. I missed my rendezvous with Wittvogel at Peitako because I left Peiping on an emergency train that went out on a few minutes notice and I had no chance to wire him. He gets more monumental all the time.

If you go to Manchuria, see Ludden, the American vice consul in Mukden (he is eager for contacts) tell him I sent you. Get him to introduce you to Chief Lengdon.

If you go to Hsinking call on all the people in the Foreign Affairs, Ohashi, Tsutsui Matsamura, and Pakh. Ask questions of as many of them as you can separately.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Poppe, do you know Mr. Ohashi?

Mr. POPPE. No, I don't know him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Tsuitsui?

Mr. POPPE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Matsamura?

Mr. POPPE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Pakh?

Mr. POPPE. Pakh was an outstanding Communist in the University of the Toilers of the East. If it is the same Pakh or not, I do not know, but I met such a person.

Mr. MORRIS. What nationality was he?

Mr. POPPE. Korean.

Mr. MORRIS. He was a Korean Communist?

Mr. POPPE. A Korean Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will the letter be accepted into evidence? Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

#### EXHIBIT No. 438

(Copy of handwritten letter:)

THE KOKUSAI HOTEL,  
Seishin Chosen, July 17, 1937.

DEAR BILL: I hope you explained to Shigi that my message was sent in sincere friendship—not to find fault but to inform—Shigi has been such a marvelous friend to me I thought he would feel I was letting him down if I did not signal to him. His representative or representatives may have no alternative in the situation in which they find themselves—but I was able with my limited facilities to check up on some raw inaccuracies and I found people in Manchukuo of all places who knew that the Peiping dispatches were inaccurate.

Tell Elizabeth that here I am in Seishin and they swear that the Siberia *Maru* will come in and go out tomorrow even as she told me the night before I flew to Chengtu.

Owen had a wonderful time with Mao, etc. Owen is in fine form. I had long talks with Peffer in Peiping and Mukden and with Bisson in Peiping. I missed my rendezvous with Wittvogel at Peitako because I left Peiping on an emergency train that went out on a few minutes notice and I had no chance to wire him. He gets more monumental all the time.

If you go to Manchuria see Ludden, the American vice consul in Mukden. (He is eager for contacts.) Tell him I sent you. Get him to introduce you to his Chief Langden. If you go to Hsinking call on all the people in Foreign Affairs Ohashi, Tsutsui, Matsamura and Pakh. Ask questions of as many of them as you can separately.

My time in Mukden and Hsinking was brief but terribly interesting and valuable, but I can't tell you about it here.

I hope you will get my today's telegram about Nan and Shigi in time to reply before I sail tomorrow at 11 a. m.

Give my love to Doreen—Alice and Ruth are going to Mrs. Cecil Lyon's at Chinwangtao—so you may miss them unless you are already in the north.

Ever affectionately,

EDWARD.

JULY 18.

P. S.—Your wire saying Nan was fine and asking for North China impression came late last evening—I am so glad about Nan—she will enjoy being with you and Doreen—she is a swell girl. I am glad she is being saved the journey through Manchuria. It is certainly gruelling heat just now—give her my love.

As to North China—in a word it is contained in this rough copy of a purely personal letter to Tomo. There was no doubt in the various Embassy circles in Peiping (when I was there) as to the provocative character of the North China garrison's actions.

Now as to the present situation you are in a better position to judge than I. I left on July 14 and events have been moving with rapidity since. Alas, I don't read Japanese so I am cut off here for the news—(I haven't met anyone here who speaks 10 words of English). Peffer was sure (July 16) that China and Japan were in for 3 or 5 years of war. I am hoping a major struggle may still be avoided but it is probably settled now one way or the other. Darien, Mukden and Hsinking were taking their air-raid drill at night with ridiculous seriousness—using it no doubt to whip up the martial spirit.

The Japanese garrison in North China has felt for a long time that it was up to them to take North China—their ideas have been in antithesis to those of ex Foreign Minister Soto. I was shown communiqués for Japanese headquarters in Peiping which were flagrantly inaccurate and must have been intentionally misleading. So many Japanese were unexpectedly killed last week that I am afraid it may be difficult to restrain Japan from an attempt at mass slaughter.

While I was in Peiping the mayor who was active while General Sung was off on his sit-down strike against Japan (on his holiday)—the mayor, who is a good soldier, was active with great wisdom, restraint, and firmness—people thought he was acting with Sung's approval—if so, Sung was acting at that time as a patriot—whether he can continue to so act now that the Japanese have him back in Tientsin I don't know.

You see I am just guessing because I have had no news for 3 days.

Please make a copy of my letter to Tomo and send it to me at Moscow and send a copy by air mail to Kate Mitchell, Hotel Crillon, Paris, but ask her not to circulate it. It is only for you and Kate.

My steamer is in and I must go on board. I'd give a great deal to stay on in China as you are doing, but you and Elizabeth and Owen and Bisson and Peffer and Doreen are all there and only I have this Soviet F. E. chance so it seems up to me to push off.

Love to Doreen.

Ever,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Notes written on side of stationery opposite para. 5, p. 2:)

Sung has wanted to remain in power in the North but he has wanted to be a success—He has done a lot of swell things and some others. He long ago realized that he had more of a future as a Chinese patriot than as Japanese hireling. He is a pretty good soldier, but rather old style and not too intelligent. (Notes following signature on p. 2:)

Loomis is coming to Tokyo but apparently not to China as he is raising money in and organizing Los Angeles in September and October.

I want him to go to Manila for January and February.

Madrigal—perhaps the richest Filipino, has at last accepted the chairmanship of the Philippine Council—I hope this means that Afortell?? will accept the Secretaryship and that you can go there for at least a week en route to New Zealand.

Please send the North China Daily News to me for the next 3 weeks to Hotel Metropole, Moscow—then for 2 weeks care Arthur Sweatser?? Geneva. Subscribe for 5 weeks and ask Elizabeth if she can to reimburse you.

Are you going to have it typed into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. It is just 2 pages.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 438" and appears on pp. 2717-2718.)

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a Mr. Borodin?

Mr. POPPE. I never knew him, but he is well known to everybody engaged in far eastern affairs in the Soviet Union. I know about him. He was born in Riga in Russia. He lived in the capital of Latvia and he was wanted by the Far East police because of his revolutionary activities and he escaped to the United States, and in the United States he started and organized an illegal Communist Party school in Chicago, where he trained Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Chicago, you say?

Mr. POPPE. In Chicago, yes. And in 1919 Lenin recalled him and wanted him to do some Comintern work in Moscow. He came and was very soon appointed Sun Yat-sen's adviser and organizer of the Kuomintang Party, and he was also the one who succeeded in merging the Communist Party with the Kuomintang Party, and he succeeded also in creating a left wing in the Kuomintang Party.

After he failed to make the Kuomintang Party completely Communist and Sun Yat-sen died, and Chiang Kai-shek found out about his activities, he was expelled, sent back to Russia, and very soon he fell into disgrace and was never mentioned again.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify the last letter I gave you, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have a carbon which was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is dated December 11, 1933, and addressed to Miss Lucy Knox, Moscow Daily News, Moscow, U. S. S. R., and is signed W. L. Holland, and at the top it is marked "Copy to O. L."

I will read one paragraph:

We are immensely interested at the office in your pleasant remarks about Borodin, so much so that I am asked by Owen Lattimore, who, as you perhaps know, has been made editor of the new Pacific Affairs, on a quarterly basis, to inquire whether you could discuss with Borodin the possibility of his writing an article for us of five or six thousand words on some aspect of his work in the Chinese Revolution, or on present-day opinion in the Soviet Union on the development of communism in China. If Borodin himself does not wish to write, would it be possible for you to interview him and let us have the article in that form? I do not need to tell you that we really do not mind what the subject is about so long as it has to do with the Pacific in some way. We really are crazy to get something from Borodin.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Poppe, did you know the Moscow Daily News?

Mr. POPPE. I read it sometimes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it a Communist publication?

Mr. POPPE. It was a paper in English, published by the Soviets.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it a Communist publication?

Mr. POPPE. It was just like Pravda or Izvestia, because all the papers are published by the Communist Party in the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know whether or not Mr. Borodin in December 1933 was then working for the Communists?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, he was still in the Comintern at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. When did he fall out of the Comintern?

Mr. POPPE. It was in about 1937, 1936 or 1937, that he also disappeared.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, would you receive that letter into the record?

Senator WATKINS. This letter will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 439," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 439

[Copy to OL]

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,  
New York City, December 11, 1933.

Miss LUCY KNOX,  
*Moscow Daily News, Moscow, U. S. S. R.*

MY DEAR LUCY: Doreen and I were greatly cheered to get your charming exposition of latter-day Marxism. I took the liberty of showing it to a number of people in the New York office, to their great enjoyment. I am awfully glad that you are learning, however late in life, a little something about the economic foundations of history. Unfortunately, of course, you are in the wrong country for studying social revolutions, and I should advise you to hurry back to New York as soon as you can in order to witness the last vestiges of capitalism in this country before it is quietly buried under a pile of codes written at Washington by a bevy of young professors from Columbia. I say it in all seriousness because you simply have no realization of the way in which rugged individualism is being maltreated over here. Liquidation of the Kullak was a mere trifle compared to the liquidation of Wall Street by the new boys at Washington.

We are immensely interested at the office in your pleasant remarks about Borodine, so much so that I am asked by Owen Lattimore, who, as you perhaps know, has been made editor of the new *Pacific Affairs*, on a quarterly basis, to inquire whether you could discuss with Borodine the possibility of his writing an article for us of five or six thousand words on some aspect of his work in the Chinese Revolution, or on present-day opinion in the Soviet Union on the development of communism in China. If Borodine himself does not wish to write, would it be possible for you to interview him and let us have the article in that form? I do not need to tell you that we really do not mind what the subject is about so long as it has to do with the Pacific in some way. We really are crazy to get something from Borodine. The fee for an article in the new regime is \$50 but we should probably be prepared to pay \$100 for a suitable article directly from Borodine.

The plaintive note in your letter about the shortage of valuta touched us all very deeply, and you may be interested to know that Joe Barnes expects to leave for Moscow in January to spend 4 months or so over there. If you could arrange it, I know he would be more than delighted to use you in some secretarial capacity. Meanwhile Doreen and I will save ourselves the trouble of sending you some useless Christmas present and send a little valuta instead.

I had expected to leave New York by the middle of December and complete the 3 months of my fellowship which are still available by going to Stanford to work under Alsberg before going out to Japan for the rest of 1934. Now that Barnes is going to Russia and Field to London early next year and Mr. Carter, as new General Secretary, is setting off on the first of his world tours in February, I have been ordered to remain in New York during the winter, so that I shall probably go directly out to Japan in the spring. I want, if possible, to remain there for 12 months and produce a colossal book on Japan's tottering economic framework. In the meantime I am struggling desperately to produce a colossal volume on the tottering discussions of the Banff Conference. Lasker and I are again partners in the job, but neither of us is at all happy about it, and, as usual, I am lagging far behind in getting my chapters written. Doreen and I lead a very comfortable and interesting life. We are living about an hour out of town in Westchester County, quite near Lasker's house. We boast of an imposing looking but somewhat defective car and commute in and out quite frequently.

I simply cannot begin to tell you all the news of ourselves and institute folk. You probably know that Loomis is now Conference Secretary and doing something in a vague way about the educational activities of the Hawaii Council; and that Miss Green has announced her resignation at the end of the year. The Keesings, after writing a book on the beastly customs of the mountain tribes in the Philippines, soon to be published in London along with their book on Samoa,

have gone off to the London School of Economics to do some anthropology under Malinowski. They have also produced a son quite recently, which solved quite a number of problems. Thus far, I have produced nothing except a few misshapen chapters for Problems of the Pacific. It is all very discouraging.

We wish you all kinds of good things, and in particular, we wish you whatever is the proletarian equivalent of a bourgeois Happy Christmas.

Affectionately yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Dihmanshtein?

Mr. POPPE. He was head of the Institute of the National Minorities. It was a Communist school in Russian subjects, but of oriental origin, the Tartars and Mongols and Kalmuks and so on. They got their sort of a high-school education and also party education, and then they were sent to their native places as party secretaries as party organizers, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he an important Communist?

Mr. POPPE. He was a member of the Comintern and a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the early 1930's.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Harondar?

Mr. POPPE. No; I don't know him.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify this next document, please, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of Institute of Pacific Relations, headed, Meeting, April 11, Institute of Nationalities; Dimanshtein, ECC, OL—ECC might be E. C. Carter and OL might be Owen Lattimore—and HM might be Harriet Moore—and Harondar.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Mandel, if the chairman will just receive that into the record, we will not give it any more attention right now.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

Mr. MORRIS. That is a list of the people present at that particular meeting.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 440," and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 440

MEETING: APRIL 11, INSTITUTE OF NATIONALITIES; DIMANSSTEIN, ECC, OL, HM, HARONDAR

The present institute is an amalgamation of two former institutes—the ethnological institute for the study of minor nationalities, and the Bostoko-begenie Institute for study of economic and social development. The work consists of a study of the history of the minor nationalities, and of their languages. They have postgraduate students who are studying to become specialists. There are 50 of them at present and 60 scientific specialists on the various nationalities. The students come from 20 different nationalities. The institute also publishes books. It has written one of the history of the nationality policy up to the end of the first 5-year plan and is now about to publish one on the first 3 years of the second 5-year plan. Likewise it has published books on various nationalities. Its magazine is Revolution and Nationality, of which Dimanshtein is the editor. The institute is now working on the new alphabets for various nationalities. It likewise has to supervise the work of its affiliated institutions in many of the minorities.

The criterion for judging whether a group is a minor or a major nationality is entirely relative, since every minor nationality is a major nationality in some district. Each one has its own institutions and its own government organs where its language is used.

The minorities in the far eastern district are mostly the small peoples of the north and the Jewish autonomous Oblast. There are schools in all of these districts, but the higher schools and techikums are centralized in Kharbarovsk.

There are also Koreans in the far eastern district, who use their own language in schools, etc. Many Koreans from Korea come there to study, since the Japanese forbid the use of their language in Korea. There are also many Ukrainians and Russians in the Far East, who have their own schools, etc.

In the past few years the results of the use of Latinized Chinese have been very successful. It is much more quickly learned and since most of the Chinese in the far eastern district are workers, they were illiterate, and the new alphabet has been a great aid in abolishing illiteracy. The use of this alphabet has been influential in China itself. They have received publications from Shanghai and other places written in their alphabet, not in the English Latin alphabet. Although there is little difference between the Latinized alphabet used here and the English one, they have found that the use of a few new signs helps with the pronunciation. The newspapers for Chinese in the far eastern district are printed in both Latinized and Chinese alphabet.

The very small tribes which are widely scattered, are beginning to consolidate and to intermix.

In Buriat-Mongolia they use the Latin alphabet for the same reasons that they use it elsewhere—it is quicker to learn. Before 90 percent of the people were illiterate and now only 30 percent are illiterate. They started work on the use of this new alphabet in 1929. In the Mongolian People's Republic, they use both the Latin and the Mongolian alphabet, although the latter predominates.

The students in the institute who come from the minor nationalities almost all go back and work among their own people after finishing their training. This institute is not coordinated with the Institute of Arctic Peoples in Leningrad. That is a higher school, while this one takes students who have already finished a higher school—aspirants. It is true that most of the Arctic tribes live in the far eastern sections.

It is difficult to tell whether some tribes learn more quickly than others. There are great differences between individuals of the same tribe, but to date there have not been enough students from the various tribes to make it possible to generalize. Earlier they used to specialize in art and the social sciences, but now they are beginning to enter the exact sciences. This is probably due to the fact that factories have been built among these peoples.

Dimanshtein is president of Ozet, the organization in charge of the colonization of Jews in Birobidjan. For the past 7 years there has been migration there, but at first there were very few and many returned from there. In the last few years the conditions of living have greatly improved. At first they had to build everything for themselves. The city of Birobidjan had only 600 people and now it has 13,000. According to the present plans this will be made an industrial center of the whole far eastern district. At present the tempo of migration is great. The total population is 62,000 and expect it to be 150,000 very soon. The natural resources of the area are rich. There is coal, minerals, lumber, fish, water power. This year many foreign Jews will be admitted. These will come largely from the United States, Latvia, Poland, and not many from Germany. This is because they will only accept qualified workers. There are not so many in Germany, because there most are intelligentsia and would find it difficult to live in Birobidjan. Four years ago about 600 foreign Jews settled there, and about one-half of them have remained. The others went to other parts of the Soviet Union. Those who migrate from within the U. S. S. R. come mostly from the Ukraine, White Russia, and the western districts. At first they accepted anyone who wanted to go, but now that there is no unemployment, they select those who are most qualified to go. The plan at present is to increase agricultural land from 48,000 hectares to 100,000, and to increase the industrial workers to 30,000 or 40,000. The Yiddish language is used, not Hebrew. Few of the Jews know Hebrew. They are now considering having it taught in the higher schools, in connection with study of Jewish history. Birobidjan formerly was uninhabited, because there were no roads into it. Now the population is 33-34 percent Jewish. By the end of the year it will be 40 percent and next year it should be 60 percent. There are some small tribes such as the Tunguski living there, and many Russians. There are very few Jews who came from Palestine. They find that they do not settle permanently. They have a metallurgical and a medical technikum and a pedagogical school. This year they are planning to open a university. They may convert the pedagogical schools into a university.

OL said that it would be interesting to have an article for PA comparing Birobidjan and Palestine in regard to aim, administration, and relation to the other peoples in the locality. Dimanshtein said that he thought this could be done. In Palestine the relations between the Jews and the Arabs is very bad,

because one represents the ruling peoples. This, of course, can't exist in Birobidjan. There the various nationalities work in the same collectives, etc. in perfect harmony.

In Buriat-Mongolia they are building a large locomotive factory and several meat combinats. The Buriats are becoming industrial workers and transport workers. There are not many minerals in Buriat-Mongolia, but it is near Kuznetsk. Also there are several autonomous districts of other minorities, which have minerals in them. These other peoples are Altai-Turkish peoples, related to people of Tanna-Tuva, rather than to the Mongols.

The course at the institute is a 3-year course. They have a library with a collection of literature, newspapers, and periodicals in many of the languages of the minor nationalities. In the institute itself there are workers in 20 languages of these peoples.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Varga?

Mr. POPPE. He is a very well-known Soviet economist. He was the one who predicted, among other things, a collapse of the capitalist system after World War II. He wrote books and articles on the economic depression imminent in the United States after 1945, but then it did not come true, and he fell in disgrace.

But Stalin, nevertheless, did not let him perish, and he is still the head of the Institute of Economics in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he the director of the Communist Academy?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, he was. And he is also the director of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences, a very important person, a Communist, Hungarian by origin.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he connected with the Comintern?

Mr. POPPE. He was; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the Communist Academy an organization run by the Comintern?

Mr. POPPE. No, by the central committee of the Russian Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know of the Institute of Oceanography?

Mr. POPPE. Yes. I knew that was a scientific organization whose head was first Chakalsky, a very famous scholar, who wrote a large book on the ice in the polar seas. And this was a scientific organization and did not have anything in common with communism.

Mr. MORRIS. It did not?

Mr. POPPE. They studied only ocean seas, water, the plants in the waters, and so on and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I believe this document has already been introduced into the record. This is a report of the visit of the secretary-general to Moscow, December 20-31, 1934.

Reference there is made to a visit with Mr. Varga, who was a director of the Communist Academy.

Senator WATKINS. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Losovsky?

Mr. POPPE. Losovsky?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. POPPE. I don't know what Losovsky—but Losovsky was the head of the Russian Information Bureau. He was responsible for the news released for the press.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he have anything to do with the Comintern?

Mr. POPPE. I don't know, but probably. He was the man responsible for the news released for the Soviet press. It was a very responsible job.



Mr. MORRIS. Have you, Professor Poppe, as a specialist in Mongolian affairs, had an opportunity to read the writings of Mr. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. POPPE. Oh, yes; I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you give us the benefit of your observations, based upon your experience in Moscow and your experience in Mongolian affairs, and the writings of Mr. Lattimore with respect to Mongolian affairs?

Mr. POPPE. Two books Mr. Owen Lattimore did, the *Mongols of Manchuria*, and the *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, are interesting books and contain sometimes valuable information. The other books, I was very sorry to state it when I read them, made a very superficial impression upon me—for instance, *Solution in Asia*, and *Situation in Asia*, and so on. And what was distressing to me was that Mr. Lattimore discusses so many countries, not having, in my opinion, a foreign knowledge of those countries, for instance, Mongolia. He often writes of Mongolia as a democratic country, a country which has made magnificent progress, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. If I may stop you at that point, Professor, was it, in fact, a country of that description?

Mr. POPPE. No; it was not.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you comment along those lines for us, please?

Mr. POPPE. This needs explanation. Mongolia was completely wild, a nomadic country in 1919. The new revolutionary people's Government established by the Soviets and supported by the Soviets and getting orders from Moscow has achieved, of course, some positive achievement, such as they established schools, hospitals, and so on. And no matter who establishes schools or hospitals, in my opinion, does a good job, if there were no schools and hospitals before. But this is not the end of this story.

The deportation of the population of the Mongolian Buddhists, Lamaseries, the destruction and the annihilation of the Mongolian Government, the execution of the Mongolian ministers, forced collectivization, the deportation of many people to the Soviet Union, and so on, are rather negative phenomena, I would say.

Therefore, I cannot call such a system a democratic one.

And also here I hope I am right, that Mr. Owen Lattimore is only superficial here, that he did not say this in order to give us a distorted picture.

For instance, in this article, *Where Outer and Inner Mongolia Meet* on page 34, he says that:

There have been internal troubles in Outer Mongolia and even attempted rebellion—

probably he was mistaken on this or misinformed. It was not an attempted rebellion. In 1932 the entire population revolted against the Soviets. The Red Mongolian Army and many members of the Mongolian People's Army took the side of the revolt, and this rebellion was suppressed by the Russian Red Army, tanks and aircraft were rushed from Russia to Mongolia, so I cannot call it an "attempted rebellion," it was more than that.

Therefore, it is either superficial, or a distortion of the truth.

And there are also other articles and items where Mr. Owen Lattimore—

Mr. MORRIS. Before you leave that book, from what did you just read?

Mr. POPPE. Where Outer and Inner Mongolia Meet.

Mr. MORRIS. And Mr. Lattimore wrote that?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date of that?

Mr. POPPE. It is from *Amerasia*, volume XI, March-August, 1938, 6 years after that revolt, and 2 years after the execution of the Mongolian Governor by the Soviets.

The members of the Government were people personally known to me.

Senator WATKINS. And you think that is a distorted account?

Mr. POPPE. It is a distorted account. I would not say it was an attempted rebellion.

Senator WATKINS. How would you describe it?

Mr. POPPE. I would say it was a revolt, or it was an overt revolt of the entire population.

Senator WATKINS. But it did not succeed?

Mr. POPPE. It did not succeed. It was more than an attempt.

In many articles we learn that, for instance:

Soviet Policy in Outer Mongolia cannot be fairly called Red imperialism. It certainly established a standard with which other nations must compete if they wish to practice a policy of attraction in Asia. The Russian-Mongolian relations in Asia, like Russian-Czechoslovak relations in Europe, deserve careful and respectful study.

I think that the comparison of Mongolians to Czechoslovakia is rather an unfortunate one, because we know what happened in Czechoslovakia, and the same benefits of what has happened in Czechoslovakia are at the present time enjoyed by the Mongols.

Mr. MORRIS. From what did you read there, Professor Poppe?

Mr. POPPE. This comes from *Solution in Asia*, page 144.

Senator WATKINS. Written by Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. POPPE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any further comments?

Mr. POPPE. They are of the same sort, in various other articles.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you make a conclusion based on all of them?

Mr. POPPE. I would say that these are the conclusions—well, it is a little bit difficult to me, because I would not like to say so, but this gives us a greatly distorted picture of Mongolia and the real happenings there. He talks about democracy. Well, the Soviets call their system the most democratic in the world. And in this sense, also, the Mongolian system, the system prevailing in Mongolia, is also democratic.

Senator WATKINS. Because it is on the Soviet pattern?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, of course; it is Soviet democracy.

So I would add in all of these writings that in Mongolia there is democracy but the Soviet democracy, how the Soviets understand it.

Mr. MORRIS. And you think Mr. Lattimore should apprise his readers of that word if he means it in that connection?

Mr. POPPE. He says simply "democracy." And sometimes he says that the Mongols and other Asians do have the same sense for understanding what democracy is as we have.

In the first place, I know that the Asians love very much property, and a man who lives in democratic conditions, such as in old China,

but who owned his own herd and sheep and his own field, he felt himself happier than being dependent, and being deprived of them and enjoying democracy alone—with no property.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, the kind of democracy he is describing is actually a democracy in which they did not have private property?

Mr. POPPE. Yes; no property. It was forced collectivism in Mongolia, which resulted in that revolt, sir.

Senator WATKINS. The picture he has shown on this country is not accurate at all?

Mr. POPPE. Not accurate; no. It is not scholarly work. Those two books, they are interesting and valuable books; and those other books are very superficial writings, and give a distorted picture of the realities.

Senator WATKINS. Are they, in effect, pro-Soviet, or favorable to the Soviet Union and its activities?

Mr. POPPE. I think that as Mr. Lattimore had not been in Outer Mongolia at that time when he wrote those books, that he had read all of this in various Soviet papers, and had taken these statements from them.

Senator WATKINS. Rather than from his own observations?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, of course. This is my feeling.

Senator WATKINS. Then he would be putting into his books the Soviet line?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, of course, and even involuntarily.

Senator WATKINS. Do you mean that he did not do it purposely?

Mr. POPPE. No; I don't know how, but I say only that one who takes his information always only from those papers, he depends greatly upon the ideas expressed in them, so I don't know whether purposely or not.

Senator WATKINS. It would give the American people, then, who read the books, a distorted, completely distorted picture of what was going on?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, a distorted picture.

Senator WATKINS. So it would be more or less favorable to the Soviet line, or the Communist line?

Mr. POPPE. Well, of course, a student who does not know anything—for instance, I remember a young fellow in the University of Washington last year, who wrote a paper on Soviet policies toward the national ties, the national minorities, and he used only Soviet literature. He wrote a paper which was an appraisal of the Soviet System from the very beginning to the end.

That paper was shown to me by one of his professors, and I demonstrated all of the mistakes. I told him, "Well, here, democracy—where did you take this democracy from?"

"Well, it is in such and such a book. It is a Russian book."

"But do you know that this democracy with concentration camps?"

"Well, how could I know? There is nothing about that in the books," he said.

Well, I cannot blame that young fellow of 20 or 21, who got his second-hand information from Russian books.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mandel has one other document I would like to put into the record here.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

**Mr. MANDEL.** This is a carbon copy taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 29, 1939, addressed to Philip C. Jessup, from Edward C. Carter. I will read portions of the letter.

I did not let Molotoff know that I was in Moscow until the day before I left. He sent word that it just happened that every minute was taken that day—and then further:

After that—a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars of the U. S. S. R., of which he is chairman. He was very anxious to have me see the Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Losovsky.

Lovsovsky is responsible for Asia and the Pacific, and Potemkin is responsible for Europe. As you know, Losovsky has long lived in Paris and has been secretary-general of the International Trade Union Movement. He is mature and informed. He said that whatever decision the Council of the U. S. S. R. of the IPR made with reference to participation in Victoria, would be followed with the closest interest by the Narkomindel—

**Mr. MORRIS.** What is that?

**Mr. POPPE.** It is a People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. It is a foreign office.

**Mr. MANDEL** (reading):

which I would realize was precluded by the IPR constitution from taking any formal part in the work of the institute. He felt that Victoria was timely, and asked specifically whether the agenda was to deal with purely academic questions, or whether it was to discuss the contemporary problems arising from the war, in the Far East.

**Mr. MORRIS.** That is the same Mr. Losovsky about whom you have testified?

**Mr. POPPE.** Yes. He became, later on during the war, he was appointed chief of the press information, and he formulated always the records from France and foreign news. Formerly he was head of that section of the foreign office.

**Mr. MANDEL.** May I read one other sentence here:

Losovsky is familiar with many of the institute studies, and is following the work of the institute closely. He indicated that in his capacity as a private citizen of the Soviet Union he hoped that the work and the program of the institute would continue to grow. Half of our long conversation was with reference to the work of the institute and the other half with reference to the world situation.

**Mr. MORRIS.** May that also be received in evidence?

**Senator WATKINS.** It may be received as a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 441" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 441

(Penciled notation:) Please return to RDC.

CARLSON COURT,  
Pall Mall Place, London S. W. 1, June 29, 1939.

**Dr. PHILIP C. JESSUP,**  
Columbia University, New York City.

**DEAR JESSUP:** My report on Moscow will have to reach you piecemeal owing to pressure of engagements in Amsterdam, London, and Paris. This report will deal with Miss Moore's monograph on Soviet policy in the Far East. I must confess that I arrived in Moscow with a large measure of uncertainty as to what the attitude of the Soviet Council would be to a member of the secretariat writing on Soviet far eastern policy. Without mentioning the author or the character of the contents I opened this section of our agenda by saying that we wished him\* to criticize a (\*Motilev) manuscript which a member of the secretariat had

\* Penciled notation.

written. He immediately said that was unnecessary and was exceedingly reluctant to do so because of his cablegram to the Princeton conference he had wanted to make it clear that the very essence of the institute as an international organization was that members of the International Secretariat should have complete academic freedom.

I then mentioned that Miss Moore was the author of the manuscript. He was very reluctant to make criticisms because he was afraid that this might be regarded in other countries as a retraction of the U. S. S. R.'s sincere commitment to academic freedom on the part of the Secretariat. I finally persuaded him, however, to read the manuscript. He said that he still favored its publication as Miss Moore's work as a member of the International Secretariat but still hesitated to make the criticism that Miss Moore so eagerly wanted from him. Finally, I got him to promise to make a careful critique, but this he only consented to do if he could send his criticism informally to her rather than as an institute communication.

I am convinced that Motylev's attitude in this matter was evidence of the deepening confidence in the value of the institute and a desire deeper than ever before to find ways and means of strengthening the work of the institute throughout the world.

At the present time he gets the most cooperation between councils from the American Council first and the Australian Council second. A very voluminous interchange of correspondence and services is now going on with the Australian Institute.

The Soviet Council has budget provisions for sending three members to Victoria. They are also endeavoring to secure additional money from the cooperating societies so as to increase their national contribution to the Pacific Council from \$2,500 to the \$3,000 which the budget committee and the finance committee suggested at Princeton.

They are perfectly willing to send their manuscripts for the Inquiry for editing and publication in New York. In fact, Motylev said that he hoped in editing their manuscripts the Secretariat would bear in mind that the Soviet method of expression was sometimes more vigorous than the best English usage and that the Secretariat in its editorial work would exercise full freedom in presenting the facts in such a way as to carry the greatest weight with English-speaking groups.

Not simply because of the purge but because of a nation-wide effort to increase efficiency in academic as well as in industrial and governmental work, a number of changes have been made in the personnel in the constituent scientific and other institutions that together make up the Soviet Council. In view of these changes it is necessary for Motylev and Voitinsky to reeducate some of the new officials of the various constituent societies so that they may be brought up-to-date fully with reference to the importance of Soviet participation in Victoria. Once this has been achieved the November date does not offer any insuperable obstacle in itself to Soviet participation.

Motylev's large monograph on Soviet events and policies in the Far East and concurrent relations of the Soviet Union to the other countries will be, he hopes, finished by the end of July. He is giving an enormous amount of time to it. It will be an elaboration and extension of his little book of contradictions which was written for a small popular audience. The 10,000 copies of the first edition have already been sold out. Voitinsky is working hard on his paper but is under such exceptional pressure that he is not absolutely certain that he can complete it in time for Victoria. It would be offered as a post-Victoria Inquiry document.

In connection with the international research committee's program on the standards of living, Markus, the very able head of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Science, is working on the Soviet standard of living. I had the privilege of an afternoon conference with him and half a dozen of the departmental heads in the institute of economics. They strike me as an exceptionally gifted group. The institute as a whole has a personnel of 130. Seventy are highly qualified research workers, the remaining 60 are engaged in clerical and routine statistical work. Markus was for sometime the Soviet member of the staff of the International Labour Office where in Geneva he was regarded as first rate.

I also had an afternoon discussion with the academician E. S. Varga, the supreme head of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Science. He has

been charged with making a thorough analysis of various regions of the Soviet Union from the standpoint of their all-round development to serve as the basis for the fuller utilization of all natural and labor resources and bringing industry nearer to the source of raw materials and the distribution of consumption. He has just completed a draft of a program of research for the third 5-year plan in which not only members of the Academy of Science but also local societies all over the Union will cooperate. This program involves a large number of scientific expeditions which are leaving this month for all parts of the Soviet Union. Varga is also responsibly related to the Institute of World Politics and World Economics in which Voitinsky, the Soviet member of the international research committee of the IPR is so actively engaged. Voitinsky, as you know, has a long background in China. He first attended Sun Yat-sen's lectures in Canton in 1920. If I remember rightly Voitinsky was in the Tsarist prison in Kamchatka at the time of the revolution where he led a prison uprising which was successful and within a few weeks at the age of 21 he was Lenin's Governor General of Kamchatka. In him we find a happy combination of the man of affairs and the very qualified scholar.

On my arrival Motylev and Voitinsky asked whether I thought we could get through our joint program of IPR and general discussion if 2 hours each day for 5 days were assigned for the purpose. I replied in the affirmative but the discussions became of such mutual advantage that we averaged 5 or 6 hours together each day during my visit.

These long conversations, visits to two of the latest movies and to the opera and ballet, together with correspondence with China and Japan pretty well filled up my time. I did, however, have the opportunity of useful conversations with Grummon, the chargé of the American Embassy, with Sir William Seeds, the British Ambassador, who with Sir William Strang was in the midst of carrying on long, protracted London-Moscow conversations with Molotoff, the new Foreign Minister of the U. S. S. R., with Yui Ming, until lately chargé of the Chinese Embassy, and who with Sun Fo were the principal Chinese negotiators in the Sino-Soviet trade pact which was signed on June 18, with Hrdlicka, of the Smithsonian, who is hoping to go shortly to Soviet shores opposite the Aleutian Islands to continue his investigation of the means by which the ancestors of the North American Indian passed from Asia to America. On his last expedition he satisfied himself that the journeys were not by land. They must have been by kayaks. He believes that if the Polynesians could travel hundreds of miles in uncharted seas, the people of northeastern Asia who are still excellent boatmen could do the same. Contrary to my practice on former visits, I spent no time with the foreign correspondents. I did, however, see Denny, of the New York Times. Among foreigners whom I saw, Bohlen of the American Embassy staff seemed to be the best and most objectively informed on the Soviet Union. He, as well as Grummon, who was for years in Dairen, should, I think, be considered for membership in the American council. Knowing how correct the U. S. S. R. IPR Council is with reference to the strictest separation of their activities and those of the Narkomindel, I did not let Molotoff know that I was in Moscow until the day before I left. He sent word that it just happened that every minute was taken that day (Sir William Seeds and Sir William Strang). After that, a meeting of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the U. S. S. R., of which he is chairman. He was very anxious to have me see the Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Losovsky.

[Penciled notation:] MRT—Note.)

Losovsky is responsible for Asia and the Pacific and Potemkin is responsible for Europe. As you know Losovsky has long lived in Paris and has been secretary general of the international trade-union movement. He is mature and informed. He said that whatever decision the Council of the U. S. S. R. of the IPR made with reference to participation in Victoria would be followed with the closest interest by the Narkomindel which I would realize was precluded by the IPR constitution from taking any formal part in the work of the institute. He felt that Victoria was timely and asked specifically whether the agenda was to deal with purely academic questions or whether it was to discuss the contemporary problems arising from the war in the Far East. I told him that I believed that 90 percent of the discussion would be on these contemporary problems but that I hoped the temper of the discussions would be 100-percent academic. Losovsky is familiar with many of the institute studies and is following the work of the institute closely. He indicated that in his capacity as a private citizen of the Soviet Union he hoped that the work and program of the institute would continue to grow. Half of our long conversation was with reference to the work of the institute and the other half with reference to the world situation.

On the evening of June 25, Motylev gave a Soviet IPR dinner attended in addition to himself and Voitinsky by Krushinitsky, head of the U. S. S. R. Chamber of Commerce (this chamber which is more interested in science and education than the chambers in other countries has been represented in the Soviet IPR from the start), Constantine Soushchak of the Institute of Economics and Politics of the Academy of Science, this institute has also been represented in the Soviet IPR from the start, and Miss Schapova who acted as my interpreter throughout my 5 days. It so happened that though she was an exceptional interpreter her services were rarely necessary. She accompanied Lindbergh as his interpreter throughout all of his flights and visits and the occasion of his last trip to the Soviet Union. She happened to interpret for him on the occasion when he affirmed to a large audience that the United States and the U. S. S. R. led the world in aviation. (I may pass on this remark to Lord Halifax who has asked me to lunch tomorrow.)

I regret to say that there were not enough hours in the day to permit my calling on either Litvinoff or Troyanovsky, both of whom are still in polite society. For Bill Holland's benefit I might say that Markus' standard-of-living study, according to Markus, will not be ready until the end of the year. On relating this Motylev said that he would bring great pressure on Markus to complete it in time to be submitted to the International Research Committee at Victoria. Motylev is eager to have it included in the regular international research series of the secretariat.

At the outset I said this letter could only be a very partial report of my Soviet visit. My notebook is full of intrinsically more important material than is contained in this letter. Furthermore, on the institutional side I have much to report to Lattimore, Holland, Field, and to some of the other national councils. On the personal side Motylev could not have made more satisfactory arrangements for my comfort and the efficiency of my visit. The Soviet members vied with the Dutch in interrogation with reference to my observations in Tokyo, Chungking, Bangkok, Allahabad, and Itarsi.

Every detail of my visit was arranged with efficiency and clocklike promptness. Having been flown by ace Dutch pilots from Bangkok all the way to Stockholm in Douglas DC-3's I wondered how the Soviet pilots would compare. To my private satisfaction and inward calm I could discover absolutely no difference in their handling of Douglas DC-3's on the outward journey Stockholm, Riga, Velikilukei, Moscow, and the return journey with the same stops. Just as the Dutch pilots on the long swing from Batavia to Amsterdam reached Amsterdam a little ahead of time so the Soviet pilots on each of the two fairly long but nevertheless shorter journeys reached their destination ahead of time. I have now added to my flying experience my having been flown by German, British, Dutch, Soviet, and Danish pilots.

I fear that the rest of my report on the Soviet Union will have to wait until my return.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—I saw innumerable new workmen's apartment houses in Moscow and also spent 2 hours wandering alone in the worst slums. I did manage an hour also at the Museum of Western Art.

Mary Pickford and her new husband arrived at my hotel 2 days before I left, but I succeeded in leaving Moscow unscathed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had Professor Poppe here today because with his experience in Moscow, and his specialty in Mongolian languages, he is one of the few people in the country who can comment and testify on some of the documents that have come before us in our extensive studies.

Senator WATKINS. How long have you been in the United States?

Mr. POPPE. Three years, sir.

Senator WATKINS. Were you a Russian citizen?

Mr. POPPE. I was a Russian citizen before; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You were captured by the Germans, were you not?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, I was; in 1942. I came to Germany and from Germany to the United States.

Senator WATKINS. You did not leave directly from Russia to come here?

Mr. POPPE. Yes; I came from Germany—in 1942 from Russia to Germany, and in 1949 from Germany to the United States.

Senator WATKINS. What was your last period of service as an educator in Russia?

Mr. POPPE. In 1942, a few days before the capture of that area by the Germans.

Mr. MORRIS. What area was that?

Mr. POPPE. Mikoyan Shakhhar in northern Caucasia. They revolted, and there was no escape from those areas, because the entire population revolted against the Soviets.

Senator WATKINS. I was wondering if you had left Russia with the consent of the Russians, or were permitted to leave, and I understand now that you got out the other way. That is all.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you very much, Professor.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in recess, subject to call. (Whereupon, at 5:05 p. m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)





# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 5:20 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Homer Ferguson.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order. Do you have a witness, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. We have Mr. William Mandel.

Senator FERGUSON. This is an open hearing. Will you see that the door is marked as such?

Mr. Mandel, will you raise your right hand?

You do solemnly swear in the matter now pending before this committee, a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

**TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM MARX MANDEL, NEW YORK, N. Y.,  
ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH FORER, WASHINGTON, D. C.**

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. William Mandel, will you give your full name and address to the reporter?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. William Marx, M-a-r-x, Mandel, with one "l," M-a-n-d-e-l. My address is 545 West One Hundred and Sixty-fourth Street, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Sir, due to the black list resulting from the activities of this committee and others, I am not able to pursue my occupation as a writer and researcher and translator, so I am trying to make a living as a furniture merchant.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. William Mandel, have you heard the testimony before this committee that you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That has been brought to my attention.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you, in fact, a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I must refuse to answer that question under my privilege of the fifth amendment against testifying against myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you reconcile that answer that you have given to that question, Mr. Mandel, with your statement which you have just made, that due to the fact that you have been blacklisted by this committee—precisely what do you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Will you make a further explanation as to what you mean by being blacklisted? Certainly this committee has issued no blacklist.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. The committee has not, sir, but the climate of opinion that has developed in the past several years around persons who have written for an organization which this committee is presently investigating, this subcommittee, and the climate of opinion that has arisen in connection with persons who, as I do, deem it possible to live in the same world with the Soviet Union, at peace, that climate of opinion, to which I believe the conduct of this subcommittee and others has contributed, has made it impossible for persons such as myself to earn a livelihood in our accepted professions.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment, Mr. Mandel. You say that this committee, by questioning subversive activities in the United States in open hearings, when people are under oath, make it impossible for a man who comes before it and says that he refuses to answer questions on the grounds that it may tend to incriminate him, as to whether or not he was or is or ever was a Communist—first, can you say that?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir. I will expand, if you would like it.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would. That is what these hearings are open for. We want an explanation as to why you think that this committee as a congressional committee should not go into the facts, to ascertain whether or not there are Communists in the Government or in organizations that are trying to influence our Government when we are in this cold war with communism, and in a hot war with communism.

Mr. MORRIS. You understand, Mr. Mandel, that you were asked to come here today to be given an opportunity to deny the fact that you were a member of the Communist Party, in accordance with open testimony?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I did not know why I was asked to come here, but, along the lines of the questioning or discussion that has proceeded thus far, it is of interest that long before anyone referred to me as ever having allegedly been a member of the Communist Party, the general climate of opinion—and I can give a specific instance if you care to have it—was such, that persons, not only myself, but others, who have not been called before this committee, but persons who have not made any secret of their belief that we and the Russians can live at peace in the same world together, with a certain amount of give and take on both sides, such persons have found it impossible to go on getting remunerative employment in the fields in which they were previously recognized.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Mandel, there is a lot of difference in being a Communist and one who says that we ought to be able to live in one world with the Russians.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I know of nobody on this committee who has questioned the right of any person to believe or to advocate that we

can live in this world with Russia. That does not say that they are Communists. That is an entirely different thing.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. But, I think it is difficult——

Senator FERGUSON. Is that where you claim you stand? Do you claim that you have been harmed by virtue of the fact that you have advocated the proposition that America and Russia should be able to live in one world?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Precisely, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me say, as far as I know, nothing has ever been said in this committee in derogation of that right.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Well, sir, to the degree that I am informed of the testimony thus far, and I have read a good deal of it quite carefully, of the witnesses called, the line of questioning pursued—I am not referring to any particular questioner, I am referring to this testimony—has been such, and particularly in the over-all events of the past year, as to indicate that anybody who does not believe that we ought to go to war with China is a Communist. That is my interpretation of the testimony and the questions with regard, for example, to gentlemen like Mr. Lattimore, with regard to a number of other people before the group, and with regard to the charges made by a number of the other witnesses.

Mr. MORRIS. You must concede, Mr. Mandel, that the only question that has been put to you today, or at least the only one I put to you, was: Were you, in fact, a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. And anything further than that was further questioning on the part of the chairman, supplemented by myself, and you were asked to explain your present attitude, and the charges you made voluntarily, before this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. You started in by charging the committee with blacklisting you, and that is what I wanted an explanation of.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Well, let me be specific.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I ask you this question, and then I will let you be specific: Do you believe that the Soviet Government has done its utmost to live in a world with America in an amicable way?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. One could also expand on that at length.

Senator FERGUSON. Expand on that at length.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. All right. I think there have been mistakes on both parts, but I believe that in proposing to reduce armaments by one-third across-the-board, and which we have not accepted, and proposing to outlaw the atom bomb cold, which we have not accepted, and they have proposed inspections, and they said we could go in there any time and they can come in here at any time to inspect——

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe that communism, even after they would say that you could inspect, would allow you to go within its borders and make an actual inspection?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is an interesting question, sir, and I can answer with this comment: That Mr. Walter Lippmann, who no one has ever accused of being a Communist or anything close to it, offered the opinion in one of his columns a year or two ago, which I would be glad to provide to this committee, that the reason for our representatives in the UN proposing inspections was that they were absolutely certain that the United States Senate would never agree to permit Russians to come poking around our installations here.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait a minute, you have not answered my question.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would answer that I think they would. That is simply my opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that Communists would allow that?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I think that they would; that is a matter of opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that the history of communism would allow America and the free nations to rely upon the words "Well, we will allow inspections"?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. May I illustrate that?

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I believe it was in Time magazine, about a month or two ago, that a British banker was reported at length on his wanderings around certain parts of Russia. They did not permit him to go everywhere—there was no such agreement of the kind that we are here hypothetically discussing—and he reported primarily in an unfavorable way on the standard of living and various other things. That is one instance of recent free poking around.

There was a delegation recently of British Quakers, headed by a very wealthy, prominent businessman, Mr. Cadbury, of the Cadbury Chocolate interests, who also went to Russia, visited many places, and had conversations at length. I do not mean to imply at all that anybody can go over there at any time that he wants to, and see what he wants to.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever been in Russia?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I have.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any restrictions placed on you?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. None whatsoever?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. None whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe that the United States has done its utmost in trying to live with the Soviet powers amicable in this world?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir. Specifically, we pledged to demilitarize Germany and Japan. We are now remilitarizing them. We have just indicated—and when I say "We," I am speaking of the United States Government—an intention to go back on our word—that's the only language I can use—given at the Yalta Conference, which was a conference at which our country was represented by its Chief of State, relative, in this particular case, to the island of Sakhalin, to the Korea islands, and to certain other holdings, and we have made peace with many of the men who were the chief enemies of our country during the last war, and I don't think that can win the confidence of a country that lost by its own estimate, 7,000,000 dead, and by the estimate of most other people, a great many more dead than that.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you this question: In case of war between the United States and the Soviet Union, whom would you support?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. If our country were attacked, I would fight for my country.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, you personally would determine whether or not Russia had attacked America?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would say, sir, that that is, as Mr. Roosevelt used to say, a very "iffy" question. I simply cannot envisage that kind of situation.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot envisage that? You cannot envisage the Soviet powers attacking America?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That's correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Because you believe that communism does not believe in aggression against capitalism?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would say that it is because I believe in terms of their record, that that has not been their record.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you say, then, about the attack on Poland, at the time of the pact with Hitler?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Mr. Churchill, whose love for communism is well known, commented at that time that it was in the interests of Russia's defense against a German attack that she stand upon that line. That is the first thing.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the attack on Finland?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. If you will review the United States Army training film, Battle of Russia, you will find that the United States Army explained to its troops that the Russian attack on Finland was part of the procedure of protecting its frontiers against the attack from Germany that was expected.

Mr. MORRIS. Who wrote that; do you know?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I have no idea.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe it?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the attack of the North Koreans on the South Koreans?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Sir, I have yet to have it satisfactorily explained to me why John Foster Dulles, the American diplomatic representative to South Korea, and our chief military man, were photographed in what was described in the New York Times the next day, the front-line trenches, 2 days before the war began.

Senator FERGUSON. I was in Korea in 1949 in December. Suppose I would have visited the front-line trenches of the South Koreans. I was at Suwon, which is thirty-some miles south of the dividing line.

On Saturday afternoon, the military authorities put on a parade, a review of their military. Do you think that if the war had started then, it would have indicated that America had something to do with the starting of the war?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would not like to impugn your intentions, no, sir; I can only say that at the time you were there, in 1949, and I would be glad to provide the committee with this document, the Minister of the Interior, I believe, Interior or Armed Forces, of South Korea stated to the New York Herald Tribune—it was published in the New York Herald Tribune—that he had been wanting to attack North Korea to settle the matter in that way and that the Americans had constantly told him, "No, not yet." The question in my mind—I was not in Korea in 1950 and I don't know—is as to whether that "Not yet" ever became "Now."

Senator FERGUSON. And you think that the fact that Mr. Dulles and someone else was up with the South Korean soldiers a few days before, indicated that the time had come, the "not yet" had arrived, at the time when they were instructed to attack or permitted to attack?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Well, sir, General MacArthur in his testimony before a committee of the Senate last year, stated that at the time of the beginning of that conflict, the North Korean troops were disposed for defense in depth, with the bulk of their troops 100 miles north of that frontier. That was his testimony, based on his Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean the South Koreans?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. The North Koreans. They were 100 miles north of this frontier.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand, then, that you believe that the South Koreans attacked the North Koreans?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I think there is that distinct possibility, in this situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think, then, that there is the possibility that Russia has nothing to do with this attack, if the North Koreans did attack?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Since I am not willing to grant as at all proven that the North Koreans did attack, I am in no position to comment on Russia. The North Koreans are certainly fighting with Russian arms. That goes without saying.

Senator FERGUSON. Your opinion is the South Koreans did the attacking?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would say there is a good chance of that, but I was not there.

Senator FERGUSON. But that is your judgment?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would offer that as my judgment.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think the Yalta agreement was a good agreement?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I certainly do. I think it was entirely to the interests of the United States in every respect.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you shoulder arms against Red China?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. If Red China attacked us, which is an utter impossibility, I certainly would.

The very question indicates to me what I said earlier about the purpose of some of the persons doing the questioning before this committee, in seeking to create an atmosphere in which anybody who opposes war with China is shut up. Obviously China cannot attack.

Senator FERGUSON. We are letting you talk.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I am sorry.

Senator FERGUSON. And I want you to talk. And now I want to ask you this question: Do you think that with the American troops fighting against the North Korean troops, with the Red Chinese soldiers moving in to North Korea, they did not attack America?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. You are speaking now of the Red Chinese?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. To which I reply that if the Red Chinese had moved to within the same distance within Canada or Mexico as we did in Korea, we would be entirely justified in moving into Canada and Mexico.

Senator FERGUSON. It is still aggression.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I don't think so, no, sir. We have established bases thousands of miles from our frontiers, all over the world.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, you believe that in this fighting in Korea, the North Koreans and the Red Chinese and the Russians, who are furnishing at least the matériel, are justified?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. In the first place, I do. In the second place, I think that the important thing today is to end the thing before it gets us all into it, rather than to argue out questions, to which, at best, I can offer an opinion only, not having been there, as I stated earlier, and anyone else can also offer an opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. How would you settle that? You say they were justified? How would you settle it?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Stop the fighting tomorrow where we are and settle all other questions afterward.

Senator FERGUSON. And move out?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Stop the fighting where we are, and then let our side and their side argue the thing out. Let the negotiators get stomach ulcers, so we don't kill any more men.

Senator FERGUSON. But then, would you move out?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would say that that depends upon the good will and the proposals of both sides from that point on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, you have not answered the question I put to you before. Would you shoulder arms against Red China?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. If Red China attacked us, which is an utter impossibility, I would shoulder arms against Red China.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you shoulder arms if you were asked tomorrow by the United States in the present set of circumstances which now exists?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. What is the question?

Senator FERGUSON. What is your age?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. My age is 34.

Senator FERGUSON. The question was: If you were asked to go to war tomorrow in the Korean theater, with the United States troops, would you go?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I will obey the laws of my country.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would go?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would go.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, you have written some books that have been sponsored by the Institute of Pacific Relations, have you not?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the extent to which your books have been sponsored by the Institute?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I wrote a book called *The Soviet Far East and Central Asia*. I believe the date of the publication in printed form was 1944. I believe that it appeared in mimeographed form either the previous year or 1942. Your information might be even more exact than mine on that; and that is the book that I wrote for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. You also made a speech, did you not, at the Eighth IPR Conference?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir; I was never at any IPR conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you an expert in foreign relation matters?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Those who have employed me to do this work apparently thought that I was.

Senator FERGUSON. In the Far East?



Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Primarily on Russia, but since this particular work regarding Russia and the Far East came along, that is how the connection arose.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your educational background?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Public schools in New York City, high school in New York City, one semester of biochemistry at the age of 14 in Moscow University, 1 year of engineering at City College thereafter, 1 year of a fellowship at postdoctoral level. They based this on the work I had done—I had no degree—at the Hoover Institute, of Stanford University, in 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you a knowledge of what communism is?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I could hardly pretend to be something of an expert on Russia without having some knowledge of what communism is.

Senator FERGUSON. I wonder whether you read the first article by Whitaker Chambers in the Saturday Evening Post?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I scanned through it; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you say about that article, on the description as to what communism is, and is not?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I am afraid that I would have to study it thoroughly before—

Senator FERGUSON. You would want to comment?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Before I would want to comment; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it was a fair explanation as to what communism is?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I said I would have to study it more fully.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us what communism is? You have said that we ought to be able to get along with it.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That we have not done our share in trying to get along with it. You think Russia has?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what is communism?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I think it is essentially a system under which what they call the means of production, factories, mills, mines, raw materials, railroads, banks, become public property—

Senator FERGUSON. That is the economic side of it?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That's the economic side of it. And that the Government is run in the interests of those who are called proletarians, industrial wage workers, to prevent any return of what they term exploitation.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you believe that they believe in the wiping out of those who are opposed to that system?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. You speak of physical wiping out?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not they have prison camps in Russia?

Mr. MANDEL. The Soviet Union has a penal system, undoubtedly.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that they did?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Wipe people out?

Senator FERGUSON. Wipe people out.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Sir, I happened to be in Russia in the year 1931, and 1932, which has been described—and I think that it is an

accurate description—no one seems to disagree with it, as perhaps the toughest years but one, economically speaking, under the present regime, since their civil war of 1918–20, and the year in which this process of collectivization of farming was very intense.

I learned the Russian language when I got there. I did not know it previously.

Senator FERGUSON. You now speak and write and read it?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I write poorly; I read it fluently, and speak it very well. I learned the language when I got over there, but the physical appearance apparently does not correspond to any particular nationality, and so, when I had dressed as a Russian, nobody took me for anything else. Here was the capital city of the nation, a city which is more comparable to Chicago, in its reflection of the country at large, than is Washington or New York City in our own country. People came in and out all the time. I went out to buy milk from the peasants who came into town.

The peasants asked me questions. There were some beggars on the streets. They were usually peasant people, judging by their clothing, but never in the year that I was there—and this is the year that is described by others, as this time of terrible imprisonment, persecution, deaths, and what have you—was there any indication in any of these contacts which one has wandering around a city, and principally out of curiosity, of this kind of procedure.

I will not question that some—how many, I don't know, and I frankly don't think anybody knows—that some of the recalcitrants employing peasants—the kulaks, as they were called—were deported to certain areas and jailed; but, as to this matter of mass murder, there was not that atmosphere of any kind in the country.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not there are slave-labor camps in Russia?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. There are penal camps.

Senator FERGUSON. Not slave labor?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Not slave-labor camps.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how many people who started out with the present Russian Soviet Government were killed?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. It's 35 years.

Senator FERGUSON. Or committed suicide?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. A number have. It's 35 years.

Senator FERGUSON. How many would you say were killed, who were known as leaders in that movement under the movement itself, by those who were coleaders?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I think we would have to say at which level we are discussing this.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at the top level.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Well, I can think of two at the very top level, a man named Zinoviev and a man named Kamenev.

Senator FERGUSON. Why were they killed?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. According to testimony given at a trial attended by Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, and which with the experience of 20 years as a lawyer he felt was legitimate testimony, these men were guilty of treason, and their country's laws provided for execution for treason.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you familiar with what was known as the trials in Russia, about 1937?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. From reading.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you think about those?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is the group of trials to which I have reference.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that they were merely carrying out the criminal laws of Russia, that they were fair, and that they were fair trials?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is the testimony of our Ambassador to our Secretary of State as published in his book *Mission to Moscow*, issued with the approval of the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. You are basing your judgment on that statement?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I am basing my judgment in part on that statement and in the full text of the testimony at those trials.

Senator FERGUSON. From the text, you came to the same conclusion?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I come to that conclusion, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I show you what purports to be a conference report, Secretariat Paper No. 1, which Mr. Mandel will identify as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. BENJAMIN MANDEL. This is a mimeographed copy taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "The Soviet Far East," by William Mandel, research associate, American-Russian Institute, eighth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mont Tremblant, Quebec, Canada, December 1942, Secretariat Paper No. 1, international secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, October 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. William Mandel, I will ask you to tell us what you know about that report.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I will identify it, judging by its appearance. I cannot go through the 56 pages offhand; but, judging from its appearance, it is the report that I wrote at that time.

I just want to make it clear that the identification of my connection does not connect this organization here [indicating].

Senator FERGUSON. What is the organization?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I was identified here as research associate of the American-Russian Institute. The conclusion might be drawn from the reading that this is in some way connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. And the other is the international secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations.

How does it come that both of those names are on that cover?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Well, one was my position.

Senator FERGUSON. Which was your position, research associate, American-Russian Institute?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir; that was my position.

Senator FERGUSON. And how did the other name—international secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York—get on it?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That organization asked me to write this report, and they published the other to identify me.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there is no misquotation on this paper?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir. My point simply was that, in a way, the way it was read, one might get the idea that the one organization was a part of the other. That was the only reason for my explanation.

Senar FERGUSON. I think that is clear; that they are not the same organization.

Mr. MORRIS. For whom did you prepare that report?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. For the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Who requested you to do it?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I don't recall exactly; probably Mr. Holland.

Mr. MORRIS. Who financed the project?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. The Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. How much was spent on that?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I don't know. Your file will probably give the information.

Mr. MORRIS. How much money did you receive from the institute?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Same thing; it was 10 years ago. The sum was not large, and you probably have the figure there, and I would be happy to verify it.

Senator FERGUSON. About how much was it? Was it an expensive job?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No; I would say it was not an expensive job.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it \$500?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would guess that it was in that vicinity. I am speaking of payment to me, not any other expenses.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Did you attend the conference itself?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You prepared the paper for submission to the conference?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. But you yourself did not attend?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Did not attend.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you prepare a pamphlet entitled "The Soviet Far East and Central Asia"?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That was a book.

Mr. MORRIS. A book, then?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That is this book [indicating]?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Correct.

Mr. MORRIS. This bears the name "The Soviet Far East" by William Mandel. That is the same as "The Soviet Far East and Central Asia"?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I believe the inside title page will show the full title. I believe it is the same.

Mr. MORRIS. Who published that book?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. The Institute of Pacific Relations and a private publisher, Dial Press.

Mr. MORRIS. Who requested you to undertake that project?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Essentially that project is this one expanded [indicating].

Senator FERGUSON. You mean the first document?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes; this second one is the first document, expanded.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a publication dated 1944, and the Mont Tremblant Conference was 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is correct, but I think the contents of the 56 pages here are virtually identical with several chapters of the other book.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the IPR finance this second project?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I don't think so. Again, if your records show differently, I would be glad to verify it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they go over this, criticize it, and approve it, reject it, or what?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I assume they did.

Senator FERGUSON. It must have been satisfactory to them, to put it out under this label, because they say "Copyright, 1944, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations."

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would say it was satisfactory, within their framework of seeking a variety of opinions. They have had books by people who would undoubtedly differ with me 100 percent in probably everything I say in there.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that this pamphlet and this book were pro-Soviet?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would say that they represented my honest opinion of the truth about the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But were they pro-Soviet?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I don't think that the truth is pro or anti.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think it was pro; it was merely as you saw it?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That's correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not trying to be pro-Soviet were you?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you read the testimony of Mr. Budenz, given this committee concerning you?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I believe I have. You may want to refresh my memory.

Mr. MORRIS. This is page 662 of the public hearings, part II:

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. William Mandel, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know him to be a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I have met him both at the headquarters of the Communist Party and also up at the offices of the Soviet Russia Today, or, yes, Soviet Russia Today.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know him to be a Communist of long standing, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he is a well-versed Communist.

Is that accurate testimony?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I am afraid that I have got to refuse to answer under the privilege granted by the fifth amendment, not to testify against myself.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Mandel, you said that you were blacklisted by this committee and others. You have now been given the opportunity to deny what at least one man said, Mr. Budenz. Is that not correct?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And I will now give you the privilege to deny what anyone has said on this record or to this committee as to your being a Communist or a pro-Communist or a card-carrying Communist, or a left winger, or anything else.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. The only person before this committee who made any such charge was Mr. Budenz.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. So you decline.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I am sorry to say—and I can assure you that I would much prefer to discuss the matter differently, but I am sorry to say that, on advice of counsel, I have given my answer to this question.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Do you believe that the Smith law, under which the 11 Communists were indicted and tried, is a good law?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. May I consult with my counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. My answer is that it is not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is not a good law?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You think it is an improper law?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. It goes counter to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, and, what is more important than that, I think it is very bad for this country to have any legislation that tends to restrict people's expressions of opinions in any way, on the books.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that the 11 men that were tried in New York in the Federal court under that law had a fair trial under the law?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. My reply, sir, is that I do not, and I have one very specific reason for thinking so, among others, and that is that the grand-jury system, the jury system, as such there—I live there and I am not unfamiliar with these things—the juries are so selected as to weight the juries disproportionately against working people, Negroes, and members of other minorities, and since these men put themselves forward as defending the rights of working people, Negroes, and other minorities, it is obvious that they might have expected, or might have had some reason to expect, a different kind of verdict if such people had been on this jury.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you in any way contribute to that trial, any funds, or anything?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I must again refuse to answer, under the privilege granted me in the fifth amendment of the Constitution, not to testify against myself.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you asked to contribute in any way to the Hiss trial—Alger Hiss?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you contribute?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you contributed to any other trials? I am excluding the Communists' trial. You refused to answer in relation to the 11 Communists.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would say I probably have.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you give us the names of them?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes. There was a trial recently of Dr. W. E. B. DuBois and his associates. If my memory serves me correctly, I made some contribution to that.

Senator FERGUSON. What were they charged with?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. My memory is that they were charged with failure to register under the foreign agents' registration law. They were acquitted, or the charge was dropped.

Senator FERGUSON. You said that you believed that the Russian trials of 1937, the purge trials, so-called, were fair, and the trial of the 11 Communists was unfair. Do you believe that the Soviet judicial system is superior to the United States of America judicial system?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is a very bland question.

I would say that I am quite keenly aware, and I say in writings of mine, of miscarriages of justice under the Soviet judicial system, and I am quite confident more of them have occurred than I have personally read about.

Senator FERGUSON. So, you do not care to pass upon which is superior?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir; I don't. I think that each country works out its own judicial system in accordance with its own history.

Senator FERGUSON. But, as to the particular trials you mentioned, you thought one was fair and the other was unfair?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I gave my answer on those; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to add anything more to your statement here?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you had a fair day in court here?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I certainly have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Mandel just about this article.

You wrote a letter to the New York Times that appeared on the editorial page on October 29, 1951.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I did, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write that at the request of anybody?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read one paragraph from that letter, please?

Mr. BENJAMIN MANDEL (reading):

If the IPR is guilty of something or other because it sponsored or publicized my work, then so are all the others listed above, which makes everybody out of step but McCarran and McCarthy. If the dicta of that group are permitted to stand, and if the Federal and State Governments are not influenced to drop the prosecutions of Dr. W. E. B. DuBois and Prof. Dirk Struik, the principle of guilt by association will be used to hound and whip into line all who, like Dr. Jessup, ever permitted free discussion and scholarship in the field of foreign policy or anything else.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that a fair statement of what you said?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is exactly what I said.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think the Government has been unfair in the prosecution of those men mentioned in that letter?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir, certainly; and, as far as Dr. DuBois is concerned, the fact that the judge threw the case out of court after I wrote this letter—I do not show any connection; I am speaking in terms of time—would tend to indicate that there is some substance to my belief.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe in the law that requires aliens to register?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, when were you most recently at the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Within the last few days, since receiving the subpoena from this committee, and for the purpose of reading the record of the previous testimony, which I cannot afford to buy at the moment.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not work for them now?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When was the last you worked for them?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. To distinguish, I have never been a salaried employee.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not mean that.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. The last time I did any paid work for them was over a lengthy period, dating from probably October 1948—the dates are subject to correction—to, I would say, July of 1950—that date also is subject to correction—compiling a collection of Soviet far-eastern policy documents and Soviet commentary. It was no commentary of my own; it was a collection of documents and commentary which they published, with a very strong anti-Soviet introductory statement by a Prof. Max Beloff, of England, who was invited to write that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Mr. Budenz?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I have given my answer to that.

Mr. MORRIS. No; you have never answered that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Mr. Louis F. Budenz?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I am afraid that I must answer that I refuse to answer on the grounds of the privilege granted me by the fifth amendment of the Constitution, not to testify against myself.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you the question as to whether or not you knew Louis F. Budenz to be a Communist at one time?

(Witness confers with his counsel.)

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I must refuse to answer that question on the same grounds just given.

Senator FERGUSON. I recognize your right to refuse to testify.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you been a guest lecturer at the California Labor School?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Again, with regrets, I must refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, were you suspended from City College in New York City in 1933, because of your opposition to the Reserve officers training program there?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I was expelled from City College in 1933 for opposition to militarism.

It may have been the particular detail that you have mentioned.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been a lecturer at the Jefferson School of Social Science?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I must refuse to answer that question under the privilege previously cited.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that you have been listed as a lecturer in the Jefferson School of Social Science in the Daily Worker of June 28, 1945, page 5?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I believe I must give the same answer as to the previous question.



Mr. MORRIS. But do you know you have been listed as such in the Daily Worker?

(The witness confers with his counsel.)

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I must refuse to answer that question on the same grounds previously stated.

Senator FERGUSON. I recognize his right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandell, were you a senior fellow in Slavic studies at the Hoover Institute in Stanford University.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you hold that position.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. For the academic year 1947; specifically from February through September, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you obtain that position?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I wrote a letter of application, if my memory serves me correctly, either to the director, without name, or to Dr. H. H. Fisher, the director.

Mr. MORRIS. How well do you know Dr. H. H. Fisher?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. In a way that a fellow very junior in years, and in standing, knows the director of a serious and important academic institution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you, prior to the time you went to Stanford University, know Dr. Fisher personally?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I had met him once.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you meet him?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I met him at Stanford University.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was that?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I think it must have been the end of 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mary Wright, at Stanford University?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I believe so.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you meet Mary Wright?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Probably during this period of 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you contribute to the Soviet Arctic Encyclopedia in 1949 or 1950?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. There was no Soviet Arctic Encyclopedia. I contributed to the Encyclopedia Arctica, a product of the Stefanson Library, financed by the United States Office of Naval Research.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you obtain that association?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Vilhjalmur Stefanson, V-i-l-h-j-a-l-m-u-r, same last name, was the head of that library, and was apparently acquainted with my work on the Soviet Union.

Apparently he drew the conclusion that I had competent knowledge to do research in the field.

Mr. MORRIS. Had you known Dr. Stefanson at the time?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. At what time?

Mr. MORRIS. At the time that you prepared that contribution?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Obviously.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know him personally?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Had you ever met him?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Under what circumstances did you meet him?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I had lunch with him in a hotel in San Francisco. I remember that because he was there lecturing.

Mr. MORRIS. Who introduced you to Mr. Stefanson?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I believe it was his wife.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that is a United States Navy project?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. It is one of the projects that—somebody else will have to give you the exact details on these things—but it is one of a number of projects which are neither civilian nor defense, exactly, and each one of the branches of the armed services—in this case, the Office of Naval Research—saw fit to finance what it called a contribution to science.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I met him once.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you meet him?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. At the home of Mr. Stefanson. I might say that I was introduced in passing.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been a contributor to Pacific Affairs, the publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Pacific Affairs published one article of mine, which is also to be found in the two other publications of mine of IPR, which you have asked me about before.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was that?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I think it was in 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the editor of Pacific Affairs at that time?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it Michael Greenberg?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That name sounds familiar.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have a discussion with Mr. Michael Greenberg at that time?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I simply don't recollect.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever met Michael Greenberg?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I think I have.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you meet Michael Greenberg?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all I have.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 6:10 p. m., Thursday, February 14, 1952, the committee was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)



# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 3:15 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 457, Senate Office Building, Hon. Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. We will come to order.

This is a continuation of the testimony of the executive session.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the witness has already been sworn in executive session.

## TESTIMONY OF LYLE H. MUNSON, SILVER SPRING, MD.

Senator FERGUSON. You understand that you have been sworn, Mr. Munson, do you not?

Mr. MUNSON. I do, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And now, under oath, this is an open hearing. I will ask you your full name.

Mr. MUNSON. My name is Lyle H. Munson.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are here under subpoena, Mr. Munson, are you?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes; I am here under subpoena.

I would also like to inquire, Mr. Chairman, if the record will show to the public that the decision that public discussion of this matter is, in fact, in the public interest was made by the committee and not by me.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct.

The present chairman of the subcommittee heard all of this testimony in executive session this morning and the subject was gone into very carefully, I think, thoroughly. I am satisfied, after conferring with counsel of the committee, that there is nothing in this record that will be brought out but what is in the interest of the public, and for that reason alone, this is a matter of great public concern and therefore it is in the public interest that we have this testimony.

I personally am very sensitive to anything that would affect our public security. I have tried to consider all that and I have come to the conclusion that the public interest is overbearing as far as this testimony is concerned.

I realize the position in which the witness is, but there are times when personal concern cannot interfere with the public interest, and I believe that this is one of the times.

Mr. MUNSON. I appreciate the chairman's understanding in this matter and I am grateful for that statement that has just been made. Senator FERGUSON. Now you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your address to the reporter, Mr. Munson?

Mr. MUNSON. I reside at 1798 East-West Highway, in Silver Spring, Md.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. MUNSON. I am a publisher, engaged in the publication of books in English, Japanese, Chinese, Siamese.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is your business office, Mr. Munson?

Mr. MUNSON. My firm is incorporated in the State of New York under the laws of the State of New York. The business was first established in the Orient, in Hong Kong, British Colony. We maintain branches in Manila and in Tokyo at the present time.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been in the past an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. MUNSON. I was at one time an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency for a period of approximately 1 year, ending on or about mid-April of 1950. I had submitted a formal resignation some 60 days in advance of that date, but my actual departure from the agency did not take place until sometime in or about mid-April of 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it a fact that you stayed on after you submitted your resignation, for a short period, in order to complete an assignment that it was desired you should stay for?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Munson, do you recall making a voluntary statement to two special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the 11th of April of 1950?

Mr. MUNSON. On or about that date I did make a statement to two special agents of the FBI.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Munson, did you this morning, in executive session, identify a copy of that instrument?

Mr. MUNSON. I did identify a document which appeared to be a copy of that instrument.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that such a copy, sir [presenting document to witness]?

Mr. MUNSON. This would appear to be a copy of that instrument.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may we allow the witness time to read this through, because I am going to question him about it somewhat?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

I think that is the copy that he saw, but I want him to read it so that he will be familiar with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you now read the statement, Mr. Munson?

Mr. MUNSON. I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there anything in that statement which is untrue, to the best of your knowledge and belief?

Mr. MUNSON. To the best of my knowledge, there is nothing appearing in this paper that is untrue.

Senator FERGUSON. This appears, then, does it, to be a copy of a statement that you made to two persons who identified themselves as special agents of the FBI?

Mr. MUNSON. It does.

Mr. SOURWINE. May this be offered for the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive it as part of the public record. It is now in the record.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 442" and was read in full:)

APRIL 11, 1950.

I, Lyle H. Munson, make the following voluntary statement to Albert C. Hayden, Jr., and William S. Hyde, who have identified themselves to me as special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

On Wednesday, November 16, 1949, I participated in a conference with John P. Davies, Jr., of the Department of State. My memorandum for record, written subsequent to that meeting, reports the following as the substance of Mr. Davies' comments:

1. That as regards Chinese personnel, the persons most helpful to OPC would be Chinese with American wives or husbands, who consequently had close ties with this country.

2. That he [Davies] had discussed with other OPC staff members the matter of employing certain persons through appropriate cut-outs, to consult and guide OPC in certain activities affecting the Far East.

3. That the persons he had indicated to them should be used were Benjamin K. Schwartz, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, Professor [John] Fairbank and wife.

Mr. Davies expressed the feeling that the above-mentioned persons should be used by OPC, and that the consultation and guidance and materials prepared by them would represent the proper approach. Mr. Davies said that he would be perfectly confident to put Professor and Mrs. Fairbank at the head of a unit charged with producing such materials. He said that he was aware that they were considered Communists by some uninformed persons, but that they were not Communists, but "only very (politically) sophisticated."

It was Davies' suggestion that the above persons be situated physically in an office or suite of offices somewhere other than Washington (probably New York or Boston) and that through a cut-out of OPC choosing, these persons provide not only guidance, but actually produce materials, for OPC utilization.

Davies was particularly insistent that Dr. Schwartz, of the Russian Research Institute at Harvard, be retained by OPC for policy guidance in certain fields of its activities, and noted that Dr. Schwartz had been most helpful to him as a consultant.

The suggestions and recommendations made by Mr. Davies did not constitute an order or directive, nor were they so interpreted by me or my superiors.

LYLE H. MUNSON.

Senator FERGUSON. We will ask you some questions about your statement, Mr. Munson.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Munson, was this a carefully prepared statement?

Mr. MUNSON. I would say that appropriate time and attention was paid in its preparation.

Mr. SOURWINE. This statement refers to an occasion on which you participated in a conference with Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., of the Department of State; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it refers to a memorandum for record, written subsequent to that meeting. Was that a memorandum which you wrote for the CIA?

Mr. MUNSON. It was.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the files of the agency by which you were then employed?

Mr. MUNSON. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have available to you, for consultation and for refreshment of your memory, at the time you wrote this memorandum of April 11, the memorandum for record which you had previously written for the CIA?

Mr. MUNSON. I did have available to me at the time that I prepared this statement for the FBI such memoranda for record as I had prepared for Central Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it true that it was not only available, but you did see it and you did know what was in it at that time?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that I had occasion to refer to it and to refresh my memory at the time I prepared this memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. So that, while it is some time after the meeting that you had with Mr. Davies on Wednesday, the 16th of November 1949 to April, you had documents before you that were made following your November meeting; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And while that meeting was then fresh in your memory?

Mr. MUNSON. And while that meeting was fresh in my memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those documents, as the chairman has pointed out, were available to you and were, in fact, consulted by you at the time this statement was prepared; is that right?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that I did consult them, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this conference with Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., a conference requested by him?

Mr. MUNSON. It was a conference requested and initiated by Mr. Davies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who participated in that conference besides yourself and Mr. Davies?

Mr. MUNSON. There was one other employee of the Central Intelligence Agency present.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you have, because of security reasons, declined to make public the name of that person; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. At that time that I joined the Central Intelligence Agency, as at the time that I resigned from it, I took an oath to maintain in confidence all activities, classified information, including the names of employees that might come to my attention during the period of my employment. The name of the gentleman who accompanied me in this conference would, it seems to me, fall in that classification.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have, as a matter of fact, been informed, since you were subpoenaed to appear before this committee, that that name did fall in that category and should not be publicly revealed; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. I have discussed this matter with responsible persons at CIA in an effort to insure that I would, in this appearance here, not have occasion to reveal any classified information, and it was requested that this name not be revealed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask permission not to proceed further with that line of inquiry.

Senator FERGUSON. The Chair, under the particular circumstances, at the particular time, is familiar with the facts, and I do not think at the present time that it detracts from the testimony. Therefore I will not compel the witness to name the particular person that was involved.

Mr. MUNSON. I am grateful for that consideration, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. At this conference, at which only three people were present—is that right, only three?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. At this conference, which took place on or about the 16th of November 1949, were certain recommendations made by Mr. Davies?

Mr. MUNSON. Certain recommendations were made by Mr. Davies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were those unsolicited recommendations, that is, unsolicited by you?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes. They were not solicited either by myself or by my confederate, who accompanied me to the conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. So far as you know, were they unsolicited by the CIA?

Mr. MUNSON. So far as I am knowledgeable, they were unsolicited by any official of CIA.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did those recommendations concern the use of certain persons, and were those certain persons named by Mr. Davies during that conference?

Mr. MUNSON. They were.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were those persons Benjamin K. Schwartz, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, Prof. John Fairbank, and the professor's wife, Wilma Fairbank?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that those were the names of the persons that Mr. Davies recommended.

Mr. SOURWINE. This memorandum mentions those names. Does it not?

Mr. MUNSON. It does.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time Mr. Davies made his recommendation to you, do you know whether he was cleared to receive classified information?

Mr. MUNSON. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it, then, that you did not at that time discuss with him any classified information; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. On the occasion of this conference I had no occasion to reveal to him any classified information that was in my possession, concerning which I was knowledgeable.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, then, this information was coming to you from an outside source, the State Department, and you were not imparting information from your agency to him or the State Department; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. I attended the conference, Mr. Chairman, as a receptacle of information which I, in turn, carried back to the agency by which I was at that time employed; where it was reviewed and acted upon, in this case the action being the form of a rejection of the recommendations that had been transmitted to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it was really that you were acting as a receptacle, as you say, receiving the information and not giving information out of your agency; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So the conversations that we will get from you today are what Mr. Davies gave you; is that right?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.



Senator FERGUSON. Rather than what you gave him?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, you merely were a receiver of this information, and this memorandum is a memorandum as to what took place, as far as Davies was concerned on that day; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. This is a record of my recollection of that conference, in which I was really a recipient of recommendations, nothing more.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Munson, did you testify this morning that nothing that Mr. Davies said could be taken as a definite information that he possessed any classified information concerning the CIA?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that there was nothing in the conversation on his part or on our part which in any way would indicate a knowledge, on the part of Mr. Davies, of the operations or activities or personnel responsibilities of our agency.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this conference cleared by the top level at CIA before it took place? Was any special issue made of it, or any special clearance sought with regard to it?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that the then head of the branch or the section to which I was assigned was conversant with Mr. Davies' request that my coworker and I go to and appear at his office for the conference. Whether or not it was discussed by him with persons higher in the bureaucracy than that, I cannot testify.

Mr. SOURWINE. As it came to you, was there anything in your instructions which, in your opinion, would have authorized you to discuss with Mr. Davies classified matter?

Mr. MUNSON. I certainly had no such instructions.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you did not discuss classified matter with him?

Mr. MUNSON. I did not discuss classified matters with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether this conference was cleared at any level in the State Department?

Mr. MUNSON. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you regard Mr. Davies, when he sought to set up the conference and when you had the conference with him, as speaking as an official of the Department of State?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes. The conference was held in an office in the Department of State Building during office hours, customary Government working hours. I did consider that he was an official of the Department of State.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he purport to speak as an official of the State Department in making his recommendations to you and, through you, to your agency?

Mr. MUNSON. I can only say that at no time did he indicate that he was not speaking as an official of the Department of State.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us in your own language, please, with reference to this memorandum—and, if necessary, refresh your memory—just what it was that Mr. Davies recommended with regard to the six named persons?

Mr. MUNSON. Mr. Davies expressed the feeling that these six persons should be used by the Central Intelligence Agency as a source of consultation and guidance and in the preparation of materials which might be useful to us in executing our chartered responsibilities.

Mr. SOURWINE. Technically speaking, did that involve employment of these persons?

Mr. MUNSON. Not employment in the sense that you here have employed the court reporter, for example, or, as I would understand your relationship, that you are an employee of this committee, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it would have constituted employment in the sense that you employ a tool or that you employ an instrument to dig in your garden, would it not?

Mr. MUNSON. Mr. Davies was recommending that we avail ourselves of the knowledge, counsel, and guidance of these six persons, that we use them as consultants in assisting us in directing activities for which we were responsible.

Mr. SOURWINE. If Mr. Davies' recommendations had been followed out, would these persons have become, in the broad sense, a part of the CIA operation?

Mr. MUNSON. Had Mr. Davies' recommendations been carried out—which I repeat, they were not during my period of employment there—these persons would have become consultants, indirectly, and would have been furnishing counsel and suggestions for the consideration of CIA officials.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will ask several questions now, which may seem to you repetitive. I will phrase them as I do because I want to traverse, in a certain way, certain phases of this.

Mr. MUNSON. All right, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies, on the occasion of this conference of November 16, 1949, suggest or urge that Edgar Snow be used for guidance by an agency of the Government other than the State Department?

Mr. MUNSON. Mr. Davies suggested the use of six persons, and Mr. Snow was one of those six persons.

Mr. SOURWINE. I appreciate that fact.

On this series of questions now, I would be grateful if you would, if you can, answer yes or no. Then if the answer needs to be qualified, qualify it. Do you understand?

Mr. MUNSON. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies ever suggest or urge that Edgar Snow be used for guidance by another agency of the Government, that is, other than the State Department?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies ever suggest or urge that Snow be used for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government, that is, other than the State Department?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes; subject to the qualification which I have indicated and which I would like to reiterate here. Mr. Davies was recommending the utilization of these people for the purpose of consultation and guidance in preparation of materials calculated to be useful to us, indirectly, through an intermediary, and in such way that Mr. Snow and the others would not be cognizant at any time that they were furnishing those suggestions or ideas, recommendations or materials directly to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean that his whole proposal clearly involved keeping these persons in the dark as to how their recommendations, suggestions, advice, and guidance were being used?

Mr. MUNSON. Mr. Davies had recommended that these persons, as a unit or as a working group, be set up or established physically out-

side the confines of the Central Intelligence Agency establishment and geographically outside the Washington area, and that contact with them be maintained or negotiated in all cases through an intermediary of CIA choosing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever suggest himself as that intermediary?

Mr. MUNSON. He did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever suggest anyone as that intermediary?

Mr. MUNSON. He made no suggestion as to who that intermediary should be. As a matter of fact, it is my recollection that he indicated that this intermediary should be a person of CIA's own selection or choice.

I should add, I think, sir, that this recommendation or proposal never was refined in thinking or in planning in the degree that we are trying to discuss it here, for the simple reason that the recommendation was rejected by responsible and proper CIA officials before any such planning or implementation could be considered.

Senator FERGUSON. On the point of having, let us say, a cut-out used, was that for the purpose of not allowing these persons to know who was getting the information; or was it for the purpose of not having them directly contact and be known to be contacting your organization?

Mr. MUNSON. I cannot speak as to what was in Mr. Davies' mind.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say on that point?

Mr. MUNSON. The matter was never discussed in those terms, Mr. Chairman. It was my understanding that these persons were to be used through an intermediary, that there would be no direct contact between any responsible official of the Central Intelligence Agency and the aforementioned six, but that that contact would be made through the intermediary for the purpose not only of denying these six access to or information about Central Intelligence Agency personnel and responsibilities and activities, but also to preclude their knowledge that they were furnishing information directly to or indirectly to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you possibly do that, under your paragraph?

I will read it to you:

It was Davies' suggestion that the above persons be situated physically in an office or suite of offices somewhere other than Washington (probably New York or Boston) and that through a cut-out of OPC choosing, these persons provide not only guidance, but actually produce materials for OPC utilization.

How would you set up six people, of diverse interests, in one office or one suite of offices and contact them to get guidance and materials for your work and they not know at least what was being done? How do you explain that?

Mr. MUNSON. I do not explain it, sir. As I said, the recommendations never were implemented.

Senator FERGUSON. But I am talking about your statement there as to what took place. Did he, or did he not, indicate that he had talked it over with the people and they were agreeable?

Mr. MUNSON. He did not at any time indicate that he had discussed this matter with any of these six persons.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Munson, was this understood by you at the time to be a proposal that these six people be duped into furnishing a service for CIA?

**Mr. MUNSON.** I would say rather that it was my impression that it was being recommended that CIA should avail itself of consultation and guidance indirectly and without the direct knowledge of these six persons.

**Mr. SOURWINE.** You have already said that, have you not?

**Mr. MUNSON.** Yes.

**Mr. SOUREWINE.** Did you understand at the time that what Mr. Davies was proposing was that these six persons be duped into providing information that the CIA could use? That either was your understanding or it was not.

**Mr. MUNSON.** I suppose in a general sense—I am simply trying to find an alternate of this word “dupe.” It is not a very satisfactory word in this instance. I suppose basically this is the substance of the recommendation, however.

**Mr. SOUREWINE.** In other words, is what you are saying that Mr. Davies referred to these people in his recommendation, treated then in his recommendation as persons who would not voluntarily help the CIA but whose help or assistance would have to be secured through a means whereby they would be uninformed as to the fact that they were actually assisting CIA operations? Is that a correct statement?

**Mr. MUNSON.** No.

Again, I cannot speak for what was in Mr. Davies' mind. It did not occur to me at the time he was suggesting that these persons were individuals who would not, if directly requested by the Central Intelligence Agency, supply information and guidance. There was never any implication of this and the question did not arise in our conversation, according to my recollection. He suggested no alternatives to this. This was simply, as I have stated in this memorandum, his recommendations as to how CIA might avail itself of this guidance and recommendation.

**Mr. SOURWINE.** Let me ask this question: was there anything in his recommendation which could have been construed or which, in your opinion, was intended as a recommendation that these people, or any of them, be used as double agents?

**Mr. MUNSON.** At no time did I understand that Mr. Davies was suggesting the use of any one or all of these persons as double agents.

**Senator FERGUSON.** They were to be used, were they not, according to this memorandum, as a unit?

**Mr. MUNSON.** They were to be used as a work shop team, or unit; yes, sir.

**Senator FERGUSON.** And the people to be placed at the head of it appeared to be, in this memorandum, Professor and Mrs. Fairbank, where you say that Mr. Davies said that he would be perfectly confident to put Professor and Mrs. Fairbank at the head of the unit, charged with producing such materials.

**Mr. MUNSON.** I did not accept this, Mr. Chairman, as a recommendation to us that Professor and Mrs. Fairbank should be placed at the head of the unit. I simply accepted it as his opinion that he would be satisfied if they were confident of their ability to perform such function.

**Mr. SOURWINE.** You both discussed the recommendation in the light of the assumption that the unit would have to have a head, is not that true?

Mr. MUNSON. We did not pursue it to that degree. It was never discussed to the degree of how it should be set up or in what nature.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Davies, at least, must have contemplated the unit would have to have a head, because he mentioned the possibility of Dr. Fairbank heading the unit; did he not?

Mr. MUNSON. He did not mention the possibility of Dr. Fairbank heading this unit. He spoke of his confidence in Professor and Mrs. Fairbank at the head of a unit charged with such responsibilities.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean it might be in contemplation that these six people would cooperate as a cooperative unit without any directing head?

Mr. MUNSON. I do not mean to imply that at all. I am simply saying Mr. Davies did not recommend to us: "I recommend you should place Professor and Mrs. Fairbank at the head of this unit." He simply expressed his own opinion that Professor and/or Mrs. Fairbank would be competent to head a unit of this kind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it not implicit in the recommendation that somebody head such a unit?

Mr. MUNSON. It seems logical to assume so; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it not inferred by you that there would have to be someone to head the unit?

Mr. MUNSON. In organizing such an activity, it would be customary to have a head certainly of such a work unit, and it would seem there would have to be a head.

Mr. SOURWINE. Under the conditions specified in Mr. Davies' recommendation, as you have explained it to us, that head would have to have been one of these six people; would it not?

Mr. MUNSON. Either one of these six people, or the intermediary.

Mr. SOURWINE. The intermediary could not have been both the unit and the cut-out, could he?

Mr. MUNSON. I don't know, because we did not discuss it or try to work it out in that detail. We did not go into any problem of organizing this; we simply accepted this as a suggestion. The suggestion was actually refused in a matter of hours or days. There was never any discussion or attempt to build what the Army calls a table of organization or to set up the structure of this committee in any way.

Mr. SOURWINE. You spoke earlier of setting up these people somewhere away from Washington, and this memorandum speaks of situating them physically in an office or suite of offices. Would you say that Mr. Davies had recommended that these persons be set up in an office or offices somewhere outside of Washington?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That they be so set up by an agency of the Government, directly or indirectly?

Mr. MUNSON. Indirectly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Indirectly, yes; is that your answer?

Mr. MUNSON. Indirectly, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask a question, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Munson, it was clear to you, was it not, that this unit was to give guidance to the program and was not to be guided?

Mr. MUNSON. It was clear to me that Mr. Davies was recommending that these persons provide and furnish consultation and guidance and that the reverse would not be the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he making a recommendation of this nature: "Get A, B, C, D, E, and F together, find out what they say, and then do the opposite"?

Was that the kind of guidance that he was recommending be secured from these people?

Mr. MUNSON. No; Mr. Davies expressed the feeling that consultation and guidance and materials coming from a unit composed of these persons and prepared by them would represent a proper approach to certain activities and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he mean proper from the standpoint of the interests of CIA and the interests of the United States?

Mr. MUNSON. I don't know how Mr. Davies uses the word "proper." That is the way I interpreted it.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the way you interpreted it?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not think, did you, that someone would be offering you help other than to help the United States?

Mr. MUNSON. I did not think so, and I hoped not.

Senator FERGUSON. And there was not anything being said by the man but what it was for the benefit of the United States and that you could rely upon it; is not that true?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Munson, Edgar Snow was one of these six people; was he not?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you have stated that Mr. Davies recommended that these six people be set up in an office by an agency of the Government; is that right?

Mr. MUNSON. Indirectly; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Davies recommend that Snow be set up in an office by an agency of the Government?

Mr. MUNSON. Insofar as Mr. Snow was to be one of this unit or working group of six; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies so recommend in that connection with regard to each one of these six named persons, that is, Snow, Benjamin Schwartz, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and Prof. and Mrs. John Fairbanks?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why the FBI came to you?

Mr. MUNSON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They merely came to you, identified themselves, and asked you concerning this interview; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that the FBI first talked with a superior of mine in the Central Intelligence Agency; having talked with him, requested an audience or an opportunity to interrogate me, and through that official of CIA, my conference with the FBI was arranged.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean your superiors knew that you were having a conference with the FBI?

Mr. MUNSON. They did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they know you had furnished a voluntary statement to the FBI?

Mr. MUNSON. They did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have furnished such a statement without giving a copy of it to the superior, for the CIA files, in case they wanted to place it there?

Mr. MUNSON. I am sure that neither then nor now is there anything in the statement which I gave the FBI which I would not then or now be willing to have any or all of my superiors see.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether you did give a copy to any of your superiors or transmit it to the CIA files?

Mr. MUNSON. I cannot remember precisely, sir. There were several memoranda on this subject. I can only state that it would have been normal process for copies of this statement to be made for the files.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you are being cautious in your answers there because you know there is no copy of it presently in the CIA files, or you have been told there is no copy presently in the CIA files; is not that right?

Mr. MUNSON. I have asked for a copy. I have asked if one was available. I was simply told that one has not been found or that one was not readily available to show. I was not told point-blank that no such copy existed.

Mr. SOURWINE. The fact that you asked for it indicates that you then thought you had furnished one for the CIA files, does it not?

Mr. MUNSON. I certainly thought that there would be one in the CIA files.

Senator FERGUSON. This indicates that it is in quotes, is not that right?

Mr. MUNSON. The statement here is in quotes, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you prepare this document, of which this is a copy, and give it to these two FBI agents?

Mr. MUNSON. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. So that, in that sense, it is official; is it not?

Mr. MUNSON. It is in that sense my sworn statement to the FBI, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You gave it to them and you wanted them to rely upon it and it is true; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. It is true.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you desire that if it came within their operations, that they rely upon it?

Mr. MUNSON. I gave it to them for such purpose as they chose to make use of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; in their official capacity.

Mr. MUNSON. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Munson, do you know what Mr. Davies knew, if anything, about Mr. John Fairbank with regard to whether he was or was not Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. MUNSON. I have no idea about what Mr. Davies knew about Mr. Fairbank.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what Mr. Davies knew about Wilma Fairbank?

Mr. MUNSON. I have no idea, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what Mr. Davies knew about Benjamin Schwartz?

Mr. MUNSON. I have no idea other than what Mr. Davies said during the course of our conference, that Dr. Schwartz was particularly

knowledgeable in the field of Chinese communism and that Dr. Schwartz had been very helpful to him as a consultant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Dr. Schwartz was, in fact, ever a consultant to Mr. Davies?

Mr. MUNSON. I do not know, other than Mr. Davies' statement at this meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. You have stated that in the next-to-the-last paragraph of your statement; have you not?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. If Mr. Davies should testify under oath that Dr. Schwartz had never been a consultant to him in any capacity, would that change your answer at all?

Mr. MUNSON. I could only reaffirm, sir, that it is my recollection—and I am willing to state—that Mr. Davies stated, in the course of our conversation in the conference on the 11th of April, that Dr. Schwartz had been most helpful to him as a consultant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were those his words, that is not a summarization of what he said?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that those were his words. I made notes during the course of the conference. Those notes have subsequently been destroyed. My memoranda for the files of the Central Intelligence Agency were made from those notes. This present memorandum supplied the FBI was made from my memoranda for the CIA files.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you misspoke the date there. You said the 11th of April.

Mr. MUNSON. Thank you for the correction, sir. The conference was the 16th of November and the statement to the FBI was on the 11th of April. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what Mr. Davies knew about Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. MUNSON. No, I do not know what he knew about Anna Louise Strong.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what he knew about Agnes Smedley?

Mr. MUNSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies, after objections were raised that any one or some of these people were Communists, assert that they certainly were not, that they were just people who were extremely politically sophisticated?

Mr. MUNSON. No objections, sir, were made that any or all of these persons were or were not Communists. Mr. Davies did volunteer, in the course of his discussion of setting up this mechanism or this workshop team and in discussion of the various persons that he recommended, that he was aware that Mr. and Mrs. Fairbank—I think he was speaking only of them—were considered Communists by some persons. He expressed himself as believing that they were not Communists but were only very politically sophisticated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you say he volunteered that statement?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, without anyone else at the conference having mentioned the question of communism in respect to Professor and Mrs. Fairbank or in respect to any of these persons, he volunteered the statement that there had been some mention, at least,



of communism with regard to Dr. and Mrs. Fairbank but that, in his opinion, they were not Communists but only very politically sophisticated; is that right?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct. It was a volunteered statement on his part, provoked by no suggestion or objection on the part of the other two participants at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he set up the charge and then knock it down?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he set it up with regard to any of those other people?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that he spoke in this regard only of Professor and Mrs. Fairbank. He did not discuss the political affiliations of any other persons or of these persons other than this one single statement.

Senator FERGUSON. That left the impression that if two were mentioned as having been considered by some to be Communists and they were not; did it, or did it not read the impression to you, that he was not giving you the information that any of the others were considered Communists or were Communists?

Mr. MUNSON. Could I have that question restated, sir, please? I am not sure I understand it.

Senator FERGUSON. I will restate it.

Where he states that two of these people were considered by some uninformed to be Communists and that he was assuring you they were not but they were only very politically sophisticated, did that leave with you the impression, not mentioning anything about communism as to the others, that they would not be Communists?

I am not asking you what you knew about these people; I am asking you about what his statements left with you.

Mr. MUNSON. In his statements, in my opinion—and it was my impression at the time, as now—he certainly was not indicating a belief that any one of these persons was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. I take it, from what you wrote there, that that would be true; that if a man mentioned out of six the fact that two of them were considered Communists and he was assuring you that they were not, that it would leave you or anyone reasonably prudent with the idea of none of them being Communists.

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. The reason implication in your inference was, was it not, that none of this group of six was Communist?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Further, Mr. Munson, did you have the impression that all six were to be cast in the same political perspective?

Mr. MUNSON. All six were to be used in the same way as part of one and the same team, performing one and the same function.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to be perfectly sure about this phrase of "only very sophisticated" or "only very politically sophisticated." I note that in this statement of April 11, 1950, the word "politically" is in parentheses. Does that indicate that possibly you added that word by way of explanation?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that the word "politically" was not used immediately prior to the word "sophisticated."

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, is it your recollection that what Mr. Davies said was that these persons, Mr. and Mrs. Fairbank were only very sophisticated?

Mr. MUNSON. Only very sophisticated; implying in a political sense.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; but did he use the whole sentence at once, stating in a single sentence that they were not Communists, they were "only very sophisticated"?

Mr. MUNSON. As near as my notes at that time revealed and my memoranda written for the agency, I tried to follow the pattern and substance of his precise remarks. It is my recollection that he said that he was aware that they—meaning Professor and Mrs. Fairbank—were considered Communists by some uninformed persons, but that they were not Communists but "only very sophisticated."

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, was he stating that a very sophisticated person—in the political sense—could be mistaken for a Communist? Was that the thesis that he was advancing?

Mr. MUNSON. As I understood it, that was the thesis that he was advancing. That was my interpretation of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is almost parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, and perhaps I should not ask this question.

In your own opinion, is that a tenable thesis, Mr. Munson?

Mr. MUNSON. In my own opinion, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you consider Communists as politically sophisticated people?

Mr. MUNSON. Communist like to think so and so represent. I have never seen, heard, read, or come into contact with Communists or any manifestation or writing of communism which indicates any particular sophistication, politically or otherwise.

Senator FERGUSON. As far as you were concerned, did this consultation or conference with Davies come out of—as we usually express it—the blue sky? Was there any warning in advance?

Mr. MUNSON. None, sir.

You are speaking of the specific conference on the 16th of November?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. MUNSON. There was none.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after you first heard that he wanted to talk with you was it that you saw him, would you say?

Mr. MUNSON. It was a matter of hours, at most. It is my recollection that the request for the appearance of the other gentleman and myself came sometime in the late forenoon or at or about noon on the date of the conference, the same day.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever sought advice from Davies before the 16th of November?

Mr. MUNSON. Had I?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MUNSON. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Munson, was Mr. Davies at that time a member of the Policy Planning Board of the State Department?

Mr. MUNSON. The dates would have to be checked and the records of the Department of State would show. It is my recollection that he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, what do the records of the Department of State show in that respect? What does the State Department Register indicate?

Mr. MANDEL. The Biographic Register of the Department of State, dated April 1, 1951, on page 109 says that John Paton Davies, Jr., was a class 2—appointed class 2 April 14, 1948, and was a member of the Policy Planning Staff July 1, 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. What does it show his status as of the middle of November 1949?

Mr. MANDEL. That would imply that he had his class 2 classification in the period prior.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I see that?

Mr. Chairman, reading from this, it says:

\* \* \* Foreign Service officer of class 3 November 13, 1946; first secretary and consul at Mexico City April 15, 1947 (canceled); to the Department August 11, 1947; class 2 April 14, 1948. \* \* \*

From that, it appears that Mr. Davies was assigned to the Department of State at the time of this conference, but it does not clearly appear that he was a member of the Policy Planning Staff prior to July 1, 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, could you tell us what position Mr. Davies holds today in the State Department?

Mr. MANDEL. The following information is the result of a telephone call to the State Department this afternoon: The Personnel Division of the State Department states that John Paton Davies, Jr., is at Frankfort, Germany, as a class 1 deputy director of political affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel calls my attention to the fact that the information we have just read appeared in the State Department Register for April 1, 1950, but does not appear in the State Department Biographical Register for April 1, 1951. The information that Mr. Mandel is referring to is that of being political officer at Frankfort on the Main.

Mr. Chairman, for the sake of comparison and to clarify what we are talking about, may I ask that these two biographical sketches be both inserted in the record at this point. Where there is any conclusion to be drawn from the facts, they will be there for study.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 442A" and is as follows:)

[From the Register of the Department of State, April 1, 1950]

DAVIES, JOHN PATON, JR.—b. Kiating, China, of Am. parents, Apr. 6, 1908; Shanghai-Am. Sch. grad.; Yenching U., Peiping, 1929-30; Columbia U., B. S. 1931; app. For. Ser. officer unclass., v. c. of career, and sec. in the Diplo. Ser. Dec. 17, 1931; v. c. at Windsor Jan. 12, 1932; For. Ser. Sch. Nov. 29, 1932; v. c. at Yunnanfu Mar. 30, 1933; language officer at Peiping Aug. 30, 1933; v. c. at Mukden Sept. 5, 1935; at Hankow Apr. 7, 1938; class eight Mar. 16, 1939; to the Dept. June 28, 1940; class seven May 1, 1941; cons. and cons. at Kunming (for duty as 2d sec. temp., at Chungking) Apr. 28, 1942; 2d sec. at Chungking July 1, 1942; class six July 16, 1943; 2d sec. and cons. at Moscow Jan. 26, 1945; class five May 16, 1945; 1st sec. at Moscow in addition to duties as cons. Nov. 14, 1945; class four May 19, 1946; For. Ser. officer of class three Nov. 13, 1946; 1st sec. and cons. at Mexico City Apr. 15, 1947 (canceled); to the Dept. Aug. 11, 1947; class two Apr. 14, 1948; pol. officer at Frankfort on the Main Feb. 17, 1950; married.—HICOG.

[From the Biographic Register of the Department of State, April 1, 1951]

DAVIES, JOHN PATON, JR.—b. Kiating, China, of Am. parents, Apr. 6, 1908; Shanghai-Am. Sch. grad.; Yenching U., Peiping, 1929-30; Columbia U., B. S. 1931; app. For. Ser. officer unclass., v. c. of career, and sec. in the Diplo. Ser. Dec. 17, 1931; v. c. at Windsor Jan. 12, 1932; For. Ser. Sch. Nov. 29, 1932; v. c. at Yünnanfu Mar. 30, 1933; language officer at Peiping Aug. 30, 1933; v. c. at Mukden Sept. 5, 1935; at Hankow Apr. 7, 1938; class eight Mar. 16, 1939; to the Dept. June 28, 1940; class seven May 1, 1941; cons. and cons. at Kunming (for duty as 2d sec. temp., at Chungking) Apr. 28, 1942; 2d sec. at Chungking July 1, 1942; class six July 16, 1943; 2d sec. and cons. at Moscow Jan. 26, 1945; class five May 16, 1945; 1st sec. at Moscow in addition to duties as cons. Nov. 14, 1945; class four May 19, 1946; For. Ser. officer of class three Nov. 13, 1946; 1st sec. and cons. at Mexico City Apr. 15, 1947 (canceled); to the Dept. Aug. 11, 1947; class two Apr. 14, 1948; mem., Policy Planning Staff, July 1, 1950; married.—HICOG.

Mr. SOURWINE. Bearing in mind what you testified to regarding the recommendation Mr. Davies made concerning this group of six persons, I would like to have you answer specifically, Mr. Munson: Did Mr. Davies recommend that Dr. Schwartz be retained by another Government agency for policy guidance?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes; in the same manner.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you stated that Mr. Davies did state that Dr. Schwartz had been helpful to him as consultant, did you?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are quite clear on that point?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say, Mr. Munson, that Mr. Davies had vouched for the responsibility of these people jointly and severally to act in the capacity that he was recommending to you?

Mr. MUNSON. May I answer, Mr. Chairman, by saying that he recommended that the consultation and guidance and materials prepared by these persons would represent a proper approach to our responsible activities, insofar as that constitutes vouching for them singly and collectively.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they to work together?

Mr. MUNSON. They were to work together; that he was so doing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Munson, did Mr. Davies on the occasion of this conference of Wednesday, November 16, 1949, suggest that Agnes Smedley be used to produce materials for utilization for another department of the Government—that is, other than the State Department?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes; in the manner that I have indicated.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did he state that materials prepared by Agnes Smedley would represent the proper approach?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say that he represented that Agnes could be used by CIA or a branch of CIA for consultation and guidance?

Mr. MUNSON. Would you restate that one, sir, please?

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say that Mr. Davies represented that Agnes Smedley could be used by the CIA or a branch of CIA for consultation and guidance?

Mr. MUNSON. He recommended that they be used.

I am not sure what the use of the word "could" in your question implies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he recommend that Agnes Smedley be used for consultation and guidance?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Senator FERGUSON. With reference to Agnes Smedley, could I ask whether or not he was recommending to you Agnes Smedley as a Communist, to be used as a Communist?

Mr. MUNSON. It was not my understanding that he was recommending her use in that way, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that he was recommending her as a member of the Communist apparatus?

Mr. MUNSON. I can only say that if he was recommending that she be used as a part of the Communist apparatus, he did not convey that to me by anything that was said at the conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. The recommendation itself had no connotation that any of these people were Communists or were to be used as Communists or were pro-Communist or were to be used as pro-Communists; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. In fact, did not what Mr. Davies said to you about Fairbank being politically sophisticated indicate to you that the contrary was the case?

Mr. MUNSON. It was such an indication to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies recommend that Anna Louise Strong be set up in an office along with these others, by some agency of the Government?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that she be used for consultation and guidance?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he state anything with regard to his impressions of either Agnes Smedley or Anna Louise Strong, as to communism or procommunism or political beliefs?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that he did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he state that materials prepared by Anna Louise Strong would represent the proper approach?

Mr. MUNSON. He did not refer singly to Anna Louise Strong. He stated that materials prepared by these as a working group, as a unit, would represent, in his opinion, the proper approach.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he specifically recommend Professor Fairbank be used for consultation and guidance by an agency of the United States?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he recommend that Professor Fairbank be used to prepare materials for another agency of Government?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he recommend the use of Mrs. Fairbank for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he recommend the use of Mr. and Mrs. Fairbank together as a part of this group for consultation and guidance by any agency of the Government?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he state that Fairbank could be trusted to prepare materials which would represent the proper approach?

Mr. MUNSON. Again, I must answer by saying that he recommended—indicated his belief that materials prepared by this group, of which Professor Fairbank would be a part, would represent the proper approach. He did not singly identify Professor Fairbank; he

simply identified materials coming from this group of which Professor Fairbank would have been one and a part.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies recommend that Fairbank be set up in an office by some agency of Government?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he state that Fairbank was a person ideally suited to provide consultation and guidance for another agency of the Government?

Mr. MUNSON. I don't recall his use of the phrase "ideally suited," sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he say, "well suited"?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that he did not say "well suited."

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he convey to you or seek to convey to you, as you understood it, the idea that Mr. Fairbank was particularly well qualified?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. To provide consultation and guidance to another agency of the Government?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did he recommend his use—that is, Mr. Fairbank's use—for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Referring again to the matter of sophistication, are you quite sure that Mr. Davies stated that Fairbank and Mrs. Fairbank were not Communists but only sophisticated?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have no other questions except this: When were you last outside the United States?

Mr. MUNSON. I made a trip abroad on business for my publishing firm in the spring of 1951. I left the United States on or about the 2d or 3d of February, according to my recollection, by way of New York and Boston, to Europe, across to the Far East, to take care of business matters in Hong Kong and Manila, transferred people in my employ from Manila to Hong Kong, returning to the United States on or about the middle of March of 1951. I have not been outside the continental United States since that date, according to my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since the middle of March 1951?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no further questions.

Senator FERGUSON. There is one other question.

Is it correct to say that, by virtue of the third paragraph from the last in your statement to the FBI agents, that you had conveyed to these FBI agents that these six people were to act collectively in giving the guidance and the material help to the CIA, or the agency with which he desired them to be placed?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct. I certainly reaffirm what I have said in this third paragraph from the last.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Munson, did the question of whether or not these people consciously knew that they were going to be working for the CIA come up in your conversation with Mr. Davies?

Mr. MUNSON. It was never discussed, sir. This was left, the mechanics of implementing this, the structure of this relationship with these people, was left to the discretion of CIA personnel. Mr. Davies' rec-

ommendations in no way constituted an order or a directive. They were not so interpreted either by myself or by my superiors. The Central Intelligence Agency, including myself, retained to itself the right to accept or reject the recommendation and implement it according to its own choice of manner. Mr. Davies made no suggestion as to the mechanics of how we should set up the relationship with these people, other than to recommend that contact with them might possibly be effected by the Central Intelligence Agency through an intermediary.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Munson, as far as you know, did he have authority to issue either a directive or an order to you?

Mr. MUNSON. I at no time assumed or believed that Mr. Davies could order me to do anything.

Senator FERGUSON. Or had authority to order?

Mr. MUNSON. Or had authority to order.

Senator FERGUSON. Or to issue a directive to you?

Mr. MUNSON. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were his recommendations so strongly advanced that they appeared to be in any sense an expression of authority or an intent to exert pressure on your agency?

Mr. MUNSON. Well, if they were, that pressure certainly was readily and easily resisted and rejected, sir. The recommendations were never implemented.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us answer the other question.

Did you get the impression, at the time that he was trying to put this over, that he was attempting to throw his weight around, that he was attempting to exert authority, whether or not he had it, that he thought he had authority? Generally, did you get the impression that he was trying to get this done?

Mr. MUNSON. I had no doubt in my mind, sir, that Mr. Davies thought this was a proper undertaking and one that should be effected and one that he would like to see effected.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, he was trying to get it done, was he?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was not simply laying it out as a possible course of action for more mature consideration at a later date, was he?

Mr. MUNSON. Well, he was offering it as a recommendation to the Central Intelligence Agency, coming from him in his capacity.

Mr. SOURWINE. As an official of the Department of State?

Mr. MUNSON. And the Central Intelligence Agency was then in a position to accept or reject it as a recommendation. It was at no time given as an order or a directive.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it ever reported back to him whether it was accepted or rejected?

Mr. MUNSON. I cannot answer that, sir. I did not report it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Munson, do you know whether or not the Willoughby charges against Agnes Smedley were known at that time?

Mr. MUNSON. I do not know, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, our record contains testimony and evidence to the effect that in February 1949 General Willoughby had put forth his conclusions of the Sorge espionage case, and a few days after that, the Army, in the person of Col. S. Eyester, Deputy Chief

of the Army Public Information Service, published a retraction of the Willoughby charges.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Mr. MORRIS. That was in February 1949. That was a time prior to both this interview and to the report of the interview.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Munson, there is one loose end here that we perhaps had better clean up for the record.

This memorandum mentions OPC. Where those initials used by you and understood by Mr. Davis to refer to a part of the CIA, a subordinate portion of the CIA operation?

Mr. MUNSON. They were so used.

Senator FERGUSON. So that when you use them here, it is the CIA or a part of it?

Mr. MUNSON. It is a part of CIA.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the record will show that five of the six mentioned here have been people who have been mentioned in varying degrees in the public hearings of the subcommittee investigating the Institute of Pacific Relations, and for that reason, Mr. Munson is giving testimony about these people today.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. MUNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. You are excused.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the witness excused from the subpoena?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

We will rise without a date.

(Thereupon at 4:30 p. m. the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene subject to call of the Chair.)





# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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MONDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 4:45 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. The first witness will be Mary Jane Keeney, who has already been sworn in executive session.

Senator FERGUSON. Mrs. Keeney, you have been sworn?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you are now under oath. You may proceed with the examination.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Keeney, will you give your full name to the reporter?

Mr. SOURWINE. If I may interpose, Mr. Chairman, if the Chair would have no objection, could the witnesses be sworn anew for this public session?

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

You do solemnly swear in the matter now pending before this committee, being a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. KEENEY. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. And if you will raise your hand, Mr. Keeney.

You do solemnly swear in the matter now pending before this subcommittee, being a subcommittee of the United States Senate, that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KEENEY. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. And you, Mr. Deane.

You do solemnly swear, in the matter now pending, that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in this hearing of a subcommittee of the United States Senate, so help you God?

Mr. DEANE. I swear.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I ask that there be inserted in the record at this point a copy of the committee resolution authorizing a single

Senator to sit and act as a quorum for the purposes of administering oaths and taking testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. It may be inserted at this point in the record. (Resolution referred to is as follows:)

*Resolved* by the special subcommittee appointed to investigate the administration of the Internal Security Act and other internal security laws under Senate Resolution 366 (81st Cong.) of the Committee on the Judiciary, that pursuant to subsection (3) of Rule XXV, as amended, of the Standing Rules of the Senate (S. Res. 180, 81st Cong., 2d sess., agreed to February 1, 1950), a quorum of the subcommittee for the purpose of taking sworn testimony shall consist of one Senator of said subcommittee. (Adopted January 18, 1951.)

**TESTIMONY OF MARY JANE KEENEY, NEW YORK CITY, ACCOMPANIED BY SARAH AMERLING, ESQ., NEW YORK CITY**

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Keeney, will you give your full name and address to the reporter.

Mrs. KEENEY. Surely. Mary Jane Keeney, 41 King Street, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Keeney, have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. KEENEY. I decline to answer that question on constitutional grounds.

It is my understanding that the fifth amendment, which does not require me to bear witness against myself, gives me that privilege.

Senator FERGUSON. Ask the next question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Keeney, have you been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. KEENEY. I decline to answer that question on precisely the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, on the grounds of self-incrimination?

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct? You just shook your head.

Mrs. KEENEY. I am sorry. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been active in the Washington Committee on the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. KEENEY. I decline to answer that question on the same ground.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Keeney, have you been an employee of the United States State Department?

Mrs. KEENEY. For a very brief period.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what period that was?

Mrs. KEENEY. In the spring of 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. Until?

Mrs. KEENEY. Until my resignation on July 15, 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. Was your resignation voluntary or were you asked to leave the State Department?

Mrs. KEENEY. Entirely voluntary.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any other United States Government employment?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what it was?

Mrs. KEENEY. I was appointed to the Board of Economic Warfare in October 1942, as an editor.

I remained in that position until approximately November 1, 1944, when I moved to another section of the same agency, which at that time

was called the Foreign Economic Administration. I was employed there as an economic analyst.

I remained in that position until approximately November 1, 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I interrupt before the witness gets beyond that date in 1945?

At the time you were first appointed to the BEW, had Mr. Henry Wallace come in to head that organization yet?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes, he was Director.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was Director?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And then you remained on through into the time when Mr. Lauchlin Currie was an Assistant Director?

Mrs. KEENEY. I don't remember whether Mr. Currie was a Director or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not remember Mr. Currie's direction?

Mrs. KEENEY. No, I don't remember Mr. Currie's connection. He may have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead from that date in 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were working for the Government, at any time, were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. KEENEY. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds that I have mentioned before.

Senator FERGUSON. The constitutional grounds?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is on the ground of possible self-incrimination?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And were you, during that same period of time, a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. KEENEY. I decline to answer that question on the same ground.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with our public exhibit 364, which was introduced on January 29, 1952, which indicates the activity on your part with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. KEENEY. May I confer with my counsel?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the record show who is the counsel accompanying the witness?

Senator FERGUSON. Will the counsel state his name?

Mr. AMERLING. Saram Amerling, 521 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you say your address was in New York City?

Mr. AMERLING. 521 Fifth Avenue.

Senator FERGUSON. A member of the New York Bar, I assume?

Mr. AMERLING. The New York Bar, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue with your delineation of duties with the United States Government?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did we get an answer to that last question, Mr. Morris?

Mrs. KEENEY. The last question was—I am not acquainted with the exhibit.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not acquainted with it?

Mrs. KEENEY. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read from paragraph 3 of our exhibit 364.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that in the printed hearings, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has a copy of those hearings been tendered to the witness and counsel?

Mr. MORRIS. It has not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can that be done?

Mr. MORRIS. It has not been printed yet.

Senator FERGUSON. Read it and then they can hear it.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Incidentally, the people who served on the committee before and who are still in Washington are: Catherine Porter (probably will have left by then), Isabel Ward, Eleanor Lattimore, Abbot Low Moffat (and Mrs. Moffat), Mortimer Graves (and Mrs. Graves), Pat and Bob Barnett, Margaret and William Carter, Shirley Jenkins, Karl Pelzer (and Mrs. Pelzer), Lillian Coville.

The additions who have been approved to date by the above people and whom I hope to have at the first meeting are: John Barrow (replaces Dr. Arndt at the U. S. Office of Education), Ethel Summy of Wilson Teachers College, Mr. and Mrs. Selden Menefee, Mary Jane Keeney (now in charge of programs at the Metropolitan Broadcasting Co.). \* \* \*

Senator FERGUSON. Is that your name?

Mrs. KEENEY. I must decline to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait, what is your name?

Mr. AMERLING. Mr. Chairman—

Senator FERGUSON. I merely want to know whether it is the same name as has been read.

Mr. AMERLING. I do not know if it is the same person.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about persons, I am talking about names.

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes, my name is Mary Jane Keeney.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you engage in the activity reported in that letter, Mrs. Keeney?

Mrs. KEENEY. I must decline to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you a program director at the Metropolitan Broadcasting Co.?

Mrs. KEENEY. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever in charge of programs at the Metropolitan?

Mrs. KEENEY. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever work for that company?

Mrs. KEENEY. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Keeney, will you proceed to enumerate the positions that you held in the United States Government?

Mr. AMERLING. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I may have, for the record, that document identified as to its source and context of that paragraph that was just read.

Mr. MORRIS. It has already been identified in our public record, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. It is in the public record as exhibit 364, open hearing on January 29, 1952.

Mr. MORRIS. A copy of that will be made available to you today, if you like.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, we will get you a copy.

Mr. AMERLING. And incorporate it in its entirety by reference in this hearing?

Mrs. KEENEY. Will the reporter tell me at what point I ceased to testify on my record of United States employment? I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you go forward from November of 1945?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes. In November of 1945 I was appointed a member of the German Economics Group, attached to the staff of the United States representative to the Allied Commission on Reparations.

I was in Europe with the Reparations Commission from November until early in March 1946.

When I returned, I found that the Office of Foreign Economic Administration, where I had been employed, had been blanketed into the State Department, sometime during that absence, at what time I do not know.

I remained in the Office until its liquidation on June 30, 1946, and resigned from the State Department, entirely voluntary, Mr. Morris, and with honors, on July 15, 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your next employment after that?

Mrs. KEENEY. My next employment after that was with the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. Did anyone in the State Department aid you in obtaining employment with the United Nations?

Mrs. KEENEY. That again represents a very great difficulty.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us why, Mrs. Keeney?

Mrs. KEENEY. It represents this difficulty, that when I appeared as a witness before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in June 1949, I was under instructions from the Bureau of Personnel of the United Nations that on matters of appointment and all matters of internal administration I was not authorized to testify.

This comes under the staff rules and regulations with respect to unpublished information, and with respect to unpublished information a member of the Secretariat is bound under staff rule 7, even after separation from the service of the United Nations, to observe the sanctity of unpublished information.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you now employed by the United Nations?

Mrs. KEENEY. No, I am not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you desire to offer for the record the staff rule to which you referred?

Mrs. KEENEY. I read it to—I showed it to Mr. Morris. I will be glad to read it to you.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you if you desired to offer it for the record.

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Am I correct in understanding that it is on the basis of this rule and the instructions previously made to you—

Mrs. KEENEY. No, the instructions previously made to me were on the basis of many more rules and regulations as well as articles 100, 103, and I believe article 105 of the Charter.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not want to put any words into your mouth, but I do want to give you an opportunity to make the record complete as to why you are now declining to answer this question.

Mrs. KEENEY. I decline to answer the question because of my previous instructions under rules and regulations, articles 100, 103, and I believe also 105 of the Charter, and also specifically staff rule 7, the

pertinent line of which reads: "This obligation does not cease with separation from service."

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you are making the point, are you, that your instructions and these rules and regulations of the United Nations excuse you from answering the question which this committee has put to you?

Mrs. KEENEY. I am pleading that the rules and regulations bind me.

Mr. SOURWINE. To the extent that you are justified in refusing to answer the committee's question, is that your contention?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not claiming immunity under the fifth amendment with regard to this question, are you?

Mrs. KEENEY. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not claim that to answer this question would tend to incriminate you?

Mrs. KEENEY. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are refusing to answer this question, are you, solely on the grounds that you are bound by the directive, the rules, and the regulations of the United Nations, and that being so bound you contend you are justified in refusing to answer the committee's question, is that right?

Mrs. KEENEY. I contend that I am barred from answering it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Barred?

Mrs. KEENEY. Barred.

Senator FERGUSON. Not permitted to answer?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes, not permitted to answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. By statute, you mean?

Mrs. KEENEY. By previous—

Mr. AMERLING. Mr. Chairman, may I interject here? I take it the position of the witness is that the status of the U. N. Charter having been adopted by the United States Senate has equivalent status to a treaty status, and that this rule 7 takes its authority from article 105 of that Charter.

Therefore, to that extent she is precluded from giving any information which the rule proscribes as to any unpublished information which she gained as a result of her employment at the United Nations.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel, you also know that the witness acts at her peril on interpreting as to whether or not the question does come within the rule, and also the question as to whether or not the rule is a valid statute, now part of the Constitution, allowing witnesses to claim privilege under this.

Mr. AMERLING. Well, Mr. Chairman, she does not claim that it is part of the Constitution. She does not assert that it is part of the Constitution as a result of the adoption of the United Nations Charter by the United States Senate.

But she maintains that this is a binding rule so far as her conduct is concerned, that this is unpublished information, and that the prohibition applies to her disclosing this information to anybody.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you adopt the statement just made by your counsel?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you contend that this rule is more binding upon you than your obligation under the oath you have just taken to tell

the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth to this committee?

Mrs. KEENEY. That is a very good question. I would like to consult my counsel.

Mr. AMERLING. Mr. Chairman, as a reply to that question, I think it is the witness' position that this body does not have the power and should not compel her to violate that rule; and that it is not a question of superior obligation or duty.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you adopt that?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the question be read back which the witness has refused to answer, and concerning which we have had colloquy since.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel that you have had a fair analysis, had the right to give a fair analysis of your reasons?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have anything else to say about why you refuse to answer this question?

Mrs. KEENEY. You must remember, Mr. Ferguson, that I am a layman; I am not an international lawyer.

My conduct in this matter is regulated, originally, by specific instructions from the Bureau of Personnel, which I assume had the benefit of the advice of international lawyers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it not true that you are not taking the position you are taking here solely on the basis of your own assumption as to what the law is, but that you are here with counsel and that you have had advice of counsel in this matter?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes, I have had advice of counsel in this matter, but it rests, of course, my answer rests, upon instructions from which I do not feel that I can be absolved.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your refusal, you recognize, as the Chair has pointed out, is your own and the consequences of that refusal will rest upon you and not upon your counsel? Do you recognize that?

Senator FERGUSON. That is why I said you do it at your peril. That is a statement that we lawyers use because we want it well understood.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your refusal is your own, is it?

Senator FERGUSON. Your counsel cannot claim privilege.

Mrs. KEENEY. I realize that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not claiming privilege, are you?

Mrs. KEENEY. No, I am not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not claiming that this will incriminate?

Senator FERGUSON. The right to refuse to answer, she is claiming that, is it not?

Mr. SOURWINE. The witness is simply refusing to answer on the ground that the committee has no power to compel her to answer and should not compel her to answer because she is bound by rules, regulations, and orders previously received by the United Nations, is that correct?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. AMERLING. Can I supplement that statement, then. Her present understanding of her obligations in this respect are based upon the official instructions which were originally given to her which covered precisely this area of information. So that it is on the basis



of having previously gotten official rulings and instructions from the UN personnel, and the presumption that they understand the coverage and the intent, or intended coverage, of that section that she takes the position she presently takes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you adopt that as your answer?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you considered the question of whether or not the United Nation treaty is self-executing?

Mrs. KEENEY. I would be incapable of answering that question because I do not understand it.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Mr. Chairman, may I ask that the question which the witness refused to answer be read back?

Senator FERGUSON. Read the question to the witness.

(The question was read by the reporter as follows:)

Mr. MORRIS. Did anyone in the State Department aid you in obtaining employment with the United Nations?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you still decline to answer that question for the reasons you have given and in light of the discussion which has taken place?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I request that the witness be directed to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. The Chair now, Madam, orders you to answer the question.

Mrs. KEENEY. May I confer with my counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mrs. KEENEY (after consultation). With all due respect to you, Senator Ferguson, and to the powers of the United States Senate, I feel that for the reasons I have already stated I must decline to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. You may call the next witness. I will excuse this witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane will be the next witness.

**TESTIMONY OF HUGH GORDON DEANE, JR., BRONXVILLE, N. Y.,  
ACCOMPANIED BY LEONARD BOUDIN, ESQ., NEW YORK, N. Y.**

Senator FERGUSON. All right, Mr. Deane.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your full name and address to the reporter?

Mr. DEANE. Hugh Gordon Deane, Jr., 790 Bronx River Road, Bronxville, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Deane?

Mr. DEANE. I am on the staff of the New York Daily Compass.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, you have been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DEANE. No; I have not been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I have been a member for some time, and I have had several other minor connections with it, but I haven't been active in it. I haven't been employed by the institute, nor with one exception have I contributed to its publications.

Senator FERGUSON. One publication, you did contribute to it?

Mr. DEANE. Yes. I wrote one article on request for the Far Eastern Review, concerning the Chinese industrial cooperatives in 1941.

After I saw how the manuscript had been edited and revised, I asked that my name be removed from the published version.

My name was printed in a footnote saying that I had contributed material. I took this step because I had written an article friendly to the Chinese industrial cooperatives, and the manuscript as it was prepared for publication was hostile to the Chinese industrial cooperatives.

Senator FERGUSON. Yours was pro?

Mr. DEANE. Mine was pro; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, have you been an employee of the Coordinator of Information?

Mr. DEANE. Yes; I have.

Mr. MORRIS. When were you an employee of the Coordinator of Information?

Mr. DEANE. I was an employee from December 1941 until December 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you obtain that position?

Mr. DEANE. I first applied for a general job with the Government, through the Civil Service Commission. Later I was interviewed by the Personnel Office of the Coordinator of Information, and by Mr. Irving Pflamm in whose section I later worked.

Mr. MORRIS. While you worked for the Coordinator of Information, Mr. Deane, did you ask the Institute of Pacific Relations to aid you in your programing?

Mr. DEANE. Yes; I did. At the direction of my superiors, whose names I don't recall—

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would try to recall the names of your superiors, Mr. Deane. Who directed you to get aid from the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DEANE. I don't remember which person it was above me who directed me to do this.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the persons above you?

Mr. DEANE. Mr. Pflamm—

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know his first name?

Mr. DEANE. Irving Pflamm, and Carl Crow.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you spell that last name?

Mr. DEANE. C-r-o-w. There were quite a number of other persons who were above me in the hierarchy, since I was at the very bottom of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you at that time a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DEANE. I believe I was then a member of the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Miss Miriam Farley at that time?

Mr. DEANE. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. How well did you know Miss Miriam Farley?

Mr. DEANE. I, at that time, had been back from China for some months, and I had met her during those months.

She was, I believe, one of the persons to whom I asked help at the direction of my superiors when we were trying to get the institute to cooperate in the preparation of propaganda broadcasts to Asia, some of which I was writing.

Senator FERGUSON. You were then an employee of the State Department?

Mr. DEANE. Was the Coordinator of Information under the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you. At least it was under the United States Government?

Mr. DEANE. It was under the United States Government; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you not think it was State Department?

Mr. DEANE. I am sorry, I do not know what the precise status of it was.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, you have before you a copy of a letter.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that at this time?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, a photostat of a copy of a letter, dated January 10, 1942, addressed to Miss Miriam Farley, signed Hugh Deane.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will receive it into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 443" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 443

[Copy]

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,  
RADIO NEWS ROOM,  
Washington, D. C., January 10, 1942.

MISS MIRIAM FARLEY,  
*Institute of Pacific Relations,  
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MIRIAM: As you may have heard, via the grapevine, I am now working for the Coordinator of Information.

We are putting out a daily broadcast to Japan, "Japan vs. Japan," sent in Japanese, as well as in English. As you can guess, this is some task.

Therefore, I'm writing to ask your help, and the help of the IPR. You can guess what sort of stuff we are interested in—material about economic and political problems and travails inside Japan, about Japanese political activities in conquered areas, about such things as evidence of graft in high place in China, etc.

Could you send me a file of the Far Eastern Survey for the last 3 months, and send me the Survey from now on. Send me the bill.

Any suggestions that you have will be much appreciated, and any material which you can supply will be most gratefully received.

I wish that we could get together and have a talk sometime. When you or Catherine, or any of your colleagues, are down this way, give me a ring. If you need a place to stay, you can always stay with my wife and me.

Best regards,

(Signed) HUGH (Deane).

Mr. SOURWINE. So that the record might be clear, Mr. Mandel, is it correct that what was found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, now in the possession of this committee, was a document marked "copy" and purporting to be a copy of this particular letter?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, do you remember sending that letter?

Mr. DEANE. I don't recall particular letters that I wrote. It is such a long time ago. But the letter does look familiar.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read the third paragraph, please?

Mr. MANDEL. It reads as follows:

Therefore, I'm writing to ask your help, and the help of the IPR. You can guess what sort of stuff we are interested in—material about economic and political problems and travails inside Japan, about Japanese political activities in conquered areas, about such things as evidence of graft in high place in China, etc.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, do you remember writing that paragraph?

Mr. DEANE. As I say, I can't be precise about correspondence that has taken place so long ago. Again, the letter looks familiar to me.

Mr. MORRIS. You will not deny that you wrote the letter?

Mr. DEANE. I am in no position to deny that I wrote the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would identify this letter of January 12 which purports to be an answer of Miss Farley to Mr. Deane.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated January 12, 1942, to Mr. Hugh Deane, Radio Newsroom, Coordinator of Information, and signed Miriam Farley.

Mr. MORRIS. May that go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. That will be received as part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 444" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 444

JANUARY 12, 1942.

Mr. HUGH DEANE,  
Radio Newsroom, Coordinator of Information,  
Washington, D. C.

DEAR HUGH: It is good to know that you are working in our propaganda department because I know that you have a lot to contribute to it. I am passing on your letter to several of my colleagues, including Bill Lockwood, and you will probably be getting lots of suggestions from us. If you don't keep after us; we are standing on our heads.

One rather obvious suggestion that occurs to me offhand is to plug Hull's note of November 26 and other American statements such as our note of December 1938 indicating that the United States was always willing to consider the peaceful alteration of the status quo including economic concessions to Japan. "We made you a fair offer but your military leaders rejected it and chose war," etc. Another rather obvious line which has doubtless already occurred to you is, "the Nazis are not your friends, they look down on the Japanese race and are just using you for their own purposes." This can be backed up by quotations from Nazi writings, the kind of thing that is found in the special section of Asia magazine for November 1941.

For our part we shall of course be much interested to know the kind of stuff that our Government is broadcasting to Japan. Would it be possible for us to obtain a file of transcripts of these broadcasts? It seems to me that it would be a very good thing if at a little later date the Far Eastern Survey could carry a short article describing American propaganda to Japan providing that this is consistent to the policy of your department.

You will be interested to know, in case you have not already heard, that we are about to open an office in Washington for the purpose of keeping in touch with all of the various departments of the Government which are working on the Far East. Bob Barnett is to be in charge and some of the rest of us will doubtless get down occasionally. I know that Bob will want to look you up as soon as he gets established.

I am passing your order for the Far Eastern Survey on to the subscription department.

Sincerely yours,

MIRIAM FARLEY.

Mr. DEANE. Mr. Chairman, if it is appropriate now, I would like to put into the record a comment on this third paragraph.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, you may comment on it.

Mr. DEANE. I will confine my comment to the last phrase "by such things as evidence of graft in high place in China, etc."

To a person unfamiliar with the situation it might seem that I was referring to evidence of graft in the Chinese Nationalist Government. Certainly, plenty of that evidence exists.

But in fact, I was referring here to evidence of graft in the Japanese puppet government set up in China. We had received information that there was a great deal of graft. We thought at the time that if we could get more evidence it would be a useful item for our propaganda in Asia.

Senator FERGUSON. You were putting out a daily broadcast to Japan, Japan versus Japan. What did you mean by that?

Mr. DEANE. Japan against Japan was the name of a daily broadcast beamed from San Francisco to Japan containing propaganda designed to alienate the Japanese people from the Japanese Government.

Along with that there was a program called Victory for Japan, some scripts of which I also wrote, and also the COI broadcast programs called Victory for the Philippines, Victory for Thailand, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, do you remember receiving that letter of January 12, 1942? This is a copy of it. It has been identified and introduced into the record.

Mr. DEANE. Again I cannot make an absolute statement about a letter received in January 1942. But again I will say that the letter looks familiar to me.

Mr. MORRIS. And that letter purports to be a cataloging of recommendations that Miriam Farley was asking you to be on the lookout for in the Coordinator of Information office?

Mr. DEANE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as they are now fully in the record, and for the sake of expediency, I would like to move on.

Senator FERGUSON. You may move on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have here a copy of a letter of February 2, 1942, from Mr. Hugh Deane.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy as taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, of a letter dated February 2, 1942, addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, signed Hugh Deane.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept that into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 445" and is as follows:)

**EXHIBIT No. 445**

WWL: From ECC, Feb. 4, 1942.

Precisely what does Hugh Deane want of the IPR? (Pencilled :) ECC.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,  
Washington, D. C., February 2, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER.

DEAR MR. CARTER: My apologies for not writing you sooner. I guess I'm getting to be a typical bureaucrat, I keep putting things off.

I have discussed your suggestions about utilizing Shortwave Research through the IPR with some people down here, and I am writing a memorandum about it to Joseph Barnes in the New York office.

Frankly, I am rather vague about what Shortwave Research could do for us. I don't know precisely what sort of material they could compile for our use. We would be interested, of course, in material about Chinese activities in this country and about right-thinking Japanese.

Could you give me a better idea about your proposition? Sorry to have to trouble you.

I was glad to have a chat with you in New York, short as it was, and hope that I will get a chance to see you again.

Very truly yours,

[S] HUGH DEANE.

(Pencilled note:) ECC. Except for the fact that I'm one of three or four people here who have had genial but meaningless letters from Deane, I know nothing about what he's doing. WWL.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read several paragraphs from that letter?

Mr. MANDEL. The letter reads as follows:

DEAR MR. CARTER: My apologies for not writing you sooner. I guess I'm getting to be a typical bureaucrat, I keep putting things off.

I have discussed your suggestions about utilizing Shortwave Research through the IPR with some people down here, and I am writing a memorandum about it to Joseph Barnes in the New York office.

Frankly, I am rather vague about what Shortwave Research could do for us. I don't know precisely what sort of material they could compile for our use. We would be interested, of course, in material about Chinese activities in this country and about right-thinking Japanese.

Could you give me a better idea about your proposition? Sorry to have to trouble you.

I was glad to have a chat with you in New York, short as it was, and hope that I will get a chance to see you again.

Very truly yours,

HUGH DEANE.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, do you remember writing that?

Mr. DEANE. It is pretty new to me, but I suppose I wrote it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, what relation did Mr. Barnes have to you at that time?

Mr. DEANE. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Barnes—Mr. Barnes, in fact, was in a separate section of the COI in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he your superior?

Mr. DEANE. No; I don't believe the two sections, the section I was in, was under his, though I can't swear to it. But I have no recollection about writing any memorandum, and I have no recollection about being told to write a memorandum or contemplate it.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not, however, deny the contents of this letter?

Mr. DEANE. I can only say that this letter looks familiar in the sense that this is the way I write letters.

Mr. MORRIS. And you do not deny that that letter is your letter, a copy of your letter?

Mr. DEANE. I cannot affirm it positively, but I cannot deny it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, while you were an employee of the Coordinator of Information, to what extent did you carry on an exchange of information such as indicated by these last three letters with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DEANE. Not to a very great extent. The Institute of Pacific Relations, apparently, as I recall, never did help us to any great extent on these particular broadcasts that we were preparing, and I believe that our effort to get more cooperation from them didn't work out very well.

Mr. MORRIS. When you left the Coordinator of Information, what was your next employment?

Mr. DEANE. I joined the Navy in December 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you take a Japanese language course, Mr. Deane?

Mr. DEANE. I took a Japanese language course at Boulder, Colo.

Mr. MORRIS. And how long did you remain a Japanese language officer?

Mr. DEANE. I remained a Japanese language officer until approximately March 1946, when my discharge from the Navy was completed.

Mr. MORRIS. During that time were you classified as an intelligence officer?

Mr. DEANE. Yes; I was.

Senator FERGUSON. And were you an intelligence officer?

Mr. DEANE. Yes; I was.

Mr. MORRIS. And as such, did you have access to classified documents, Mr. Deane?

Mr. DEANE. I had some access to classified documents.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. DEANE. I must decline to answer that question for the following two reasons: First, this question involves freedom of speech; in particular, since I am a working newspaperman it involves freedom of the press, and, therefore, I avail myself of the protection offered by the first amendment of the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. Before you get to the second one, could I ask you some questions?

In other words, you claim that a man can refuse to answer a question before a committee because he has the freedom of speech, the freedom not to answer. Is that right?

Mr. DEANE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And the second question, that you are a newspaperman, and as a newspaperman you have the freedom to refuse to answer a question?

Mr. DEANE. Yes; the freedom of press is an aspect of the freedom of speech.

Senator FERGUSON. And you claim that you have the right rather than to speak, not to speak, as a newspaperman?

Mr. DEANE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that it?

Mr. DEANE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will not be able to recognize your two rights as you define them under the first, because I don't think that the Constitution allows anyone to use those two reasons for failing to answer a question material to the issue.

You may proceed to your next reason that you were going to give.

Mr. DEANE. And secondly, I avail myself of the privilege of the fifth amendment, which, I am advised by counsel, has been interpreted by the courts as designed to cover the innocent as well as the guilty.

Senator FERGUSON. And you realize that the provision in that constitutional amendment is that one need not testify against himself?

Mr. DEANE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or testify to anything that would tend to incriminate him?

Mr. DEANE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will recognize your second reason, the fifth amendment. I will not require you to answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, before I get too far away from it, I would like also to introduce into the record a letter dated January 16—

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to ask another question.

While you were an intelligence officer of the United States, and entitled to classified information, I will ask you whether or not you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. DEANE. I must decline to answer for the reasons cited above.

Senator FERGUSON. I will not require you to repeat those reasons. They were just given.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you identify this letter of January 16?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original letter on the letterhead of the Coordinator of Information, Washington, D. C., Radio News Division, dated January 16, 1942 to Mr. Edward C. Carter, signed Hugh Deane.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you read that letter, please, into the record.

Mr. MANDEL. The letter reads as follows:

DEAR MR. CARTER. Thanks for your prompt reply. I plan to come to New York next Friday, January 23, and hope to have a chat with you.

Here's the dope generally about our broadcasts. We have a staff of four, in Washington, a couple of more people in New York, and an office in San Francisco. In San Francisco our scripts are translated. We broadcast from KGEI in San Francisco. To Japan, the stuff goes in Japanese and English. To China, in Mandarin and Cantonese, not Shanghai as yet. Also English of course.

Mr. BOUDIN. Are you suggesting that was not in every appropriation hearing?

Mr. MORRIS. We are asking the witness if he was authorized to dispense that information.

What is your answer, Mr. Deane?

Mr. DEANE. To the best of my recollection, my dealings with the IPR were at the direction of my superiors.

I was a rather minor official, and I didn't take it upon myself to inaugurate any such program. I wasn't authorized to send myself up to New York.

The fact was that we had the task of broadcasting to Asia, and we wanted to get the cooperation of people who were experts in the field.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that be admitted into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, it will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 446" and was read in full:)

Mr. MANDEL (continuing):

We are broadcasting only in short wave. But in a couple of weeks, we hope to start pumping the stuff in long wave.

We get fairly complete reports from the FCC's monitoring service, and, of course, find them very useful.

When in New York, I hope to get some good material from you. We are planning a series of broadcasts under the theme Unfinished Business—i. e., about Japan's unconcluded war in China. I want to get, therefore, some material on Wang Ching-wei, etc.

Our office in Washington is at Twenty-fifth and E Streets NW. My telephone number is Executive 3300, extension 480.

Will you please inform your colleagues of my impending visit?

Hoping to see you next Friday.

Sincerely yours,



Mr. MORRIS. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Deane, did you not consider that the fact that we get fairly complete reports from the FCC monitoring service was a classified type of information at that time?

Mr. DEANE. I have no recollection about the FCC monitoring service.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, is that your signature? That is an original letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think information like that would be classified during a war, that they were monitoring certain broadcasts and you were getting the information?

Mr. DEANE. The only relevant information I can give you, Mr. Chairman, is this: As I understand it, the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service is now undertaking this job of monitoring foreign newscasts, and that the FBIS releases or makes available to private organizations and private persons, daily, the results of its monitoring a foreign broadcast.

Senator FERGUSON. But when we were at war, did you not consider that that kind of information was classified information?

Mr. DEANE. I have no recollection of my consideration of the question at all or of even the fact that we were getting FCC broadcasts.

Mr. MORRIS. That is your signature, Mr. Deane?

Mr. DEANE. Yes; that is my signature.

Senator FERGUSON. Was IPR giving you help on these broadcasts?

Mr. DEANE. Yes. We were trying to get more help from the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who in the IPR was giving you help, so as to help you broadcast to the Pacific and China and Japan?

Mr. DEANE. When I approached the institute I talked to quite a number of people in it, and I gathered from these letters that I approached Mr. Carter and Miss Farley, and some others. I don't recall the details now.

Senator FERGUSON. Did your superiors know that you were getting information from the IPR?

Mr. DEANE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And for the IPR? The Senator's question was from the IPR, and I add for the IPR. You see, you were supplying IPR with information here.

Mr. BOUDIN. What information was being furnished?

Mr. MORRIS. The letter itself is information, the second paragraph:

Here's the dope generally about our broadcasts. We have a staff of four in Washington, a couple more people in New York, and an office in San Francisco. In San Francisco our scripts are translated. We broadcast from KGEI in San Francisco. To Japan, the stuff going in Japanese and English. To China, in Mandarin and Cantonese; not Shanghai as yet. Also English, of course.

We are broadcasting only in short wave. But in a couple of weeks we hope to start pumping the stuff in long wave.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, have you been a consultant with the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. DEANE. I will decline to answer for the reasons which I have stated earlier in the testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. And that is?

Senator FERGUSON. The fifth amendment, if that is what you mean; is that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. The fifth, not the first?

Mr. DEANE. I will simply refer to my previous answer.

Senator FERGUSON. You may ask the next question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have introduced into the record the Far East Spotlight, March 1949, or at least the index of that volume. It shows that Mr. Deane was in fact a contributor to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

May the whole page in its entirety go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received; yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 447," and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 447

**FAR EAST SPOTLIGHT**

## Editor

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The Editor will consider manuscripts submitted, but assumes no responsibility regarding them.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been a correspondent for the Allied Labor News?

Mr. DEANE. Yes, I have.

Mr. MORRIS. And for what other syndicates?

Mr. DEANE. Tele-Press.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you become a correspondent for Allied Labor News and Tele-Press?

Mr. DEANE. The summer of 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. And where did you carry out your assignments?

Mr. DEANE. Tokyo, Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a fully accredited correspondent at SCAP headquarters?

Mr. DEANE. Yes, I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any difficulty at SCAP headquarters?

Mr. DEANE. Yes; I had some difficulty at SCAP headquarters, like most of my colleagues.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were at SCAP headquarters, I will ask you whether or not you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. DEANE. I must decline to answer for the same reasons which I have given before, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, did you ever have a by-line article in the Daily Worker?

Mr. DEANE. Yes, I believe I did. My articles to Allied Labor News were distributed to some 150 or more clients, of whom the Daily Worker was 1.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the Allied Labor News in the habit of dispensing articles to the Daily Worker?

Mr. DEANE. Since the Daily Worker subscribed to Allied Labor News, it received everything that Allied Labor News distributed.

Mr. MORRIS. And by arrangement with the Daily Worker, was it enabled to take an article of yours, written under the auspices of the Allied Labor News, and put it into the Daily Worker with your by-line?

Mr. DEANE. Yes, it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you find that an objectionable fact?

Mr. DEANE. I had no objection.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the staff of the China Monthly Review?

Mr. DEANE. I am listed as a contributing editor to the China Monthly Review.

Mr. MORRIS. As of today?

Mr. DEANE. As of today.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is that now published?

Mr. DEANE. That magazine is published in Shanghai, China.

Mr. MORRIS. In Communist China?

Mr. DEANE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Under Communist auspices?

Mr. DEANE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you consider that a Communist magazine?

Mr. DEANE. I will decline to characterize it for the reasons I have stated above.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, the fifth amendment and the first amendment. I will recognize it for the fifth amendment.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been a correspondent for the China Weekly Review?

Mr. DEANE. The China Weekly Review is the predecessor of the China Monthly Review, and I have written for the China Weekly Review for approximately 10 or 12 years.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you an expert on the Far East?

Mr. DEANE. I write on the Far East on the basis of considerable background and with considerable care to the facts.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever written under an alias?

Mr. DEANE. No, I haven't.

Senator FERGUSON. Always your own name?

Mr. DEANE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been a contributor to the Far Eastern Survey? That is the publication of the IPR.

Mr. DEANE. Yes. As I explained earlier, I wrote one piece for the Far East Survey, from which I requested that my name be deleted.

My name was printed as a footnote, saying that I had contributed material to the article. This was the article about the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever contributed to Pacific Affairs?

Mr. DEANE. No, I haven't.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions at this moment.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Keeney.

**TESTIMONY OF PHILIP O. KEENEY, NEW YORK CITY, ACCOMPANIED  
BY SARAH AMERLING, ESQ., NEW YORK CITY**

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Keeney, you have been sworn. State your full name and address.

Mr. KEENEY. Philip O. Keeney, 41 King Street, New York City.

Senator FERGUSON. And your last occupation?

Mr. KEENEY. My last occupation was with the War Department in Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you quit that occupation?

Mr. KEENEY. May 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. You are the husband of the lady who testified here previously, Mary Jane?

Mr. KEENEY. Yes, I am.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, Mary Jane Keeney?

Mr. KEENEY. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Keeney, were you the principal speaker at a luncheon held under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the fourth floor at Seventeenth and K Streets NW, in Washington, D. C.?

Mr. KEENEY. I decline to answer that question on the reasons given in the fifth amendment, of self-incrimination.

Mr. MORRIS. You understand the question is were you the speaker at a luncheon held under the auspices of the IPR?

Mr. KEENEY. Yes; I understand the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like Mr. Mandel to identify this document and read that one paragraph, and have it read into the record.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, on the letterhead of American Institute of Pacific Relations. There is no date. It reads as follows:

**EXHIBIT No. 448**

You are cordially invited to attend the IPR luncheon Wednesday, December 11, 12:30 p. m., fourth floor dining room, YWCA, Seventeenth and K. Streets NW. Speakers will be Martin Bennett, industrial engineer, who was special assistant to Mr. Pauley, member of the first reparations mission to Japan and chief of staff of the second mission to Manchuria. Mr. Bennett will talk on the Pauley reparations report on Japan, which was recently presented to the President.

Philip O. Keeney, who recently returned from Japan. As libraries officer for the Civil Information and Education Division of SCAP, Mr. Keeney covered all the islands. He will speak on conditions in Japan generally.

Mr. MORRIS. Will that be included in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that you were listed to speak?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason, Senator Ferguson.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Keeney, have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were the librarian in Japan, were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. KEENEY. Senator Ferguson, I refuse to answer that question for the same reason, self-incrimination.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Keeney, have you been a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question, Mr. Morris, for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you contributed to the Far Eastern Survey, which is the official publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Keeney, were you ever treasurer of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think the index of the Far Eastern Spotlight which we introduced into the record during the testimony of the last witness makes mention of the fact that Philip O. Keeney was there listed as treasurer.

Senator FERGUSON. Your name is Philip O. Keeney?

Mr. KEENEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you write an article called Reorganization of the Japanese Public Library System, which appeared in two parts in the January 28, 1948, and the February 11, 1948, issues of the Far East Spotlight, which was the official publication of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know as to whether or not it was a fact that Communists were put into the schools and colleges after the surrender of Japan?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question, Senator Ferguson, for the reason given above.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you whether or not you knew that Communists were put into the labor unions in Japan after their surrender in August of 1945.

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Keeney, when did you first take employment with the United States Government?

Mr. KEENEY. In January 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did you hold at that time?

Mr. KEENEY. I had a position in the Reference Department in the Library of Congress.

How long did you hold that position?

Mr. KEENEY. I held that position for approximately 5 months when I was made acting chief of the Accessions Division in the Library of Congress.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you hold that position as Acting Chief of the Accessions Division?

Mr. KEENEY. I held that position until September 19—I think it was 1941 when I went to the—I became the library officer to the Coordinator of Information, which became later on OSS.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Keeney, would you say it would be advantageous for Communists to put a Communist into the Library of Congress of the United States?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the reason I stated above.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, the fifth amendment?

Mr. KEENEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were an employee of the Coordinator of Information, were you acquainted with the previous witness before this committee, Mr. Hugh Deane?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question, and state the reason I mentioned above.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Hugh Deane?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the reason I mentioned above.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, did you receive this into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will receive it.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 448" and was read into the record in full. See p. 2791.)

Mr. MORRIS. What was your next employment in the Government, Mr. Keeney?

Mr. KEENEY. I think it was approximately September 1943. I became Chief of the Documents Security Section for the Foreign Economic Administration.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you work under that employment?

Mr. KEENEY. At Q Street.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your next employment, Mr. Keeney?

Mr. KEENEY. I went to Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. What assignment did you have in Japan?

Mr. KEENEY. In Japan I became the libraries officer for SCAP.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Keeney, when you were in the Library, working in the Library of Congress, did you have anything to do with a special room known as the Russian Room where there was Russian literature?

Mr. KEENEY. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not have anything to do with that?

Mr. KEENEY. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that shortly after you went into the Library, papers disappeared out of that room, and they have not been able to locate them?

Mr. KEENEY. It is the first I have ever heard of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell the committee the nature of your duties as a chief librarian at SCAP headquarters? What was the title you gave?

Mr. KEENEY. Well, I was called libraries officer. I traveled quite widely through Japan, seeing the demolition that had occurred to

Japanese libraries, and tried to discuss with Japanese librarians the best way to rehabilitate those buildings, and tried to work out legislation that would be advantageous for the rehabilitation of those libraries, and also I tried to improve the standard of librarians in Japan, get them larger salaries because they were grossly underpaid.

That was my main function.

Mr. MORRIS. While holding that position, did you encounter various members of the Institute of Pacific Relations who visited Japan?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the reason stated above.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you at that time encounter Mr. Owen Lattimore, who was in Japan with the Pauley Reparations Commission?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the reason stated above.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you engage in extensive conversation with Lattimore?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the reason stated. Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Owen Lattimore?

Mr. KEENEY. Senator Ferguson, I refuse to answer that question for the reason stated above.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the leader of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Edward C. Carter?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. W. L. Holland?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that for the reason stated above.

Mr. MORRIS. Philip H. Jessup?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest in view of the witness' attitude that we desist from pursuing this line of inquiry any further. It is obvious that he is not going to give us any answers about the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. You refuse to answer any question, I understand it, in relation to the Institute of Pacific Relations, is that right, on the ground that it would tend to incriminate you?

Mr. KEENEY. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there is no use to proceed any further.

Mr. MORRIS. I suggest that we adjourn until 2:30 tomorrow, Senator.

Senator, our witness at 2:30 tomorrow has been summoned to appear, but until we hear that he is going to be here I suggest that we do not announce his identity.

Mr. AMERLING. Mr. Chairman, I take it the present witnesses are excused?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, they are.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess until 2:30 tomorrow afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 5:45 p. m., Monday, February 18, 1952, the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., Tuesday, February 19, 1951.)

# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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**TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1952**

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 2:30 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland, presiding.

Present: Senators Eastland and Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator EASTLAND. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. The witness today will be Mr. Weyl.

Senator EASTLAND. Will you raise your right hand, please?

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give to the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate of the United States will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. WEYL. I do.

## TESTIMONY OF NATHANIEL WEYL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, will you give your name and address, full name and address, to the reporter, please?

Mr. WEYL. Nathaniel Weyl, 1718 P Street NW, Washington, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. Writer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, I have, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you join the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. I joined the Communist Party either in very late 1932 or very early 1933, I believe the latter.

Mr. MORRIS. How old were you at the time?

Mr. WEYL. Twenty-two years old.

Mr. MORRIS. When you joined the Communist Party, Mr. Weyl, were you assigned to a particular unit or a particular cell?

Mr. WEYL. You mean when I first joined the Communist Party?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, when you first joined.

Mr. WEYL. I was assigned to what is known as a fraction as distinguished from a cell.

Mr. MORRIS. What city was this in?

Mr. WEYL. This was in New York City, and the fraction was in the National Student League.



Senator EASTLAND. What is the difference between a fraction and a cell?

Mr. WEYL. A fraction consists of a group of Communists who are working inside an organization.

Senator EASTLAND. Is that for the purpose of controlling the organization?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; that is right.

Senator EASTLAND. What organization did you want to control?

Mr. WEYL. The organization was called the National Student League. It was a Communist organization among the students, and has subsequently been cited as subversive, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not clear. A fraction would work in that particular organization?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; and would consist of members of the organization.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WEYL. Whereas, a cell would consist of the Communists living in a certain neighborhood or perhaps working in a certain industry. No, I believe working in a certain industry would mean fraction.

Senator FERGUSON. That would mean, technically, a fraction?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it is the Communist fraction of an industry, is that right, or of an organization?

Mr. WEYL. Or of an organization, trade-union.

Mr. MORRIS. It is that portion of the whole organization that is made up of Communists?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And I assume that that is for the purpose so that they can exert their efforts in that particular industry or organization like your student movement, and so forth?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir; either an organization which they do not control and which they wish to control, or one which they already control, which was the case with the National Student League. They merely desired to maintain control.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you assigned to that?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; I think I can say I was assigned to it, but may I answer that more fully?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I wish you would.

Mr. WEYL. I joined the National Student League before I joined the Communist Party, and I was placed, to the best of my recollection—I was placed on the executive committee almost immediately because I had been fairly prominent in Socialist student affairs. So when I joined the Communist Party I became a member of the fraction of that organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, now, Mr. Weyl, how long did you remain in that particular activity in New York City for the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. To the best of my recollection, Mr. Morris, until my study terminated, which was the end of the academic year, I presume, May or June.

Mr. MORRIS. That was the year 1934?

Mr. WEYL. No, 1933.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you leave New York at that time, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; I was a graduate student.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you go?

Mr. WEYL. I was a graduate student at Columbia University.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you return back to your home?

Mr. WEYL. You mean immediately thereafter?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. WEYL. Immediately thereafter I went to my mother's home for the summer, in Woodstock, N. Y., and then was requested to come down to Washington for a job in the Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Who requested you?

Mr. WEYL. Thomas C. Blaisdell. May I add to that answer that I am convinced that Mr. Blaisdell was never a Communist or a sympathizer of the Communist Party. He had known me principally in the relation of teacher to student.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony, Mr. Weyl, that Mr. Blaisdell's asking you to Washington bore no relation whatever to your work within the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Precisely. I want to emphasize that.

Senator EASTLAND. Where did you know Mr. Blaisdell?

Mr. WEYL. At Columbia, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. What did he teach at Columbia?

Mr. WEYL. He taught economics.

Senator EASTLAND. What department employed you in Washington?

Mr. WEYL. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to know about this: Did Blaisdell know that there was such an organization as the youth movement there, the student movement?

Mr. WEYL. I believe he must have, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was it a secret that the Communists had obtained control of that organization?

Mr. WEYL. Well, that is very hard for me to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. I am wondering how you young folks kept this such a great secret that the professors did not catch on to what you were doing.

Mr. WEYL. Well, Senator, as far as I was concerned, I was always, at Columbia, perfectly open about my views.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it was known that you were a Communist?

Mr. WEYL. Well, I said so.

Senator FERGUSON. You said so?

Mr. WEYL. I wrote articles under my own name. Now, all I am saying—

Senator FERGUSON. Then Mr. Blaisdell must have know you were.

Senator EASTLAND. Let him answer. Go ahead and finish your answer, sir.

Mr. WEYL. The rest that I would like to is this, and, of course, here we are speculating about what goes on in another man's mind—

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking you what goes on in his mind.

Mr. WEYL. But it is very possible, and I would judge probable, that Mr. Blaisdell, having no interest in student and campus politics, paid very little attention to this sort of thing, which was ascertainable, and if he did have an opinion that I was radical he may well have thought that this was simply a disease of youth.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were going to take that disease with you down into Government and it was a rather contagious disease, was it not?

Mr. WEYL. It certainly turned out to be, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean, there was not any doubt that communism was contagious among youth.

Mr. WEYL. That is correct; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. As you described it, a disease.

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Blaisdell's job down here in the Government?

Mr. WEYL. He was the Assistant Chief of the Consumer's Council of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Would you like an explanation of what they did?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WEYL. The organization, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, had two main functions: One was the crop restriction program and the other was marketing agreements, which involved regulation with the consent, generally, of industry of the processing industries in the agricultural field with respect to prices and fair-trade practices.

In the regulatory hearings, there would be three representatives: The commodity specialist in the Department of Agriculture, who would preside, the representative of the general counsel's office, and the representative of the Consumers' Council.

The Consumer's Council was appointed or rather was set up under the Agricultural Adjustment Act for the purpose of protecting consumer interests within the program. Therefore, we tended to oppose price regulation and restrictive devices.

Senator FERGUSON. How long had you been before that in Blaisdell's classes?

Mr. WEYL. I don't recall, Senator, that I was ever in his classes because he taught in Columbia College. I may have been. I was at the graduate school.

Senator EASTLAND. Who recommended you to him?

Mr. WEYL. It wasn't a question of anybody recommending me to him. I was a graduate student in economics and he and I have had many discussions of economic theory.

Senator EASTLAND. What I want to know is: To your knowledge, did someone recommend you to him for employment?

Mr. WEYL. That I have no knowledge of, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. When you got to Washington, did you find any other Communists in the Government here?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you come to join a Communist cell in Washington?

Mr. WEYL. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Who induced you to join a Communist cell, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. A man named Harold Ware.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a Communist at that time?

Mr. WEYL. He was.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did he work?

Mr. WEYL. He had set up a small Communist-controlled outfit called Farm Research. The name may be slightly inaccurate. I am sure Mr. Mandel could correct it himself.

However, I did not know him in that context. He came to me stating that as a member of the party it was, of course, one of my obligations to—

Mr. MORRIS. That is the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Yes. To function in an organization of the party.

Senator EASTLAND. He knew you were a member of the party?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir, Senator; from New York, from the headquarters files, I presume.

Senator EASTLAND. He got that information from the Communist headquarters in New York?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So you were a full-fledged Communist member at that time?

Mr. WEYL. That is right, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. And came down here, or then you were transferred down here, is that it, to a cell?

Mr. WEYL. Well, I was such a new member of the Communist Party, Senator, that I think I did not realize that I was supposed to transfer.

Senator FERGUSON. You joined the new one down here?

Mr. WEYL. Yes. I was told that "this is the unit," and "you are in it."

Senator EASTLAND. He was assigned to a unit, is his testimony, from headquarters in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, would you tell us who were the members of that Harold Ware unit of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Mr. Morris. I hope I will not omit any names because sometimes you remember the names very well but you can't remember them to recite in a series after 19 years or so. Alger Hiss, of course, Lee Pressman, Charles Kramer, Henry Collins, John Abt.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Nathan Witt a member of that?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; he was.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Victor Perlo?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; he was.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say Alger Hiss, Mr. Weyl, did you see—

Mr. WEYL. Excuse me. Still with this question, should we deal with that matter we discussed in executive session, or skip it?

Mr. MORRIS. I think we will come to that, Mr. Weyl.

Mr. WEYL. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Weyl has indicated he left out one name which he has given in executive session.

Senator EASTLAND. I think he should supply it.

Mr. MORRIS. He has supplied it.

Senator FERGUSON. I might say that I presided at that meeting, and the committee has that name.

Senator EASTLAND. Is there any reason why he should not testify now as to the name?

Senator FERGUSON. I think so. I will explain it to the Chair.

Senator EASTLAND. That is all right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, when you say that Alger Hiss was a member of that unit, how do you know that Alger Hiss was a member of the Harold Ware cell of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Well, I only know that, Mr. Morris, because I saw him there on, let us say, more than two occasions, because nobody was in

that unit who was not a Communist Party member, and I saw him pay dues.

Senator FERGUSON. In the cell?

Mr. WEYL. In the cell.

Senator FERGUSON. You sat with him, in other words, in the cell meeting?

Mr. WEYL. Precisely.

Senator FERGUSON. On at least two occasions?

Mr. WEYL. More than two occasions.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you estimate the number of times, Mr. Weyl, that you saw Alger Hiss in closed Communist meetings of the Harold Ware cell of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. I am afraid I couldn't do that, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Would it run as high as 20?

Mr. WEYL. Well, I think I have to repeat my answer for this reason: The lapse of time is 18 years. I attached no particular importance to Mr. Hiss and would have no reason to remember the number of times he was present and the number of times he was absent.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said that in the past tense, you "attached"?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, attached.

Mr. SOURWINE. No particular importance at that time?

Mr. WEYL. Of course, subsequently it has assumed very great importance.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say it was more than five times, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. If I can answer this as a guess, I would say yes.

Senator FERGUSON. A guess would not do us any good. You do testify absolutely that it was more than two?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He could not have attended a meeting of that cell once without being a Communist, could he, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. No, he could not, Mr. Sourwine.

Senator EASTLAND. You said you saw him pay dues. I think he has covered that. What about Mr. Kramer?

Mr. WEYL. I beg pardon?

Senator EASTLAND. What about Kramer? You mentioned a Mr. Kramer.

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Charles Kramer.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know whether he was employed since that time by a committee of the United States Senate?

Mr. WEYL. I so understand, Senator, from published testimony concerning a man who was, obviously the same person on the basis of the photographs then published.

Senator EASTLAND. You identify him as the same party who was a party member with you?

Mr. WEYL. That is correct, yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Could you remember the committee that employed him?

Mr. WEYL. My impression was that it was a committee under the chairmanship of Senator Pepper.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you a question. I show you the Saturday Evening Post of February 9, 1952, and I show you a picture that you were shown in executive session.

It is now torn out of here.

Senator EASTLAND. In addition to the people which you have named, who were members of the cell to which you belonged, did you know any other Communists who were employed by the Federal Government?

Mr. WEYL. I can't recollect knowing any, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you receive information that there were other Communists in the Government?

Mr. WEYL. No; I did not. The only information bearing on that, which I received, was from Harold Ware to the effect that this unit would be confined to people of, let us say, professional grade, whose rank in the Government was either reasonably high in terms of their age, or whose prospects were fairly good.

Senator FERGUSON. But they were all in Government?

Mr. WEYL. They were all in Government, Senator, yes, except Harold Ware.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you call him?

Mr. WEYL. You would call him the organizer.

Senator FERGUSON. The organizer?

Mr. WEYL. Or the secretary of the party unit.

Senator EASTLAND. Where is he now? Do you know?

Mr. WEYL. He is dead Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Lee Pressman a member of that unit?

Mr. WEYL. He was, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you tell us more about the unit? Was it a secret unit or was it an open unit?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; I would like to do that. It was very definitely a secret unit. At the time I was a member of it, it was engaged, to the best of my recollection, purely in study, that is Marxist study.

The reason given to me for the secrecy which, by the way, I rather objected to, particularly since I had not been secretive about my beliefs previously, was that all these people anticipated a permanent career in Government, and if it is known that they are Communists, although there is no legal barrier—that is, speaking at that time——

Senator FERGUSON. At that time, you could be hired even though you were an open and notorious Communist.

Mr. WEYL. You could, Senator, and, furthermore, the civil service specifically was debarred from inquiring into political affiliations.

Senator EASTLAND. By who?

Mr. WEYL. I think it is the act of 1884, the Civil Service Act. But I wouldn't be sure of the date. But, despite the legality of the matter, the way the thing was presented to me by Ware was that this would involve a very serious prejudice and destruction of these men's careers and therefore secrecy was essential.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you comply with that question of secrecy?

Mr. WEYL. I complied with it, Senator. At least I thought I complied with it. I was never quite as conspiratorial and discreet as the others would have liked.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that you sat with every one of these people that you named here, or were asked about, as being members of the cell, that you sat in this Communist cell with them on at least one occasion?

Mr. WEYL. I would say that definitely, but provided I understand the question. In saying that I sat with all of them——

Senator FERGUSON. I do not mean at one time. At one time or another.

Mr. WEYL. At one time or another I sat with all of them, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you are giving personal knowledge that each one of them was a Communist member and sat in a cell meeting, this cell meeting, with you at least on one occasion.

I am talking about all the others besides Hiss.

Mr. WEYL. That is my testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. And, Mr. Weyl, these people whom you have named, do you know, as a matter of fact, these are the same people who have been subsequently identified by Mr. Chambers before the House Un-American Affairs Committee, and before the Alger Hiss trials in New York?

Mr. WEYL. I do, Mr. Morris.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, at that point, I wonder if we could not make that identification more current.

Senator FERGUSON. I was going to say there is an identification in the record. I mean, we have sent for the identification and we will put it into the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very well, but before we are through so that this record hooks them up with existing people whose present identity can be established.

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain a member of that unit?

Mr. WEYL. I ceased to be a member of that unit in June of 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you leave the unit?

Mr. WEYL. I felt the role of being a Government official and a secret member of the party uncomfortable. I, of course, was not at liberty as a disciplined Communist to change units or change jobs at my whim or pleasure. I first approached Ware on the basis of my personal dislike for the situation and got nowhere.

I then pointed out to Mr. Ware that my presence in this cell was violative of all the rules of secrecy that he himself had set up on the grounds that I had published articles clearly identifying myself as a Communist in the Student Review and the Daily Worker, and had spoken as a Communist at gatherings up to and over 1,000 people; that this had happened in the winter of 1932-34, and so it was a matter of very easy check; that, therefore, my presence in the unit was a threat to its security, and, on that basis, I requested and obtained the right to resign from the Government.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Hiss' position in Government at that time?

Mr. WEYL. He was an assistant counsel to the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, that is, one of the two men directly under Jerome Frank, who was general counsel.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the other man?

Mr. WEYL. The other was Lee Pressman.

Mr. MORRIS. Also a member of the unit?

Mr. WEYL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after you came to Washington did you become a member of this unit in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration?

Mr. WEYL. That is a question, Senator, that the FBI asked me, and I honestly can't answer because I don't recollect.

Senator FERGUSON. About how long?

Mr. WEYL. The best recollection, and it may be a bad one, is that this unit was set up around the beginning of 1934.

Senator FERGUSON. It was set up, then, and you were in it about how long?

Mr. WEYL. Well, I am here assuming, Senator, and I think that assumption is right, that it was set up with all of the people who were then in Government brought in as members. In other words, the only persons who were members during my time, and who came in after the initial meeting, were people who joined the Government after I did.

Senator FERGUSON. What year would you say that you sat with these people in this Communist cell?

Mr. WEYL. On the basis of this recollection, which I emphasize is imperfect, I would guess that I sat in these unit meetings for approximately the first 6 months of 1934. It may have been longer.

Senator FERGUSON. But you place it as 1934?

Mr. WEYL. If this point is important, we could get closer to the time period in this sense: Charles Kramer, I recall, came in to the Government at a time when the unit was already set up. His name was then Charles Krivitsky. I am sure that there is a personnel record of the date on which he joined the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

Mr. MORRIS. And you offer that by way of giving us the precise date of which you attended these meetings?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. If I might, Mr. Chairman, clear this matter up, in the Saturday Evening Post, February 9, 1952, I show you page 17 of that magazine, and I ask you as to whether or not you can identify on that page a picture of Alger Hiss, the Alger Hiss that you sat with in a Communist cell here in Washington, and who, you say, paid dues.

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Senator; this man [indicating].

Senator FERGUSON. You are pointing to a man in the right-hand column, the tallest one in the group; is that right?

Mr. WEYL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Standing next to a man with a hat over his face; is that correct?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; that is the identification. And that man is Alger Hiss whom I knew as a Communist Party member in 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, was Whittaker Chambers at that time a member of the Ware cell?

Mr. WEYL. No; he was not.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Donald Hiss?

Mr. WEYL. Mr. Donald Hiss was not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, when did you tell this information that you are presenting to the committee today to the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. WEYL. Approximately a month after the outbreak of war in Korea.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you mean that the outbreak of war in Korea caused you to give evidence to the FBI that you had withheld up to that time?



Mr. WEYL. Yes, Mr. Morris. My break with the Communist Party was very much earlier.

Mr. MORRIS. When was your break with the Communist Party completed, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. The complete rupture with the Communist Party occurred precisely on the day that the Nazi-Soviet pact was announced, culminating a period of doubt and indecision.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first break with the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. That was when I first broke. However, I lapsed as a member of the Communist Party in 1938, I believe, but continued to do some work in Communist-controlled organizations which were specifically directed against nazism.

Mr. MORRIS. But that ceased, as you say, at the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact?

Mr. WEYL. At the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact I proceeded to write articles and deliver speeches opposing communism and opposing the Soviet state. But I did not reveal my personal part in the Communist movement, nor did I identify persons who had been Communists with me and toward whom I felt I had certain obligations of trust and confidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the record on a previous hearing our exhibits numbered 17, 19, 20, 23, 26, 107, 115, 131, and 132, which represented extensive evidence of Alger Hiss' activities in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I think we can just make mention of that fact today.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you want them to go into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. No, sir. They are in the record, Mr. Chairman.

And in connection with these other names, we have no evidence that they were connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, at least we present no evidence at this time that they were connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

If the chairman thinks we have covered this particular subject sufficiently, we would like to ask Mr. Weyl some questions about other people connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. I just wanted to go over in evidence, Mr. Chairman, this part of this magazine with this picture on it. It is already in the record of the executive session but I would like to make it part of this record.

Senator EASTLAND. It will be received.

(The document referred to by reference was marked "Exhibit No. 449" and filed for the record.)

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, did you know Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mr. WEYL. I did, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Frederick Vanderbilt Field was a Communist?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Frederick Vanderbilt Field at one time a Socialist?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Mr. Morris, he was. When I first knew him, in 19— I will just leave out that date, about 1930, he was a Socialist.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that Frederick Vanderbilt Field left the Socialist Party and entered the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. That is correct, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. When did this transition take place, to the best of your recollection?

Mr. WEYL. To the best of my knowledge, the transition took place in 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man named Chao-ting Chi?

Mr. WEYL. I did, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. I am going to be very careful about this testimony, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would be, Mr. Weyl.

Mr. WEYL. With respect to Chao-ting Chi I can say that I always dealt with him as a Communist and that he made statements to me that indicated that he was a Communist, and that they were indicative of his having been an official in the Communist Internationale.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the reason for your giving the latter, coming to the latter conclusion?

Mr. WEYL. Of course, Chi was, I would say, quite open about his Communist beliefs and affiliations. My hesitation was on the specific question of Communist Party membership.

But the instance that comes to my mind is that Chi was talking about Heinz Neumann, who was a very well-known leader of the German Communist Party, and he said that he had no respect for Neumann or no use for Neumann, and Neumann was a coward, and then told the story of Neumann being in Hong Kong and driving around Hong Kong with Chinese comrades. Chi would be using the word "comrades" in this connection.

Well, getting into an area where there was Chinese authority, the police took out these Chinese Communists and shot them. Neumann, in Chi's opinion, could have prevented it if he had shown courage.

This was purely Chi's story, and the way it was told and the circumstances under which it was told indicated to me that Chi had been working with Neumann or under Neumann.

And a subsequent check indicated that Neumann was one of the men responsible for Communist Internationale policies in China about the year 1929 or 1930.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, Mr. Weyl, that Chi's association with the Communist movement was open and notorious?

Mr. WEYL. I don't think I can go that far, Mr. Morris. I would merely like to say that I would not have considered him a very secret member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean he was very open in his pro-Communist expressions?

Mr. WEYL. I thought so.

Senator EASTLAND. I would like to ask you a question right there, if you will permit me. Did you attend any Communist social functions in Washington at any time?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, very many; Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. What were they? Were they parties, drinking parties, dances, or what were they?

Mr. WEYL. Well, I suppose, going over a period of several years, they might have included all of those things—talks, motion-picture showings, dances, drinking parties.

Senator EASTLAND. Who attended those parties?

Mr. WEYL. Well, Senator, that is such a broad question. I mean, there are so many of them.

Senator EASTLAND. The people that you know and can recall.

The question that I just asked you is a question that should have some thought. I am going to ask you to make that list and deliver it to the attorney for the committee.

Mr. WEYL. You mean, Senator, have it of all the persons whom I recollect as having been at a Communist party?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes. We probably will not publish the list, but we want the information.

Mr. MORRIS. That is at executive session, you understand.

Senator FERGUSON. Could we ask what you define as a Communist social party?

Mr. WEYL. That is why I was so bewildered at the question, frankly, and I think I may have misunderstood it. I can't recall any social functions that were confined to Communist Party members.

Senator EASTLAND. That is the reason that I will take the list in executive session.

Mr. WEYL. Yes. Well, I mean that there are hundreds of people who would go to parties under Communist sponsorship, possibly knowing about them, possibly ignorant of them, possibly simply wanting to look up a friend who was there which would, by itself, be something that would have no significance at all I would think.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ever use it as a kind of a means to recruit members, to get them to associate with Communists, and so forth?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; I suppose that was unquestionably the main purpose.

Senator EASTLAND. Those social functions, were they organized by this unit of the party?

Mr. WEYL. In Washington?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes; the one to which you belonged?

Mr. WEYL. No; the unit was secret. It was supposed to have no connections whatsoever with the Communist Party of Washington, D. C.

Senator EASTLAND. How would they be organized? How were they organized?

Mr. WEYL. The unit you mean?

Senator EASTLAND. No; the social functions. Who sponsored them?

Mr. WEYL. Well, I am now thinking of New York, not of Washington. I don't think I ever attended a Communist social function in Washington, D. C.

Senator EASTLAND. I asked you about Washington.

Mr. WEYL. About Washington?

Senator EASTLAND. Social functions that the Communists sponsored in Washington.

Mr. WEYL. Then my answer is "No," and if you wish I will explain why.

Senator EASTLAND. No; that is all that is necessary.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, would you tell the committee what you can about Chi's open and notorious pro-Communist activities, to the best of your ability?

Mr. WEYL. Well, you want direct testimony here, of course.

Mr. MORRIS. I want whatever you know about him, Mr. Weyl.

Mr. WEYL. I was simply wondering whether I should tell the story I told in executive session, which I pointed out to you at the time was simply a story I had heard from that period.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you give it to us, Mr. Weyl, for just whatever it is worth. If something has to be followed up, the committee can undertake that.

Mr. WEYL. I give it to you with a distinct and explicit preliminary statement that I don't vouch for its accuracy one bit.

Mr. MORRIS. This is something you heard, rather than something you experienced?

Mr. WEYL. I can't tell you whether I heard it from Chi himself or somebody else.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I respectfully suggest that if this is, one, a story which the witness calls hearsay, and, two, one not from experience, and, three, a story which was given to the committee in executive session, it may serve very little useful purpose.

Senator EASTLAND. I want to get the story and see whether it can be connected up. I was not present in the executive session and I do not know what the story was. I want to know it. You may proceed, sir.

Mr. WEYL. The story, Mr. Chairman, is that the Theater Guild was putting on a Communist play, a play written by a Soviet writer. I believe it was called *Roar, China, Roar*. The hero was a Chinese revolutionary.

So they were hard put to find a suitable Chinese revolutionary, and they went down to Union Square and saw an obviously intelligent and eloquent and rather commanding figure giving a Communist speech. That was Chao-ting Chi.

On this basis, they proceeded to give him a try-out, and he played the leading role. So, again, that is the story. That is not something that I personally vouch for as true.

Senator EASTLAND. Where did you get that story?

Mr. WEYL. Well, I can't recollect where I got it, except that the time when I heard it was around 1937, when I knew Chi. It may have been from Chi. It may have been from some mutual friend.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you believe that story?

Mr. WEYL. Well, Senator, I simply accepted it as true, having no particular curiosity and no reason to verify.

Senator EASTLAND. At the time you were told the story and based on your knowledge at that time, you believed its accuracy; is that what I understand?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. All right, go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that one of the things that led you to say that he was an open Communist?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; that was one of the things.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever have dinner at Dr. Chi's home?

Mr. WEYL. I believe I did; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In the presence of his wife?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you testify that Dr. Chi's wife, Harriet Levine, was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. No, Mr. Morris. I can testify that I took it for granted that she was a Communist.

When I say a Communist, I don't necessarily mean that she carried a party card. I would have no knowledge of that.

Mr. MORRIS. But she engaged in conversations with you and with him in your presence which indicated to you that she was a Communist?

Mr. WEYL. Yes. May I make a little explanation here?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means, Mr. Weyl.

Mr. WEYL. I hope that my answers do not sound evasive. One knows, when one is in the Communist Party, and one discusses inter-party matters with people on a certain basis, that they are Communists and it is very difficult coming before this committee or any other body more than 10 years later to give any specific and convincing reason for that knowledge.

Where the question is directed to actual membership in the Communist Party, it is generally impossible to answer with respect to people who normally would not carry party cards and would not pay dues, but would be under the discipline of the organization so that, technically, it might be said that they were not members of the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. But they would still be Communists?

Mr. WEYL. They would be Communists in the fundamental sense of being believers in communism, subject to the discipline of the Communist Party organization.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you can be subject to the discipline and not carry a card?

Mr. WEYL. Precisely, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. And you could be also subject to the discipline and not pay dues?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that all these people in this unit, Alger Hiss unit or Ware unit, as you called it, were under the discipline of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir, Senator; and I would say there very categorically that they were Communists, according to the official definition in the statutes of the Communist Internationale, that is, they were subordinate to the discipline, they were active in an organization, they paid dues, and they had party cards.

Senator FERGUSON. They did at that time?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So you would say, then, that all these people in this one cell that you mentioned here in Washington, in the agricultural section, of which Mr. Hiss sat at the meetings, had party cards?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know whether the wives of those people were Communists or not?

Mr. WEYL. I don't Senator, and if they were Communists they were not in the unit.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the testimony concerning Mr. Lee Pressman, I would like to offer into the record a

paper which Mr. Mandel will identify as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which purports to be a photostatic copy, and which shows that among the American delegation to the 1945 conference of IPR was a Mr. Pressman.

Mr. Mandel, would you identify that?

Senator EASTLAND. Could you identify it? You said it purports to be.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated March 2, 1944, headed "Suggestions for categories of American delegation, 1945 conference."

It is divided into categories including: Business, press, military, government, and, under the category of Labor we find, under CIO, DeCaux, Nixon, Pressman, Walsh.

At that time, Lee Pressman was general counsel for the CIO.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this a photostat of a document which was found in the IPR files and which is now in the possession of this committee?

Senator EASTLAND. That is what he testified.

Mr. MANDEL. The document was in the IPR files.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you cause this photostat to be made?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. It will be admitted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 450" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 450

MARCH 2, 1944.

## SUGGESTIONS FOR CATEGORIES OF AMERICAN DELEGATION—1945 CONFERENCE

**Business:**

Investment and Finance: e. g. Eric Johnston, C. V. Starr-----	2
Transportation: e. g. Grady, Kaiser, Trippe-----	1
Sales, branch factory: Production and imports: e. g. Batt, Minor, Odum, Schultz, Watson-----	2
<b>Total</b> -----	<b>5</b>

Press; e. g. Mrs. Bolton, Byas, Dabney, Daniele, Field, Davis, James, Lipp- mann, Luce, Menefee, Sharwood, Sulzberger-----	2
Military: e. g. Bales, Clay, Hilldring, Pence, Reischauer, Schuirmann, Shoemaker, Yarnell-----	2

**Government:**

Political; e. g. Austin, Fulbright, Grew, Judd, Thomas, Wallace-----	2
Administration and Policy: e. g. Berle, Currie, Emerson, Hornbeck, Howard, Remer, Thompson, Vincent-----	3
<b>Total</b> -----	<b>5</b>

**Labor:**

AFL: e. g. Shiehkkin, Watt-----	
CIO: e. g. DeCaux, Nixon, Pressman, Walsh-----	
<b>Total</b> -----	<b>2</b>

Professional and Academic: e. g. Colgrove T. Dennett, Dunn, Fairbank, Jessup, Johnstone, Keesing, Kirk, MacNair, Moore, Stanley, B. Wilbur, B. Kizer-----	4
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## TOTAL DELEGATION

<sup>1</sup> *Nuclear group*

Business: Kizer and/or Wilbur

Military: Yarnell, Bales, or Shoemaker

Government: Emerson, Vincent, or Remer

Professional: Jessup and Johnstone, Fairbank, Stanley, or Dennett

(Penciled note:) Sent to members of conf cttee July 28, 1944.

Business:

Benjamin H. Kizer }  
Brayton Wilbur } We are already committed to these two delegates.

Suggestions:

Eric Johnston: Kizer is going to explore the possibilities late in August and will report thereafter. He thinks the chances are good. I assume that the committee will approve issuance of a formal invitation upon indication that Johnston will accept.

Will Clayton or T. J. Caldwell (Houston, Tex.): Both suggested by the executive committee of the Houston Foreign Policy Association. As an alternative, it was suggested that Clayton might be asked to name a member of his firm who had charge of business in the Far East. No commitments. Some desirability of getting representation from Southeast. George A. Morison; Vice president, Bucyrus-Erie Co., Milwaukee, or someone picked by him from that area. Morison is chairman of the Milwaukee chapter. No commitment. Good to get Middle West represented and draw Milwaukee group into planning.

Croyle Hunter: President, Northwest Airlines. A friend of Ben Kizer's, active in fight against the "chosen instrument" interest of Pan American Airways. Very concerned about postwar aviation to Orient. No commitment.

The following are suggestions drawn from the names of those who have attended New York meetings of the American Council:

J. C. Cooper: Pan American Airways

Mansfield Freeman: Starr Park & Freeman

J. A. MacKay: National City Bank

Philo W. Parker: Standard Vacuum Oil Co.

Government:

Lauchlin Currie: Department of State

Dean Acheson: Department of State

John Carter Vincent: Department of State

Eugene Doorman, or Joseph C. Grew: Department of State

Harry White: Treasury Department

J. W. Fulbright: House of Representatives

Senator Austin: U. S. Senate

Senator Thomas: U. S. Senate

W. H. Judd: House of Representatives

Rupert Emerson, or Willauer: Foreign Economic Administration

C. A. Remer: Department of State

Owen Lattimore: Office of War Information

W. A. M. Burden: Civil Aeronautics Board

Abbot Low Moffat: Department of State

Stanley K. Hornbeck: Department of State

(Mr. Currie, who clearly indicated he would like to be invited, thought the Government representative should be: Acheson, as head of all economic planning in the State Department; Emerson, as operating head of Liberated Areas in F. E. A.; Vincent and Doorman, or Grew, as those on technical level in State; and Harry White. The presence of Acheson would obviate any problem of omitting SKH. Currie himself would, if asked, probably help persuade the others on his list to accept. I would suggest naming five people to be asked as delegates and another five to be asked as members of the American delegation secretariat.)

Labor:

Robert J. Watt: A. F. of L. (no commitment. Has indicated he might be willing to accept).

<sup>1</sup> To do some initial planning.

Len DeCaux: CIO (no commitment. DeCaux would like to come again; is perfectly willing to step aside if we feel someone else would help in getting more CIO cooperation).

(In both cases the invitation should be addressed to the head of the organization with the name of the preferred person specified in the text of the letter.)

**Military:**

Admiral Harry E. Yarnell  
General Frank R. McCoy  
Admiral Greenslade  
General Bissell  
Commodore Allen  
Colonel Carl Faymonville  
Captain Pence  
Colonel Shoemaker

(General McCoy strongly recommended General Bissell, hoped that this conference would see some new and younger faces. Admiral Yarnell, as a vice chairman of Pacific Council will attend in any event, therefore technically need not be counted as a member of the American delegation. If California is allowed to name a delegate in addition to Wilbur—as I think they ought to be—Greenslade or Allen are definite possibilities or even probabilities.)

**Press:**

Virginius Dabney, Richmond  
R. E. Freeman, Richmond  
Walter Lippmann  
Sumner Welles  
Joseph Barnes  
Raymond Gram Swing

(No commitments. I personally would favor making every effort to get Sumner Welles there in view of his recent book. Kemper Freeman, son of Miller Freeman, may want to attend as an observer and for reasons of good will in Seattle it may be desirable to allow him to come.)

**Academic and professional—**

Philip C. Jessup	Frederick V. Field	Grayson Kirk
H. Foster Bain	Knight Biggerstaff	Frank W. Notestein
Tyler Dennett	Harold Sprout	Ada Comstock Notestein

Secretariat of American Delegation (other than the staff members who will be picked late). It would be desirable, in assessing the list above, to suggest those who should come in this bracket if not up to the level of the brackets above—

William C. Johnstone  
Wilma Fairbank, Science, Education, and Arts Division, Department of State  
Haldore Hansen, Science, Education, and Arts Division, Department of State  
Robert Feary, Department of State. Former private secretary to Grew.  
Ernest B. Price  
Charles E. Loomis  
Solomon Adler, Stabilization Board. Recently in Chungking.

(In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding or criticism, I suggest that all those who are on the American Council payroll, such as Loomis or Price as well as our own staff, be placed in this category rather than on the official delegate list.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, did you know Philip Jaffe?

Mr. WEYL. I did, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether or not Philip Jaffe was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Mr. Morris, Philip Jaffe identified himself to me as a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Did that mean that he was technically a member of the Communist Party?



Mr. WEYL. Not necessarily, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain what you mean, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. Yes. There is a rather sharp line of demarcation—I should probably more accurately say there was because I have no direct knowledge of these things of recent date—between the fellow traveler who either went part way with the Communist program or was utilized by the Communists, and the man who was inside, who was subject to the discipline of the organization, who was a complete believer, at least as far as the party knew, in its doctrines, and who could, therefore, be trusted.

This did not, however, necessarily mean carrying a card or paying dues. At all times the Communist Party of the United States has had secret organizations which include espionage organizations but are not in any sense limited to them. That is, a person of fairly high professional standing or somebody who is much in the public eye would normally not carry a party card or pay dues because these would be tangible facts of evidence which might sometime be found and lead to his exposure and thus ruin his usefulness.

So by Communist I mean somebody who was considered to be a person who could be relied upon, who was subordinate to the organization, who carried out orders and who worked for the party.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Philip Jaffe and Harriet Levine, their names have occurred in this investigation as being connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Mandel, is there anything that we have today that we can introduce into the record in connection with Harriet Levine?

Mr. MANDEL. According to sworn testimony before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, part one, 1950, dealing with State Department loyalty investigations, Harriet Levine is identified as the wife of Chao-ting Chi, and also as a secretary of Owen Lattimore. She worked for the Institute of Pacific Relations in the summer of 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Who identified her as such, Mr. Mandel? From whose testimony are you reading?

Mr. MANDEL. From Owen Lattimore's sworn testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, have you ever been in the office of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WEYL. I have, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us the circumstances of your being in the offices of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WEYL. Yes. I am afraid I can't even approximate the date, except the late 1930's. I was doing some research of my own, that happened to be on world resources and population, and, at the moment, I was working on far-eastern material.

So I telephoned Field and asked whether I could use the library, and he very kindly consented for me to do so. I would imagine that I was in and out of there for a period of a month; not every day but fairly frequently.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you understand, as a Communist Party member, was it your understanding, that the Institute of Pacific Relations was controlled by the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Well Senator, no, it was not. I had nothing to do with far-eastern work. I simply realized that certain people who had a powerful position in the—what you might call the secretariat of the

organization were Communists, and that the Institute of Pacific Relations seemed to be following more or less of a Communist Party line.

But I had no knowledge beyond that.

Mr. MORRIS. You had no knowledge, really, Mr. Weyl, to come to the conclusion whether or not the Communists were able to control the policies of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WEYL. No.

Senator EASTLAND. He said so, he said to follow the Communist policy.

Mr. WEYL. I said a pro-Communist policy. By that I do not mean——

Senator EASTLAND. That is a distinction without a difference.

Mr. WEYL. Well, I think, Senator, I would like to take exception to that if I may.

Senator EASTLAND. All right, sir.

Mr. WEYL. I simply felt that the trend in their publications was in the general direction of the Communist Party——

Senator EASTLAND. Pro-Communist.

Mr. WEYL. Yes——was not sufficient to indicate to my mind definitely whether it was or was not controlled.

Mr. MORRIS. As a matter of fact, you did not know one way or the other whether it was controlled by the Communists or not.

Mr. WEYL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You never made a search of their writings to ascertain, did you?

Mr. WEYL. No, I didn't, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were you visiting at the time of your visit to the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WEYL. Mr. Morris, I wasn't visiting anybody. I simply got a place where I could put down my typewriter.

Mr. MORRIS. Who gave you permission?

Mr. WEYL. Fred Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the Institute of Pacific Relations' office near the Amerasia office?

Mr. WEYL. Yes. My recollection is that they were adjoining, and that there was a door between them, and that people seemed to flow from one office to the other. I was never clear on which was which.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know anything about Amerasia, the magazine?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Senator, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that it was pro-Soviet?

Mr. WEYL. I would have assumed at the time that it was Communist controlled.

Senator FERGUSON. You had reasons to believe from reading it, and so forth, and the way it was gotten up, and all, that it was Communist controlled?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know a Lieutenant Roth?

Mr. WEYL. No, I never knew Lieutenant Roth.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify for the record these two documents?

Mr. Chairman, there is one item in connection with Mr. Alger Hiss' activities in the Institute of Pacific Relations which has not been brought out in public session yet, and I would like to introduce some

preliminary documents on that, preparatory to having other witnesses discuss the particular subject.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you want the documents read?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel can identify two of them first.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated May 14, 1947, addressed to O. C. Hansen, Esq., from Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. And the second, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. The second is a mimeographed copy of a letter marked "personal" and "confidential," dated March 28, 1947, addressed to Brooks Emeny, from Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read the fourth paragraph.

Mr. MANDEL. May I say that the mimeographed copy came from the files of the Institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you read the fourth paragraph in the letter to Brooks Emeny?

Mr. MANDEL. It reads as follows:

As a concession to the Council on Foreign Relations, the World Peace Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the IPR, I am inclined to think that if you want to get the maximum number of organizations in under your umbrella, you will be wise to consider calling the new organization the American Institute of International Relations or the American Institute of World Affairs rather than attempting to woo these organizations into becoming subordinate to the FPA.

That is the Foreign Policy Association.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Mandel, would you read an extract from the letter to Mr. Hansen, which begins at the bottom of page 5.

Mr. MANDEL. At the bottom of page 5 is the following paragraph:

The man on whom we are all pinning our greatest hopes for advancing the whole cause of interorganizational coordination and cooperation is Alger Hiss, who had succeeded President Butler as the new head of the Carnegie Endowment. Recently I received from Hiss, under date of May 2, his comment on my letter of March 28 to Emeny. I think I am violating no confidence in quoting the following from Hiss' letter:

"I am returning herewith copies of your memorandum of January 15 and your letter of March 28 to Brooks Emeny. I appreciate very much having had the opportunity to read them and having the benefit of such a full exposition of your views. You asked for 'comment.' I find myself in agreement that amalgamation at this stage is undesirable and impracticable."

Mr. Hiss goes on in the letter to affirm his commitment to continuing and accelerating the process of interorganizational cooperation which took on a new lease of life in the spring of 1946. At the executive committee meeting on May 5, it was voted unanimously to take a definitely affirmative attitude to a proposal from Roland Redmond, of the American Geographical Society, and Alger Hiss with reference to securing a common office building for several research organizations on a property immediately adjacent to the United Nations here in New York. This will, of course, take time, for condemnation proceedings and new construction are involved. The executive committee enthusiastically supported my recommendation for full-scale exploration with Redmond, Hiss, and others of this important proposal. There are several other concrete cases of interorganizational cooperation on which we are all working for a common end. For example, a dozen organizations, a number somewhat in excess of those named in resolution 1, are working out an extensive plan for greatly increasing the distribution of United Nations documents in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, have both of those documents now been introduced into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. I will order them into the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 450-A" and are as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 450-A

MAY 14, 1947.

O. C. HANSEN, Esq.,  
301 Clay Street, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR MR. HANSEN: Thank you for your frank letter of May 2 expressing disappointment at my letter of April 25, with its memorandum to the board regarding the Coronado resolutions.

I can quite understand the reasons for your disappointment and sympathize with them. At the same time, I hope I can aid you in taking an equally sympathetic point of view to the obligation which I felt I had in writing that memorandum.

Certainly a majority of the members from the bay region and Seattle were practically unanimous in favoring Resolutions 1, 2 and 3. But this enthusiasm was not expressed as vividly by other members of the conference.

As you will remember, the membership of the Coronado conference was somewhat in excess of 100. The attendance at the meeting on the morning of April 12 was approximately 90. In spite of the interesting discussion and the arguments of those who favored Dr. White's resolution, the maximum number who voted on any of the resolutions was 45. (In favor of Resolution 1, 43; in favor of Resolution 2, 36.)

There were several reasons for this 50-percent abstention from voting:

1. Many had never heard of a proposal for organic union between the FPA and the IPR until they reached Coronado and did not want to commit themselves until there had been much further study.

2. Several were very definitely against it, but did not vote against it because they had confidence that the national board of trustees, after studying the matter, would make decisions which all would recognize as sound. If the national board finally recommended organic union, these members were prepared to accept it.

3. A few of the Government people from Washington who were opposed to the merging of the FPA and the IPR did not vote because Government people are not encouraged to take part in the policy-making activities of organizations like ours.

By the time we left Coronado nearly as many people had spoken to us opposing Dr. White's resolution as had publicly voted for the resolution as finally presented at the plenary session. When I asked some of these why they were not more vocal at the session, they retorted in various ways:

One member said that organic union with the FPA was so contrary to the historic mission of the IPR that he couldn't see how it could possibly ever be approved by the national board of trustees.

Another said that the process already started between the IPR, Council on Foreign Relations, the FPA, and other bodies that had been gathering momentum for the past year was so encouraging that he thought that publicity about organic union would hinder rather than help.

Another member said that there was very little use in opposing what he felt was an organized minority at Coronado. All admitted, he said, that the national board of trustees was the institute's policy-forming body. When the board of trustees considered the Coronado resolutions he was sure that although the board would give serious study to them he did not think that the board would be overly impressed by the fact that they had been voted for by only about half of the members of the IPR at Coronado, especially in view of the fact that the total membership at Coronado was only about 5 percent of the total membership of the American IPR.

A number of members from both sides of the Rockies expressed some considerable perplexity over the phenomenon in which all the advocates of organic union between the FPA and the IPR came from cities in which there are no branches of the FPA. Some of these same members also pointed out that a few of the members of the IPR in Seattle and San Francisco who on the one hand had been most eager for organic union with the FPA and on the other had been most critical of the IPR for what they described as Manhattan-domination, seemed completely to ignore the fact that the policies, activities, and directives of the FPA, excellent as they are, are far more Manhattan-dominated than is the case with the IPR. For example, one only has to compare the composition of the

national board of trustees of the IPR during the last 5 years with the board of directors of the FPA during the same period to substantiate this.

In other words, I had to write the memorandum knowing that it would be studied by those members of the IPR who had been at Coronado and were strongly in favor of organic union, those who were opposed to it, and also to members of the board of trustees, a majority of whom had not been at Coronado, and ultimately to the members throughout the country, only a fraction of whom had had the benefit of the Coronado discussions.

I think part of the difficulty at the moment arises from the fact that, as is so often the case, a set of resolutions that are passed at a single conference or a single meeting that have not been submitted to careful study in advance are likely to mean different things to different people.

I gather that to several in San Francisco the resolutions meant "union now" between the FPA and the IPR at the national level as a nucleus for an all-inclusive American Institute of International or World Affairs with local Institutes of World Affairs in as many communities as possible throughout the country.

To others, the resolution meant a mandate to the national board of trustees of the American IPR to seriously and immediately consider inviting the trustees of other organizations to appoint a joint committee to explore the possibility of organic union or some form of greater coordination between their organizations.

To some it may have meant a green light for the IPR at the local level to merge with other similar organizations in a community effort, leaving national coordination as something to be explored more deliberately.

I remember vividly your statement at the plenary session at Coronado that there never might be so propitious a time as the present for bringing about amalgamation, due to the fact that Brooks Emeny, the newly elected president of the FPA was present, and that Emeny and I had full confidence in each other. I imagine that Emeny was as pleased as I was by your genuine bouquets. Perhaps following your remarks I should have said that there might be quite a difference between what he and I would like to do in our personal capacities and what we would have to do in our role as servants respectively of the FPA and the IPR.

Now at Coronado you were one of the few to bring in the all-important question of financial support. I only wish that this had been discussed more thoroughly. At the community level, united fund-raising is pretty general American practice for charitable organizations both in peace and war and for war-relief organizations during periods of international crisis.

For many years both San Francisco and Honolulu raised their funds independently of other agencies and, on balance, pretty successfully. Now I gather that you feel the community study of the Pacific and the Far East can be financed more easily and more adequately by a united appeal. I certainly would not want to challenge your intimate knowledge of San Francisco's giving habits on this point.

At the national level, however, the situation is quite different. Practically 100 percent of the hundreds of thousands of dollars which have been contributed to the national and international programs of the IPR in recent years, and indeed throughout its history, has been given precisely because the IPR was a specialist organization with a big but concentrated program. Many of the largest givers have continued their donations because they felt the IPR was homogeneous, was without entangling alliances, and was free to dedicate itself exclusively to its central purpose of research, discussion, and publication on the problems of the Pacific.

At the local level I have assured Dr. Staley and other friends in San Francisco that the bay region committee's autonomy and competence was such that it must decide what was best for the community and best for promoting intelligent study of international affairs on the part of great masses of San Francisco's population.

I do hope that nothing in my April memorandum on Coronado caused anyone in San Francisco to feel that I was opposed to the formation of a San Francisco Council on World Affairs, even though that meant the end of the use of the name "IPR" in San Francisco.

The board of trustees, however, have assumed over the years and currently some very heavy responsibilities. Among these, not necessarily in the order of their importance, are the following:

A. An extensive program of participation, research, publication, and financial support of the international IPR.

B. To the great foundations we have made moral commitments for carrying out certain programs in the educational and research field beyond the life of present financial grants from these foundations.

C. We are committed to a number of business corporations who contribute from \$500 to \$2,500 a year to the national budget for continuing service.

D. We are committed to projects in several of the universities and to cooperation with some of the learned societies which we cannot lightly terminate.

E. There are quite a number of generous individual donors to the national budget who expect us to carry on as a highly competent specialist organization on the Pacific at least until the American people generally are giving proportionately as much study to the problems of the Pacific as they are to the problems of the rest of the world.

I can assure you quite definitely that unless some heretofore unidentified millionaires emerge to throw vast financial resources behind organic union of the FPA and the IPR, much of the present national income of the American IPR would wither away if the IPR became merely one unit in a national organization on world affairs.

Partially because it has no endowment and partially because it is a research organization, the American IPR has always had some difficulty in securing its annual budget. On balance, this has been a healthy stimulus to turn out work of the highest quality and dealing in the main with urgent current problems. I have learned that in a few quarters there is some pessimism as to the IPR's ability to continue to secure its national budget. Personally, I am optimistic on this score because of the institute's marked growth in national prestige recently. Some of the pessimists have said that the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation will not continue to support the IPR unless it amalgamates with the FPA. I have been unable to find the slightest basis for this rumor. Of course it is true that for years these two humanitarian organizations have periodically warned us that we must not count on their support in perpetuity. In accordance with their policy toward other organizations, both the Rockefellers and the Carnegies are supporting us at present on a declining scale. I have recently been informed by one who I believe has the confidence of both the Rockefellers and the Carnegies that the kind of cooperative plan on which we have been working with the other organizations for over a year is more than likely to result more in an increase of foundation financial support of the IPR than in a decrease.

As was pointed out at Coronado, there is considerable criticism in England, both on the part of big business and among scholars, of the inadequate handling of Far Eastern problems by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. I have experience of similar situations in Australia, New Zealand, and India.

However much one may mark one's memoranda "confidential," ideas do get around. My memorandum had to be written in the knowledge that some of the IPR members who would receive it were also members and in some cases officers of the organizations mentioned in Resolution 1. As I explained at Coronado, and here I think the members of the conference were most considerate in deferring to my point of view, for over a year representatives of the IPR have been engaging in extended consultations with representatives of the FPA, Carnegie Endowment, Council on Foreign Relations, World Peace Foundation, etc., working toward a far greater coordination of effort with a view to a much wider national service.

For some months, as you so well know, under Henry Grady's chairmanship, there have been a similar series of consultations on the part of leaders of various organizations in San Francisco.

Now the San Francisco resolution as originally proposed at Coronado seemed to some of us as completely ignoring this painstaking and already productive process of consultation at the national level. Perhaps I can best illustrate my point by transplanting the problem from the national to San Francisco level.

Supposing in the midst of the negotiations between Henry Grady, Staley, Lynn White, Thomas Harris, Deutsch, and others, some of the members of, say, the Carnegie Endowment's Center and the IPR had got together and recommended immediate organic union between those two organizations; and this to be effected without the knowledge of the Mills Institute nor the ARI nor any of the other organizations. I think you will agree that Grady and Deutsch would have found themselves in an exceedingly embarrassing position, irrespective of the merits of a bilateral amalgamation of the International Center and the IPR.

If the San Francisco resolution had gone through in its original form, the national officers of the American IPR would have been put into a highly embarrass-

ing position in their relationships to the Carnegie Endowment, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the other organizations mentioned in Resolution 1 as adopted.

In salesmanship as well as in wooing, one does have to consider the attitudes of the other party. Before I left Coronado I had received word from high authority in the Foreign Policy Association in New York that the directors of that organization had never considered, either as a corporate body or as individuals, any proposals for organic union between the FPA and the IPR. This, of course, was right in line with Brooks Emeny's remarks at Coronado when he said he was participating in the discussions not as the newly-elected president of the FPA but as a member of the IPR.

In March of this year, I wrote Emeny, on learning that he had accepted the presidency of the FPA. For your information I enclose a copy of the letter to Emeny, dated March 28. On his arrival in Coronado, Emeny told me that the letter had reached him too late to answer from Cleveland, but that he was glad to say that he agreed fully with everything I said in that letter.

The man on whom we are all pinning our greatest hopes for advancing the whole cause of interorganizational coordination and cooperation is Alger Hiss, who had succeeded President Butler as the new head of the Carnegie Endowment.

Recently I received from Hiss, under date of May 2, his comment on my letter of March 28 to Emeny. I think I am violating no confidence in quoting the following from Hiss' letter:

"I am returning herewith copies of your memorandum of January 15 and your letter of March 28 to Brooks Emeny. I appreciate very much having had the opportunity to read them and having the benefit of such a full exposition of your views. You asked for 'comment.' I find myself in agreement that amalgamation at this stage is undesirable and impracticable."

Mr. Hiss goes on in the letter to affirm his commitment to continuing and accelerating the process of interorganizational cooperation which took on a new lease of life in the spring of 1946. At the executive committee meeting on May 5, it was voted unanimously to take a definitely affirmative attitude to a proposal from Roland Redmond of the American Geographical Society and Alger Hiss with reference to securing a common office building for several research organizations on a property immediately adjacent to the United Nations here in New York. This will, of course, take time, for condemnation proceedings and new construction are involved. The executive committee enthusiastically supported my recommendation for full-scale exploration with Redmond, Hiss, and others of this important proposal. There are several other concrete cases of interorganizational cooperation on which we are all working for a common end. For example, a dozen organizations, a number somewhat in excess of those named in Resolution 1, are working out an extensive plan for greatly increasing the distribution of United Nations documents in this country.

On May 5 we had the great privilege of having Mr. Rene May of San Francisco in attendance at the executive committee meeting. Unfortunately, it was a poorly attended meeting due to Huntington Gilchrist's absence in Europe, Arthur Dean's place being grounded in Washington, and several other similar occurrences. Other than Mr. May, there were only five members of the executive committee present.

Luckily, Mr. May had attended a recent and very fully attended meeting of the bay region committee when the Coronado resolutions were fully discussed. He kindly called on me before the meeting and made an admirable statement of the bay region's point of view. He was warmly welcomed by the other members of the executive committee. He urged that we should not go ahead too rapidly in pressing for the implementation of the Coronado resolutions. He felt strongly that the matter should be fully discussed by a full meeting of the national board of trustees before approaches were made to the other organizations. He stated emphatically that he had said at the San Francisco meeting that premature action in changing the status of the IPR would be seized upon by Mr. Kohlberg as evidence that his campaign, although meeting overwhelming defeat, was now later handsomely vindicated.

In line with Mr. May's remarks, the executive committee recommended that the officers call a meeting of the board of trustees in June when a maximum attendance could be sought and as many points of view as possible solicited in writing in advance.

Already a number of letters have come in commenting on my memorandum regarding Coronado. For your information I enclose copies of letters from the

following: Ed Allen, E. C. Auchter, Arthur Coons, George B. Cressey, Carrington Goodrich, Elizabeth Grenn Handy, B. H. Kizer, Herbert Little, Charles E. Martin, David N. Rowe, and David L. Shillinglaw, and Louise L. Wright. You have already received direct from President White a copy of his letter to me of May 1.

Now what I would like from you is a detailed statement of why you regard my memorandum as biased.

The protagonists of "union now" were very brief in giving their reasons in favor of their position. I do not remember their making any points which were not mentioned in my memorandum. Doubtless they can make a much stronger case than they made at Coronado. It was precisely because I wanted my memorandum to be as useful to all as possible that I stated in it that I hoped it could be kept within the family because if it "is inaccurate at any point I am eager to have it corrected prior to any wider circulation."

Thanking you again for your letter, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

[Confidential]

MARCH 28, 1947.

Personal.

BROOKS EMENY, Esq.,  
*Council on World Affairs,  
 922 Society for Savings Building,  
 Cleveland, Ohio.*

DEAR BROOKS: You were good enough several weeks ago to tell me that I was the first person outside the FPA board whom you had consulted with reference to the invitation to you to become president of that association. I deeply valued this confidence and have observed it. You have discussed the pros and cons with me several times since, and the last day you were here you asked me flatly whether I would advise you to accept. This I did with real conviction. Now I have been informed that you have definitely accepted and will give a great deal of time to the FPA from now on but will not assume full-time work until September.

One of the several reasons for my position that you accept was that you assured me that the FPA board had told you that it was dissatisfied with the FPA of the past and would make any changes in program in the future that you and they felt wise, including a change of name.

On the matter of the name, my tentative judgment is that it would be questionable during the first year of your administration to change it. Because of the genuine institutional pride which so many FPA members possess, you may find it unwise to make this change too abruptly.

As a concession to the Council on Foreign Relations, the World Peace Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the IPR, I am inclined to think that if you want to get the maximum number of organizations in under your umbrella, you will be wise to consider calling the new organization the American Institute of International Relations or the American Institute of World Affairs rather than attempting to woo these organizations into becoming subordinate to the FPA.

As you know, the IPR through Mrs. Stewart, Dr. Ewing, and me has been working for cooperation with the other organizations on a functional basis. So far as I know, informed IPR members have gone along with these cooperative moves.

But I am somewhat doubtful whether within 12 months we could have any hope of getting the most intelligent and dynamic far eastern experts in the IPR to recommend merging the IPR in the FPA. It is true that a few of our members would welcome this. But they are not people, for the most part, who are seized with the importance of keeping the study of far eastern problems constantly before the American public.

It seems to many of us that before a Nation-wide attempt is made to amalgamate the various foreign affairs organizations there is a prior desideratum, namely, an effort to stimulate indigenous and largely self-sustaining movements to found an American Institute of African Relations, an American Institute of Latin American Relations, an Institute of Middle East Relations, and, perhaps, last of all, an American Institute of European Relations. We question whether these can be organized from the top down nationally. It would be easy to do on a chart, but not in fact. Initiative must come from those who have an imme-



diate concern—just as was the case with the Institute of Pacific Relations. We have never forgotten your letter of October 18, 1946, when you wrote to a mutual friend as follows:

"The principal reason why I have decided to continue my support in the American Council is because it has accomplished in the past what I consider to be an unique contribution to the furtherance of understanding of Far East relations and should be able to continue to do so in the future. Its contributions include not only the richest research material available on any region of the world, but of equal importance it has been the means of inspiring the interest of more American men and women in Far East problems than any other single institution or group of institutions that have come to my knowledge. If you study the war record of this country you will be amazed to find that the overwhelming proportion of American brain work which went into the successful prosecution of the war and is now engaged in the solution of the problems of peace was actually recruited from people whose first interest in Far East matters were inspired by the Institute of Pacific Relations. Another major contribution has been the techniques which the institute has developed, not only in the matter of regional research but also in study and conference methods with respect to the problems of a specific region of the world. If this same procedure could have been adopted as it applies to Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa we would not be facing the shortage of manpower and brainpower which we now face with respect to these other regions."

Happily, there already exist nuclei for such organizations. Although the Princeton University effort on the Near East is still rather slight, the Washington effort which Hoskins and others are developing is more promising and may get somewhat substantial backing. Regarding the North American-European area you will remember the IPR initiated a number of years ago a conference at Prout's Neck on North Atlantic relations which was of considerable value and influentially attended, but the war prevented any follow-up. When I was in France in 1945 some of our French colleagues expressed the hope that a conference of that sort leading to a North Atlantic Institute might soon be organized. Perhaps Africa is less well covered in our universities than most other areas. There are, however, a few competent people who are anxious to proceed with something substantial and not propagandist.

There is another problem on which the IPR is working that I know you will also want to study. Happily, several of our great universities are developing what are called area faculties or institutes, which are staffed by representatives of many disciplines in the social sciences. This is happily bringing into the universities the IPR pattern, according to which for years its research work has been an integration of the viewpoints of anthropologists, economists, sociologists, historians, political scientists, etc., in the study of a limited though large area of the world. The universities, at the moment, are circumscribing their field to areas somewhat smaller than that of the IPR, but some will shortly include all, or nearly all, of Asia.

The IPR is integrating its program with many of these area faculties and has been offered to this end the active cooperation of some of the learned societies.

Our feeling is that institutes like ours which have, for the most part, had their research roots in the universities must accentuate this relationship, and it may be that area institutes such as I have envisaged at the top of page 2 of this letter may best develop from bases in appropriate universities rather than from a possibly somewhat artificial organization of new ad hoc societies, not fully integrated with the university faculties.

You know that you can always be assured of my cooperation with you in your new job. But I did not want you to conclude from my urging you to accept it that I see any early likelihood of the IPR dissolving itself and trusting the FPA, even under your leadership, to cover the Far East and the Pacific adequately in the immediate future.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. They are being offered as evidence of Alger Hiss' activity in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Now, Mr. Weyl, did you ever engage in espionage in connection with your activity in the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Never, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever violate the laws of the United States Government while you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. I never did, Mr. Morris. May I add something?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, by all means.

Mr. WEYL. Odd as this may seem, I never suspected that these secret organizations of Communists were to be diverted for espionage purposes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the testimony of Whittaker Chambers on these matters?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Does he give any testimony to the effect that there was espionage being engaged in by that unit at the time you were in it?

Mr. WEYL. No, Mr. Morris. My recollection of the testimony is that the espionage started at a time after my departure from it.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions of the witness, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Nobody ever approached you for papers out of the Agriculture Department?

Mr. WEYL. No, certainly not.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact, at that time they were rather public property anyway, were they not?

Mr. WEYL. Yes. There was no security classification that I can recall at this time, except possibly in State and War.

Senator FERGUSON. So there would not have been any reason to have you use a ring to get them out of the Agricultural Adjustment?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, that is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

Senator EASTLAND. I would like to thank you for candidly and directly answering the questions that have been put to you today. You have been a refreshing contrast to some of the witnesses appearing in public session here during the past few weeks.

I have noted in particular that you have given this evidence to the FBI after the Hiss trials. I can, of course, regret that you had not done so before. However, the task of our committee is to give every encouragement to people to come forward with whatever evidence they possess to expose the Communist conspiracy that apparently has reached high places in our country.

I note that you broke with the Communist Party in 1939, and that it took the Korean war to break down your reluctance to testify openly on these matters. But the phenomena surrounding an ex-Communist's unwillingness to expose former associates has been extensively demonstrated previously before our committee.

We can deplore that it took so long, but, at the same time, we are glad that it did take place.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I just inquire once again?

Prior to Alger Hiss' trials, were you approached to try and get this testimony?

Mr. WEYL. No, Senator, I was not.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you were not called before the grand jury?

Mr. WEYL. No, I was not interrogated.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were not questioned by anyone as to what you knew about Alger Hiss or his connection with communism?

Mr. WEYL. No, Senator, not in any respect.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you have given now this testimony, these statements, to the FBI?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Senator. I went voluntarily to the FBI about a year and a half ago and told them the story.

Mr. MORRIS. However, Mr. Weyl, you were called before the House committee in 1942, were you not?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. And you did not give this testimony at that time?

Mr. WEYL. No. Would you like me to explain my attitude?

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would. I think it is of significance.

Mr. WEYL. First I will go back a bit. I think that should be changed to 1943, Mr. Morris, although I told you 1942, in executive session.

I rejoined the Government service after my public break with communism—by which I mean public attacks of communism, not public statements about my own role. I was then faced with the problem on what I should do in reference to these people who I know had been members of the Communist Party. Still, I repeat, the idea of espionage did not cross my mind.

Thinking it over, I saw no possible way of finding out the truth. If I went to any of them on a private basis, they would, of course, tell me that they had broken, whether they had or not. I was rather inclined to assume—and, incidentally, Hede Massing tells me she made the same assumption—that a man like Alger Hiss whom I had considered to be level-headed and highly intelligent would not have remained in the Communist organization after or during the alliance with Hitler. So I remained silent about them—

Senator FERGUSON. You mean the Soviet alliance with Hitler?

Mr. WEYL. Yes. I remained silent about the entire matter. I avoided these people. I felt that I did not see sufficiently strong reasons for my breaching confidence and destroying the careers of people who might very well have changed.

I, of course, now recognize that this was wrong, and I make no apology for it. I was, in 1943, I believe, subpoenaed to appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee and answer charges that I had published Communist articles under my own name in 1932 or 1933, and that I had been active in various Communist-front organizations.

I told the committee that I had been, until 1939, a Communist, and I offered to the committee, into evidence, writings subsequent to 1939 showing them that I was now an anti-Communist, so that there was a certain degree, though certainly not an entire degree, of candor about my own role, and I simply put before the committee the question which was for them to decide of whether my past activities or my present activities should be the compelling consideration.

Senator FERGUSON. You left out, in other words, between 1933 and 1939, that space?

Mr. WEYL. I left out the whole organizational matter. I could not have brought it in without naming names.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you questioned in detail on it?

Mr. WEYL. No, I don't believe, Senator, that any questions were asked that had any bearing on the existence of such. I am sure there was not.

Senator EASTLAND. Is there anything further?

Mr. MORRIS. I have nothing further.

Mr. WEYL. I would like to thank you, Senators, and members of the committee, for the courtesy and fairness of this hearing.

Senator EASTLAND. You have been a very frank witness and we appreciate your assistance.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, tomorrow we have Dr. Edna Fluegel of the staff of Trinity College, who was a member of the Postwar Planning Division of the State Department, and who will give some testimony concerning Mr. Hiss' role in the Postwar Planning Division of the State Department.

Senator EASTLAND. We will recess until 2:30 tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 3:36 p. m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., Wednesday, February 20, 1952.)



# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 2:30 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur V. Watkins presiding.

Present: Senators Watkins and Ferguson.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. The witness today will be Dr. Edna R. Fluegel.

Senator WATKINS. Will you raise your right hand, please?

Do you solemnly swear the testimony given in the matter now pending before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Miss FLUEGEL. I do.

## TESTIMONY OF EDNA R. FLUEGEL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, did you receive a telephone call last night in connection with your announced testimony before this committee today?

Miss FLUEGEL. I did, about 20 minutes of 11. I answered the telephone, and someone said something about "You remember that security documents are subject to penalties," and hung up.

I frankly don't know if someone was trying to kid me or if it was serious.

Senator WATKINS. Do you have any idea who telephoned you?

Miss FLUEGEL. No, I have no idea. It happened so fast that I was not thinking of anything like it. It did, however, suggest a question: As far as I know, most of the documents I will be referring to, while they were secret and top secret at the time I used them, have certainly been declassified in the course of years.

Senator WATKINS. Do you know that as a fact?

Miss FLUEGEL. If they haven't been declassified, it has been inertia rather than anything else. Certainly, nothing I say will jeopardize the security of the country.

Senator WATKINS. I say, Mr. Morris, I think that the staff of this committee should start an investigation immediately so as to discover,

if possible, the source of that telephone call. The witnesses here must not be intimidated in any way.

Mr. MORRIS. That will be very difficult, Senator, to follow up a call like that.

Senator WATKINS. It may be, but I think we ought to do whatever we can that can be done about it.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present address now?

Miss FLUEGEL. 2531 Q Street NW., apartment 207.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present position?

Miss FLUEGEL. Professor of political science, Trinity College.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever an employee of the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, I entered the State Department in June of 1942, and worked in the Postwar Trends Unit until the following spring, about May.

In May of 1943 I became a member of the special group working on public opinion studies, and late in the summer, about September, I became unit head of a unit that was preparing biographical intelligence studies for possible use in selecting postwar leaders.

In the following summer, about September of 1944, I became a foreign affairs specialist on the staff of the Secretary of State, servicing the postwar programs committee.

That postwar programs committee became the Secretary-staff committee in the State Department reorganization at the end of the year.

Technically, I stayed with that for the rest of the time I was in the Department, which was until September of 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, would you raise your voice just a bit, please?

Miss FLUEGEL. Technically I stayed in that outfit until I left the Department in September of 1948, although actually I was detailed to the San Francisco Conference, and then over to the first meetings of the United Nations in London, and then to work on a book describing the whole story of postwar planning.

I was working on that book from about June of 1946 until I left the Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, do you have that book that you mentioned with you now?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, I have. It is right here.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify that fully for the committee, please?

Miss FLUEGEL. The title is Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-45, published by the Department of State.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that published by the Department of State, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. Let me check. Released February 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. February of 1950.

Mr. Mandel, will you verify for the record—I think it is in the introduction—that Dr. Fluegel is mentioned in this volume as one of the contributors to the compilation of that volume?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here the index of persons, which lists Edna R. Fluegel on pages 4, 158, 211, and 415. These are the persons involved in the formulation of this document.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Mandel, too, there is an accreditation given on page 4, is there not?

Mr. MANDEL. On page 4 we find the paragraph which reads as follows:

The book was written by Harvey A. Notter, adviser to the Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs. Research and editorial assistance was given by a small staff comprised of—

and that list has Miss Edna R. Fluegel.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us with particularity, Dr. Fluegel, what your assignment was in connection with this volume?

Miss FLUEGEL. When I was detailed to the volume, they were trying to pull together a group who had actually been through the postwar planning experience. Since the documents were scattered and only people who knew what had happened, it was felt, could understand the work on that book, difficulties arose which made it impossible to get much of a staff.

So that from June of 1946 until sometime toward the end of 1947 Mr. Notter worked on it occasionally and part time. I worked on it full time and did a great deal of the research.

At that time, the rest of the group came on.

Mr. MORRIS. And when did you leave the State Department, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. In September of 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your position at the time of your departure?

Miss FLUEGEL. Foreign affairs specialist, technically attached to the Office of the Secretary of State.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, while you were associated with the Postwar Planning Division of the Department, to what documents and reports did you have access?

Miss FLUEGEL. Perhaps I can particularize that because it will explain different understandings at different times. When I was on the Postwar Trends Unit we received everything that came into the Department that in any way contained proposals of what we might do at the end of the war.

That would range from dispatches through published material. When I had the intelligence unit, we received every bit of information that contained any name of a foreign personality, including OSS material, and, when we needed it, of course, material from other intelligence units.

When I went to the Postwar Programs Committee, our job, of course, was to service the top planning committee in State, made up of the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretaries. So that then I saw all of the minutes and all of the documents going for top policy decision.

The same thing was true in the Secretary's staff committee. And then, when I went to work on this book, we had access to all the material that we could find that bore on the subject.

Mr. MORRIS. On the subject of postwar planning?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. And it was at that time that I had access to all of the minutes and documents from back in 1942, which I had not seen in 1942, of course.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, were these minutes that were made available to you, Dr. Fluegel, would they be minutes of meetings involving, say, the President of the United States and Premier Stalin?

Miss FLUEGEL. Pertinent memoranda of conversations between the President and Mr. Stalin would be available, plus the verbatim minutes



of all of the meetings held in all of the committees and subcommittees working on postwar planning.

Senator WATKINS. You mean to say that there would be a memorandum there in the files of these meetings purporting to be the minutes or to give the substance of what had transpired?

Miss FLUEGEL. As far as the meetings of the committees in the postwar planning organization, it would be the authenticated verbatim minutes.

Senator WATKINS. I am calling your attention specifically to the conferences between the President and Premier Stalin.

Miss FLUEGEL. That varied. I had them in some cases and in some cases I had all of the communication between the two of them.

Senator WATKINS. You mean the letters and cables or whatever had passed between them?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. In the case of the Moscow Conference, for example, I had the whole records. In the case of Tehran, the Department did not have the whole record on Tehran. In the case of Yalta, I had the records of one man who attended it, and bits from other people, but no verified records from Yalta.

Senator WATKINS. None of the correspondence as you had in the other case?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, here and there, on one or two particular questions, for example, on which I worked. You see, it was a question of what we needed. On questions on which I worked I had all of the correspondence that could be found.

Mr. MORRIS. And that would be minutes of very high classification, is that so?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. Sometimes Cabinet meetings; sometimes meetings of the Secretary of State; sometimes an interdepartmental meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. In your opinion, Dr. Fluegel, is there a question of present security involved in any of the testimony that we have taken here in executive session in connection with your own experience in the State Department, concerning your experience with these documents?

Miss FLUEGEL. I certainly can think of none.

Mr. MORRIS. You can think of none?

Miss FLUEGEL. No.

Senator WATKINS. Speak up a little louder.

Miss FLUEGEL. I said I can think of none.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, what was the genesis of the postwar planning section of the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. It is a rather long story. I will try to telescope it.

In the fall of 1939, Secretary Hull, that was at the time we were neutral, Secretary Hull was very much worried about what the state of the world would be like at the end of the war, and that was on the assumption that we would not partake in the war.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that?

Miss FLUEGEL. That was expressly stated. I had the records of all of that.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was that stated?

Miss FLUEGEL. Mr. Leo Pasvolsky was appointed in charge of the small group and at the first meeting, which was held about the middle of December 1939—it was with the Secretary of State, and the As-

sistant Secretaries—the feeling was expressed that the United States should be thinking of what the condition would be at the end of the hostilities and, from there until much later the assumption was that we would remain neutral.

The primary work of that group was the preparation of a memorandum of proposals which Mr. Welles took to Europe when he saw all of the heads of the belligerent States about February of—

Mr. MORRIS. How did you know that?

Miss FLUEGEL. I had the documents.

Mr. MORRIS. You had the documents.

Miss FLUEGEL. Including Mr. Welles' report on his mission.

Mr. MORRIS. And the basis of your testimony here today is on the basis of the documents which you have handled?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. All right.

Miss FLUEGEL. That will be true throughout. That particular effort was abandoned at the time—right after the blitz. I wasn't in the Department at the time. They had proposed a conference of neutrals.

Mr. MORRIS. By the blitz, you refer to the—

Miss FLUEGEL. The German sweep into Western Europe. Many of the neutrals who were going to participate in a conference, of course, were occupied by the German armies.

In the summer of 1940, and again I had these minutes, I was not in the Department then—in the summer of 1940 a study was made as to what—

Senator WATKINS. Let us see if I understand you. You say you had those minutes and you were not in the Department then. How did you have the minutes?

Miss FLUEGEL. I got the minutes when I was working on this book.

Mr. MORRIS. You see, Senator Watkins, I think the witness has indicated that she received minutes when she was working on this book of events that had taken place prior to the time she was working in the Department.

Senator WATKINS. I understood so. But I was wondering how she had possession of them after she had severed her connection with the Department.

Miss FLUEGEL. No; I was just explaining that I was not then a member of this postwar planning group.

Senator WATKINS. All right.

Miss FLUEGEL. That group in the summer of 1940 reconsidered matters in terms of events in Europe and made economic studies as to what the effect, for example, would be on the United States if Germany conquered the rest of the world. A whole series of studies of that sort were made.

As far as we could gather from the records, that particular effort tapered off in the fall of 1940. Running through the year 1941, there was a very small group continuing to work on problems, but, of course, it was a year of transition.

A recommendation—I saw the recommendation—went to Mr. Roosevelt in the spring of 1941 to establish a more definite postwar planning set-up. That recommendation was acted upon by Mr. Roosevelt a few days after Pearl Harbor, and the first full meeting of what became the real post-war planning outfit was held in February of 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. 1942, did you say, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. And that first meeting was what was known as the President's Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that held?

Miss FLUEGEL. February 1942. Mr. Hull was ill at the time and Mr. Welles presided at the first meeting. There were about four of those meetings, and out of those meetings—

Mr. MORRIS. Continuing through what period of time?

Miss FLUEGEL. The top committee, that particular committee, met only four times terminating, I think, in April or May of the same year.

It had by that time, though, laid down the basic lines and launched this whole series of subcommittees.

There was a subcommittee on territorial problems, which branched off into a whole series of committees, including country committees; there was one on political problems; later one on dependent areas; one on security problems, in which the Army and Navy participated.

They all proceeded to meet and plan and work. The research staff serviced those, and I was a member of the research staff.

Mr. MORRIS. So really this all went into effect in 1942, is that right?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to have introduced into the record three documents which relate to IPR activities along the lines being described by the witness here today.

Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would identify and read into the record this exchange of correspondence.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here some documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I will begin this series chronologically.

The first is a carbon copy of a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The letter is dated March 30, 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may these go into the record before the reading?

Senator WATKINS. They may be made a part of the record.

(Letters referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 451" and are read in full below.)

Mr. MANDEL. The carbon comes from the files of the institute. It is addressed to Mr. William M. Lockwood, on the letterhead of the Board of Economic Welfare, and is signed by Roy Veach, March 30, 1942.

DEAR BILL: I have had an opportunity to talk with a good many people both inside and outside the Government since I came down here, particularly regarding the present state of thought and action on plans and advance preparations for the postwar world. It seems perfectly clear to me, and to others who are trying to observe the situation closely, that some new impetus is needed to bring scattered thinking into focus. We do not yet have in Government or outside of Government any agreement, or any general understanding, as to the essential points in a postwar set-up that will make possible another war within a generation or two, and there is no adequate plan for such public discussion of this problem as will lead to general support of the action that governments must take.

I, and a few others here, have been casting about for the proper agency or medium to bring together the people who should think through this problem and advise upon lines of action. This might be done by Edward Meade Earle's committee, as a follow-up of the Prout's Neck Conference last summer. On the other hand, I believe it would be desirable for the auspices to be a little broader and I wondered therefore whether the IPR and the FPA—

referring to the Foreign Policy Association—

and perhaps also Shotwell's Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations, might join with Earle's committee in sponsoring such a conference, entirely without publicity.

It would be my idea that a group ought to meet near Washington during the spring, at least before the end of May, and that it should spend 2 to 4 days together. If the meeting is limited to 2 days, say Saturday and Sunday, I believe you would have a better chance to hold the entire group together since each member might be able to commit himself to that much time.

As a starter I would suggest the following people outside the Government: Shotwell, Buell, Pittman Potter, Eugene Staley, Jacob Viner, Clarence Pickett, Quincy Wright, J. B. Condliffe, Isaiah Bowman, Dr. Boudreau, A. Loveday, A. Hansen, Edward Meade Earle, Walter Van Kirk, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Vera Micheles Dean, and of course you and Ned Carter. You might want to include also George Warren, Secretary of the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees; Patrick M. Malin, American Director, International Migration Service; Michael Straight, Maxwell S. Stewart, Carter Goodrich, Esther Brunauer, Bill and Anne Johnstone and John Coyl of the National Planning Association.

From within the Government you might include Mrs. Roosevelt, Vice President Wallace, Milo Perkins, Berle, Acheson, Pasvolsky (and Julian Wadleigh, Charles Yost, and Harley Notter, from Pasvolsky's Division in the State Department); Harry White of the Treasury; Wayne Taylor, Amos Taylor and A. R. Upgren of the Department of Commerce; Lubin and Hinrichs from the labor field; Stacy May from WPB; Stephen Raushenbush from the Power Commission; Rigland and Fox, on the staff of the President's Committee on War Relief Appeals (and perhaps Joseph E. Davies and Keppel of the committee); and from the staff of our board, Lewis Lorwin, Winfield Riefler, William T. Stone, and Louis Bean.

Let me know what you think about this plan. If you are not in a position to take the initiative we should like to take it up with someone else.

Sincerely yours,

ROY VEATCH.

P. S.—Of course other names will occur to me as soon as this has gone—for instance, I certainly wouldn't leave out Phil Jessup. Presumably a group of four or five would want to do a careful job of drawing up the list.

This is followed by a letter dated April 6, 1942, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to ECC, presumably E. C. Carter, and WLH, presumably William L. Holland, from WWL, presumably William W. Lockwood:

I'd like your advice on a reply to the attached letter from Roy Veatch. It proposes a conference this spring on the essentials of a postwar settlement, attended by persons in and out of the Government.

There isn't any doubt but that this would be a very useful undertaking if properly set up. It might in fact be the Prout's Neck follow-up which we have been unable to arrange thus far.

The chief problem I should think would not be organizational sponsorship but finding someone with the standing, time, and resources to pull it off. Given this it would be easy to get the necessary informal cooperation.

As for our taking the lead, shouldn't positive IPR efforts in this field be devoted primarily to our own area of concern? I should think any conferencing that we do ought to be directed first of all at several preparatory meetings for the September show. This would not preclude our chipping in but would mean that someone else would really have to carry the ball.

Ed Earle is out West for a month investigating different aspects of the Japanese evacuation.

I am sending a copy of Roy's letter to Phil Jessup. He might like to consider the proposal in relation to his Carnegie endowment program.

Veatch's personnel proposals are entirely American, but surely this meeting should be international in character.

That letter is dated April 6, 1942. And then from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations is a brief note, a carbon of a note, dated April 7, 1942, headed "WWL from ECC":

I wish somehow or other someone other than Roy Veatch could undertake the task of postwar planning. While he knows a great many people in Washington I can't believe that he is the soundest person for us to tie to.

Mr. MORRIS. And then, Mr. Chairman, we have a letter dated September 25, 1942, which apparently indicates that the Institute of Pacific Relations did carry on a postwar policy discussion plan.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that and read that one into the record, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated September 25, 1943. At the top it says: Similar letters to—and lists the following individuals: J. H. Shoemaker, K. Y. Yin, W. H. Schubert, Archie Lochhead, Li Ming, H. D. Fong, Lauchlin Currie, W. L. Pierson, W. Taylor, E. C. Carter, Harry White, Frank Coe, E. J. Coil, Emile Despres, Herbert Feis, Irving Friedman, Mawell Hamilton, Alvin Hansen, Alger Hiss, P. H. Ho, Stanley K. Hornbeck, Charles Kindelberger, Leo Pasvolksy, Harry B. Price, Ludwik Rajchman, Carl F. Remer.

The letter reads as follows:

EXHIBIT No. 451A

Dr. KAN LEE,

*China Defense Supplies, Inc.,  
1601 V Street NW., Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. LEE: The Institute of Pacific Relations will hold the second session of its round table discussion on Chinese postwar reconstruction on Friday evening, October 2, in the Colonial Room of the Cosmos Club. Dr. Harry White will be in the chair. Dinner will be at seven; drinks being served from 6:30.

There are enclosed an agenda for this meeting and a summary of the last. Please indicate on the enclosed card whether or not you can attend.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT W. BARNETT.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the person described as being in the chair, Dr. Harry White, has been identified before this committee by several witnesses as being a member of the Communist Party, as in addition some of the members to whom similar letters were sent, according to the notations Mr. Mandel has read.

As evidence of IPR activity along the lines that the witness is now testifying, will you receive this letter into the record?

Senator WATKINS. It may be received in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 451A" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, what position did Alger Hiss have at this particular time? This is now the fall of 1942.

Miss FLUEGEL. At that time, he was assistant to Mr. Stanley Hornbeck, who was political adviser in the State Department, and was a member of the President's Advisory Commission.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the President's Advisory Commission, Dr. Fluegel, that you refer to?

Miss FLUEGEL. The President's Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy is this top, over-all postwar committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Made up of whom? What was the make of it?

Miss FLUEGEL. The composition, roughly, as it started, was to include members of the Department, senior members of the Department, senior members on a very top level for other interested departments, and also some of the new postwar outfits, like BEW.

It was also to include distinguished outsiders like Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Myron Taylor, Ann O'Hare McCormick, and several

others, with representation from War and Navy, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I think also the idea was that this represented the military departments as well.

A little bit later, I think sometime in the spring of 1942, some Congressmen started coming in, but most of the Congressmen were not in until 1943.

The full list of membership—there were so many new ones added to it because sometimes the member never did attend but sent a representative. There was also—I forgot to mention—representation from the White House.

Mr. MORRIS. Who represented the White House on this?

Miss FLUEGEL. Lauchlin Currie was one, David Niles was another, and there was a third member.

It was not always clear, even then, whether they represented the White House or one of the parts of the White House Establishment.

The full list which we had worked out and had verified by most of the members is contained in that book, and it gives the new ones so far as any of us were able to establish it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, at this point in the record, will you insert the references made by Dr. Fluegel in this volume? I do not think we have to go into it now, Mr. Chairman. It does not have to be read, Mr. Chairman. But at this point in the record, will you accept from Mr. Mandel the list that appears in this volume?

Senator WATKINS. We will accept it that way.

Mr. MORRIS. We do not have to take the time to go into it, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. It can be inserted in the record, if you will present it.

(Information referred to is as follows:)

#### MEMBERSHIP

[Source: "Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-45," Department of State, Publication 3580, General Foreign Policy, Series 15, Released February 1950, pp. 71-78 of chapter entitled "Organization and Meetings of Full Committee"]

When the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy began its meetings, its composition and its structure of subcommittees were established in principle but not fully elaborated. Its organization was not an action completed on a given day but was rather a process of development. This process continued throughout the committee's active life, which lasted in most of the political fields of its work until the summer of 1943 and in the economic fields and that of special regional problems until the spring of 1944. This process of growth at all times affected not only the Advisory Committee's membership and structure but the scope and the conduct of its discussions as well. Flexibility of conception, not the rigidity of preconception, characterized every aspect of the committee and its work. By the spring of 1943 various departmental, inter-departmental, and other mechanisms had begun to grow out of the committee's activity. In a number of important respects the committee's powers and functions became the foundation for various later structures through which its work was carried forward, with little interruption but much adaptation, as the periods of advanced preparation and of action arrived in the several fields of work.

Although there was great need to keep the Advisory Committee small, there was greater need to provide the range of competent judgment essential for sound results. Ultimately, specific representation of major points of view among the public and in the Government became a factor that further enlarged the committee. "Membership" tended for these reasons to be defined strictly but to be widely diversified.

The Advisory Committee proper came to include 10 nonofficial members, 5 Senators and 3 Representatives 11 members from the Department of State of whom 4 were ex-officio, a member each from the War and Navy Departments and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a unit, and 1 member each from 4 other departments, 3 members from the White House staff, 1 from the Library of

Congress, 4 from the wartime agencies, and 1 from among the continuing agencies of the Government. In addition there were other Senators and Representatives, as well as certain individuals from private and public life, who served on the subsidiary bodies of the main committee.

The members drawn from private life were chosen primarily because of their high personal qualifications for policy consideration and because of their capacity broadly to represent informed public opinion and interests. The selection of official members was based both on personal qualifications and on representation of the interested parts of the Government. Emphasis upon "representation" increasingly became a practical objective in building the Committee on effective and influential lines and was reflected in all appointments made after the initial four months of the Committee's activity.

Usually the members from private life and from the Congress were invited by letter from the Secretary of State with the approval of the President. Formal procedure was likewise followed in the case of invitations to members having Cabinet status, who either attended themselves or, while holding direct consultations with Secretary Hull and other officials of the Committee, were represented at meetings by appointees of their own choice. Other members were invited informally, through oral invitations extended by Secretary Hull or with his approval.

The distinction between formal and informal membership was without significance in the actual character of participation. In contrast, however, there were differences in extent of participation between general members, who took part in various aspects of the work, and special members invited to serve in particular problem fields. General members tended to be active in the consideration of political, territorial, and security problems, whereas the special members were active chiefly, though not exclusively, with respect to economic problems.

Five of the persons named in the initial recommendation approved by the President in December 1941 were general members. Of these, three were wholly engaged in nonofficial activities at the time: Isaiah Bowman, President of the Johns Hopkins University, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of Foreign Affairs, and Mrs. Anne O'Hare McCormick, foreign-affairs analyst of the New York Times. Two were so largely engaged in nonofficial pursuits, though having special official responsibilities, that they also were regarded as representing the public. These were Myron C. Taylor and Norman H. Davis. Mr. Taylor, industrialist and philanthropist, was Personal Representative of the President, with the rank of Ambassador, on the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees and also to Pope Pius XII. Mr. Davis had been in official service for many years, especially in connection with economic and disarmament conferences, and was at the time Chairman of the American Red Cross and President of the Council of Foreign Relations. James Thomson Shotwell, historian and Director of the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was added in June 1942, becoming the sixth member having general and nonofficial status on the Advisory Committee.

Of the special nonofficial members, two were invited in May 1942 to participate in the field of economic problems: Robert J. Watt, international representative of the American Federation of Labor, and Walter P. Reuther of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. A month later Brooks Emeny, director of the Council of Foreign Affairs of Cleveland, Ohio, was invited to take part in the same field and in that of legal problems. Early in April 1943 William Green, president of the A. F. of L., and Philip Murray, president of the C. I. O., received invitations formally to represent directly their organizations in the economic field, taking the places held previously on a more personal basis by Mr. Watt and Mr. Reuther. (See pp. 136, 139.) Eric A. Johnston, president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, was likewise invited at the same time directly to represent his organization in the economic field. Two economists, Percy W. Bidwell of the Council on Foreign Relations and Jacob Viner of the University of Chicago, participated in the specialized consideration accorded European regional problems for some months beginning in June 1943.

The membership from the Congress reflected the desire of both Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt to have direct congressional participation in the preparation on a basis of as nearly equal representation of the two major political parties as practicable. Nonpartisan agreement upon foreign policy and harmony of views between the Executive and the Congress were the objectives. This desire to assure a unified national view on basic foreign policy and so avoid the costly mistakes made at the close of World War I was manifest

in the earliest of the invitations, May 27, 1942, and throughout all subsequent developments. Senator Tom Connally of Texas, Democrat, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Warren R. Austin of Vermont, Republican, the minority member of that committee designated after consultation with Republican leaders, were the first congressional participants.

On January 9, 1943, two Democratic Senators, Walter F. George of Georgia and Elbert D. Thomas of Utah; two Democratic Representatives, Sol Bloom of New York and Luther A. Johnson of Texas; and one Republican Representative, Charles A. Eaton of New Jersey, joined the Committee. Six weeks later, another Republican Senator, Wallace H. White of Maine, also became a member. The Senators named were currently serving on the Committee on Foreign Relations except for Senator George, who after long service as its chairman had recently left that committee for another important assignment. The Representatives were members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Representative Bloom being its chairman and Representative Eaton its ranking minority member. Participation was undertaken in various capacities by other Republican leaders as political changes occurred and later as international negotiations were undertaken. (See pp. III and IV.)

In addition to congressional participation in the Advisory Committee and its initial subcommittees, a number of Members of the Congress later sat on the "special committees" that during 1943, as the main work of the Advisory Committee was drawing to a close, became active in the economic and social fields. Participation in these bodies did not necessarily involve membership on the Advisory Committee. Invitations were given in such instances by the various "special committee" chairmen directly. The "special committees" included the following Members from the Congress: Senators Scott W. Lucas of Illinois and Claude Pepper of Florida and Representatives Schuyler Otis Bland of Virginia with J. Hardin Peterson of Florida as alternate, and Alfred L. Bulwinkle of North Carolina, Democrats; and Representatives Richard J. Welch of California and Charles A. Wolverton of New Jersey, Republicans.

The number of Department of State officials named as members of the Advisory Committee continued throughout to be severely restricted in order that the Committee might be in fact widely representative of the country. This policy was adhered to strictly in the case of the Committee itself, the President having said, when approving the Committee, that the proposed State Department membership was a little too heavy. The policy was relaxed slightly, however, in the case of the main subcommittees. Membership accordingly was confined largely to officials of the rank of Assistant Secretary or above, with participation of other high officers limited, as a general rule, to attendance on request without membership.

A large proportion of these departmental officials had taken part in the earlier planning effort. Those having general membership were principally those mentioned in the original letter of recommendation to the President: Secretary Hull, Under Secretary Welles, Assistant Secretaries Berle and Acheson, together with four members of ex officio standing. Mr. Pasvolsky was a member ex officio on the basis of both his responsibility as Executive Director of the Advisory Committee and his general duties as Special Assistant to the Secretary. The legal adviser, Mr. Hackworth, and the Adviser of International Economic Affairs, Mr. Feis, had ex officio status based on their regular duties. Assistant Secretary Acheson and Mr. Hawkins, the fourth ex officio member as Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements, were specialized in their assignment at this time, working wholly in the economic field.

On February 6, 1942, just before the Advisory Committee convened, Assistant Secretary Breckinridge Long and John Van A. MacMurray, who was serving temporarily as Special Assistant to the Secretary, were appointed to take part in a special capacity. Soon thereafter the Chief of the Division of European Affairs, Ray Atherton, was similarly appointed because of his particular personal qualifications for work in connection with political, territorial, and security problems, though he was usually represented in the two latter fields by Cavendish Cannon of the same Division, acting in a personal capacity.

In addition, the four political advisers of the Department—James Clement Dunn for Europe, Stanley K. Hornbeck for the Far East, Laurence Duggan for the other American Republics, and Wallace S. Murray for the Near East—attended meeting as superior operating officials when political, territorial, and security problems pertaining to the countries and areas of concern to each, respectively, were scheduled for discussion and on such occasions served as special ex officio members. Mr. Hornbeck in August 1942 and Mr. Dunn in March



1943 began regularly to undertake subcommittee duties in connection with international security problems, as did Joseph C. Green, Special Assistant to the Secretary, in the same special ex officio capacity beginning June 10, 1943. The participation undertaken at times in various economic fields by Paul Culbertson, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, beginning October 9, 1943, and H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, former Minister to Finland on special duty in the Department, beginning June 23, 1943, did not raise questions of membership.

Three members from the White House staff took part. Benjamin V. Cohen, who had been named in the original list submitted in December 1941 and who had general duties at the White House in his capacity as legal counsel of the Office of War Mobilization and on the basis of his earlier work in the Government, was active in all fields. David K. Niles, administrative Assistant to the President in matters concerning the War Production Board, became a member prior to the convening of the first meeting of the Advisory Committee and concentrated on economic problems. While serving personally, he spoke in a sense for Harry Hopkins in accord with the wishes of the President. Subsequently, on April 9, 1943, Lauchlin Currie, also administrative assistant to the President, became a member for work on economic problems.

Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress, joined the Committee on January 2, 1943, taking part especially in the consideration of political problems.

The Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War were requested early in the work of the Advisory Committee to designate representatives in connection with problems of international security, and consequently Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn and Maj. Gen. George V. Strong became members at the end of April 1942. Rear Admiral Harold C. Train began regular attendance as alternate member for the Navy Department in August 1942. The Joint Chiefs of Staff as an entity was invited in March and April 1943 to be represented. Its several officers who thereafter attended comprised in fact the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and they spoke together for the Joint Chiefs of Staff as if they were a single member of the Advisory Committee. They were Vice Admiral Russell Willson of the Navy, Lt. Gen. Stanley D. Embick of the Army, and Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild of the Air Corps. Shortly thereafter a naval air representative, Capt. George H. DeBaun, was designated to serve with these officers. Senior representatives of the armed services were assisted throughout by specialists on given problems or by other aides. Among these assisting officers were Brig. Gen. Hayes A. Kroner, Col. Thomas J. Betts, Col. James F. Olive, Jr., Lt. Col. Thomas G. Lanphier, Capt. H. L. Pence and Capt. V. E. Korn, who attended without being members.

Representation of several wartime agencies was rendered highly desirable by the postwar hearings of their emergency functions. Outstanding among these was the Board of Economic Warfare, of which Vice President Henry A. Wallace was Chairman. Since Mr. Wallace himself could not attend, he was represented from the beginning by an appointee of his own choice, Milo Perkins, Executive Director of the Board. Mr. Perkins also was unable personally to attend meetings, and accordingly the further exception was allowed to the general rule against alternates by permitting William T. Stone, Assistant Director of the Board, and also Louis H. Bean, to attend for him, effective with the first meeting on February 12, 1942. Subsequently, on June 6, 1943, Mr. Stone himself was designated as the member for participation in the fields of economic problems of concern to the Board, while Mr. Bean continued thereafter to attend as observer.

Various other emergency agencies were eventually represented. Chester C. Davis, Administrator of the Food Production and Distribution Administration, became a member early in April 1943, though his regular duties shortly proved too heavy to permit his attendance. On April 9, 1943, Marvin Jones, Judge of the United States Court of Claims, was invited to membership, at first personally but subsequently in his capacity as War Food Administrator. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, was invited to membership on April 9, 1943.

It was recognized at the outset that the economic and social problems to be considered by the Advisory Committee would involve at various stages the work of a number of the permanent Departments and agencies of the Government. Preliminary studies in connection with such problems in their respective fields had been begun or projected by a number of the Departments, but, in several instances, time was required to arrange for the representation of these Departments and agencies on the Committee because of the many readjustments of function and responsibility then being undertaken to place the Government

on a war footing. Furthermore, there was need of prior exploration by the Committee to clarify the policy problems presented before all the Departments most concerned could be determined.

Harry D. White, Director of Monetary Research and Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, was designated April 15, 1942, to represent Henry Morgenthau, Jr., in the case of economic and financial problems. Paul H. Appleby, Under Secretary of Agriculture, was invited to membership on February 9, 1942, representing Claude R. Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture. The Secretary of Commerce, Jesse Jones, was represented by Wayne C. Taylor, Under Secretary of Commerce, beginning the following July. William L. Clayton, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, served for a time commencing June 21, 1943, as chairman of a special economic committee, though he did not become a member of the Advisory Committee. Invitations to membership were extended on April 9, 1943, to Miss Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor, and to Marriner Eccles, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Subsequently, officials of other agencies were asked to undertake special responsibilities in the work, though not formally as members of the Advisory Committee. As Oscar B. Ryder, Chairman of the Tariff Commission, could not attend, Lynn R. Edminster of the same Commission participated in his stead beginning June 15, 1943. Leland Olds, Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, and Hugh Cox, Assistant Attorney General, took part in the consideration of economic problems commencing June 4 and July 2, 1943, respectively.

Many other officials in various Departments and agencies of the Government took part in discussions or assisted otherwise in the conduct of the committee's work. In view of the scope and character of the problems at issue, the number of these officials progressively increased. However, because such participation was pursuant to official duty and accordingly was subject to the frequent changes of personnel or assignment in the Government, the separate identification of all these individuals is not undertaken here. The participation of those active on one or another related committee in the Advisory Committee structure and of those specially placed at the service of the committee in a professional research capacity is indicated below.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the first Director of the Postwar Planning Division of the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Mr. Leo Pasvolsky was special assistant to the Secretary in charge of postwar matters.

I should explain, I suppose, that up until about the fall of 1943 we were not allowed to use the term "postwar." We were working on problems arising from the strained relations, or something to that effect.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, who succeeded Pasvolsky?

Miss FLUEGEL. Pasvolsky remained in charge as special assistant, but shortly before the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, Ambassador Wilson returned—it was directly before the Dumbarton Oaks Conference—and Alger Hiss, who had been special assistant to Mr. Hornbeck who had just been designated Ambassador to the Netherlands, became special assistant to Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Wilson was ill off and on through that period although he did attend the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Shortly after the conference, Mr. Wilson left and Mr. Hiss was in charge. I think technically he became director of what was known as the Special Political Affairs Office about February of 1945, although he had been acting sometime before that.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you testify that, although he had been acting director prior to February 1945, he formally became the director of what was in effect the postwar planning division of the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, will you tell us about the nature of his duties in that role, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. Well, right before Dumbarton Oaks, when he first came, he immediately took a very active part. He was in charge of all of the arrangements. He was secretary to several of the top planning committees and attended Dumbarton Oaks in that capacity.

I suppose you would describe his job as pretty much the job of a secretary general plus personal adviser to the delegates.

Mr. MORRIS. What documents or what material would be available to him in that role?

Miss FLUEGEL. Everything that existed.

Mr. MORRIS. Everything in the entire Department of the highest classification?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. At that particular time, you see, postwar involved everything, economics, social, political.

Senator WATKINS. Do you know that of your own personal knowledge?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. You see, everything, every single decision—at that time, they had this top secretary's committee which was the final place where policy decisions were made, and it really operated then. So that every paper on every subject requiring top policy decision came to it, and Mr. Hiss was ex officio a member of that committee.

Senator WATKINS. And all that material was then available to him as it was to the members of the committee?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. Do you want me to carry on?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss FLUEGEL. Following the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, he did, of course, participate in all of the meetings, discussing plans for Yalta, since a major part of the Yalta Conference—as a matter of fact the reason for the Yalta Conference—was the failure to settle certain questions during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.

Among other things, I think you probably remember that there was a stage during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference when it was touch and go as to whether the conference would continue. There was a great deal of correspondence between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Stalin.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us when Dumbarton Oaks Conference was held?

Miss FLUEGEL. I would have to check the exact date. Roughly in August and running through September.

Mr. MORRIS. August of 1944?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. It was held in two stages. The first stage in which Great Britain and the United States and the Soviet Union participated, and the second between the United States, Great Britain and China, with the final session that brought all four together.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, I wonder if we might go back to the period of 1941 and 1942, at the start of the war.

What was our policy then, to the best of the ability that you are able to testify, on the basis of your experience, toward the Soviet Union?

Miss FLUEGEL. I would start, then, with the policy statement given to the President's Advisory Committee in the first meeting in February of 1942.

It was made by Mr. Welles. I should point out I was not in the Department then. I have this from the minutes.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say you have this from them, the minutes, the minutes were made available to you in connection with your duties in compiling this volume——

Miss FLUEGEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. And on the basis of your experience with those minutes, you are now testifying here today?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is correct. Mr. Welles informed the members of the committee, when it convened for the first time, that they were to consider as policy guidance the Atlantic Charter, the decision to concentrate the war in Europe, which would guide them in giving priority to European problems, and that the third factor to be borne in mind was that the method by which the United Nations Declaration had been signed with the great powers—the four great powers, since France was not considered—signing at the White House and the other powers signing at the State Department. From the beginning that constituted the differentiation between the great powers and the small powers.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did that policy remain in force?

Miss FLUEGEL. You had some minor shifting in policy all through the period, but the first question, great question, of change in policy came up in the spring of 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened then, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. Immediately after the Soviet victory at Stalingrad, difficulties arose between the two countries and you may remember——

Senator WATKINS. Between which two countries?

Miss FLUEGEL. Between the United States and the Soviet Union. It reached such a point, you may remember, that publicly Admiral Standley, who was our Ambassador in Moscow at the time——

Mr. MORRIS. What was the nature of this difficulty?

Miss FLUEGEL. Growing demands for a second front on the part of the Soviet Union, the fact that, immediately after Stalingrad, the League of Polish Patriots was announced at Moscow, and also the Committee for Free Germany, and this association of German officers who had surrendered at Stalingrad. It was recognized almost immediately that, potentially, at least, they could become governments in exile sponsored by the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. From documents.

Mr. MORRIS. You know each of those things which you have testified to from documents?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, documents and dispatches sent in alerting us to that fact.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, the existence of the Polish——

Miss FLUEGEL. The League of Polish Patriots.

Mr. MORRIS. The German Officers Corps, and the Free German Committee?

Miss FLUEGEL. And, as a matter of fact, the accuracy of that prediction was confirmed by the fact that the leading members of the Polish Government and of the Eastern German Government have now been taken from those groups.

This agitation was reflected by Admiral Standley when he criticized the Soviet Union for not publicizing lend-lease, and Pravda, I think

it was Pravda—it may have been Izvestia—did publish a small paragraph. That was sometime in March.

Mr. MORRIS. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I think Admiral Standley will be one of the later witnesses before this committee, and we can have verification of this part of it from him.

Miss FLUEGEL. I should add, following that, a decision was made to try to prevent any further deterioration in relations and that is when a mission was sent to Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any concern expressed by the officials of the United States Government at that time?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, a very great deal.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. Again from documents and dispatches at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain in detail what some of these documents are?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. As a matter of fact, I never clarified in my own mind whether Admiral Standley spoke on his own or under instruction. I did not see that.

But I do know that the immediate reaction was very bad, and there was discussion in the Department, there were dispatches coming in and inquiring inquiries going out.

Mr. MORRIS. Did these inquiries and dispatches indicate concern on the part of the United States officials about the deterioration of the United States-Soviet Union relation?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. The purpose of the mission sent to Moscow that spring was to try and reconcile differences, and one of the things we got out of that was the abolition of the Comintern. What we gave, I never saw.

Senator WATKINS. Who were the members of the mission?

Miss FLUEGEL. That was Ambassador Davies. I don't recall who went with him.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, at this time, was the term "United Nations" being used at all, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, it had been used off and on, and some people have tried to trace it, and I think the tracing has resulted in attributing it to Mr. Roosevelt even before the United Nations declaration in January. That was pretty much—

Mr. MORRIS. January of what year?

Miss FLUEGEL. 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the term "United Nations" used at that time?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. Yes, United Nations was used. Perhaps, to carry through in answering your question, it was in August of 1943 that this uneasiness crystallized in a decision on the part of the President to go ahead full speed with the establishment of a postwar international organization.

Up to that time, there had been some consideration given to a transitional period after the war, what we called the posthostilities period, and to not establishing the permanent organization until after the world had settled down a little.

But at a meeting, at the White House, and I saw the records of the meeting, Mr. Roosevelt decided that the only hope of insuring Russian participation and thus Russian cooperation in the postwar would be if we got her in the organization before the end of the war. It was in

the light of that August 1943, decision that we proceeded with the Moscow Conference and the Four Power Declaration.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know all of this, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. From documents and memoranda of conversations at the White House.

Mr. MORRIS. Which you had and dealt with and handled in connection with your work?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Well now, Dr. Fluegel, did you go with Alger Hiss to the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about the development of postwar planning at that juncture in history?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. But perhaps there I should back track again because having taken this up to 1943 there was another development in 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that?

Miss FLUEGEL. That bears directly both on Yalta and on San Francisco.

Midway in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, several questions popped up, but two that were very serious.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, I wonder if you would inform the committee of the developments leading up to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. What was the nature of it, and why was it called?

Miss FLUEGEL. After the Moscow declaration, the Four Nation Declaration, since we had decided to go ahead full steam, the United States spent every effort to get the meeting held.

Running through the spring of 1944, we initiated rather elaborate drafts. In the month of May, Mr. Hull met with Congressmen and consulted them on it. At the conclusion of those consultations, a copy of our proposals was given to the other governments concerned.

The British also had proposals. Then when they came to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the idea was that the four powers would work over these, and if they reached agreement then they would call the larger meeting, including all of the other nations.

The United States insisted on the participation of China. Britain was agreeable; Russia objected. The conversations were held in the two stages.

It was in the first stage, the Russian stage, that the conference almost broke down when the question of the so-called veto, and the question of plural membership for the Soviet Union came up.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the first time that that problem arose, is that right, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. We should have known about the plural membership. We had one alert, and that was in connection with the war crimes matter.

I think it was very late in 1943. The Russians had raised the question. They had been denied, I think, primarily at that time by the British. The Russians then proceeded to change their constitution.

The amendment to the Russian constitution of February 1944, apparently, was to meet that objection to establish that the Republics of the Soviet Union actually did have independent control of their foreign affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. When you mentioned the problem——

Miss FLUEGEL. Somebody noted it. I saw a record noting that somebody suggested that maybe this was laying the groundwork for future claims.

Mr. MORRIS. You remember seeing that that had been noted within the Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. But so much was happening at the time that it was just lost track of. So that when the question came up, it was a bombshell.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say the question came up, Dr. Fluegel, I wish you would describe in full to the committee the nature of the problem that arose at that time.

Without going into what happened, Dr. Fluegel, I would like you to explain the nature of the question itself. You refer to the plural proposal.

Miss FLUEGEL. The Russian proposal, at first presented to us, was about three points. First it was a request that every one of the Soviet republics be given membership.

Mr. MORRIS. How many separate Soviet republics were there?

Miss FLUEGEL. Sixteen. The second proposal was the Ukraine and Byelorussia and Lithuania. Lithuania, you see, would have involved forcing American recognition which we had refused and continue to refuse.

Mr. MORRIS. That was the second. That would have given the Soviet Union four votes.

Miss FLUEGEL. Plus the recognition of Lithuania which would have automatically extended to Estonia and Latvia as well.

Mr. MORRIS. And at that time, the United States had not recognized the absorption of Lithuania?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And acquiescence in that plan would have given recognition to Lithuania?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. The third proposal, the one which eventually they got, was the admission of the Ukraine and Byelorussia. It did, of course, involve complete distortion since we had decided that membership was to be to sovereign states only. At the time the question came up, it was considered dynamite, so much so that it was referred to from the time of Dumbarton Oaks until Yalta as the X matter, and they kept a record of even the stenographers who had typed papers concerning it. It is an example of one of the questions that was considered dynamite at the time and didn't turn out to be such dynamite.

Mr. MORRIS. Doctor, is it your testimony that there was a great deal of secrecy surrounding the Soviet's demand that they have the plural number of votes?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. We even asked them not to bring it up again, and there was a limit on the papers and all in which any reference to it appeared. When the reference did appear, it was veiled as the X matter.

I am citing that now because, certainly, it can no longer have any security importance, although at the time it did.

The question of the voting almost resulted in a breakdown of the Conference and at one time, according to records I saw, Mr. Hull asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and here I don't know whether he did it by letter or through the military liaison——

Mr. MORRIS. But you do know he did it?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, sir—what their opinion was, how important it was to continue with Dumbarton Oaks. The answer we received was at all costs to accommodate because we could never again fight a major war.

It was in the light of that, that accommodations were made and the questions were postponed and the plans for Yalta were set, which brings us down to Yalta.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, now, Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might go into the San Francisco part before we go into the Yalta thing. That is not taking it in continuity, but I think it will bring out the witness' role in this affair better than if we did it the other way.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed in any order you think will develop the subject matter better.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, will you tell us what your role was at the San Francisco Conference?

Miss FLUEGEL. I was special assistant to the executive secretary in the international secretariat of which Mr. Hiss was Secretary-General.

Mr. MORRIS. Hiss was Secretary-General?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were special assistant?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the executive secretary?

Miss FLUEGEL. Easton Rothwell, who was head of the staff servicing the Secretary's office.

Mr. MORRIS. How long were you in San Francisco with that staff?

Miss FLUEGEL. Roughly 3 months. I arrived about a week before San Francisco, and stayed a few days after.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Hiss' role at that time in the formation of the United Nations?

Miss FLUEGEL. As Secretary-General he was, of course, an international officer running the Conference and trying to compromise frictions between the delegates. In addition to that, he operated up at the Fairmount Hotel with the Big Five, who held almost a separate conference, of course, all during the San Francisco meeting, and also with the American delegation.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently did you see Mr. Hiss during those days?

Miss FLUEGEL. I probably ran into him a couple of times a day, or would see him at meetings.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say he had complete control of the delegation, United States delegation, at that time?

Miss FLUEGEL. No, he had complete control of the international secretariat. As far as I could gather from the records of the delegation I saw, he operated in a sense as Mr. Stettinius' assistant with respect to the delegation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stettinius was at that time Secretary of State?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what role had Alger Hiss played at Yalta?

Miss FLUEGEL. Well, of course, he went to Yalta as the top international organization specialist, and a large part of the Yalta Conference was to be devoted to that. That, at the time, of course, is all I knew.



Mr. MORRIS. You were not at Yalta, were you, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. No, I was not at Yalta. When I was working on the book, we were fortunate enough to get from a man in the State Department Mr. Hiss' handwritten notes on the Yalta Conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you get the handwritten notes?

Miss FLUEGEL. Mr. Bechover. He is in some post, or was, in United Nations Affairs. And he gave Mr. Notter, who gave me, the notes Mr. Hiss had left with him on the Yalta Conference.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you handled the original notes?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, they were all handwritten.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Senator WATKINS. Did you know the handwriting of Mr. Hiss? Are you sure of that?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. I was told they were, and I did know the handwriting.

Senator WATKINS. You had seen it many times before?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. And you had seen him write?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. I probably should describe the notes to explain that I really know only about one section of them.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain them in full?

Miss FLUEGEL. I was interested because I was trying to follow the story on the Ukraine and Byelorussia.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, at the time you were handling these notes, you were preparing a paper on this plural voting difficulty?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right, and had no interest at all in any other feature. So I leafed through the notes, looking for this material.

The notes, as I said, were mostly penciled, containing the kind of doodling you would have, you know, if you were keeping notes during a meeting. On some occasions there was an indication that he had passed them back and forth. Occasionally there was an "OK., FDR." I remember that particularly. "San Francisco, O. K., FDR," added to it.

The notes were very difficult to read, so that all I recall of the pages I leafed through were scattered references to really the whole range of the Conference. On the Ukraine and Byelorussia, I did read everything in there.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it is your testimony, Doctor, that in connection with the subjects covered by the Hiss notes that did not concern you directly, you had only a casual perusal?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right, the kind of a perusal you would have when you were looking for your own subject.

Mr. MORRIS. But with your own interests, you studied those notes in detail and are prepared to testify here today?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we ask the State Department to make a copy of all of Hiss' notes to the committee.

Senator WATKINS. And not only to make a copy, but you want it produced for the committee?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. I think that is a fair request.

Mr. MORRIS. Were there copies made of those notes?

Miss FLUEGEL. I should explain that, too. At that particular time the Department had no record of Yalta whatever, except a few short summaries.

Mr. MORRIS. Summaries by whom?

Miss FLUEGEL. There was one summary by Mr. Mathews, but a very, very short one, I think, about two paragraphs.

Senator WATKINS. You made a pretty broad statement there. You said no record whatever. At least they knew a conference had been held there.

Miss FLUEGEL. I mean no verbatim record. They had requested it and, I believe, subsequently secured it. But at the time we were working on this book we were told that no such copies existed.

Senator WATKINS. How long was that after the Yalta Conference?

Miss FLUEGEL. That was 1948.

Senator WATKINS. 1948?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. When you say that, you are making a rather strong statement there. Did you have an opportunity to examine all of the files to see whether or not there was any record there?

Miss FLUEGEL. No; but Mr. Notter did call every top officer in the Department asking if they had it.

Senator WATKINS. And the answer was in the negative?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

And as I indicated, subsequently I have reason to believe they got it. But that is completely hearsay.

Mr. MORRIS. You think that memorandum was subsequently obtained?

Miss FLUEGEL. That the records of Yalta were subsequently obtained; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. But at that time they were not available to your project?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. The records of Tehran were not available either.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, in connection with these Hiss minutes, they, however, were available?

Miss FLUEGEL. That was not a Department document. That was in Mr. Bechover's personal possession.

Mr. MORRIS. How did he obtain them?

Miss FLUEGEL. From Mr. Hiss, so he said.

Mr. MORRIS. Were copies made of Hiss' notes at Yalta?

Miss FLUEGEL. Because we had nothing else, I had the feeling that copies should be made and that it should be more than just a personal copy. At the time, however, we were extremely hard pressed for typing. I did give Mr. Hiss' notes to a stenographer who had to farm them out.

The handwriting was very bad and, actually, they were so confused in places that the ideal thing would have been to have had them photostated. But photostating facilities were not available. Copies were made, I would say roughly four or five, and I directed that a couple of them be sent over to one of the files. What happened to the others I don't know, or how authentic the copy is, because I never had a chance to proofread it.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, to compare with the original?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. I could decipher the handwriting, knowing a great deal about the subject matter of the section I read. How accurately it would have been deciphered by a stenographer I don't know. It was difficult handwriting.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the original if possible of those notes be obtained from the State Department for the committee, or, if that is not available, certainly one of the copies that the witness has testified to today.

Senator WATKINS. I think it should be obtained and it would probably take a letter from the chairman of the committee to the State Department to obtain it.

I think such a letter should be sent, and they should be obtained if at all possible.

Mr. MORRIS. The witness is prepared to talk about those features of the notes concerned with her particular project but the rest of it we know nothing about, as far as this witness is concerned, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. As far as this investigation is concerned, I do not think it would be complete, now that these matters have been brought up, without getting those notes.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. And we are interested in Mr. Hiss' role because Mr. Hiss was active in the Institute of Pacific Relations which we are examining.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, it all ties into this general investigation we are making of the activities of this organization now, and how our postwar planning was influenced.

Mr. MORRIS. That, in conjunction with the IPR letters we have introduced into the record today, together then with the IPR people who were mentioned in this book as being influential in postwar policy.

To get back to 1943 and 1944, what were some of the factors which caused us to change our policy, Soviet postwar policy, with respect to the Soviet Union?

Miss FLUEGEL. I have, of course, thought and thought and thought back over the matter. I think the first major decision that, as it worked out, almost forced us in the direction of subsequent decisions, was the one to concentrate the war on Europe because what happened is that, as we began to realize that the European war would finish up, and as we then thought that the Japanese war would continue a long time after, it was always a question of what we actually could do.

I know specifically, I can tell you in the case of the declaration on liberated areas, in the course of the discussion, when the idea came up that maybe we should insist on guaranties, of course, the answer immediately was that we were in no position to insist on anything. We would be pulling our armies out of Europe to transfer them to Japan, and it would leave Russia able to do what it wanted to anyway.

Therefore, a paper agreement was better than no agreement. That sort of reasoning ran through any number of questions.

Senator WATKINS. Was there anything in the files to indicate what the real situation was in the Far East, the military situation?

I am not asking you to state what it was, but was there information to indicate what the real situation was?

Miss FLUEGEL. I saw relatively little information, although I know that in the debate on the Japanese Emperor, for example, the idea that ran in and out was that, if we did not have to insist on unconditional surrender, if we didn't have to insist on the elimination of the Emperor, then a quicker conclusion was possible. Otherwise, the calculation was a year to a year and a half after the end of the European war.

Senator WATKINS. If I understand you correctly, then, it would be that if we did not insist on unconditional surrender, the war would have ended 2 years earlier?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right, or a few months after the end of the German war. You see, many historians argued that, since this was Japan's first major effort at world conquest, contrary to the opinion of some of the Japanese experts it was unlikely that a country in that position would really knock herself out. She would be more likely to make peace and try again. That was the general historian's line of reasoning.

Senator WATKINS. Was there anything in the file to indicate that any overtures had been received through Russia from Japan seeking to bring about an early peace?

Miss FLUEGEL. I don't recall specifically. I read about the overtures to Russia. I have a very vague recollection in the spring of 1945 of recurrent rumors from different parts.

However, none of those were any stronger than many we had received about other countries, too. I did not see the kind of very definite reports I have since read about.

Senator WATKINS. Did you have the full correspondence between the Department and Russia?

Miss FLUEGEL. No. In working on this, you see, it begins to taper off with San Francisco and, on the book, we dropped our interests in territorial matters a little bit earlier. The division of territorial studies was abolished in February 1945, so that that sort of thing would not have come to us.

Senator WATKINS. I would think it would come into the general subject of postwar planning, to know just what Russia was indicating she was going to do with respect to the Far East.

Miss FLUEGEL. Senator, you might also think that the atomic bomb would. But frankly, it never came into consideration at the meetings. These people, the technical people, who were doing the postwar planning up through San Francisco did not know of the possibilities of the atomic bomb, and, consequently, some of their plans were pretty unrealistic.

Senator WATKINS. Did they not know about the general position of the Army and our forces over there, and of the Japanese forces, and the condition of the Japanese Navy and their shipping and the general state of the Japanese which indicated—at least we know now—that collapse was imminent?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is true. But I should explain again that the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee was established in the fall of 1944. Thereafter, much of the so-called postwar planning began to narrow into organizational planning. What was really happening all through this later period was that parts of the postwar planning activity began to separate out into the permanent structure of the Department.

Now, that began to happen, in a way, as early as 1943. What is now the whole public affairs outfit is really the descendant of this little postwar trends unit I was in. And by the beginning of 1945 \* the postwar planning was primarily directed toward San Francisco and the broad consideration of all questions bearing on the postwar began to disappear at the most critical time.

\* Hull went out at end of 1944.

Senator WATKINS. When did your work in this Department cease? When did you end your connection with the Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. In September of 1948. You mean when I left the Department?

Senator WATKINS. Yes.

Miss FLUEGEL. September of 1948.

Senator WATKINS. Then in 1945, after the German Foreign Office files were discovered, was there any information brought before the groups with respect to what Russia had been doing in connection with Germany?

Miss FLUEGEL. There again I have since seen, when I was working on that book, a few scattered records of the top level sub-Cabinet group that was working on plans for Germany. But those plans were not then being brought into the Secretary's staff committee.

Senator WATKINS. Was there any reference to those files which had later been published by the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Not that I recall. What I recall, actually, is the fight between State and Treasury as to what to do about Germany.

Senator WATKINS. You recall that those files were captured along about April 1, I think, 1945?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. And you say there was no reference to the contents of those files?

Miss FLUEGEL. I saw no reference. In fact, the first reference I saw to the contents of those files was when the publication came out on Nazi-Soviet relations.

Senator WATKINS. You know what was in those files now by reason of that publication?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. And that, of course, would have been of great consequence in knowing what to do about Russia.

Miss FLUEGEL. It still would be worth taking into consideration.

Senator WATKINS. I think you are right.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, do you know from your own personal experience of any changes made in planning at Yalta?

Miss FLUEGEL. This one subject in which I was primarily interested—

Mr. MORRIS. What subject is that, Doctor?

Miss FLUEGEL. Ukraine and Byelorussia.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the question of plural voting?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. That was referred to as the X matter because it was of such secrecy that they did not want to mention it by name?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is correct. Everybody who typed a paper connected with it, their names were kept from Dumbarton through Yalta.

I don't have all of the answers to that, but I do have a rough idea from Mr. Hiss' notes of what happened, and his version is somewhat different from Mr. Byrne's book, in his published book, *Speaking Frankly*.

I do know that all of the records of the Department, including the last paper that went with the American group to Yalta, stated the reasons for opposing, with the concluding recommendation "do not accept on the X matter."

At Yalta itself, a meeting of the three foreign ministers was held to discuss the matter. The matter was then referred to their direct assistants, Mr. Jebb, Gromyko, and Hiss. I have it here.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, are you testifying now from your memory?

Miss FLUEGEL. I am.

Mr. MORRIS. What is that you have there?

Miss FLUEGEL. This is the record of Mr. Hiss' notes.

Mr. MORRIS. And would you identify what it is?

Senator WATKINS. You mean to say you have there this copy of the notes that the stenographer did?

Miss FLUEGEL. No; I have the summary of the information on Ukraine and Byelorussia which I extracted from the notes in connection with this larger paper on the subject I had been doing.

Mr. MORRIS. You remember we said Dr. Fluegel was ready to testify on that portion of the Hiss notes concerning the particular problem on which she was working. But as to the remainder of the items, she has nothing but a vague recollection.

Senator WATKINS. I had reference to the basis for her testimony. We are inquiring about that. You asked her if it was from her memory, and she said it was from the notes she had taken from the summary.

Miss FLUEGEL. I was talking from my memory.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you make those notes?

Miss FLUEGEL. When I was in the Department.

Mr. MORRIS. When the Hiss notes were available to you?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. I made them from the Hiss notes.

Mr. MORRIS. May I suggest that the witness be directed to read from that inasmuch as the source may be more accurate than her recollection?

Senator WATKINS. I think she can use it for a basis of her recollection. That is, if you think it would give a more accurate picture than your memory, I would suggest you read from them.

Miss FLUEGEL. This is a boiled-down version of what I extracted, and I will break into the story directly.

The last notation I have here, right before the Yalta Conference in January of 1945, is that there may have been talks with members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and with other individuals. I haven't found the records.

Mr. MORRIS. In a louder voice, please.

Miss FLUEGEL. Information that such talks occurred is from handwritten notations by Mr. Hiss to the effect that the President had made a special point in these congressional talks of the ridiculousness of the Soviet proposal re the 16 republics.

Then the following information is from Mr. Hiss' papers at Yalta:

At a plenary meeting of the Conference on February 7, 1945, Molotov said that the Soviet proposal was based on the changes in the Soviet Constitution of February 1944. He said, however, that the Soviet Government, now informed of the United States and United Kingdom position, was not urging the proposal advanced at Dumbarton Oaks for admission of 16 Soviet Republics. He said that the Soviet Union appreciated the patience and the gradual character of the British dominions' approach to separate international status, and that the Soviet Union, in withdrawing its original proposal, would consider it fair if at least three or perhaps two republics were admitted to original membership. The Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Lithuania were specified. The

population and importance of the former were stressed and the sacrifices in the war of all three. President Roosevelt observed that the whole question of plural voting was most interesting and required detailed study. He proposed that the Soviet request be referred to the three foreign ministers for study. This was done.

Then, a paper, a background paper, was prepared for the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 8, and it is that paper that advanced the arguments against the proposals.

Senator WATKINS. Who prepared that paper, do you know?

Miss FLUEGEL. The people over there, on the basis of the papers they had taken with them.

Senator WATKINS. When you say the people over there, who do you mean?

Miss FLUEGEL. I would assume Mr. Hiss and the people working on international-organizational matters.

Mr. MORRIS. That is Mr. Hiss and his group?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. It would have been prepared on the basis of papers they had taken from the Department. We had prepared two black books, one for the President and one for the Secretary, giving all possible positions which they should take.

Senator WATKINS. All possible positions? Do you mean all alternatives?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. We usually prepare them in terms of the maximum desirable and the minimum acceptable with intermediate positions [reading]:

At that meeting—

this is the meeting of the Foreign Ministers—

which was at the British delegation's headquarters and was presided over by Eden, Molotov and Eden jointly agreed that in the course of the San Francisco Conference the Soviet representatives would propose that the Ukraine and White Russian Republics be named as initial members of the organization and the British would support this proposal. Mr. Stettinius said he felt that, from the standpoint of geographic area and population, question deserved sympathetic consideration, but that he found it difficult to reconcile the proposal with the Dumbarton Oaks decision that each state have one vote. He thought that the United Nations might meet to complete the charter and then elect additional members before the first meeting of the new organization. Mr. Stettinius explained, however, that he hadn't had an opportunity to discuss the matter with the President and couldn't commit the United States until he did. A drafting committee composed of Jebb, Gromyko, and Hiss was appointed—

Senator WATKINS. And Gromyko was the Foreign Ambassador to the United States?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. And Alger Hiss—

Mr. MORRIS. This is the drafting committee of three to resolve the problems?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right, and to prepare the recommendation for the heads of states—

to draft the report of the meeting for the next plenary. The draft agreed upon by the drafting committee was to the effect the United Kingdom supported, United States reserved its position.

This is Mr. Hiss' version, of course.

Subsequently, without clearing with or informing Mr. Hiss or, presumably, Ambassador Gromyko—

and I hesitate over this, but I stress this is what was in Mr. Hiss' notes—

the British changed the report so that it stated the United States as well as the United Kingdom concurred. The British said that they had cleared this change with Mr. Stettinius but this was not the case as he did not understand that any such issue was presented to him.

Mr. MORRIS. That last statement, Dr. Fluegel, what is the origin of the last statement?

Miss FLUEGEL. Mr. Hiss' notes.

Mr. MORRIS. That is Hiss' notes?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. Right on through, this is all from his notes. Senator WATKINS. You say that Stettinius did not agree to this?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. Mr. Hiss says that it was not the case.

Senator WATKINS. That is, that the United States had not joined that same position?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right [reading]:

At the afternoon plenary (February 8), the report of the Foreign Ministers was presented. The pertinent passage was "The United Nations, as they existed on February —, 1945, that is, those who had—

this is just the thing that subsequently came out.

According to a memorandum [March 19, 1945] by Mr. Hiss, the above report was made and—

and this is a direct quote from Mr. Hiss' minutes from the memorandum of March 19—

before the matter could be clarified the President expressed his agreement as a matter of policy.

Another record in the Hiss papers states:

The report by the Foreign Secretaries was accepted, subject to paragraph 2 (b) being amended to read as follows: "The United Nations as they exist on February 8, 1945, and such of the associated nations—"

and then it runs on through.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there more on that point?

Miss FLUEGEL. I have a comment now.

Senator WATKINS. Did you finish reading that paragraph?

Miss FLUEGEL. There is more in the quote, but it is what has subsequently been published.

Senator WATKINS. I think probably that ought to be included in the record. Let us have it all.

Miss FLUEGEL (reading):

as have declared war on the common enemy by March 1, 1945, would be the only states invited to the Conference on World Organization. At that stage the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i. e., the Ukraine and White Russia.

Mr. Hiss' notes on the plenary meeting show clearly that the President, while he agreed, did not consider the Ukraine and Byelorussia separate states.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he did not understand the problem.

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And is that a question of briefing, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. It does raise the question. I got interested in the question, really, as an example of how diplomacy should not be practiced. Here was this question that everybody had been standing on their heads about all these months, and suddenly, in a casual minute, either because the President didn't understand or because he wasn't briefed, for some reason, he agreed.



Mr. MORRIS. The very problems you were discussing were not taken into consideration at all?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. And then after they tried to patch the thing up, because Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Flynn, according to Hiss notes, and my recollection is that it is also in Mr. Byrne's book, were very much concerned about it, and what they succeeded in doing is getting Mr. Roosevelt to request that the United States reserve the right to request additional votes. We later decided not to do so.

Senator WATKINS. That was after the decision had been made?

Miss FLUEGEL. That was after the decision had been made.

Mr. MORRIS. And again, Dr. Fluegel, the basis of that testimony is the Hiss notes and the memorandum of your reading the Hiss notes which you have before you now?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is why it is important on other subjects that we obtain a copy of these Hiss notes to find out what exactly his role was in some of the other subjects that were discussed at Yalta.

Senator WATKINS. Would it be likewise important to ask the Secretary of State to furnish such other documents they have there, or notes, that would explain the matters that we have gone into here?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. There may be others in addition to the Hiss notes that this witness might be able to tell us.

If you have gone through these records, and had access to them, is there anything there that would help this committee? Can you put your finger on any others, or name any others, that you know?

Miss FLUEGEL. You see, the Far East was not my field, but the entire story of all of the evolution of the territorial planning is in the minutes of these postwar committees.

Senator WATKINS. Can you name the committee so that we will know what to request?

Miss FLUEGEL. Starting with the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, running through the Subcommittee on Political Problems, Subcommittee on Territorial Problems, the country committee in China, Burma, and India, and so forth. There was another country committee on the Far East, one on dependent areas; the Postwar Planning Committee, the Secretary's Staff Committee.

The papers, you see, kept coming through all the time. Some were repeats, some were new ideas. It just wasn't my field so I didn't follow the developments.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Morris, I think we ought to request from the Secretary of State that these papers be made available to our staff members for at least investigation and inspection to see whether or not they have any bearing on the matter we are investigating.

Senator FERGUSON. I am familiar with some of these facts, and I would just like to ask a few questions about the telephone call. Did you recognize the voice in any way?

Miss FLUEGEL. No; not at all. Frankly, I, when I first told Mr. Morris this morning, had really thought it was someone kidding me, and had the reaction that maybe I had better raise the question as to whether I would be violating security.

Senator FERGUSON. You have a memorandum of some of Mr. Hiss' notes?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. And you see the position I take on that is that it is not a Department of State document. That was a personal memorandum of Mr. Hiss. Consequently, it does not raise the question of security.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But Mr. Hiss made personal notes.

Miss FLUEGEL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make a transcript of those notes for Mr. Hiss?

Miss FLUEGEL. No. Mr. Hiss was out of the Department at the time. He had left this copy of his handwritten notes with Mr. Bechover. What I did, I thought that a copy should go in the Department's files.

Senator FERGUSON. And you made a copy for the Department's files?

Miss FLUEGEL. I asked the secretary to make it. She was very hard pressed and had to farm it out. There were copies made, and I directed that two be sent to the postwar files. I did not, however, read them. They had not been proofread. The general nature of the notes, except here and there, was such that they almost required photostating. Not being able to arrange for photostating, I thought we had better get as much as we could.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you, let us say, transcribe those notes, or did you merely take the bundle of those notes and give them to some officer in the State Department and tell him what they were? I am not clear on the record as to what these notes that you are talking about are.

Miss FLUEGEL. The notes, judging from the nature of the notes themselves, were taken by Mr. Hiss in pencil, handwritten at the meetings, with apparently some insertions in between, containing all sorts of "doodling." For example, if I passed the paper over to you, and you would say, "Let's go ahead," or something, and pass it back, plus long sections summarizing the proceedings of the meetings. They were his personal notes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. When you took those notes, did you have them transcribed and put in the files?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. First I ran through them myself, looking for the one subject in which I was interested, which I had a legitimate reason for extracting. I did that and then gave it to the secretary and asked her to have come copies made.

I did raise the question of photostating, but at that time, at least, photostating just was not feasible. You couldn't get it done, and you had to send the things all over the place.

So I do know a couple of copies were made, but they were made in sections. We broke up the papers, for example, and one girl was given five or six pages and no one had time to proof it.

Senator FERGUSON. Not knowing whether they had been proofread or not, the last you knew the notes themselves, the official documents, were in the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Mr. Hiss' personal notes were returned to Mr. Bechover. The copies that we had had typed but not checked were sent to the files.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is Bechover?

MISS FLUEGEL. Mr. Bechover was a member of the staff of the United Nations Affairs office at the time, and I believe is still in the State Department.

SENATOR FERGUSON. He was at that time an official of the United States State Department?

MISS FLUEGEL. That is right.

SENATOR FERGUSON. So that you have every reason to believe that at the present time these notes and papers are in the State Department?

MISS FLUEGEL. Yes; in his possession.

SENATOR FERGUSON. But he is an official.

MISS FLUEGEL. That is true.

MR. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, perhaps I should add that the witness has testified that copies were made up of those notes and that those copies were put in the files. Senator Watkins has directed that the State Department be requested to give either the original copy of his notes or, failing to be able to supply that, the copies of Hiss' notes that were made, and that Dr. Fluegel has testified were made at her direction.

SENATOR FERGUSON. I think that should be done.

SENATOR WATKINS. I am glad you are in agreement, because it seems to me, in matters as important as this, especially inasmuch as Mr. Hiss was tied in with the Institute of Pacific Relations and this whole pattern runs through the proceedings, we ought to have those notes.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to state on the record now that I ran into a quotation from an officer of the State Department that I would like to put in the record here because I would like to have this brought over at the same time.

SENATOR WATKINS. I think probably at this time we can have it put into the record.

SENATOR FERGUSON. It is Conrad E. Snow of the Loyalty Board, and he is quoted as saying:

The Hiss case, and the case of Judith Coplon in the Justice Department, have done more harm in terms of public confidence than any harm Hiss or Coplon ever did in the delivery of classified papers.

That would indicate, if I interpret it, that the State Department has taken upon itself to judge whether or not disloyalty is less harm than to disclose to the public that there has been disloyalty. The reason I bring it to the attention of this committee is because of Mr. Hiss' name coming in, these notes, and also the fact that yesterday Mr. Vincent was cleared by this Loyalty Board.

Previously Mr. Service had been cleared by this Loyalty Board, although the Review Board held on the question of loyalty that he should not be further employed.

SENATOR WATKINS. Has Mr. Vincent's case been reviewed by the Review Board yet?

SENATOR FERGUSON. No; it has not been reviewed. As I understand it, where you are cleared, a review board is not supposed to take jurisdiction of it unless they do on their own motion.

Then there is Mr. Davies, whose name was brought into the record just last week on the testimony of Mr. Munson in relation to some people that were recommended to the CIA by Mr. Davies. Now, I think we ought to ask Mr. Conrad E. Snow to come up and make an explanation as to whether or not this quotation is a correct quotation from him.

I will put it in this record again. I will read the whole quotation :

The Hiss case and the case of Judith Coplon, in the Justice Department, have done more harm in terms of public confidence than any harm Hiss or Coplon ever did in the delivery of classified papers. Both worked in absolute secrecy. Their best friends were ignorant of their acts. Neither would have been employed by Government for a day after their acts were discovered. But a swallow does not make a summer; neither do these two cases make out an infiltration of Government by Communists.

I think it is something that this committee should go into. If that is the attitude now, if Mr. Hiss' notes are in the Department, we ought to have them. But we ought to at least have Mr. Snow's attitude on the question of loyalty in the State Department, which we are investigating in connection with the IPR and these particular men connected with the IPR.

Senator WATKINS. I agree with the Senator from Michigan. Since, under the rules of this committee, we now have a quorum, I direct that a subpoena be issued for Mr. Snow.

Mr. MORRIS. It shall be done, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And I will furnish you with a copy of this so that you can ask him to bring his speech along.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, will it be necessary for us to put into the minutes in connection with that evidence that Mr. Hiss' affiliation with the Communist Party was known long before his departure from the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, that is another item in here, when he says he would not have been allowed to remain there a day. The evidence is well established that Mr. Berle took it up with the President and that it was known in the State Department.

Senator WATKINS. But it was not believed.

Senator FERGUSON. I may say when the Hiss case was first mentioned, being the chairman of the investigating committee of this Senate in looking into the facts of the Hiss-Chambers case, trying to decide whether or not Mr. Chambers should be brought before that committee, I took it up with the State Department, one of the officials, and that official admitted that the question of the loyalty of Hiss had been taken up in the Department and there was a memorandum on it.

Senator WATKINS. Did he give you the date of the memorandum?

Senator FERGUSON. No. I was making a search as to whether or not to use Mr. Chambers as a witness. So that last part shows, at least, not a knowledge of what had gone on in the State Department in relation to Mr. Hiss, but that is minor compared to the actual quotation that I presented.

Senator WATKINS. We will have Mr. Snow here and have him make a full explanation.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, was the policy in connection with this plural voting determined prior to the time the delegation left for Yalta?

Miss FLUEGEL. It was determined contrary to the final solution; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. From a whole series of meetings and a whole series of memoranda, including a final memorandum.

Mr. MORRIS. What did the final memorandum say?

Mr. Chairman, in connection with this memorandum the witness is about to read from, she has evidenced a reluctance to put this into the record on the general question of security. Will you direct the witness, Mr. Chairman, to put that into the record?

Senator WATKINS. I would like to hear from the witness what her reasons are before I make that direction.

Miss FLUEGEL. The primary reason is not security involving the Government, but a possible reflection on the British who, of course, had a special interest in this because they didn't want the question of the Dominions, as they were then, raised.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think that if there is a question of security, the committee ought to have the opportunity to examine it as a whole before it is put into the record.

Senator WATKINS. Of course, the witness has said it does not involve the question of security, but it might be a reflection upon the British. Now, whether or not that involves our security may be open to argument.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not know as though Mr. Hiss could cast much reflection upon the British.

Miss FLUEGEL. I might be able to resolve the difficulty by reading the headings of the three propositions.

The first is the Soviet Republics are not signatories of the United Nations Declaration. That is the first argument against admitting the two republics, and the rule had been that only States which signed the declaration could be admitted to membership.

The second proposition is: The question should be postponed until the organization is formed.

The third question, the third proposition, is: The Soviet Republics are not sovereign states under international practice. That is from a memorandum dated February 8, 1945, and headed "Arguments against inclusion of any of the Soviet Republics among the United Nations members."

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Dr. Fluegel, I would like to ask you if there is anything more in that memorandum that should be added in connection with the testimony that you are giving here today?

Miss FLUEGEL. I think not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have the question of whether that whole document which is from Dr. Fluegel's memorandum made on the basis of reading the Hiss notes should be inserted into our record.

Senator WATKINS. I think probably the committee ought to take a look at it in view of the question raised by Senator Ferguson before it is received. Do you have another copy of it?

Miss FLUEGEL. No. I will be glad to leave this with you. I would like to read it over—there may be one or two things that I would delete for security reasons.

Senator WATKINS. They are your own notes?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you mark those, then?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

ROUGH NOTES ON THE "PLURAL VOTING" QUESTION PREPARED BY DR. EDNA FLUEGEL

UKRAINE AND BYELORUSSIA

The admission to UNCIO of the Ukrainian and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics to initial membership in the UN and participation in the conference was the endproduct of a Soviet offensive initiated in August 1943. For the United States it represented and continues to represent a deviation from the decision to base membership in the Organization on states and to accord to each state one vote. American support for the deviation was reluctantly accorded at the Crimean conference whether by design or by error, only after the initial Soviet request had been considerably, although not fundamentally, curtailed, and when it became apparent that neither Soviet participation nor a prompt convening of UNCIO, both judged to be of paramount importance, could be obtained without acceding to the Soviet demands.

*Pre-Dumbarton Oaks*

[NOTE.—The question of votes for separate Soviet Republics was first raised in connection with membership on the UN Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes.]

After a year of informal discussion, the UK issued invitations on August 31, 1943, for the diplomatic representatives at London of the governments invited to meet to discuss the establishment of a UN Commission. In reply, the Soviet Union asserted that the separate Soviet Republics were as sovereign as the Dominions and should each be invited. They specified, as particularly worthy in view of suffering, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Karelian-Finnish Republics. The Soviet Government claimed that, since the meeting was to be judicial, no legal obstacles existed and that such important matters should not be decided by ordinary standards of international practice. The UK rejected these claims because (1) it would involve recognition of Soviet absorption of the Baltic Republics and Eastern Poland, (2) it would constitute a precedent and other federations could just as logically claim representation. The UK suggested the Soviet Union could designate an adviser from any Soviet Republic affected by a discussion. A meeting was set for October 21, but the Soviet Union failed to attend and failed to reply to a resolution urging Soviet participation. In an aide memoire to the United States the UK reviewed the whole problem, stressing again the Baltic and Eastern Poland aspects, as well as the fact that the Soviet Constitution of 1936 under article 14 reserved the representation of Union citizens in international affairs to the Soviet Government. Throughout, the United States was in accord, but stressed the importance of not arousing debate and not alienating the Soviet Union. In February 1944 the Soviet Constitution was changed. Studies made in the State Department's Division of International Security Organization of the constitutional changes, however, concluded that they did not alter the situation. While it was then feared at the research level, that the Soviet might press for more votes in the international security organization, no such Soviet proposal was made before Dumbarton Oaks.

*Dumbarton Oaks*

The question was first introduced at the Dumbarton Oaks conversations on August 28, 1944, toward the conclusion of a discussion in the steering committee of initial membership in the projected Organization. The unexpurgated minutes of that meeting record that Ambassador Gromyko "stated that all of the 16 Soviet Republics should be included among the initial members of the Organization." The Soviet representative subsequently amended the record to read "it is the Soviet understanding that all of the 16 Soviet Republics will be included, etc." The British representative, Sir Alexander Cadogan, immediately said that he would make no comment but that the United Kingdom would have to discuss with the Soviet Union the question of the international status of the

Soviet Republics. Under Secretary Stettinius said the United States would have to consider the proposal.<sup>1</sup>

While the steering committee immediately proceeded to other business, the seriousness of the Soviet move was fully appreciated, both in terms of substance and in term of its potentially disastrous effect on public opinion both in the United States and in other nations.

Under Secretary Stettinius reported the matter to the President at 5 p. m. the same day and to Secretary Hull early the next morning. Both were amazed and deeply concerned, and Mr. Stettinius was instructed to state that the United States could under no conditions accept the Soviet position and explain that it would present untold difficulties. The President observed that it would be just as logical for the United States to seek 48 votes.

Mr. Stettinius met with the Soviet Ambassador at 11:15 on August 29 as instructed, informed him that both the President and the Secretary considered the Soviet proposal out of order and apt to jeopardize the success of the meeting, and asked that the proposal be withdrawn, suggesting that, in any event, it might more properly be presented to the projected Organization subsequent to establishment. The memorandum of conversation, dictated by Mr. Stettinius, quotes Mr. Gromyko as responding: "The reason I raised this point at the meeting yesterday was merely to advise the United Kingdom and the American Government that we had this matter in mind but I will agree, in our present meetings at Dumbarton Oaks, that there should be no further reference whatsoever to this subject, and I agree that we will define the initial membership as consisting of the United Nations and Associated Nations." At the joint steering committee meeting that afternoon, the Ambassador, while rejecting a suggestion that the reference in the minutes of the previous meeting be deleted, agreed not to refer to the matter again during the conversations. He said his purpose had been to notify the United States and United Kingdom and that the subject would probably be raised by his Government on some other occasion.

This eased the immediate situation, but did not resolve the matter. Measures, instituted when the question was first introduced, to guard against a "leak" were continued in the hope that negotiations at the top level would succeed. Records mentioning the matter were drastically curtailed and all reference to it utilized a code designation, "the X matter." In the period between August 28, 1944, and the Yalta Conference, fewer than a dozen Americans were acquainted with the problem.

During this period, a solution was sought. Mr. Stettinius reported to the President immediately after the steering committee meeting on August 29 and the problem was further considered by the President and Secretary Hull. It was feared that, if no explicit formal objection were recorded the Soviet Union might bring up the matter at UNCIO, stating that it had been notified of the United States and United Kingdom at the Dumbarton Oaks conversations and that no objection had been made. It was decided, therefore, that the President should send a personal message to Marshal Stalin immediately. The message, drafted in the State Department and sent on August 31, 1944, expressed the President's deep concern and pointed out that raising the question at any time before the establishment and entry into operation of the projected organization would imperil the entire project. The President added to the State Department draft a sentence pointing out that, when the organization was established, the General Assembly would be in a position to deal with the question if the Soviet Union then wished to introduce it.

Marshal Stalin's reply of September 7, 1944, was not reassuring, although it did disclose a base for compromise and an intention to discuss the matter further with the President. Marshal Stalin first made it clear that he attached "exceptional importance" to the matter. He then referred to the constitutional changes effected in the Soviet Union earlier in the year.<sup>2</sup> He cited the Byelorussian and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic specifically as surpassing in population and political importance many of the states on which agreement had been reached. The message concluded with the hope that an opportunity would develop to explain to the President the political importance of the question raised by the Soviet delegation.

The X matter was touched on indirectly in a joint steering committee meeting on September 19 and specifically on September 27. At the latter meeting Am-

<sup>1</sup> The word "new" was inserted before "proposal" in the revised minutes.

<sup>2</sup> U. S. S. R. Const., art. XVIII A revised by decree on February 1, 1944. The new relationship was carefully studied in the State Department by several groups but the conclusion reached by all throughout was that the "republics" were not, in fact, autonomous states.

bassador Gromyko stated that Soviet agreement on a date for the general conference would depend on the acceptance by the United States and the United Kingdom of two Soviet proposals, the Soviet position on unanimity in the Security Council and the Soviet proposal that the 16 Soviet Republics be among the initial members of the Organization.

During the Chinese phase of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, the X problem was discussed briefly at a joint steering committee meeting on October 4, 1944. The President had alluded to it on the previous day in a conversation with Ambassador Wellington Koo. The President had asked how many Chinese provinces there were and had gone on to refer to a Soviet proposal which he characterized as absurd. At the steering committee meeting the previous developments were sketched, and the need to maintain secrecy while efforts were made to resolve the problem was stressed.

#### *Follow-through consideration*

The problem was considered again and again in follow-through meetings in the Department in the fall of 1944. It was felt that the matter would have to be settled by the Big Three heads of state, that the United States could not accede to the Soviet proposal, and that the Soviet Union might be attempting to make a trade on the two major outstanding questions, unanimity in the Security Council and initial membership in the U. N. for the 16 Soviet Republics. The conclusion reached in these meetings was phrased in a recommendation of November 15, 1944, "In any event, oppose X."

In conversations with officers of the Department in January 1945 Ambassador Gromyko continued to stress the importance his country attached to the proposal, however, and to advance arguments in support of it. He asserted that the 16 Soviet Republics, although intimately associated as members of a federation, had their own constitutions and dealt independently with their own foreign affairs. He also asserted that most of them were more important than Liberia or Guatemala. The Department officials replied that it was obviously a question for discussion at a Big Three meeting.

The matter was, in fact, being handled by the President directly. At a meeting at the White House on January 8, 1945, the President had informed Secretary Stettinius, and Messrs. Dunn, Pasvolsky, and Bohlen that he was clear as to how he would proceed.

[NOTE.—About this time, there may have been talks with members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and with other individuals. Information that such talks occurred is from a handwritten notation by Mr. Hiss to the effect that the President had made a special point in these talks of the ridiculousness of the Soviet proposal re the 16 Republics.]

#### *Yalta*

The question was resolved at the Yalta Conference in the following manner:

[NOTE.—This information from papers of Mr. Hiss.]

At a plenary meeting of the Conference on February 7, 1945, Molotov said that the Soviet proposal was based on the changes in the Soviet Constitution of February 1944. He said, however, that the Soviet Government, now informed of the United States and United Kingdom position, was not urging the proposal advanced at Dumbarton Oaks for admission of 16 Soviet Republics. He said that the Soviet Union appreciated the patience and the gradual character of the British Dominions' approach to separate international status, and that the Soviet Union, in withdrawing its original proposal, would consider it fair if at least three or perhaps two Republics were admitted to original membership. The Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Lithuania were specified. The population and importance of the former were stressed and the sacrifices in the war of all three. President Roosevelt observed that the whole question of plural voting was most interesting and required detailed study. He proposed that the Soviet request be referred to the three Foreign Ministers for study. This was done.

The following paper was supplied to Secretary Stettinius as "background" for the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 8:

FEBRUARY 8, 1945.

#### ARGUMENTS AGAINST INCLUSION OF ANY OF THE SOVIET REPUBLICS AMONG THE INITIAL MEMBERS

1. *Soviet Republics not signatories of the United Nations Declaration.*—On further thought we have become impressed with the Soviet view that the initial member of the United Nations Organization should be the signatories of the



United Nations Declaration. As none of the Soviet Republics are signatories of that Declaration, Mr. Molotov's proposal that two or three of these Republics be admitted to initial membership would be contrary to that principle.

2. *The question should be postponed until the Organization is formed.*—The President indicated in his remarks yesterday at the plenary session that this question should not come up until after the Organization is formed.

Mr. Molotov said yesterday at the plenary session that the Soviet Government had observed the gradual development of international relations of the British Dominions. In accordance with the practice followed by the Dominions, it would seem to be premature to take the action proposed by Mr. Molotov at this time. We should allow a longer time to elapse and have available more experience as to the international relations of the Soviet Republics before we consider this question.

The question is such a novel one in international relations that the other members of the Organization should have a chance to consider the question before a decision is reached.

3. *The Soviet Republics are not sovereign states under international practice.*—The Soviet Constitution does not permit the Soviet Republics to control their own foreign policy or affairs. Other aspects of central control over the Republic are also inconsistent with the Republics being sovereign.

[NOTE.—India is one of the United Nations. It, too, is not dependent. The Soviet representatives will probably argue that if India can be a member so should their three Republics.]

*The answer.*—India has for some period past been gradually developing international relations, and is generally regarded as having more of the attributes of separate nationhood than the Soviet Republics.)

At that meeting, which was at the British delegation's headquarters and was presided over by Eden, Molotov and Eden jointly agreed that in the course of the San Francisco Conference the Soviet representatives would propose that the Ukraine and White Russian Republics be named as initial members of the Organization and the British would support this proposal. Mr. Stettinius said he felt that, from the standpoint of geographic area and population, the question deserved sympathetic consideration, but that he found it difficult to reconcile the proposal with the Dumbarton Oaks decision that each state have one vote. He thought that United Nations might meet to complete the Charter and then elect additional members before the first meeting of the new Organization. Mr. Stettinius explained, however, that he hadn't had an opportunity to discuss the matter with the President and couldn't commit the United States until he did. A drafting committee composed of Jebb, Gromyko, and Hiss was appointed to draft the report of the meeting for the next plenary. The draft agreed upon by the drafting committee was to the effect that the United Kingdom supported, United States reserved its position. Subsequently, without clearing with or informing Mr. Hiss or, presumably, Ambassador Gromyko, the British changed the report so that it stated the United States as well as the United Kingdom concurred. The British said that they had cleared this change with Mr. Stettinius but this was not the case as he did not understand that any such issue was presented to him.

At the afternoon plenary (February 8), the report of the foreign ministers was presented. The pertinent passage was: "The United Nations, as they existed on February —, 1945, i. e., those who had at that date signed the United Nations Declaration, would be the only states invited to the Conference on World Organization. It will be for the Conference to determine the list of original members of the Organization. At that stage the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics."

According to a memorandum (March 19, 1945) by Mr. Hiss, the above report was made and "before the matter could be clarified the President expressed his agreement as a matter of policy." Another record in the Hiss papers states:

"The report by the Foreign Secretary was accepted, subject to paragraph 2 (b) being amended to read as follows: 'The United Nations as they exist on the 8th February 1945, and such of the Associated Nations' as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March 1945, would be the only States invited to the Conference on World Organization. At that stage the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support the pro-

\* The term "Associated Nations" in this connection means the eight Associated Nations and Turkey which shall be regarded as an Associated Nation for the purpose.

posal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i. e., the Ukraine and White Russia.' "

Mr. Hiss' notes on the plenary meeting show clearly that the President, while he agreed, did not consider the Ukraine and Byelorussia separate states. Both Molotov and Stalin suggested that the position of the Soviet Republics would be facilitated if they signed the U. N. Declaration before March 1, 1945. President Roosevelt objected that signatories must be states, that while the Ukraine and Byelorussia were at war they were at war as parts of the Soviet Union. It was decided that they should not adhere to the Declaration and should not receive invitations to the conference.

According to rough notes by Mr. Hiss, Mr. Byrnes was very worried about the commitment made on February 8, 1945, and, on February 9 discussed it with Mr. Flynn who was also worried. Mr. Byrnes proposed that votes be accorded Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska and discussed this with the President and with Prime Minister Churchill. Mr. Hiss said that he told Byrnes it would be better for the President to get released from his commitment than to propose this.

At the plenary meeting on February 11, when the communiqué was under consideration, Stalin proposed to include: "It has been also resolved to recommend to the Conference to invite the Ukraine and White Russia as original members." Both the President and the Prime Minister indicated that publication of such a statement would cause them embarrassment and Stalin withdrew the proposal. The secret protocol of the Conference contained the following commitment: "When the Conference on World Organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i. e., the Ukraine and White Russia." [Something happened here that is not covered by the Hiss papers—the tentative United States claim to additional votes.]

[NOTE.—The following version of what happened is taken from *Speaking Frankly*, by James F. Byrnes:]

"Immediately after announcing the Soviet Union's acceptance of the President's proposal on voting procedure in the Security Council, Mr. Molotov expressed the hope that Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania would be admitted to the United Nations. In any event, he said, he hoped the first two would be admitted. Marshal Stalin made a forceful plea in support of the suggestion.

"Prime Minister Churchill supported the Soviet request, stating: 'My heart goes out to White Russia, bleeding from her wounds while beating down the tyrants.'

"Not wishing to agree, and yet not wanting to oppose Churchill and Stalin directly while the issue of the international organization was in the balance, the President made this statement: 'The British Empire has great populations in its dominions, like Australia, Canada, and South Africa. The Soviet Government has great masses of population like the three dominions mentioned. The United States has no colonies but has a large population. Brazil is smaller than the Soviet Union but larger in area than the United States. There are many countries with small population, like Honduras and Liberia. We must study the question of whether any country should be given more than one vote. I do not want to break down the principle of one vote to each nation. Therefore, we can decide on the general plan of a meeting to organize the association and then before the meeting, through the Foreign Secretaries, or at that meeting we can decide these questions and I will be glad to take them up.'

"There was no dissent. Because I was strongly opposed to granting the Soviet request, I thought the President had done a good job and that we might hear no more of the proposal. But at the Conference table the next afternoon the President began reading a report of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers which had just been handed him and said:

"'Paragraph 2 is that it will be for the Conference to determine the list of the original members of the Organization.

"'At that stage the delegates of the United Kingdom and the United States will support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist republics.'

"The report was agreed to.

"I learned later that at the Foreign Ministers meeting, Mr. Eden, who wanted to be certain of the admission of all members of the British Commonwealth including India, which was not an independent state, agreed with Mr. Molotov on the votes for Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Mr. Stettinius then also agreed to the arrangement. As the meeting opened, the Secretary advised the President of the action which the President later announced, and the heads of the Government approved.

"I was surprised at the agreement which, in my opinion, was very unwise. After the meeting I urged my view upon the President. I reminded him that before we left Washington he had told a group of Senators that if Stalin proposed granting membership to Byelorussia and the Ukraine, he would insist upon membership for each of our 48 States. The truth is, the Soviet Republics are no more independent than the States of our Union.

"I recalled to him how effectively the opponents of the League of Nations had argued that the British, because of their dominions, would have five votes in the Assembly while we would have but one. Our people had come to realize that the dominions were independent states and frequently held views different from the United Kingdom, but that was not true of the Soviet Republics. I feared the opponents of the United Nations might use the allotment of three votes to the Soviet Union as effectively as the foes of the League had used the argument against the British votes 26 years earlier. I urged the President at least to ask that the United States be granted a number of votes equal to those of the Soviet Union. The President feared it was too late but said he would consider it.

"I convinced Hopkins that, at the very least, we should secure such an agreement from Stalin and Churchill whether or not we afterward exercised the right. He then joined me in urging the President to withdraw his agreement regarding the two Soviet Republics unless Russia agreed the United States also should have three votes. The President finally told us he would present it to Marshal Stalin. On the last day I spent at Yalta, February 10, the President wrote him a letter which stated:

"I am somewhat concerned lest it be pointed out that the United States will have only one vote in the Assembly. It may be necessary for me, therefore, if I am to insure wholehearted acceptance by the Congress and people of the United States of our participation in the World Organization, to ask for additional votes in the Assembly in order to give parity to the United States.

"I would like to know, before I face this problem, that you perceive no objection and would support a proposal along this line if it is necessary for me to make it at the forthcoming conference."

"The following day Marshal Stalin advised the President that he entirely agreed with him that 'since the number of votes for the Soviet Union is increased to three in connection with the inclusion of the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet White Russia among the members of the Assembly, the number of votes for the U. S. A. should also be increased.

"The number of votes for the U.S.A. might be increased to three as in the case of the Soviet Union and its two basic Republics,' he said. 'If it is necessary I am prepared officially to support this proposal.'

"President Roosevelt also asked Churchill for his views, and Churchill stated he would support the President in any proposal he made to achieve American equality with other nations.

"When I arrived in Washington there was waiting for me in the White House Map Room the following cable:

*"For Justice Byrnes from Mr. Hopkins*

"The President has received completely satisfactory replies from the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin on additional votes to achieve parity for the United States, if necessary. In view of the fact that nothing on this whole subject appears in the communique, the President is extremely anxious no aspect of this question be discussed even privately.'

"I assumed he had some very good reason for not wishing this matter to be discussed, and I complied with the request.

"The President and his advisers concluded not to ask at San Francisco for compliance with the agreement that we have as many votes as were given to Russia. He did not again discuss the subject with me, and I did not know he had changed his mind. I admit that the public opposition to Russia's three votes as against our one was not so great as I had expected. But nevertheless I think we should have insisted at San Francisco on the agreement made at Yalta. I felt then and feel now that the smaller states would have opposed the request of the Soviets and the United States. This course would have been just and it would have resulted in both Governments having only one vote. That would have been the best solution."

#### *Follow-up*

Following the conference there were further developments. On March 17 Ambassador Gromyko called on Mr. Dunn to inform him of Soviet plans for representation at the San Francisco Conference. After giving the figures for

Soviet personnel, the Ambassador went on to say that the representation for the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics would total 30. In the subsequent discussion it became clear that the Soviet Union was intent on expanding the Yalta commitment to include immediate participation of the two republics at the conference. This had been rejected by both the United Kingdom and the United States at Yalta. The precise and limited nature of the Yalta commitment was pointed out in this and subsequent discussions.

Shortly thereafter partial information in regard to the matter "leaked" to the press and on March 30 correspondents submitted a series of direct questions to the Secretary of State. At a press conference on April 3, the following statement was released:

"The Soviet representatives at Yalta proposed that the White Russian and the Ukrainian Republics be initial members of the proposed international organization. This was a question for the United Nations assembled at San Francisco to consider and decide.

"In view of the importance which the Soviet Government attached to this proposal, the American representatives at Yalta, having the utmost respect for the heroic part played by the people of these republics in their unyielding resistance to the common enemy and the fortitude with which they have borne great suffering in the prosecution of the war, agreed that the Government of the United States would support such a Soviet proposal at San Francisco if made. No agreement was, however, made at Yalta on the question of the participation of these republics in the San Francisco Conference.

"In the circumstances the American representatives at Yalta believed that it was their duty to reserve the possibility of the United States having three votes in the General Assembly. The Soviet and British representatives stated their willingness to support a proposal, if the United States should make it, to accord three votes in the assembly to the United States. The President has decided that at the San Francisco Conference the United States will not request additional votes for the Government of the United States in the General Assembly.

"Announcement of these proposals was made first to the United States delegation to the San Francisco Conference. In order to correct the impression conveyed by partial publication of the facts, public announcement was made prior to a final determination of the course to be followed by the delegation with regard to possible additional representation for the United States."

A further Soviet attempt to expand the nature of this commitment was made in a preconference meeting of the heads of the Big Four delegations on April 23, 1945.<sup>4</sup> Foreign Minister Molotov, raising the question of procedure in regard to the consideration of the question, sought information on how other states, particularly the Latin-American states and the other British Dominions, were likely to vote. He said that he considered the United States and the United Kingdom morally bound to exert every effort to secure a favorable vote. Secretary Stettinius said that, while the United States was committed to vote in favor of admitting the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics as initial members of the projected organization, the decision on whether they should be admitted rested with the Conference. He also pointed out that, at Yalta, the question of participation by those republics in the Conference itself had not been raised (this conflicts with Conference notes) and that the United States was not committed to support that. Foreign Minister Molotov agreed with this interpretation of the Yalta commitment but said that the Soviet Union expected the United States and United Kingdom to see to it that admission was voted and that his government would judge by the results of the election. Both Secretary Stettinius and Foreign Minister Eden repeated that their governments controlled no vote but their own and that their commitment was limited to a pledge to support by their vote admission to initial membership in the organization, and that the decision in any case rested with the Conference itself.

The proposal to admit to original membership in the organization the two Soviet Republics was formally submitted to the San Francisco Conference by Mr. Molotov on April 27, at a meeting of the heads of delegations. It was promptly supported, in accordance with the Yalta agreement, by the United States and United Kingdom and was unanimously endorsed. It was reported to the plenary session and approved the same day. The proposal to admit the two republics to the Conference, which had not been agreed to at Yalta, was

<sup>4</sup> The discussion took place at the beginning of the meeting before Foreign Minister Soong joined the meeting.

also pressed by the Soviet Union at the meeting of heads of delegations on April 27. It was referred to the Executive Committee and approved on April 30 by the Committee, the heads of delegations, and the fifth plenary session.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, had you any reason to suspect Alger Hiss during the course of your dealings with him? In other words, were you surprised when the disclosure about Alger Hiss came forth?

Miss FLUEGEL. I had no reason to consider him a Communist or to expect the allegation that he might be one. I had one experience that made me question his judgment, and that was this: It is a very small matter, but when I was in London, roughly in February of 1946, at the United Nations meeting, I was told by the—you see, I was with the international secretariat at the time, on loan from the State Department—Mr. Hiss was with the United States delegation in London—I was told by the French editor of the new United Nations Journal that he was not going to take responsibility for the way the Soviets were changing the records of the Security Council meetings.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean the minutes of the meetings?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. I had done my doctorate work in the field of constitutional law and knew that those first meetings were apt to become precedents, and consequently it was essential that the minutes in all languages coincide.

So I reported it to the American delegation headquarters and was rather brushed aside with the comment that Mr. Hiss and a person who was working for him at the time as an assistant, Miss Fosdick—

Mr. MORRIS. What Fosdick?

Miss FLUEGEL. Dorothy Fosdick, now with the policy planning staff.

Mr. MORRIS. Is she presently a member of the five-member policy committee?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is true—that they were keeping track of it and that nothing could be going wrong. Of course, I dropped the matter. I was just reporting what the Journal editor had said.

I do know that later when I was working on this book I came across a letter from Mr. John Foster Dulles sent to the Department the following summer in which he raised the question, because apparently either he or some member of his staff who reads Russian had been comparing the records and had found discrepancies. Well, that was one episode.

Mr. MORRIS. You feel that Mr. Hiss was in charge of keeping that record straight; is that right?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is what I was told.

Mr. MORRIS. That he had what position in respect to those minutes?

Miss FLUEGEL. Well, I was told that Mr. Hiss and Miss Fosdick were following the matter and that nothing could be wrong with the minutes.

Now, that was a very small thing. Following that, I would say roughly about a year before the whole thing came out and, as a matter of fact, when Mr. Hiss was still in the Department, when security people or FBI people would ask you about somebody else, the question was often "What is that person's relationship with Mr. Hiss?"

Well, of course, it builds up in your mind the idea that Mr. Hiss was being investigated, too. So that I was not surprised, but I had no reason to know.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, were you aware of the Institute of Pacific Relations during the term of your work in the Postwar Planning Division in the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Rather vaguely because my field is not the Far East. However, in the first job on postwar trends, in addition to all of the dispatches, we did get this volume of literature. Almost the only literature on the Far East, magazine literature, was from the Institute of Pacific Relations. So we used all of that, and everybody else did, too.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say literature of the Institute of Pacific Relations, do you mean the publications of the institute?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes; Amerasia, Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Far Eastern Survey?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Senator WATKINS. And the handbooks were put out for the inspection of our troops and so forth?

Miss FLUEGEL. I saw relatively few of the handbooks. I saw maybe one or two. It was mostly these magazines at that early period.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there anything extended to the possibility that the publications of the Institute and Amerasia possibly could be partisan.

Miss FLUEGEL. No. Frankly, not being, myself, an expert in the Far East, I would depend on them a good bit. They were produced by an educational organization of good repute. They came to our desk from the library, and you used them.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you feel that the IPR and its publications had an influence on the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes; I would be quite sure they did.

Senator FERGUSON. On policy?

Miss FLUEGEL. Well, you know, that is an awfully hard question to answer, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize that. That is one of the problems of this committee.

Miss FLUEGEL. But the thing is, the question of who makes policy, theoretically—I doubt, for example, that it influenced Mr. Hull or, later, any of the others. But what makes them make policy is this whole flow of information that goes up to them.

Senator FERGUSON. From them all?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. Now, unquestionably that flow of information is influenced by what you read.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you think it was influenced by the IPR?

Miss FLUEGEL. It was bound to be, since it was all that you were reading.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that that was virtually the only material available on the Far East?

Miss FLUEGEL. The only material that I recall except dispatches coming in from Chungking. As I say, my work then was postwar trends and, later, personalities. I used those magazines if they had any information on Chinese leaders.

Senator WATKINS. What about the others working in those fields? Were they using it likewise?

Miss FLUEGEL. Well, I know, of course, that the people working in the Far East—

Senator WATKINS. That was the only information available to them as well as to you?

Miss FLUEGEL. Well, you see, they may have had some information from their own competence against which to check this, but the rest of us didn't have.

Senator FERGUSON. When you had questions concerning the Far East, would you say that the IPR or its publications had any influence on your judgment?

Miss FLUEGEL. Here is the sort of thing that I did at that time: From all this material that came to us in postwar trends, we prepared, I think it was about a six-page mimeographed sheet which we distributed to the Department and to our missions abroad, summarizing for them ideas that were being tossed around on postwar planning.

For example, if we had come across an article on postwar planning in one of these magazines, we would have been likely to abstract it and circulate it further.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, were you acquainted with the John S. Service dispatches from the field?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, because they created, of course, a tremendous sensation in the Department. Most of the material for a person like myself, whose field is political theory and foreign policy rather than a specialized country area, the over-all picture I would be getting would be in the form of digested summaries of telegrams and dispatches coming in, without the name of the person sending them in.

At that time you rarely questioned an incoming dispatch because there was no question of the competence of department in most of our minds. But in the case of the John Service dispatches, well, I remember that they were routed especially to me by a friend in another office, and I think a similar practice followed throughout the Department, because they were extremely well written and they were exciting, and they came in at a time when everybody was depressed and frustrated about the future.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you say they represented, what view? You said they were refreshing and lively.

Mr. FLUEGEL. Well, after I read a couple of them, I was quite sure what view they represented.

Senator FERGUSON. What did they represent?

Miss FLUEGEL. I thought they were definitely pro-Communist. Certainly, I distinguished sharply, for example, between the interpretation he put on agrarians, let us say, and some of the things we got in at an earlier date from the so-called peasant movement in Middle and Eastern Europe, which was certainly agrarian.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Service contend that the movement in China was agrarian?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes; as I remember the dispatches, and, remember, it was years ago and I read them only because they were well written and everybody was talking about them, as I recall them, yes, much of it was on the freshness, the honesty, the realism, the enthusiasm of these people, and, as I said, there was so little of that anywhere else at the time that it was refreshing.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he indicate that it was communism?

Miss FLUEGEL. My recollection is, and I can't be sure whether that was in Service's dispatches or others coming in at the time, that there

was some questions as to whether it was communism, whether it wasn't just like the term "socialism," covering a great many differences, and the emphasis was that this was certainly a different kind of communism.

Senator FERGUSON. Not Soviet?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that Service's reports indicated that it was not Soviet Kremlin communism, international communism?

Miss FLUEGEL. Well, I think that there is a little shift, and again I am talking now on very sketchy background, but my recollection is that there was a little shift in the line, if you want to call it that, from the initial enthusiasm and the initial stress that this was an agrarian movement. Then, quite suddenly—no, it is not that, it is communism but you had better make your peace with it and win it over.

Senator FERGUSON. When did that take place?

Miss FLUEGEL. Sometime in the period, I would say, generally 1944-1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Dr. Fluegel, who was Alger Hiss' deputy when he was the head of Postwar Planning Division in the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Mr. John Ross, who had been in charge of personnel throughout most of the postwar period, I think from 1942 until right before the San Francisco Conference.

He then became Mr. Hiss' deputy and left the Department at the time Mr. Hiss left and went up to New York and has been aiding Senator Austin in all sorts of capacities since; sometimes one of our delegates, sometimes deputy delegate.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there a relationship between Mr. Ross and Mr. Hiss which was a close one?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes; I would think so. For about a year my office was across the hall from them, and they were around all the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Dr. Fluegel, you say that you were active in the preparation of this volume, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation.

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you made a compilation of this Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation volume of the State Department and determined from that preparation the role played by members of the Institute of Pacific Relations, particularly those whose names appeared before our open hearings in connection with this volume?

Mr. MANDEL. I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive Mr. Mandel's report on how members of the Institute of Pacific Relations, who have been mentioned in these hearings, figured, according to this volume again, in the postwar planning work of our State Department?

Senator WATKINS. Receive it in what form? Is it to be presented in a memo, or is he going to quote from the book itself?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, what is that?

Mr. MANDEL. I have prepared a memorandum based on this volume, entitled "Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation," showing the membership in committees and subcommittees of persons associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The list is a brief one. I would like to read it. It includes: Hugh Borton, Mrs. Esther C. Brunauer, V. Frank Coe, Lauchlin Currie, Lawrence Finkelstein, O. Benjamin Gerig, Harold Glasser, Alger Hiss,



Philip C. Jessup, William T. Stone, and Harry Dexter White. The positions are enumerated and the pages referenced.

**I have also prepared a list of the associations of the listed individuals with the Institute of Pacific Relations which, if the Chairman permits, I will read.**

Senator WATKINS. We will receive this first memorandum, and then we will permit you to go ahead with the other.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

**POSTWAR FOREIGN-POLICY PREPARATION, 1939-45, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

[Released February 1950]

Hugh Borton attended meetings of subcommittee on territorial problems, of the advisory committee (p. 119).

Mrs. Esther C. Brunauer attended meetings of international organization group as an expert (p. 249).

Became an assistant secretary (p. 303).

V. Frank Coe listed as a representative at meetings of the Interdepartmental group to consider postwar international economic problems and policies, representing the Treasury Department (p. 29).

Attended meetings of the American Technical Committee representing the Foreign Economic Administration (p. 143 n.).

Alternate member of the informal policy committee on Germany (p. 370).

Lauchlin Currie listed as a representative at meetings of the Interdepartmental group to consider postwar international economic problems and policies representing the Executive Office of the President (p. 29 n.).

Member for work on economic problems of the advisory committee (p. 76).

Member, committee on postwar foreign economic policy (p. 139).

Member, executive committee on economic foreign policy (p. 219).

Laurence Duggan, member, advisory committee (p. 76).

Member, subcommittee on political problems (p. 97).

Member, departmental committee on political planning (p. 156).

Chairman, area committee for Latin America of committee on special studies (p. 178).

Member, policy committee (p. 209).

Lawrence Finkelstein, member, preparation staff, United States delegation to the United Nations Conference (p. 420).

O. Benjamin Gerig assisted in directing the work on international organization and arrangements of the advisory committee (p. 155).

Member, drafting group, the Charter of the United Nations (p. 176).

Interdivisional committee on over-all economic organization (p. 222).

Member, research staff, international organization group (p. 249).

Member of drafting group preparatory to the Crimea Conference (p. 373).

Attended meetings of subcommittees of advisory committee on postwar foreign policy (97, 108, 119 n., 147 n.); Food Conference and Organization (p. 144, 184); chairman, committee on colonial problems (p. 177); Assistant Chief, International Security and Organization Division (p. 216).

Attended Dumbarton Oaks conversations (pp. 291, 295, 307, 314, 315, 316, 332); Chief, Dependent Area Affairs Division (p. 351); work on trusteeship problems (pp. 387, 388, 429, 432, 434, 446); attended San Francisco Conference (pp. 419, 420, 436, 437, 443 n., 446).

Harold Glasser, one of the advisers to Dean Acheson at the Atlantic City UNRRA Conference, representing the Treasury Department as the Assistant Director of the Division of Monetary Research (205 n.).

Member, subcommittee to formulate recommendations within the framework of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (p. 354).

Alger Hiss attended meetings of subcommittee on territorial problems, of the advisory committee (p. 119).

Alternate member, policy committee (p. 209 n.).

Appointed Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (p. 216).

Attended meetings preparatory to Dumbarton Oaks Conference (p. 249).

Member, agenda group (p. 275).

Alternate member, armaments committee (p. 275).

Member of committee to allocate officers to work on the basic instrument of the general international organization preparatory to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (p. 291).

Responsible for developing administrative arrangements for Dumbarton Oaks (p. 292).

Executive secretary, American group, Dumbarton Oaks (p. 293).

Present at preconference briefing, Dumbarton Oaks (p. 295).

Executive secretary of executive secretariat of American group at Dumbarton Oaks (p. 297).

Secretary in international capacity, Dumbarton Oaks meeting of heads of Great Britain, Russia, and United States (p. 305).

Secretary, steering committee, Dumbarton Oaks (p. 312).

Attended meetings for drawing up plans for a general international organization (p. 381).

Member of committee preparing for Crimea Conference (p. 386).

Attended meeting of the interdepartmental committee on dependent area aspects of international organization as State Department representative (p. 388).

Accompanied President to Yalta (p. 392).

In charge of arrangements for United Nations Conference at San Francisco (p. 415).

Secretary, informal organizing group on arrangements for the San Francisco Conference (p. 439).

*Philip C. Jessup*, technical expert on proposals for the statute of the court, United Nations Conference at San Francisco (p. 419).

United States adviser on committee to draft statute for United Nations Conference at San Francisco (p. 426).

*William T. Stone* attended advisory committee on postwar foreign policy meetings representing the Board of Economic Warfare (p. 77).

Member, economic subcommittee, committee on postwar economic policy (p. 139).

*Harry Dexter White*, member, interdepartmental group to consider postwar economic problems and policies (p. 29).

Attended international conferences (33 n., 241, 242 n., 418, 438).

Member, advisory committee on postwar foreign policy (pp. 77, 81, 92, 135, 136).

Member, Taylor committee (p. 139).

Attended meetings of Cabinet committee (p. 141).

Chairman, Stabilization Fund and Reconstruction and Development Bank Committee (pp. 142, 224).

Attended Anglo-American economic conversations (pp. 191, 192).

Member, executive committee on economic foreign policy (p. 219).

Representative, informal policy committee on Germany (p. 370).

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this is the list of those people who are mentioned in this volume as having active roles in the formulation of postwar planning for the State Department under the project about which we are hearing testimony today.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Mandel may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will now read the connections that these people did have with the Institute of Pacific Relations and the general nature of the testimony which is before this committee concerning each. This is the testimony that has come out to date, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. Hugh Borton is listed as a writer for Pacific Affairs, member of the board of trustees of the American council, and a writer of several IPR publications. An IPR luncheon was given in his honor on January 11, 1947.

Esther C. Brunauer, according to our files, was suspended from the State Department for security reasons. She was an incorporator of the IPR.

V. Frank Coe has been cited in testimony of Elizabeth Bentley as a member of the Silvermaster group of the Communist Party. He attended IPR conferences in 1942 and 1945.

Lauchlin Currie has been cited in testimony of Elizabeth Bentley as cooperating with an underground group of the Communist Party. He was a member of the board of trustees of the IPR in 1946.

Lawrence Duggan was cited as a member of the underground group of the Communist Party by Whittaker Chambers and Hede Massing in testimony before this committee. He is listed as a member of the IPR.

Lawrence Finkelstein has been a contributor to the Far Eastern Survey and a coauthor of several IPR publications.

O. Benjamin Gerig was a representative of the IPR at one of its study meetings in 1939.

Harold Glasser was cited in testimony before this committee as a member of an underground group of the Communist Party. He is mentioned in one of the IPR letters as a favorable Washington prospect for the IPR.

Alger Hiss is listed as a member of the board of trustees of the IPR and has been cited in testimony as a member of the underground group of the Communist Party.

Philip C. Jessup, was chairman of the Pacific council of the IPR in 1946, and vice chairman of the American council from 1936 to 1943.

William T. Stone has been an incorporator of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, when the Institute of Pacific Relations became incorporated, he was one of the three people named in the certificate of incorporation as incorporators. Is that right, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. Harry Dexter White was also mentioned in testimony before this committee as a member of an underground group of the Communist Party and a member of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, who succeeded Alger Hiss as head of the postwar planning Division of the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Dr. Dean Rusk.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, was Dr. Dean Rusk active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Dr. Dean Rusk was a member of the American council of the IPR and actively supported an IPR request for a donation from the Rockefeller Foundation as late as 1950. He also suggested the use of IPR publications by the Chief of Military Intelligence, according to a letter in our files.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that letter is introduced into the record, bearing on the general question on whether or not the Institute of Pacific Relations and its members who were active in it had an influence on our far eastern policy as set forth by this project, about which we have heard testimony today.

Senator WATKINS. That will be so received.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions of the witness.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will recess, subject to call.

(Whereupon, at 4:25 p. m., Wednesday, February 20, 1952, the hearing was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
Washington, D. C.,

The subcommittee met at 3 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson presiding.

Present: Senators Ferguson and Watkins.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, Mr. Weyl has asked to make a couple of changes in his testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. You have been sworn, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Senator, I have.

Senator FERGUSON. And you are continuing under oath?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir.

## TESTIMONY OF NATHANIEL WEYL, WASHINGTON, D. C.—Resumed

Senator FERGUSON. What is it you desire to say on the record?

Mr. WEYL. Well, Senator, when I testified here the day before yesterday, it was without having had the opportunity to check my recollection on a few points, and I find that my recollection was in error.

Now, in my testimony of 2 days ago, before this committee, I was queried about testimony I gave under subpoena before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1943, and my answer is, or my answer then was:

I told the committee that I had been until 1933 a Communist, and I offered to the committee into evidence writings subsequent to 1939 showing them that I was now an anti-Communist.

Then it continued, and then you, Senator, asked the question:

You left out, in other words, between 1933 and 1939, that space?

My reply:

I left out the whole organizational matter. I could not have brought it in without naming names.

Now, subsequent to that testimony, I had opportunity to see what I actually did tell the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1943.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you got that testimony?

Mr. WEYL. I have that, sir. I was asked at that time whether I was or had ever been a member of the Communist Party, and my reply that I then made was not true.

Senator FERGUSON. Read the question of the record of the Un-American Activities Committee and your answer.

Mr. WEYL. Senator, I do not find the question. It is very far up here that Mr. Matthews, who was the interrogator of the House Committee—here it is:

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Weyl, have you any dissent that you would like to enter at this time to the remarks made by the Honorable Martin Dies?

I will now skip down to the essential point.

Mr. WEYL. Yes; I would like to make a dissent on some of the details.

Then I go on down—

Mr. WEYL. This is a dissent of detail. Now, your statement is that there is no doubt about my being a loyal Communist Party member. I would like to make two points about that. The first is that while those articles—

this refers to articles written by me of a Communist character in 1932 and 1933—

The first is that while those articles show very clearly, I think, although I then espoused the Communist position, I was not a member of the Communist Party. That is perhaps not too significant, because whether a man carries a card or holds certain views is perhaps legalistic. The thing that is significant is the implication "his being a loyal Communist Party member" that I am now a member of the Communist Party.

And when the occasion arises here, I would like to try to submit to you pretty conclusive evidence that I am not only not a member of the Communist Party, but that I have written in opposition to the Communist Party over a period of a year or so prior to my present employment by the Government.

And elsewhere here I said that I had been, to all intents, a Communist. So that the point of correction is obviously there is no correction of my statement that I became anti-Communist in 1939. The point of correction is that I stated falsely before the House Committee in 1947 that I had never formally been a member of the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. And it is that that you want to correct here, and you are offering this as the record as to what you did say over there? You are not disputing this record?

Mr. WEYL. Not at all, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. But you want to correct this record in the present proceedings to say now that notwithstanding what that record showed in the Un-American Activities Committee that you were, at that time, an actual member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. No, Senator, not at the time I testified; certainly not.

Senator FERGUSON. No, I mean at the time that you testified before the Un-American Activities Committee.

Mr. WEYL. I was not a Communist then, no.

Senator FERGUSON. But you had been at the time you related, in 1932 and 1933.

Mr. WEYL. That is right. And that the statement I made there that I was to all intents a Communist was certainly insufficient.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel now that a frank, fair statement would have been as of 1932 and 1933, the time mentioned in that testimony that you were an active and real member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Precisely, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. I will permit this record to be, to show now what you say, and I think we ought to include that whole page that you have been reading.

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 452" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 452

Let me add for the record that the Mahogany program is not, of course, for furniture but for military purposes.

That, I think, brings the record up to date.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Weyl, have you any dissent that you would like to enter at this time to the remarks made by the Honorable Martin Dies?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; I would like to make a dissent on some of the details.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Take them point by point.

Mr. WEYL. Yes. Before doing so, you spoke of my making a statement about this. Is it your intention that I shall make a statement?

Mr. STARNES. Yes; that is what you are being asked for now. Any statement that you care to make of a dissenting nature about the allegations made by Mr. Dies, in connection with his speech.

Mr. WEYL. I will first make a few corrections on details which are of no importance.

My title is principal business economic analyst.

My salary is \$5,600.

Then, another dissenting detail is this: This statement says: "For several years Weyl was very prominent in Communist activities among the students."

I had the opportunity to check up these files in the Public Library of New York, and the dates, as near as I can recall it, are from approximately December 1932 until May of 1933. Of course, that does not affect the substance of it, but it is a correction of detail.

Mr. MASON. I want to get this clear. Instead of saying for several years, it should have been for several months; is that it?

Mr. WEYL. That is correct; yes.

Mr. STARNES. A part of 2 years?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. STARNES. Several months, but a part of 2 years?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; that is correct.

Then there is another dissent of detail. This states:

"His writings in the Communist Party newspaper, the Daily Worker, also leave no doubt about his being a loyal Communist Party member."

I had forgotten that I ever wrote for the Daily Worker. As far as my research of the files in New York indicates, I wrote one article there. Isn't that correct, Mr. Matthews?

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is the only one we have.

Mr. WEYL. Well, I think describing one article as "writings" is a bit misleading.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you recall the date of the article to which you refer?

Mr. WEYL. I think it was May 1, wasn't it?

Mr. MATTHEWS. 1933?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. It was for a May Day supplement, but it appeared under the date of April 29, 1933.

Mr. WEYL. I see. This is a dissent of detail.

Now, your statement is that there is no doubt about my being a loyal Communist Party member. I would like to make two points about that.

The first is that while those articles show very clearly, I think, although I then espoused the Communist position, I was not a member of the Communist Party. That is perhaps not too significant, because whether a man carries a card or holds certain views is perhaps legalistic. The thing that is significant is the implication "his being a loyal Communist Party member" that I am now a member of the Communist Party.

And when the occasion arises here, I would like to try to submit to you pretty conclusive evidence that I am not only not a member of the Communist Party, but that I have written in opposition to the Communist Party over a period of a year or so prior to my present employment by the Government.

Mr. MASON. Well, would you say that it is correct that at that particular time, and in that particular writing, we will say, that you agreed with or espoused the Communist position at that time?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir. I will have to admit to that mistake.

Mr. MASON. I just want to get in my own mind how much truth there is in this.

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. MASON. But you, of course, would deny that you ever were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir.

Mr. STARNES. Go ahead.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you through with the dissents?

Mr. WEYL. I would like to ask your pleasure in this.

When I got my subpoena yesterday, I dug through a lot of newspaper writings of mine to show my points, at which I said things no Communist or Communist sympathizer could say. I would like to put those in the record. I don't care when I do so. That is entirely at your pleasure.

Mr. STARNES. That is all right. You can append those just like these publications. They are too lengthy, of course, to put in the record, but we will append them as exhibits, and go along with the testimony, and then the other members of the committee can examine them at length.

Mr. WEYL. Unless Dr. Matthews would like the opportunity of hearing them and cross-examining on them, in case he feels they do not indicate what I say they do.

Mr. STARNES. All right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Before we leave the substance of the matter contained in the speech of the Honorable Martin Dies, I would like to ask a few questions about the organizations involved there, for the record.

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you publicly associated with an organization known as the National Student League?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you hold any official position in connection with that organization?

Mr. WEYL. Well, as I recall, I was associate editor of this magazine, Student Review, and that was, I think, the official organ of the National Student League.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have another change you want to make, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. I do. But before doing so, Mr. Morris, I would like not to expand on this but just to mention my reason for saying what I did before the House committee in 1943.

I have mentioned it before. It was a feeling that I had an obligation to protect people who had been associated with me in the Communist Party, and whom I thought might very well have broken quietly.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any such feeling now?

Mr. WEYL. No, Senator, I do not. Senator, I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. And at the time you testified the other day, Mr. Weyl—was that the 14th?

Mr. MORRIS. It was Tuesday of this week. That is the 19th.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any such reservations?

Mr. WEYL. No, I had no such reservations, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, your testimony now, your oath, is without mental reservations?

Mr. WEYL. It is, sir.

The other correction is this: I stated in my testimony 2 days ago when I was asked to estimate the time at which the Ware cell started functioning—

Senator FERGUSON. I think that was my question.

Mr. WEYL. I think it was, Senator. Perhaps we can find it here.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you help the witness find that testimony, Mr. Morris?

Mr. WEYL. The question was as to the date at which the unit started, and the testimony reads as follows:

Senator FERGUSON. How long after you came to Washington did you become a member of this unit in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration?

Mr. WEYL. That is a question, Senator, that the FBI asked me, and I honestly can't answer because I don't recollect.

Senator FERGUSON. About how long?

Mr. WEYL. The best recollection, and it may be a bad one, is that this unit was set up around the beginning of 1934.

And then further testimony by me:

Mr. WEYL. If this point is important, we could get closer to the time period in this sense: Charles Kramer, I recall, came into the Government at a time when the unit was already set up. His name was then Charles Krivitsky. I am sure that there is a personnel record of the date on which he joined the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

I am not taking the trouble to check the personnel records. But I am taking the time to check Mr. Kramer's testimony in regard to charges made against him by Whittaker Chambers. In that he states that he joined the Agricultural Administration late in 1933. If that is true, and I see no reason why such testimony should not be true, then it would follow that the Ware unit was initiated in 1933 and not in 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. You estimated the point early in 1934, did you not?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And it is, instead, late 1933?

Mr. WEYL. That is all I have.

Mr. MORRIS. The second item, Senator Ferguson, was that he placed the date in his mind as early in 1934, whereas he has since had a chance to test the records and he finds it was late in 1933.

Senator FERGUSON. Instead of early 1934?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. WEYL. This is an inferential process from the Kramer entry into the Government which I was able to check after I left.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Is there anything else that you want to say?

Mr. WEYL. I have nothing further, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. And you have seen your testimony?

Mr. WEYL. I have, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it is correct and accurate?

Mr. WEYL. Well, there is possibly one detail. I think it is so minor that I am not sure it should be brought up here.

Senator FERGUSON. What is it?

Mr. WEYL. I notice that I stated that I had been a member of the executive committee of the National Student League. To the extent that there was a controlling body, I was a member of it. But I am not sure that it was formally an executive committee. My reason for having doubts at this time is that I note my 1943 testimony simply stated my function in the organization as associate editor of the Student Review, which was their national organ.

Senator FERGUSON. But on the controlling body, you were an active member?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Senator. I just am not entirely sure that this was very formally established as a controlling body. My recollection does not suffice in that point.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only explanation that you want to make on this record?



Mr. WEYL. That is all I have, Senator.  
Senator FERGUSON. All right.

**TESTIMONY OF SOL AUERBACH (JAMES S. ALLEN), LONG BEACH,  
N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID REIN, ESQ., WASHINGTON, D. C.**

Senator FERGUSON. You were sworn in an executive session today?  
Mr. AUERBACH. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And this is a continuation. The Chair recessed the executive session to an open hearing today at this hour. So you may proceed under oath.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your name?

Mr. AUERBACH. My pen name is James S. Allen. My real name is Sol Auerbach. My address is 134 West Hudson Street, Long Beach, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. AUERBACH. I am a writer.

Mr. MORRIS. For whom do you write?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will claim privilege under the fifth amendment on the grounds that an answer might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your education, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. Through college.

Mr. MORRIS. What college did you attend?

Mr. AUERBACH. The University of Pennsylvania.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, are you acquainted with the testimony before this committee to the effect that you were a representative of the Communist International and a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. AUERBACH. I must refrain from making any comment on that on the grounds of the privilege accorded me under the fifth amendment.

Mr. MORRIS. You understand, Mr. Auerbach, the question put to you was: Are you aware of the testimony before this committee to that effect?

Mr. AUERBACH. I am aware of the testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that testimony true and accurate?

Mr. AUERBACH. There I claim my privilege.

Senator FERGUSON. On that, you claim that could tend to incriminate you?

Mr. AUERBACH. Correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, have you been a contributor to Pacific Affairs?

Mr. AUERBACH. I have.

Mr. MORRIS. What articles have you contributed to Pacific Affairs?

Mr. AUERBACH. I contributed one article on the agrarian situation in the Philippines and another on the danger of Japanese aggression against the Philippines.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write an article called "The Negro in the United States"?

Mr. AUERBACH. Not an article, Mr. Morris. It was a book.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Was that book reviewed in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. AUERBACH. Not that I can remember.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not know whether Guy B. Johnson reviewed your book for Pacific Affairs?

Mr. AUERBACH. That I wouldn't know.

Mr. MORRIS. That was in March 1937, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. What was? The book?

Mr. MORRIS. The review.

Mr. AUERBACH. I wouldn't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, did you ever write a book for the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. AUERBACH. I never did.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any negotiation toward that end?

Mr. AUERBACH. I did negotiate.

Mr. MORRIS. And will you tell us what happened?

Mr. AUERBACH. I had asked the Institute of Pacific Relations to help finance a book on the Philippines, which would discuss the situation of the Philippines with regard to Japanese aggression in the Pacific, and that award was never granted by the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. With whom did you carry on negotiations?

Mr. AUERBACH. As I recollect, it was with Mr. Carter, principally. There may have been some correspondence with Mr. Field on that.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you negotiate with Mr. Lattimore in that connection?

Mr. AUERBACH. I don't believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever negotiate with Mr. Owen Lattimore about writing any article?

Mr. AUERBACH. I did, in connection with Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these volumes? Will you authenticate these letters?

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask permission, after proper authentication, to introduce these into the record.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed from 381 Fourth Avenue, room 1301.

Mr. MORRIS. What is that address?

Mr. AUERBACH. On that question, I claim my privilege under the fifth amendment.

Mr. MANDEL. It is addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, from James S. Allen.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that address of 381 Fourth Avenue, room 1301, the address of the International Publishers?

Mr. AUERBACH. I am afraid I would have to claim my privilege on that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. And refuse to answer on the grounds it would tend to incriminate you?

Mr. AUERBACH. Of possible self-incrimination.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know whose address it was?

Mr. AUERBACH. At what time?

Senator FERGUSON. On June 2, 1938.

Mr. AUERBACH. Obviously I know whose address it was.

Senator FERGUSON. And were you at that address at that time?

Mr. AUERBACH. There again I must claim my privilege.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do we have in our public record to date any evidence that the International Publishers is an open and notorious Communist publication? Mr. Mandel, have you that in the public record?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, we have.

Mr. MORRIS. It is in the public record?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I thought if we did not, Mr. Mandel would be directed to have something in there.

Mr. MANDEL. International Publishers has been cited by the Attorney General or the House committee, or both.

Senator FERGUSON. You state it now for the record?

Mr. MANDEL. I would like to check on it rather than trust my memory.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you state as to whether or not on June 2, 1938, the date of that letter, that it was the address of the International Publishers?

Put that in and then check up.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MANDEL. It reads as follows:

EXHIBIT No. 47

DEAR MR. CARTER: I am enclosing a copy of my letter to Mr. Field with regard to my proposed book on the Philippines. Please pardon the delay in replying to your note of May 28, since I have just returned to the city.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES S. ALLEN.

Another letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations is dated April 13, 1938, addressed to Mr. Frederick V. Field, from James S. Allen:

EXHIBIT No. 46

DEAR MR. FIELD: I am contemplating a small book on the Philippines, with chief emphasis upon the internal situation in the light of the problems of the Pacific area.

I have already done much preparatory work, and expect to round out my materials by additional observation and new data during another trip to the Islands. I will probably leave in July and spend 4 or 5 months there.

It has occurred to me that the Institute may be interested in the project, and may be willing to extend financial aid. Upon my return at the end of this year, I will have at hand the materials necessary for the writing of the book. But my problem will then be to assure myself 3 or 4 months of uninterrupted time for writing the book. I do not know the usual procedure of the Institute in such matters, but may I take the liberty of requesting an advance grant to enable me to complete the book for publication?

Should the institute be unwilling to make any commitments with regard to the sponsoring or publication of the book, another alternative seems possible. In the kind of general book which I am planning, it will be impossible to use the mass of data which I already have and which I will gather during my next trip. The institute may be interested in taking the materials for utilization in a Philippine handbook or other form. In this case, I could arrange for the publication of my book on its completion with a commercial publisher.

If it is possible to work out some basis of aid in advance, I could plan my trip and future plans accordingly. Should it be felt that some arrangement could be worked out, I would, of course, be glad to supply further details on the plan of the book.

I am ready to consider any other suggestion you may have in the matter.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES S. ALLEN.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that go into the record at this point?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received in the record.

(Letters referred to were exhibits Nos. 46 and 47, pp. 247 and 248, pt. 1, from the open hearing before this committee on August 2, 1951.)

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, Mr. Auerbach, that you did not complete negotiations with the institute at that time?

Mr. AUERBACH. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you admit you wrote this letter?

Mr. AUERBACH. Very likely, yes. I am certain I wrote that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter as a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is dated April 16, 1938. It is addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, from Frederick V. Field, and reads as follows:

EXHIBIT No. 453

DEAR MR. CARTER: Here are copies of an exchange of correspondence which I have had with James S. Allen which speaks for itself. You doubtless know of his work for he has contributed to both Pacific Affairs and Amerasia. The book he will turn out on the Philippines will, I know, give the best analysis of internal forces, economic, social and political within the islands which has yet been made available. I had a long talk with him when he returned from his first trip to the Philippines and know that he thinks along lines which you and I would both respect.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

The next is a letter addressed from care of Auerbach, 45-40 Forty-eighth Street, Woodside, Long Island, N. Y.; April 13, 1938; from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is a photostat of a letter from those files, addressed to Mr. Frederick V. Field, from James S. Allen.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write that letter?

Mr. AUERBACH. I suppose I did.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no reason to deny it?

Mr. AUERBACH. I have no reason to deny it. It is in line.

Senator FERGUSON. It was in line with your idea at that time?

Mr. AUERBACH. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive it.

(The first letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 453" and was read in full. The content of the second letter is the same as that of exhibit 46, p. 247, pt. 1.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, who financed your trip to the Philippines at that time?

Mr. AUERBACH. I must invoke my privilege under the fifth amendment on the grounds that to make a reply to that question might tend to be self-incriminating.

Mr. MORRIS. You did make a trip to the Philippines, did you not? Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you stay in the Philippines?

Mr. AUERBACH. All told probably about 7 or 8 months, or in that.

Mr. MORRIS. And what was the nature of your work in the Philippines?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will have to invoke the privilege of the fifth amendment on that, too, Mr. Morris.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you a member or were you at that time representing the international Communist movement?

Mr. AUERBACH. Again I will have to invoke my privilege on that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Frederick V. Field?

Mr. AUERBACH. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know whether or not he in any way represented the international Communist movement?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will have to invoke my privilege on that question, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not Mr. Field was ever a Communist?

Mr. AUERBACH. My reply would be the same.

Senator FERGUSON. That you claim the privilege under the Constitution. All right. The next question, please.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel wants to read something into the record.

Mr. MANDEL. I refer to exhibit No. 52, page 252, part I, placed into the record previously, it being a letter from the New York Telephone Co., dated May 15, 1951, addressed to Senator Pat McCarran, which reads as follows:

DEAR SIR: Your letter of May 9, 1951, in reference to a listing in the Manhattan Telephone Book for 1938 of the names International Publishers, Communist Party USA, or Communist Party of New York State has been referred to me for reply.

The 1938 edition of the Manhattan alphabetical directory, corrected to November 10, 1937, contained the following listings, among others: International Publishers Co., 381 Fourth Avenue, Murray Hill, 5-2864; Communist Party of the U. S. A., New York County Committee, 381 Fourth Avenue, Murray Hill 5-2462.

No listing appeared in the directory for a New York State Communist Party or a Communist Party of New York State.

The two listings published in the 1938 Manhattan alphabetical directory also appeared in the 1938-39 edition, corrected to May 12, 1938, and again in the 1939 issue, corrected to November 9, 1938.

If we can be of any further assistance to you or to your committee in this matter, please do not hesitate to call on us.

Sincerely yours,

L. J. JORDAN,  
*General Directory Manager.*

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please, for the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This has been previously used as exhibit No. 53, page 254, part I. It is a carbon copy taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated May 29, 1940, addressed to W. L. Holland from Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read the last paragraph of that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. The last paragraph reads as follows:

Last week we had a special meeting on Soviet Policy in the Pacific made up of some members of Corbett's group, but it was an ad hoc meeting. Those present were: Kathleen Barnes, Lockwood, Grajdanzev, Corbett, Muhle, Bisson, Moore, Field, James Allen, Bill Carter, E. C. Carter, and Owen Lattimore, and Leaning.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, can you recall attending the meeting described in that letter?

Mr. AUERBACH. Rather dimly, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us what happened at that meeting, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. I don't recollect it enough to be able to describe it in detail.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you cannot recall what transpired at that meeting, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. My testimony is that my recollection is rather dim about the meeting and I can't remember just what happened.

Mr. MORRIS. You do remember the meeting, though?

Mr. AUERBACH. I do dimly remember such meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember that all of those people mentioned in this letter were actually present at the meeting?

Mr. AUERBACH. I do not. I couldn't testify to that.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Edward C. Carter?

Mr. AUERBACH. I had met Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. And on how many occasions had you met Mr. Carter?

Mr. AUERBACH. Perhaps only at that meeting. I don't recollect any other occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions did you meet Mr. Field?

Mr. AUERBACH. That I wouldn't know.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say you wouldn't know, Mr. Auerbach, what do you mean?

Mr. AUERBACH. I mean I wouldn't recollect just how many times I had met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you estimate for the committee how many times you met Mr. Field?

Mr. AUERBACH. It would be a rather difficult thing to do.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would try, Mr. Auerbach.

Mr. Chairman, the witness is trying to recall how many times he met Mr. Field.

Mr. AUERBACH. I am afraid I couldn't say just how many times.

Senator FERGUSON. More than a dozen times?

Mr. AUERBACH. Perhaps not; no.

Senator FERGUSON. More than a half dozen times?

Mr. AUERBACH. Perhaps. Maybe that would be more or less about it.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be about the number.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, do you recall attending a meeting in honor of Sir Stafford Cripps?

Mr. AUERBACH. I do recall that; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you attend such a meeting?

Mr. AUERBACH. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Under what auspices was that meeting held?

Mr. AUERBACH. As I remember, it was held under the auspices of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter as a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original memorandum dated April 3, 1940, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Memorandum to ECC," presumably E. C. Carter, from FVF, presumably F. V. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the significant parts, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. It reads as follows:

It is very difficult to suggest changes in your dinner list for Sir Stafford Cripps on April 11. I should like to suggest for your consideration the following, not on your present list: Jaffe, Bisson, Rosinger (particularly if you invite Barnett), Luther Tucker, Harry Price, Corliss Lamont, and James Allen.

Mr. MORRIS. The next paragraph too, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

I don't know who could be eliminated from your present list because I do not know exactly what purposes you have in mind in including some of the people you have proposed. I am wondering if you would insure a more frank discussion if you eliminated all non-Americans, including, of course, representatives of the British Dominions. I suggest this with a good deal of hesitance because it eliminates some of the best people on your list. As far as the American Council is concerned, I question including Robert S. Lynd, but you may have some special reason for this. I also question Stefansson, Rose Rubin, and Rose Somerville whom I do not know.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you as a matter of fact attend the meeting referred to in this letter, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. I recall that I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us what happened at that meeting, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. As I remember, it was in the nature of an interview with Sir Stafford Cripps, where everyone present just fired questions at him and tried to get his opinion on various problems at that time confronting the world.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you throw questions at Sir Stafford Cripps at that time?

Mr. AUERBACH. I imagine I did.

Mr. MORRIS. You cannot recall, however, as a matter of fact, whether you did or not?

Mr. AUERBACH. I would say I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know on what basis Mr. Field was making up this list that was just read to you?

Mr. AUERBACH. I wouldn't have the slightest idea.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, is there anything in that letter that indicates the basis for sending out that list?

Mr. MANDEL. A postscript reads:

Because of the size of the room I can't invite all that you have proposed, but I have eliminated some from my list. My list was made up in part by suggestions from the American Russian Institute. I shall try to get Cripps for a small private all-American meeting if you wish it, but I cannot be certain of success.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the American Russian Institute?

Mr. AUERBACH. Only through the news and through some of the publications.

Mr. MORRIS. You have never attended meetings of the American Russian Institute?

Mr. AUERBACH. No; I never have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that last letter be received in evidence?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 454" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 454

APRIL 3, 1940.

Memorandum to ECC.  
From FVF.

It is very difficult to suggest changes in your dinner list for Sir Stafford Cripps on April 11. I should like to suggest for your consideration the following, not on your present list: Jaffe, Bisson, Rosinger (particularly if you invite Barnett), Luther Tucker, Harry Price, Corliss Lamont, and James Allen.

I don't know who could be eliminated from your present list because I do not know exactly what purposes you have in mind in including some of the people you have proposed. I am wondering if you would insure a more frank discussion if you eliminated all non-Americans, including, of course, representatives of the British Dominions. I suggest this with a good deal of hesitance because it eliminates some of the best people on your list. As far as the American Council is concerned, I question including Robert S. Lynd, but you may have some special reason for this. I also question Stefansson, Rose Rubin, and Rose Somerville whom I do not know.

If Mrs. Eliot Pratt comes, I hope you will let me sit next to her because I like to look at her and I think she is a very intelligent girl. Aside from that there isn't any particular reason why she should be included.

I am afraid that these comments are not very helpful, for any list of 20 people has to be pretty arbitrary, and you are the obvious person to exercise the authority.

FVF from ECC:

Because of the size of the room I can't invite all that you have proposed, but I have eliminated some from my list. My list was made up in part by suggestions from the American Russian Institute. I shall try to get Cripps for a small private all-American meeting if you wish it, but I cannot be certain of success.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, I am going to give you a compilation prepared by Mr. Mandel of what seems to be a list of your writings. Would you look at this and see if there are any inaccuracies on the list?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will have to claim privilege on that, Mr. Morris. Senator FERGUSON. Of the whole list?

Mr. AUERBACH. On the whole list.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean if there were typographical inaccuracies there you would decline to make the correction for us?

Mr. AUERBACH. I had not looked at it from that viewpoint.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you deny writing any of these matters?

Mr. AUERBACH. I would claim privilege on that, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in a case like this, we try to be as accurate in compiling a man's writings as possible. Mr. Mandel has carefully prepared that list. Before putting it into the record, we wanted to present it to Mr. Auerbach and see if that is an accurate list.

Senator FERGUSON. I see that. But he claims his privilege.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever work for International Publishers?

Mr. AUERBACH. I claim my privilege on that.

Mr. MORRIS. Have we anything to show that the International Publishers has been listed as a subversive organization by the Attorney General?

Mr. MANDEL. The International Publishers has been listed as the Communist Party publishing house, headed by Alexander Trachtenberg, and this citation was made by Attorney General Francis Biddle in 1942. Also, Mr. Biddle cited the International Publishing House as the "publishing agency of the Communist Party" in his brief of the case of William Schneiderman, a brief for the case of the United States against William Schneiderman, page 145.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have three or four letters here I think should be properly introduced into the record at this time, further showing the association of Mr. Auerbach, who is known as James A. Allen, and the Institute of Pacific Relations, some of which indicate that the officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations knew of Mr. Allen's Communist disposition at that time.

Will you receive them in the record, or should we go through them individually?

Senator FERGUSON. Are they identified, all of them? Mr. Mandel, are all these letters now identified as coming from the records of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 16, 1938, headed "WWL to ECC."

Senator FERGUSON. If you will just identify them, please.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there one passage in there that you have noted, Mr. Mandel?



Mr. MANDEL. The second is a photostat of a memorandum dated April 14, 1938, headed "WWL to ECC," marked "Philippine research."

In this letter is a paragraph on page 2 reading as follows:

Are you in touch with James Allen? I understand he is going to the islands in July to continue his investigation. His recent Pacific Affairs article on the agrarian question was most interesting and gave evidence of being a careful and scholarly piece of work. His earlier book on the Negro problem in the United States was praised by scholars as an excellent piece of research, even though his Communist ideology led him off into a proposal for "national self-determination" in the black belt which most people thought rather fantastic. Since the agrarian problem in the Philippines is obviously a key issue and since Allen has been short of funds, at least until recently, there may be some way in which the IPR can give him a useful boost. Chen Han-seng says that Allen's former hostility to Quezon has now been somewhat modified.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Auerbach, did you ever write a book on the Negro problem in the United States?

Mr. AUERBACH. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it propose national self-determination for the Negro?

Mr. AUERBACH. That was one of the points raised in the book.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that a communistic ideology?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will have to claim privilege on that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You claim privilege on that and refuse to answer on the grounds it would tend to incriminate you?

Mr. AUERBACH. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive these into the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 455 and 455A" and are as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 455

APRIL 16, 1938.

WWL to ECC:

In the accompanying memorandum I have attempted to advance the discussion of the American council's role in Philippine research beyond the point where the subject was left at our luncheon the other day. For the immediate future the conclusions are rather negative—you may think them unnecessarily so.

I wonder if this project is not one on which we might make a special appeal in certain quarters for new funds and thus put ourselves in a position to do a really effective piece of promotion.

WWL to ECC

APRIL 14, 1938.

#### PHILIPPINE RESEARCH

Our luncheon meeting still leaves rather vague what the American council should do both as regards the Secretariat inquiry and a long-term research program. Even if we follow up the suggestion and call a committee under Hayden, we should attempt meanwhile to clarify what we want done and might be in a position to do. It is unlikely that merely setting up a committee will carry us far unless we have a pretty good idea what we want and unless we are prepared to put a good deal of staff effort into pushing the thing along. I hope that Hayden will be here within a few weeks for a research committee meeting so that we can confer with him in person. Meanwhile, the situation looks to me about as follows:

#### SECRETARIAT INQUIRY

The bulk of the contribution to the Secretariat inquiry, as I understand it, is to come from the Philippine council, with what assistance the Secretariat and the American council may be able to give. The American council is to be primarily responsible, however, only for the specific American angle—the Philippines as a factor in our far eastern relations. Not only does this accord with IPR policy, but it recognizes the fact that with two possible exceptions, which I shall mention below, Americans in this country are hardly in a position to make any very useful contribution to the study of internal Philippine affairs

or of Philippines relations in the Far East. Just what the general program of the Philippine study should be is for someone else to say. Perhaps the possibilities can be divided into two categories: (1) Memoranda on the general aspects of the external problems of the Commonwealth, and (2) more thoroughgoing research into various domestic phases of Philippine economic and political life.

Under the first category come the general subjects of international trade and international political relationships during and after the change in the political status of the islands. From the Philippine angle this involves the problem of economic readjustment and of political security in the present and future. From the American, it involves primarily the Philippines as a factor in our policy in the Pacific. In this category the American council shares with the Philippine council the responsibility for documenting the Secretariat inquiry.

It hardly seems necessary, however, for the American council to plan any extensive effort along this line. Philippine-American trade relations have been abundantly documented by the United States Government and private investigators. The facts are known and the problem is largely the political one of negotiation. So, too, the political and strategic phases of American interests are not in need of extensive research, particularly in view of Hayden's forthcoming volume (about which I have written for more specific information). The naval angle will come in for consideration in our naval study. In addition, we contemplate a data paper on American far eastern policy for the next conference, and meanwhile the conferences now being held may turn up a good deal of analysis and opinion on the subject.

Accordingly, I see no reason to alter our original proposal—that the American council should now plan only for a memorandum (possibly a data paper for the next conference) analyzing the place of the Philippines in American policy and the American angle of the Philippine question itself. Even this should be somewhat conditional on Hayden's present work, and on the needs of the situation as it develops next fall. It may be that the most useful thing we could do would be to assemble a small group of people next winter to prepare a brief series of recommendations on Philippine policy, comparable to that issued under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Association 2 or 3 years ago. Possibly this report might be correlated with a parallel report undertaken and issued in the Philippines by a responsible group of Filipinos.

In the second category—that of Philippine research projects bearing on the secretariate inquiry—it is not clear to me that the American council should undertake anything at the present time. Little progress can be made in any important Philippine studies except by persons on the spot. I do not know whether the secretariat is sending someone to the islands or what relationship, if any, this person might have to the American council. Presumably this matter of research on internal political, economic and social affairs will be worked out between the Secretariat and the Philippine Council, although the American council would naturally do everything it could to assist.

Are you in touch with James Allen? I understand he is going to the islands in July to continue his investigation. His recent Pacific Affairs article on the agrarian question was most interesting and gave evidence of being a careful and scholarly piece of work. His earlier book on the Negro problem in the United States was praised by scholars as an excellent piece of research, even though his Communist ideology led him off into a proposal for "national self-determination" in the black belt which most people thought rather fantastic. Since the agrarian problem in the Philippines is obviously a key issue and since Allen has been short of funds, at least until recently, there may be some way in which the IPR can give him a useful boost. Chen Han-seng says that Allen's former hostility to Quezon has now been somewhat modified. Without knowing any more of the situation than this, I wonder if it would be desirable to investigate the possibility of hooking up Allen, Fred Howe, and others in such a way as to secure a thoroughgoing and rounded report on all phases of the agrarian problem. Perhaps this is altogether fanciful in view of personalities, etc., but in any case the sample of Allen's work is most promising.

With reference to your exchange of letters with Field on the subject of Miss Eleanor Dennison, which you passed along for comment—the subject of Philippine economic interest in the Far East deserves thoroughgoing study. The existing trade is relatively small, of course, and is a subject easily documented. The important question is rather the potentialities for the future. If the American trade tie is cut, the islands will be forced to reorient themselves in terms of far-eastern trade relations, and this means primarily but not exclusively trade with Japan. (A study of Hongkong trade, for example, shows that intra-

regional trade has developed rapidly in this area, even excluding the Japanese share.) Someone ought to make a close study of both the competitive and complementary relationships of Philippines products and potential products with those of adjacent countries on all sides. But this is a highly technical matter and hardly to be undertaken as a doctoral thesis by some American girl in California. Unless it is already being done in the Philippines under official auspices, I should think it would constitute one important phase of the secretariat inquiry in the islands.

#### LONG-RANGE RESEARCH PLANS

Before setting up any committees and inviting suggestions for a program, I wonder if we should not consider rather carefully what we are actually prepared to do. In general, the need seems to be for basic studies in the social sciences in the Philippines rather than for anything that can be done from secondary materials over here. Moreover, our program, as you have pointed out, should be the stimulation of interest among American scholars, largely lacking in the past, rather than carrying through some particular research project under American council auspices. Such a research-promotion campaign would presumably include a survey of these research needs, after the fashion of an SSRC committee, to be followed by a varied program including publicity for these needs, the coordination of research efforts, the provision of funds for travel and study in the islands, the encouragement of graduate study by Filipinos in the United States, the building up of library resources here and in the islands, etc.

There is only one objection to our launching such a program right away, but that is a practical one: Who is going to do it? We can get useful advice, suggestions, and contacts from a committee set up for the purpose, as proposed, but the actual execution of the program—the administrative responsibility—would fall upon us to a large extent and would be quite time consuming. There is little value in making the gesture unless we are prepared to follow it through. At present we are already rather far extended in our general program. It is questionable whether we should embark on any special effort along this line until some of our present responsibilities are liquidated.

It was this limitation of staff which was largely responsible for dropping the proposal discussed last summer for a Philippine-American council or committee. The plan which Lasker then proposed was a program to stimulate cultural relations in general with research as one of its important subdivisions. For a time it looked as though Veatch might be the man to carry out this research project, to serve as correspondent for the committee in the islands, and to carry a good deal of responsibility for organizing the thing at this end. When this scheme collapsed, owing to Veatch's decision to stay with the State Department, and when the war broke out, we went no further.

What we need is a staff person who would be our research person on the Philippines, thoroughly conversant with the subject, and who, in the remainder of his or her time, would be a Mortimer Graves in this field. It would be advantageous, although not essential, for this person to spend a period in the Philippines and return with a first-hand understanding of the situation. Until we see our way clear to some such arrangement, I am somewhat skeptical of the wisdom of making the initial splash and arousing expectations which we may not be in a position to fulfill. Is this taking a too negative view as far as the immediate possibilities are concerned?

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#### EXHIBIT No. 455A

#### WRITINGS OF JAMES S. ALLEN

The Communist, "A Magazine of the Theory and Practise of Marxism-Leninism published monthly by the Communist Party of the United States of America" (became Political Affairs in 1945):

"The Soviet Nations and Teheran," March 1944, pp. 206-216.

"The New Role of China," April 1942.

"Prologue to the Liberation of the Negro People," February 1933, p. 147.

"The Scottsboro Struggle," May 1933, p. 437.

"American Imperialism and the War," November 1939, pp. 1046-1053.

"The Crisis in Mexico," October 1940, pp. 907-915.

"The Farmers and the Struggle Against the War Program," July 1940, pp. 623-648.

"Farm Production for Defense," October 1941, pp. 910-916.

"The Far Eastern Front in the War Against the Axis," March 1942, pp. 143-162.

"The New Role of China," April 1942, pp. 238-249.

"Introduction to 'For the Fulfillment of the Rio Pledges: Resolution of the Central Committee, Communist Party of Argentina,'" May 1942, pp. 360-363.

"The Pacific Front in the Global War," December 1942, pp. 1012-1020.

"Some Lessons of the 'Fateful Decade,'" March 1943, pp. 258-265.

"We Can Win in '43," November 1943, pp. 680-687.

"Bretton Woods and World Security," December 1944, pp. 1078-1086.

"Prologue to the Liberation of the Negro People," February 1933, pp. 147-170.

"Sharecropping as a Remnant of Chattel Slavery," December 1934, pp. 1241-1253.

#### Political Affairs:

"The World Assembly at San Francisco," April 1945, pp. 291-301.

"The New Stage in the Far East," May 1945, pp. 441-447.

"'Enlightened' American Imperialism in the Philippines," June 1946, pp. 526-540.

"The Policy of Anti-Soviet Encirclement," October 1946, pp. 879-892.

"The Negro Question, A Discussion Article," November 1946, pp. 1046-1056.

"The Negro Question," December 1946, pp. 1132-1150.

"A Comment on State Capitalism and Socialism," May 1948, pp. 426-439.

"The New War Economy," December 1948, pp. 1055-1074.

"The Marshall Plan," July 1947, pp. 536-570.

"The Marshall Offensive for Imperializing the Ruhr," August 1947, pp. 739-750.

"German Policy of the Marshall Plan," September 1947, pp. 855-864.

#### Amerasia:

"Japan in the Philippines," April 1937, pp. 73-78.

"Democracy and Independence in the Philippines," March 1939, pp. 25-29.

New Masses, cited by Attorney General Francis Biddle as a "Communist Periodical," Congressional Record, September 24, 1942, p. 7688:

"Quezon and the Philippines," April 27, 1937.

Reviews "Civil War in USA," by Marx and Engels, International Publishers, December 14, 1937.

"Where We Stand with Russia," November 13, 1945.

#### Pacific Affairs:

"Agrarian Tendencies in the Philippines," March 1938, pp. 52-65.

"The Philippine Problem Enters a New Phase," June 1938, pp. 159-170.

#### Books:

"The Negro Question in the United States," International Publishers, New York, 1946.

"World Monopoly and Peace," International Publishers, 1946.

"The Negroes in a Soviet America," coauthor with James W. Ford, Workers Library Publishers, New York, June 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. And, Mr. Chairman, integrated into the record at this time should be exhibits Nos. 50, 51, and 52, which also relate to the same subject. They are in the record now, but they should be integrated into this hearing.

(See exhibits Nos. 50, 51, 52, pp. 251 and 252, pt. I, from the open hearings before this committee on August 2, 1951.)

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Morris, who is this memorandum by which states this? It is William Lockwood to E. C. Carter, and Carter at that time was the Secretary?

Mr. MORRIS. Secretary General.

Senator FERGUSON. Of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and in this he acknowledges the Communist ideology of the writer of the book, and the writer was James S. Allen, the present witness.

Mr. MORRIS. The letter so indicates, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any other evidence in there that they knew that Mr. Allen was a Communist? That letter clearly states or indicates that they knew he was a Communist.

Mr. MANDEL. That is all on that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have another letter to go into the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter addressed to Mr. James S. Allen, care of Auerbach, dated April 16, 1938, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, signed by Frederick V. Field, which I offer for the record. Attached thereto is another letter dated April 13, 1938, to Mr. Frederick V. Field from James S. Allen.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything notable that should be called to the attention of the chairman, in that letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I do not think so.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 456" and are as follows. For the letter of April 13, 1938, see exhibit No. 47, p. 248, pt. I, of the open hearing before this committee on August 2, 1951.)

EXHIBIT No. 456

SAN FRANCISCO, April 16, 1938.

Mr. JAMES S. ALLEN,  
% Auerbach, 45-40 Forty-eighth Street,  
Woodside, Long Island, N. Y.

DEAR MR. ALLEN: I wish I were in a position to send an encouraging reply to your letter of April 13 regarding the possibility that the American Council might be interested in financially sponsoring the completion of your book on the Philippines. I am obliged, however, to reply by informing you that we have no funds whatsoever to devote to this project and that I see little possibility of our being able to secure special funds during the course of the year.

I am, however, sending your letter to Mr. Edward Carter, Secretary General of the international body of the Institute, who may have something more constructive to suggest to you. It is also possible that when Mr. Holland, secretary of the International Research Committee, returns to this country early in June, I may find that he knows of some way of putting a few hundred dollars at your disposal. He is now in New Zealand and the difficulties of the mails for that distant region are such that there is no use in trying to get in touch with him until he reaches San Francisco six weeks hence.

Be assured that I shall keep this request in the back of my mind and shall inform you of any encouraging signs which I may use on the horizon. You need not argue the importance of your project for I know enough of your work to anticipate the important contribution your book will make. It is merely a question of figuring out how help can possibly be extended.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

f/g

copy to Mr. Carter

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, have you ever been the foreign editor of the Daily Worker?

Mr. AUERBACH. I must claim privilege on that, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, how many trips have you made abroad in your life?

Senator FERGUSON. Just one moment. I show you a little pamphlet here, World Cooperation and Post-War Prosperity, by James S. Allen. Did you write that?

Mr. AUERBACH. Yes; I wrote that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I call to your attention now on the second page about the author:

James S. Allen, the author of this pamphlet, is the foreign editor of the *Worker*, and a regular contributor to the magazine *Political Affairs*.

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will have to claim privilege there, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that that was circulated as part of that book?

Mr. AUERBACH. I knew the pamphlet was circulated, and everything in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Everything in it. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with New Century Publishers?

Mr. AUERBACH. How do you mean that, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of its existence?

Mr. AUERBACH. I know of its existence.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you worked for it?

Mr. AUERBACH. I must refuse to answer that on the grounds of privilege.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the New Century Publishers, Inc., of 832 Broadway, New York 3, N. Y., a Communist publisher?

Mr. AUERBACH. Again I must claim my privilege on that, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do we have a citation by the Attorney General of New Century Publishers?

Mr. MANDEL. We have none from the Attorney General, but I know from my research that it is the official Communist Party publisher.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have more letters here, but I think they should properly be reserved until some of the future witnesses come before this committee inasmuch as they bear on the other witnesses as well as Mr. Allen.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter as a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated March 9, 1938, headed "ECC from CH-S," presumably that standing for Chen han-seng. This letter refers to "excellent material" to be found in the work of James Allen.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you receive that into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 457" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 457

9TH MARCH, 1938.

ECC from CH—s:

To the two enquiries you made yesterday, I reply as follows:

I do not know specifically what Bill had in mind with regard to the Russian materials. However I am inclined to believe that it would not be Russian studies of Chinese and Japanese agrarian problems because such materials although appearing in Russian have been taken originally from Chinese and Japanese publications. As data materials, therefore, there is hardly any point in getting them through the Russian language. Even articles originally done by the Russians themselves, in such studies, are already available in Japanese and Chinese translations. The Japanese have been very quick, not only in translating Russian articles, but also in making full translations of materials such as those that I have used.

I think it most probable that Bill had in mind materials on Soviet agriculture, in order to show how collectivisation can and has been accomplished, particularly on the rice farms in Birobidjan and Primorskaya.

If you want to read some of the "devastating recent books on the American share croppers," such books as:

Rupert B. Vance, *Human Geography of the South, Human Factors in Cotton Culture*

Walter Wilson, *Forced Labor in the United States*

Charles S. Johnson, *Shadow of the Plantation*—

are of course indispensable general descriptions. There is other excellent material, such as the Department of Agriculture publications since 1916 and especially since 1933: statistical investigations by the University of North Carolina on two counties (Arthur Raper, a Preface to *Peasantry*, published 1936); theoretical studies as Marx and Engels' *The Civil War in the United States*, and Lenin's *Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States* (included in the volume *Lenin on America*); and more or less polemic literature like Allen's *The Negro Question in the United States* and Norman Thomas' *Human Exploitation in the United States*.

At this point I would like to say, however, that I think after going through the literature above mentioned it will be clear that the differences between the situation in the United States and China are so fundamental that in spite of the grievous conditions of the southern sharecroppers, they still represent two categories of agrarian economy. The United States Cotton Belt is in the main framework of a highly developed capitalistic society, whereas China is almost entirely embedded in a pre-capitalistic society. Let us ask, for instance, why is it not possible in China at present to have such agricultural export as financed by Wall Street for the South; and again why is it not possible to initiate such a large-scale relief administration as under the Roosevelt regime? Then it is also to be observed that there are different tendencies in the two countries: in the South there is a noticeable tendency among the sharecroppers to become wage earners on the farm, whereas in China the tendency is just the reverse, i. e., money wages are decreasing the reverting to wages in kind.

As for an international comparison of the grievous peasant conditions as an isolated phenomenon, would it not be better to choose such places as exist in Rumania, Hungary, or Brazil? I am not suggesting such a comparison, however, because the value and validity of such a comparison is still doubtful.

In reading through my file of letters from Bill, I notice that in one of them, dated February 12, he said, "I was talking about your manuscript with Dr. Alsberg the other day and raised the question of whether it would be politically wise to publish the book just at this time. He said he thought there was no objection to our going ahead."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a mimeographed sheet taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and it is a table of contents of Pacific Affairs for March 1938 showing James S. Allen as author of an article entitled "Agrarian Tendencies in the Philippines."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 458" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 458

#### PACIFIC AFFAIRS

March 1938

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The Changing Status of the Cabinet in Japan—Yashushi Sekiguchi.

China's Advance From Defeat to Strength—"Asiaticus."

The Strategy of the Sino-Japanese Conflict—Herbert Rosinski.

The Soviet Press and Japan's War on China—Harriet Moore.

Agrarian Tendencies in the Philippines—James S. Allen.

The Revolution in Chinese Legal Thought—M. H. van der Valk.

Reports on research:

No. III: A Large-Scale Investigation of China's Socio-Economic Structure—Karl August Wittfogel.

**Comment and correspondence:**

Footnote on "American Foreign Policy"—Sir Frederick Whyte.  
 Japan's War Hunger—Eliot Janeway.  
 Letter from W. E. Wheeler, with editor's reply.  
 Letter from Rammanohar Lohia.

**Book reviews:**

Red Star Over China, by Edgar Snow—Edward C. Carter.  
 First Act in China: The Story of the Sian Mutiny, by James M. Bertram—Chen Han-seng.  
 Problems of the Pacific, 1936: Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, edited by W. L. Holland and Kate Mitchell, assisted by Harriet Moore and R. Pyke-D. Mitrany.  
 China at Work: An Illustrated Record of the Primitive Industries of China's Masses, by Rudolph P. Hommel—T. T. Read.  
 Japan's Foreign Relations, 1542-1936, by Roy H. Akagi; and The Abrogation of the Gentlemen's Agreement, by Rodman W. Paul—Harold S. Quigley.  
 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; Symposium on Problems of Japanese Economics, July 1937 (in German)—Emil Lederer.  
 The Problem of Japan, by Capt. Malcolm D. Kennedy—Herbert Rosinski.  
 Prince Ito, by Kenju Hamada—Grace James.  
 Oasis Interdites: De Pekin au Cachemire, by Ella Maillart—O. L.  
 American Foreign Policy in Canadian Relations, by James Morton Callahan—Edgar McInnis.  
 Why We Went to War by Newton D. Baker—R. C. K. Ensor.  
 A History of the Modern and Contemporary Far East, by Paul H. Clyde—K. S. Latourette.  
 Raw Materials in Peace and War, by Eugene Staley—Wilfred Smith.  
 Limits of Land Settlement, prepared under the direction of Isaiah Bowman—P. M. Roxby.  
 The Private Manufacture of Armaments, vol. I, by Phillip Noel-Baker; and Armaments Year-Book, 1936, League of Nations—Russel E. Hall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write such a pamphlet?

Mr. AUERBACH. An article. Yes; I wrote that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, are you acquainted with a man named Chao-ting Chi?

Mr. AUERBACH. I did know him.

Mr. MORRIS. How well did you know Mr. Chi?

Mr. AUERBACH. It is a difficult question to answer.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently did you see Mr. Chi?

Mr. AUERBACH. That is difficult to say; several times.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you see him as many as 10 times?

Mr. AUERBACH. I would say not.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say not?

Mr. AUERBACH. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man named Chen Han-seng?

Mr. AUERBACH. Yes; I had met him.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions did you meet Chen Han-seng?

Mr. AUERBACH. On a few occasions; not many.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man named Y. Y. Hsu?

Mr. AUERBACH. I don't believe so.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you have never met Mr. Hsu?

Mr. AUERBACH. I don't recall meeting Mr. Hsu.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man who used the pen name of Asiaticus?

Mr. AUERBACH. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man named Hans Mueller?

Mr. AUERBACH. I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man named Shippe?

Mr. AUERBACH. No.



Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Dr. Chi or Mr. Chen Han-seng were members of the Communist Party?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will have to claim privilege on that.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Mr. Owen Lattimore was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. AUERBACH. I claim the privilege on that.

Senator FERGUSON. On the grounds that it might tend to incriminate you?

Mr. AUERBACH. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, I do not think you had completed answering the question that I had asked you before of your developing your trips abroad. When did you first go abroad?

Mr. AUERBACH. I first went abroad in 1927.

Mr. MORRIS. Under what auspices did you go abroad on that occasion?

Mr. AUERBACH. Under the auspices of a student organization, composed of a number of social problems clubs at the various university campuses.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you next go abroad?

Mr. AUERBACH. In 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you go on that occasion?

Mr. AUERBACH. To the Philippines.

Mr. MORRIS. What other countries?

Mr. AUERBACH. In passing, Japan, China, and coming back stopping at a number of European countries, but only in passing, in transit.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have a United States passport at that time?

Mr. AUERBACH. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Under what name was the passport issued?

Mr. AUERBACH. Under my own name—Sol Auerbach.

Mr. MORRIS. Who financed that particular trip, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will claim the privilege on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you try to get aid from the IPR for that trip?

Mr. AUERBACH. I tried to get aid from the IPR for a book.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you write that book?

Mr. AUERBACH. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they give you any aid?

Mr. AUERBACH. They did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ask them for any aid to make the trip to write the book?

Mr. AUERBACH. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, in order that you would write the book later?

Mr. AUERBACH. No. I suppose that it might have worked that way, if they had given me a grant on writing the book. It would have contributed to the expenses of the trip.

Mr. MORRIS. Actually, did you receive money while you were in the Philippines from the IPR for your articles?

Mr. AUERBACH. Not while—no, I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Money was not sent to you there?

Mr. AUERBACH. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the articles that you wrote about then or before help to finance your trip to the Philippines?

Mr. AUERBACH. It did.

Senator FERGUSON. So then really, the IPR did help to finance your trip to the Philippines.

Mr. AUERBACH. That is a pretty broad interpretation, isn't it, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you. Did it not do so?

Mr. AUERBACH. It was after—I wrote the articles after I returned from my trip to the Philippines, and whatever I received from them I received on my return.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the witness has testified that he did not receive the money while he was in the Philippines.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand. He got it after he came back. Did you borrow money and repay it out of the money you got from these articles?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will have to claim privilege there, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not the International Communist organization finance your trip to the Philippines?

Mr. AUERBACH. The privilege again.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you make a trip abroad, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. In 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Who financed that trip?

Mr. AUERBACH. I claim privilege there.

Mr. MORRIS. What countries did you visit at that time?

Mr. AUERBACH. The Philippines.

Mr. MORRIS. And what other countries?

Mr. AUERBACH. In transit, I suppose just Japan and China.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did that trip last, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. About 6 months.

Mr. MORRIS. Therefore, it ended in early 1939?

Mr. AUERBACH. I think it did. I think I returned at the beginning of 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. And then you stayed in the United States how long?

Mr. AUERBACH. Constantly, with the exception of a trip now and then to Mexico or Cuba.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you make your first trip to Mexico?

Mr. AUERBACH. I believe it was in 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Who financed that trip, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. The privilege again.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, how long did you stay in Mexico at that time?

Mr. AUERBACH. Perhaps as long as 2 months. I am not quite certain. I don't recollect the exact duration of my stay.

Mr. MORRIS. In all, how many trips have you made to Mexico?

Mr. AUERBACH. Perhaps three, two or three, maybe.

Mr. MORRIS. And who financed the second and third trips to Mexico, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. Again I must claim privilege on that.

Mr. MORRIS. What other trips have you made abroad, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. I made a trip to Cuba.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you make that trip to Cuba?

Mr. AUERBACH. Also about the same time, 1940 or 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. Who financed that trip?

Mr. AUERBACH. The privilege on that.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your last trip abroad?

Mr. AUERBACH. I believe that was it.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you applied since that time to make a trip abroad?

Mr. AUERBACH. I have not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you still have a United States passport?

Mr. AUERBACH. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not?

Mr. AUERBACH. No.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened to your passport?

Mr. AUERBACH. I think it was taken up by one of the inspectors at the Mexican border on one of my trips back. I had taken it along for identification purposes, and I think it was collected by the Department of State there.

Mr. MORRIS. Why was that, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. That you will have to ask them.

Senator FERGUSON. I think at this time the record should show that the "ECCI"—will you tell who that is?

Mr. MANDEL. That is the executive committee of the Communist Internationale.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

And its presidium has the right to send their representatives to the various sections of the Communist Internationale.

I will offer to put in the record, out of the bylaws and regulations, sections 21 and 22 (and is as follows):

[Source: A pamphlet published by Workers Library Publishers, New York, 1936]

PROGRAM OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL TOGETHER WITH ITS CONSTITUTION  
CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

\* \* \* III. The executive committee of the Communist International and its subsidiary bodies.

\* \* \* 21. The sections must carry out the instructions of the permanent bureaus of the ECCI. Sections may appeal against the instructions of the permanent bureaus to the ECCI or to its Presidium, but must continue to carry out such instructions pending the decision of the ECCI or of its Presidium.

22. The ECCI and its Presidium have the right to send their representatives to the various Sections of the Communist International. Such representatives receive their instructions from the ECCI or from its Presidium, and are responsible to them for their activities. \* \* \*

It seems clear from the evidence, at least the conclusion can be drawn, that the witness' refusing to answer who paid his way, and the other evidence in this case, would indicate that it was paid by the Internationale, and, therefore, it also indicates that there was some evidence of that known to the IPR, and that they had him write articles after he came back after being supported and sent there by the Communist Internationale.

I think that is a fair deduction from the testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. The testimony from two witnesses to date, Miss Hede Massing and Mr. Louis Budenz, has been to the effect that Mr. Auerbach, or Mr. Allen, was working for the Communist Internationale. In addition, Mr. Chairman, we have, if necessary, other witnesses to that same effect.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I say, up to the present date. That does not mean that the IPR cannot come in here and show what they know about it, I mean, the record as it now stands.

Mr. MORRIS. And we have asked Mr. Auerbach to come here and and we have given him an opportunity to deny these things. He has chosen to stand on his privilege.

Do you know, Mr. Auerbach, that you have been quoted as an authority by Mr. Andre Vishinsky who is the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, on September 18, 1947?

Mr. AUERBACH. I know I was quoted in one of his speeches. I don't know as an authority or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it an accurate quotation?

Mr. AUERBACH. I suppose the sense of it was. I will not vouch for every word.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did he make the quotation?

Mr. AUERBACH. As I recall, at the General Assembly meeting of the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union?

Mr. AUERBACH. No, I don't know him.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever met him?

Mr. AUERBACH. I have met him at a reception.

Mr. MORRIS. What reception was that, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. At a reception at the Soviet Embassy on their anniversary.

Senator FERGUSON. Here in Washington?

Mr. AUERBACH. Here in Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you frequently attend those celebrations?

Mr. AUERBACH. No, not frequently.

Mr. MORRIS. How many times have you been to them?

Mr. AUERBACH. Twice, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever discussed this quotation that he made with him?

Mr. AUERBACH. No, I never had that opportunity.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you give us a list of the Soviet officials that you have met? Let the record show that the witness is conferring with counsel. What is the answer?

Mr. AUERBACH. Well, I was conferring with the counsel in order to make my own mind clear on some points. I believe that I have met, at the reception, I have met innumerable representatives. I can't recall all the names.

Senator FERGUSON. Any outside of the formal reception?

Mr. AUERBACH. Not that I can recollect outside of the receptions themselves.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that include members of the International, the Communist International?

Mr. AUERBACH. That I wouldn't have any way of knowing, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know that?

Mr. AUERBACH. No.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, we were to have another witness here today. The other witness will be Ella Winter. We have received an official

report from the United States marshal in New York. According to the notation on the subpoena which was returned by the marshal, "is said to be vacationing in Europe."

But it says here:

After due and diligent search, I am unable to find the within-named Ella Winter within the eastern district of New York. Signed William A. Carroll, United States marshal, by James Griffin, deputy.

May that go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. That will be a part of the record.

(Subpena referred to is filed with the committee's files, and is for committee reference.)

Mr. MORRIS. And may the staff be instructed they no longer continue their efforts to subpoena Ella Winter to appear before this body?

Senator FERGUSON. Unless they get evidence that she is back in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. There is nothing else, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will recess subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., Thursday, February 21, 1952, subject to the call of the Chair.)

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